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Abstract 
This thesis will be concerned with articulating and defending a form of realist social 
theory entitled "emergentist Marxism". As such its principal objective is less to 
investigate or review the voluminous literature on "social realism" and more to show 
the ways in which Marxian social theory can be legitimately "constructed" as a 
specific "materialistic" application of ontological and methodological realism in the 
human sciences. The significance of this research is that it functions simultaneously as 
a contribution to the social science component of Roy Bhaskar's philosophical realism 
and as a Marxist commentary upon and perhaps intervention against it. The latter is 
less certain, however, because Bhaskar's depth realism appears to be consistent with 
the form of anti-reductive materialism defended here. 
"Realism" or "emergentism" refers to an ontological position denoting a stratified 
social world of irreducible levels, of which persons, practices and structures are the 
most fundamental, all of which are efficacious by virtue of the properties and powers 
which pertain to each of them. "Materialism" denotes the ontological position that the 
material structures of social systems vertically explain social and cultural structures 
without "explaining them away". Thus "emergentist Marxism" is an anti-reductive 
socio-historical ontological materialism and attendant dialectical realist method. 
Translated into practical social research, it is applied concretely here to the task of 
theorising the interface between the properties and powers which pertain to human 
agents and those which pertain to social structures in shaping the constitution and 
dynamics of social systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The task of this thesis is an ambitious one: to outline and defend a Marxist 
understanding of the relationship between human agency, social interaction and social 
structure in social systems. To these ends I have "reconstructed" Marx's socio- 
historical materialism as a radicalised form of realist or "emergentist" social theory: 
"emergentist Marxism". 
THEORY AND METHOD 
By "emergentism" I mean a philosophical ontology which specifies a stratified 
material world, comprised of irreducible levels (many of which are unobservables), 
extending from the most basic structures of inorganic matter to the higher strata of 
mind, self and society, each of which is defined as such by its possession of discrete 
autonomous causal properties and conditional effects, and each of which arises once a 
given complexity of interaction at an anterior or underlying level of organisation is 
reached. By social realism I mean an emergentist ontology of society, specifying a 
stratified social world, comprised of distinct levels of necessarily and internally 
related phenomena (of which "individuals", "interaction" and "structure" are the most 
basic), each of which is irreducible to the others "precisely because of the properties 
and powers which only belong to ... them and whose emergence 
from one another 
justifies their differentiation as strata at all. "' The methodological task of realist social 
theory is to investigate the dialectical interplay between these distinct "domains" of 
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the social world in shaping structural or systemic outcomes. "Emergentist Marxism" 
accepts this philosophical argument, and the practical analytical conclusions which 
are drawn from it. But this form of realist social theory is committed to defending the 
controversial but central claim of classical Marxism that specific forms of human 
agency (social labour and class struggle) and social structure (the forces and relations 
of production) have explanatory primacy in shaping the constitution and dynamics of 
social systems. 
My reason for constructing socio-historical materialism as realist social theory is 
a straightforward one. Only by doing so can the long-standing dilemma of 
voluntarism versus determinism, structure versus agency be resolved. An emergentist 
ontology of the social world, together with those "analytical logics" consistent with it, 
is a necessity for Marxist theory because it provides the researcher with an invaluable 
redoubt against the various reductive forms of contemporary social theory which have 
bedevilled attempts to grasp the nature of the individual-society or micro-macro 
connection. What such approaches have in common is a commitment to treating one 
or other of the constitutive strata of social reality (whether individuals, practices or 
structures) as alone providing the "master key" by which it should be analysed or 
explained. By contrast, emergentist Marxism is resolutely anti-reductive, by virtue of 
its advancement of a realist "stratified model" of reality. 
Now the advantages of endorsing emergentism and attendant methodological 
realism in social analysis are best demonstrated by considering in a little more detail 
the unhappy fate of those sociological approaches (namely holism, atomism and 
elisionism) which reject it. Consider, first of all, the competing claims of both sides of 
the long-standing debate between exponents of holism and individualism in t_ie _ 
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philosophy of social science. This has been kept alive to a large extent beyond its sell- 
by date by the fact that both sides have contributed something of value to sociology. 
From the atomist camp (or at least that part of it which rejects psychologism and 
biologism) has come the insight, in opposition to holism, that people are sui generis, 
that it is they not societies who make history, and that social interaction between 
individuals not "structural laws" or "system imperatives" are responsible for societal 
reproduction or elaboration. From the holist camp has come the insight, in opposition 
to atomism, that the interaction of human agents and much of their disposition-set is 
explainable in terms of the socio-cultural structures and "situations" within these 
structures into which they enter involuntarily at birth. 
Both kinds of perspective thus capture something of importance about the 
experience of people in society. Individualists (though not atomists generally) rightly 
emphasise the fact that people are "sovereign artificers", possessing powers of 
subjectivity and agency irreducible to the facts of their society's structural 
organisation and their biological constitution, and argue with equal veracity that 
society and culture are dependent for their existence and persistence upon the ideas 
and activity of people. Holists rightly emphasise the fact that individuals are inserted 
involuntarily into patterned and enduring social relationships which exist 
independently of their will, which shape their actions and consciousness in 
determinate ways, and which offer resistance even to concerted collective efforts to 
alter or transform them. 
Where atomism and holism go wrong, however, is in building up their respective 
partial insights into the nature of society into full-blown philosophical ontologies of 
social being. By doing so they each, in their own way, ride roughshod over the 
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"vexatious fact of society, "2 which is definable as such by its complex articulation of 
powers and properties pertaining to structures and individuals respectively. For 
atomists (including exponents of biological or psychological reductionism), the 
necessity and desirability of their ontology and methodology is given by the logical 
absurdity (as they see it) of attributing existential status to unobservable "societal 
facts" (i. e. socio-cultural structures) which nonetheless are dependent for their 
existence and development upon human beings, their dispositions and activities. The 
activity-dependence of structures is, for them, suggestive of an underlying identity 
between individuals and their "relational properties", the latter being merely an 
aggregation of the behaviours (derived from pre-social impulses) of the former. For 
holists, by contrast, the fact that atomists are not able to reduce social facts to facts 
about individuals (or human nature), is itself indicative of the need for social analysis 
to embrace an ontology and method which deals only with the relations between 
"holistic" entities and which infers sociological "laws" (e. g. of integration or 
adaptation) irreducible to individual beliefs, desires or dispositions on this basis. The 
necessity of socio-cultural entities to describe and explain the social behaviour and 
attitudes of individuals is, for them, proof of their independent and irreducible 
ontological status vis-ä-vis individuals, and of the methodological dispensability of 
reference to individuals and their activities in explaining social structure. 
For both parties, then, a dogmatic refusal to acknowledge the valid insights of the 
other side, and to assume their own insights must be exhaustive of social reality, has 
generated the pernicious long-term consequence of denying sociological analysis the 
theoretical tools to conceptualise the relationship between structure and interaction, 
human nature and social order. For it is only by abandoning the either-or polarity of 
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the atomism versus holism debate that the social analyst can begin to get to grips with 
the problem of theorising how structures can be dependent upon the activities and 
attitudes (or dispositions) of human beings and yet enjoy existential (and hence 
explanatory) autonomy from them. This has been (until recently) the outstanding 
unresolved theoretical problem of sociology. 
But how can this mutual wilful disregard by practitioners of atomism and holism 
of the insights and arguments of each other (which has discouraged for so long the 
articulation of an emergentist alternative to both) be explained? Undoubtedly an 
important explanation of why many social analysts have found themselves drawn to 
ontological atomism and methodological micro-reductionism is to be found in their 
acceptance of empiricist epistemology. For instance, atomists of a "subjectivist 
orientation" have managed to turn a blind eye to the explanatory autonomy and causal 
efficacy of structures by dismissing anything that is unobservable from social analysis 
(without noticing that the "personal dispositions" of individuals which they hold to be 
"ultimate" are also unobservable! ). By contrast, the ontological warranty of holism 
appears rather more ambiguous and uncertain than that which underwrites atomism, 
motivated as it has been by both empiricist assumptions (in the work of the 
functionalists) and their mirror-opposite (in the work of the structuralists). 
For the functionalists, adherence to sociological holism does not seem consistent 
with a genuinely scientific empiricism (given that all "social facts" other than those 
specifying small groups are not amendable to "sense data"). Doubtless it is this fact 
which explains Durkheim's resort to positivism, a move which allowed him to treat 
social facts as empirically specifiable things, operating in a law-like manner and 
manifesting observable regularities at the level of events. For the structuralists, 
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rejection of Humean causality, though entirely defensible, has inevitably underwritten 
forms of social theory which are emancipated from the disciplines of any kind of 
empirical checking and which function to assimilate the tangible to the intangible (the 
abolition of the subject and the postulation of an "indeterminate" human nature). Here 
holist ontology and method is defended by means of theoretical fiat: unobservable 
properties of society are asserted to be real, autonomous of people, and alone causally 
efficacious in explaining interaction, even where no empirical data can substantiate or 
otherwise suggest their existence. Thus, whereas for atomists the baneful shadow of 
empiricism has been the chief culprit in fostering an uncritical and unreflective refusal 
on their part to countenance the disconfirming arguments of collectivists, for holists 
opposition to individualism (where it has not itself been undermined by adherence to 
empiricism) has been justified in the name of an anti-empiricism which blinds itself to 
the fact that some empirical means of validating emergent entities is necessary and 
that tangible flesh-and-blood individuals are also causally efficacious and are hence 
irreducible to the unobservable structures they inhabit. 
The fundamental problem with holism, on the one hand, is that reference to 
individuals and their social interaction is indispensable to specifying what "societal 
entities" are and what they do. "Structures" and "systems of structures" are not self- 
regulating or self-determining, and they cannot be explained in abstraction from 
people, their powers and doings, since they depend for their existence and persistence 
on the activities and attitudes of individuals. The fundamental problem with atomism, 
on the other hand, is that reference to the existential reality and explanatory autonomy 
of structures is necessary to account for much of the "attitudes" and "actions" of 
individuals. Structures are real because they pre-exist the individuals who animate 
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them, and because they generate or define causal powers or conditional effects which 
are not explainable in terms of individual human organisms or subjects, their 
dispositions or interaction in the present tense. At the same time, however, structures 
are not explainable "in their own terms", and nor do they operate as hydraulic 
determinants of human agency and social interaction. They are, in fact, "emergent" 
from the activities and attitudes of previous generations of human beings. Yet the 
properties or powers they possess in their own right are not those specifying how 
individuals must think and act, but are rather those defining their "situational logics" 
(and their objective social interests) and the cultural resources which constrain and 
enable their thinking. 
Consider now the theoretical logic of the new "elisionary" sociologies (i. e. 
symbolic interactionism, social constructionism, structuration theory and post- 
structuralism). Practitioners of these all have claimed to offer a viable solution to the 
either-or polarities of structure or agency, macro or micro, system or subject (and 
related divides such as determinism-voluntarism, objectivism-subjectivism, etc. ) 
represented traditionally by both sides of the holism versus atomism dispute. But, 
whereas holism and atomism have opted for different sides of the dualism of structure 
and subject, the elisionary theorists have sought to deny the relevance of the old 
dispute, replacing it with theoretical perspectives which treat subjects and their social 
"environment" or "circumstances" as twin aspects of the duality of social interaction, 
cultural praxis or social or signifying practices. From this point of view, neither 
subject nor structure is the "basic constituent" of social reality, since both social 
organisation and self-identity emerge from the immersion of human beings in ongoing 
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social practices or processes of interaction, meaning that neither have any autonomy 
or efficacy apart from intersubjective relations. 
In embracing central conflation in theory and meso reduction in method, 
however, the elisionary sociologists have surrendered important insights of both the 
earlier approaches they have sought to synthesise or transcend - most notably 
individualism's emphasis on the irreducibility of the subject and holism's opposite 
stress on the irreducibility of structure and system, both of which are entirely 
respectable. That neither subjects nor structures of social relations can be reduced 
"without remainder" to social practices or interaction is indicated by the fact that 
explanation in terms of the latter always presupposes properties and powers pertaining 
to the former. 3 But this means that social analysis must proceed by examining the 
interface of at least three distinct levels of reality: subjects, interaction and structure. 
To put the matter economically: structure cannot be an aspect of current or ongoing 
social practices because interactants always find it "already made", the ineluctable 
environment of their conduct, meaning that social interaction modifies or replicates 
but never creates structure. 
The failings of holism, atomism and elisionism indicate the advantages to the 
theorist of endorsing sociological emergentism. For only a realist ontology, which 
specifies a stratified social world comprised of irreducible levels embodying "real" yet 
unobservable emergent entities, is capable of coming to grips with the dualistic nature 
of social reality, and hence of providing a plausible explanation of why statements 
pertaining to structure, interaction and subject are ineliminable from social description 
and explanation. Moreover only sociological emergentism can unravel the problem of 
empiricist sociology of specifying how structures can be different in kind from people 
9 
and their interaction yet dependent upon them. This is because structures are theorised 
by realists in a way which preserves their activity-dependence (and hence protects 
them against charges of reification) and which secures their real existential status vis- 
ä-vis individuals. On this view, structures are the unobservable resultants of the 
interaction of past generations of human agents which, though activity-dependent 
upon contemporary individuals in the sense that these can be reproduced or 
transformed only through the doings of the living, nonetheless confront flesh-and- 
blood people as an inherited social environment of independent powers and effects (of 
objective constraint, enablement and impulse). 
Now an acceptance of the necessity of an emergentist or realist social ontology 
immediately furnishes the sociologist with stringent guidelines as to which forms of 
explanatory methodology and modes of practical theorising are appropriate to the task 
of analysing society. I have suggested that the autonomy of structures from flesh-and- 
blood human agents and their social interaction is revealed by their pre-existence: 
every generation of individuals is born into an already functioning societal 
organisation which is constraining and enabling of its activity and ideas. This is in 
itself a practical demonstration of the factual separability of structure and interaction 
in social systems, since it is indicative that these two key strata of society are not co- 
existent in time. Because structure always predates the interactions which reproduce 
or elaborate it, and because interaction always predates the elaborated or reproduced 
structure which results from it (structural elaboration necessarily post-dating social 
interaction), it follows that the two cannot be identical and hence must be treated as 
analytically separable for purposes of social theorising. It is, in other words, the 
temporal disjunction between structure and interaction which evidences their 
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existential independence and which thereby justifies their analytical separability in 
social research. It follows from these observations that the methodological task of 
social analysis is to examine the manner in which the powers and properties which 
belong to the "people" of a society interact over time with the properties and powers 
which belong to the "parts" which compose its social structure). For any "inert" or 
"static" conception of society which neglects the temporal dimension must render 
either structure or individuals as epiphenomena of the other. 
Another way of making this argument is to point out that a realist ontology of 
society requires both "analytical dualism" and the "morphogenetic/static" theoretical 
approach. A useful specification of the warranty of methodological dualism in social 
research has recently been provided by Nicos Mouzelis: 
[T]he utility of the agency-institutional distinction is that it helps us to 
realise that for a full explanation of social stability or change one must look 
at social phenomena from both an institutional [i. e. structural] and an agency 
perspective. Parsons does not do this, with his emphasis on institutional 
compatibilities, but Marx does, with his emphasis on structural 
contradictions and social conflict.... The crucial point here is that although 
the system-social integration distinction ... 
is an analytic one, it refers to 
aspects of social reality that can vary in relatively independent fashion - 
given that growing institutional incompatibilities do not automatically 
generate social conflict or a certain type of strategic conduct. Situations can 
be envisaged in which, for example, specific institutional incompatibilities, 
on the level of agency, lead to revolutionary, reformist or "apathetic" 
conduct.... [This] makes it clear that the distinction between institutions and 
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actors (between system and social integration in Lockwood's formulation ... ) 
becomes useful when one allows for agents to react in a non-fixed, not 
predetermined manner to ... [structural] 
incompatibilities. That is to say, it 
becomes useful for asking questions about how actors perceive institutional 
incompatibilities (if at all), and what they do about them. Who, for instance, 
is aware of such incompatibilities and how? Who is trying to maintain, and 
who to transform them, and why? Such ... questions are absolutely 
indispensable for understanding how institutional analysis is related to an 
analysis in terms of strategic conduct, and they can be asked only if one 
introduces the concept of "dualism" at levels of "structure" and "system". 5 
The morphogenetic-static approach to social analysis is the practical application 
of methodological dualism in social analysis. Its warranty is a function of the 
necessity of social analysis to approach the study of the dialectical interface between 
structure and interaction in a way which allows the theorist to grasp the manner of 
their mutual interplay across time and space in the reconstitution and elaboration/ 
transformation of social systems. From this perspective, since structure always 
predates and preconditions the social interaction which replicates, modifies or 
transforms it, and since structural replication/elaboration/transformation always post- 
dates the activities which have given rise to it, it follows that social theory must 
conceptualise and study the dynamics of social systems accordingly. In practice this 
means endorsing a diachronic and sequential mode of analysis whereby structural 
conditioning (p1) is "present" in the social interaction of agents, in which structurally 
conditioned social interaction (p2) then gives rise to an elaborated or reproduced 
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structure (p3), which in turn preconditions subsequent interaction (p1), hence marking 
the start of a new morphogenetic/static cycle of societal dynamics. 
Thus, grasped concretely from this realist perspective, structural contradictions 
and compatibilities (conceived as emergent entities constraining and facilitating 
action) operate to distribute differential life-chances, vested interests and causal 
powers to differently situated collectivities of agents and institutional functions, and 
by doing so exert a directional pressure upon agents to act in ways which protect or 
further their interests. These are the antecedent conditions for social malintegration 
(i. e., inter-agential antagonisms and conflicts), and these correspond to the first phase 
of the morphogenetic cycle. The actuality and outcome of social malintegration (p2 
and p3 respectively) is then subsequently resolved either in terms of system 
replication or elaboration or in terms of system transformation, depending crucially on 
the success or otherwise of agential groupings in articulating their common interests 
in stability or change and mobilising their structural and institutional capacities (of 
organisation, political leadership, ideology, etc. ) towards the realisation of these ends. 
Realism and morphogenesis thus provide the sociologist with the analytical tools to 
reconcile the "structuralist" and "activist" dimensions of sociological thought within a 
unitary theoretical research programme. For the first time coherent philosophical and 
methodological grounds can be given to justify Percy Cohen's famous assertion that 
in all sociological inquiry it is assumed that some features of social structure 
and culture are strategically important and enduring and that they provide 
limitations within which particular social situations can occur. On this 
assumption the action approach can help explain the nature of the situations 
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and how they affect conduct. It does not explain the social structure and 
culture as such, except by lending itself to a developmental inquiry which 
must start from some previous point at which structural and cultural 
elements are treated as given. 
This realist method and social ontology informs and enters into all of the 
explanatory hypotheses advanced in the forthcoming analysis. But why should a 
realist theory of the social world be reconstructed or redefined as "emergentist 
Marxism"? Or to put it more bluntly: why does realism need materialism? My point 
of departure from philosophical realism is that only by grasping social realism as a 
kind of anti-reductive materialism can two unacceptable theoretical-methodological 
positions in the social sciences be avoided. The first of these is a residual idealism, 
which can be justified on the grounds that "cultural elements" because irreducible are 
autonomous of social and material structures. The second is "pluralism", or what 
Althusser once (rightly) dismissed as a "theory of factors". One major conceptual 
difficulty with the latter approach is that it sanctions an understanding of society 
which disassembles it into autonomous institutional spheres or "modes of social 
power" and in doing so abstracts away from its relational nature. Little wonder that 
practitioners of "multi-factoral" social theory (notably postmodernists and neo- 
Weberians) often find themselves denying the reality of social systems. A second 
major conceptual difficulty of pluralist social theory is that it cannot support an 
understanding of societal change as development or evolution, which I consider to sit 
uneasily with the historical facts of the matter. Instead history has to be grasped as 
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just-so empirical narrative, which in practice reduces it to Weber's "chaotic 
flux" or "meaningless multiplicity". 
Emergentist Marxism offers a solution to these problems. Firstly the "ideal 
elements" of society are explainable in terms of material structures which are 
"basic" to them, yet are not "explained away" by them, or denied emergent 
powers in their own right. They remain real and efficacious apart from their 
"causes" or "conditions". Secondly the idea of "system" is preserved, because 
structures of social relations constitute a "unity-in-difference" by virtue of their 
common locus or basis in relations of production and class power. Finally so 
too is the "problem of history" (i. e. that it evidently is not a directionless flow 
of events) offered a solution of sorts. For the "dominance" of the mode of 
production in shaping societal dynamics allows one to account for 
"directionality" in history, by virtue of its unique generative powers in enabling 
and stimulating overall social development, and its "tendency to assert its own 
movement as necessary", even against obstruction from the "non-economic" 
structures and practices of social systems. 
STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
These are the central arguments of the present undertaking. I have organised 
the work as follows. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter. Its purpose is to 
investigate the relationship between philosophical realism and emergentist 
Marxism, and to investigate the ways in which Marxism is a "materialism" and 
what kind of materialism it is. I am also concerned here with defending the 
core explanatory concepts of Marx's philosophy and social theory (prior 
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to their more substantial treatment in later chapters), showing their compatibility with 
ontological and methodological realism, yet showing also the ways in which they can 
be legitimately said to enrich or deepen the realist approach. 
Chapter 2 addresses the "microfoundations" of social systems: individuals as the 
bearers of organismic and subjective properties and powers. Here I am concerned with 
theorising the relationship between "species-being" and "social being". My argument 
is that specifying the relative autonomy of the subjectivist and organismic properties 
of human agents from socio-cultural conditioning is indispensable to any adequate 
explanation of societal organisation and societal change. 
Chapter 3 addresses the "interaction order" which rests upon and is emergent 
from the organismic and subjectivist strata of individuals. My objective here is to 
obtain a purchase on the question of the relationship between the "macroscopic" 
(structural) and microscopic (psycho-organic) properties or levels which are 
constitutive of social systems. My argument is that "interaction" is the mechanism of 
system elaboration or statics, as this is forged in the interface between structural and 
organismic conditioning (human needs mediated by vested social interests). 
Finally chapter 4 is concerned with theorising the structural properties of social 
systems. Its primary aim is to show how a realist "stratified model" of society can 
sustain a Marxian understanding of "structural causality" (the vertical determination 
of superstructure by structure) which does not "de-centre" human agency or collapse 
into economic reductionism. My argument is twofold. Firstly that structural 
conditioning operates on agents by defining the situations they confront, the vested 
interests attached to situations, and the costs or benefits which follow from the neglect 
or pursuit of these vested interests determined by "situational logics", this explaining 
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the "regularities" of social interaction which reproduce and elaborate social systems. 
Secondly that the "situational logics" and vested social interests determined by class 
positions within social relations have explanatory primacy in explaining the socio- 
political consciousness and agency of interactants (because these are decisive in 
determining the access of agents to material and cultural goods), this accounting for 
why superstructural forms have a tendency to "correspond" with relations of 
production and systems of class power. 
This, I conclude, leaves us with as much of Marx's social theory as is reasonable 
to hope for: a defensible materialist account of the constitution and dynamics of social 
systems. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CRITICAL REALISM AND 
EMERGENTI ST MARXI SM 
1.1: THE TASKS OF MARXISM IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
In the introduction of the current undertaking I have briefly set out the case for a 
realist (or emergentist) ontology of the social world and those theoretical and 
methodological perspectives which are consistent with it. This has been accomplished 
by presenting the conceptual and methodological defects of the more influential 
misadventures in social theory of recent years (i. e. individualism, holism and 
elisionism in their various guises), and by showing how analytical models rooted in 
sociological emergentism overcome these. So it is that individualism fetishises the 
subject by placing him or her prior to the ensemble of social relations which are 
necessary to explain his or her thinking and conduct (e. g. Weber's attempt to grasp 
social institutions in accordance with his typology of the value-orientations and ends 
of social action). So it is that holism reifies social relations by endowing these with 
powers of reason, intentionality and agency by virtue of which individuals are mere 
"bearers" of their teleological or functional "needs" (e. g. Parsons' "system 
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imperatives" of adaptation, pattern- maintenance, goal attainment and integration). 
And so it is that elisionism de-centres both the social-structural and organismic- 
subjective properties of society - by treating these as "two sides of the same coin" of 
social practices or routinised interaction - and in so doing locates the "overplastic 
self' in a world devoid of objective material constraints (e. g. Blumer's and Giddens' 
collapse of subject, society and nature into intersubjective relations). Thus the burden 
of my critique so far has been to demonstrate that reductive-conflationary social 
theory in all its forms is inadequate because an abstraction from the multi-layered 
complexity of social reality and from the irreducibility and causal efficacy of its 
constitutive emergent strata. 
In contrast to these "simplifying manoeuvres", which seek to render social 
analysis less daunting by squeezing its object into a unidimensional space, the task of 
sociological emergentism is to grasp society as a "differentiated totality", as the 
resultant of a plurality of generative mechanisms operative at different levels of the 
social and natural worlds. This implies a definite form of theory and method. 
Structural analysis will not alone suffice because structural properties are reproduced 
and elaborated only by virtue of social interaction and these systemic outcomes are by 
no means determined in advance of interaction. The problematic of "interaction" or 
"praxis" will not do either because the doings of agents are precisely "routinised" or 
"structured" in various ways by virtue of the existence of an objective social world 
which from the point of view of every generation of people is "already made". Nor 
can social theory make its appeal to subjects as its "ultimate constituents", for 
although the individual is "author" of his or her social behaviour, he or she is also 
forged in the space between physical, biological and social reality, and in this sense is 
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the product of "a rich totality of many determinations and relations. "' It is this "Janus- 
faced" nature of human-social reality which necessitates a methodological-theoretical 
approach which neither dissolves its hierarchically structured complexity nor simply 
reproduces a "chaotic conception of the whole"2 in thought. For this reason I have 
argued that methodological dualism (the analytic abstraction of structure from 
interaction and the analysis of the reciprocal effectivity of these strata over time in 
shaping systemic outcomes) and morphogenetic theorising (the activation or 
contextualisation of analytical dualism within a diachronic cyclical model of society 
whereby anterior structural properties condition social interactions which in turn give 
rise to structural elaboration or reproduction) provides the sociologist with 
indispensable tools for the practical business of "doing" research. 
Yet realist social science is not fully adequate to the task its practitioners have set 
for it of providing the theoretical and methodological tools for grasping the interface 
between the different strata which comprise the subject-matter of the human and 
social sciences. This is because scientific realism can only benefit from the 
incorporation of dialectical methodology into its analytical framework, in the absence 
of which it is necessarily incomplete or partial. Methodological realism investigates 
the "real object" as follows. First by moving from the concrete to the abstract (through 
finer and finer conceptual abstractions), proceeding in this way until its constituent 
elements or relations (which generate its manifold causal powers and empirical 
effects) are identified and delineated. Then by retracing its steps until the "chaotic 
whole" (concrete reality) is reconstructed in thought as a systematically ordered 
totality which distinguishes between its essential and inessential aspects and between 
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its contingent and necessary relations with other objects. Andrew Sayer summarises 
the approach as follows: 
As a concrete entity, a particular person, institution or whatever combines 
influences and properties from a wide range of sources, each of which (e. g. 
physique, personality, intelligence, attitudes, etc. ) might be isolated in 
thought by means of abstraction, as a first step towards conceptualising their 
combined effect. In other words, the understanding of concrete events or 
objects involves a double movement: concrete -) abstract, abstract -) 
concrete. At the outset our concepts of concrete objects are likely to be 
superficial or chaotic. In order to understand them we must first abstract 
them systematically. When each of the abstracted aspects has been examined 
it is possible to combine the abstractions so as to form concepts which grasp 
the concreteness of their objects. 3 
This is basically Marx's method in Capital. Marx's purpose here is to outline "a 
hierarchy of theoretical models, ascending by successive approximation from very 
abstract models representing the basic social forms present in modem bourgeois 
society up to fuller, more detailed models of this society. "4 Such an analytical 
approach is necessary for two reasons. Firstly because "concrete objects" (and the 
structures which comprise them) are often unobservables, Secondly because the 
empirical world (which is directly amendable to the senses) is the chaotic resultant of 
a plurality of generative mechanisms derived from various underlying structures, 
together with the multiple contingencies of their functioning in the open social 
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system, and hence is a poor guide to the determinate causal powers of any of these 
structures. 
Now this method is already dialectical in the sense that it does not seek to 
decompose its objects of knowledge (unobservable structures or systems of structures) 
into "a chaotic collection of fragments ... or a mere aggregate of unconnected 
happenings"5 but instead attempts to grasp these as wholes of interconnected parts. 
"The true is the whole", 6 as Hegel put it, and the whole can be grasped only by means 
of an analysis of the dynamic interplay of its parts, just as the parts can be understood 
only by examining their interplay with the whole, not least because the powers and 
characteristics of both are modified or even transformed by the interaction between 
them. This method is also dialectical in the sense that it attempts to grasp objects or 
structures by differentiating between those elements or relations which define their 
essence and those which are simply contingent or phenomenal aspects of their 
organisation or functioning. Wholes have to be grasped as organic totalities, as Marx 
and Hegel both insisted, since this allows us to understand dynamic processes in terms 
of internally generated development. For example, it does not make any sense to 
define "value" in abstraction from the relations between "many capitals" and between 
employers and wage-labourers. The law of value can exist only by virtue of the 
internal and necessary social relations of commodity production, which in its turn 
gives rise to a specific pattern of economic motion (the boom-slump cycle, organic 
crisis, concentration-centralisation of production, etc. ). 
Finally methodological realism is dialectical because its mode of operation is 
based foursquare upon "a dialectic between concept and fact"7 operative at each level 
of scientific inquiry. This is for the simple reason that the concepts which are applied 
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to each aspect of a "unity-in-difference" (the natural and social worlds) cannot be 
ahistorical givens or the product of a universal method but must "be carefully 
scrutinised and grounded in the particular subject matter under investigation", 8 as the 
understanding of this is developed through the ongoing process of practical scientific 
activity and the theoretical abstractions and methodological innovations which are 
derived from it. In other words, scientific realists, in common with Marx, recognise 
that science is "a dialectical process in the sense that its methods and concepts, as well 
as its theories, develop over time in dynamic interaction with one another and with the 
material world, allowing progressively more accurate descriptions of reality to 
emerge. "9 For example, the "various concepts of physics - such as mass, velocity and 
energy ... did not arise automatically from experience, but were developed by a long 
and complex process of abstraction, and the same holds true for the very different 
concepts employed in cell biology or in meteorology or in any other area of 
science. " 10 
Nonetheless there is one important way in which realist methodology neglects 
dialectics, and is the poorer for it. I refer to the failure of many contemporary 
scientific realists to acknowledge explicitly that dialectical thinking is necessary to 
scientific inquiry for the simple reason that the nature of reality demands it. Marx 
argues that dialectical thinking "includes in its comprehension and affirmative 
recognition of the existing state of affairs, at the same time also, the recognition of the 
negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historical 
developed ... form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes 
into account its transient 
nature not less than its momentary existence. "" The basis for this view is Marx's 
understanding, in common with Hegel, that objects or systems are often contradictory 
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in themselves, invariably exist in relations of tension as well as compatibility with 
other objects or systems, and that it is this fact which makes historical change a 
possibility, whether in nature or society. 12 As Hegel himself puts it, "contradiction is 
at the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a 
contradiction that anything moves. , 13 The reason for this is simply that all processes 
of internal change or development to which structures or objects are subject are 
necessarily and simultaneously processes of self-cancellation and self-affirmation. 14 
This means that in order to understand the nature of concrete objects, one cannot 
simply examine the whole, nor its separate parts, but must instead study "the process 
of development through which the parts come to constitute the whole and, in doing so, 
become different than they were in their pre-existing form. "' 
A dialectical method is therefore appropriate in scientific research because reality 
is dialectical. 16 The basic idea is that if thought objects are to correspond to real 
objects which are dialectical they too must have a dialectical structure. Such a view is 
not in the least bit difficult to fathom and is entirely defensible. Consider the 
alternative. If reality is not dialectical there can be no impulse towards change in 
either nature or society; without contradictions as well as complementarities built into 
the structures of reality there can only be cyclical processes of simple reproduction or 
repetition at work in the world, not processes of molecular development interspersed 
by novel transformations. Thus a non-dialectical world-view and method of cognition 
reduces the world to a dead collection of facts, devoid of life or movement; and it is 
this which is the basis of empiricist and theological views of unchanging "things-in- 
themselves" as constitutive of the universe. Yet the proof of the necessity of a 
dialectical approach is precisely to be found in the historical development of scientific 
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inquiry itself. For it can hardly be doubted that empirical science has uncovered "a 
world of dynamic, interconnected processes - processes which frequently involve 
elements which not only interact but are in conflict with one another, and thus give the 
system to which they belong an inherent tendency to develop", and leading over time 
"to sudden radical changes in the system as a whole. "17 To admit of this however is to 
do no more than concede Engels' basic argument: "Nature is the proof of dialectics, 
and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished the proof with very rich 
materials, daily increasing. "18 
By way of demonstration of the efficacy of dialectical method I will consider a 
single example: the question of the appropriate analytical and theoretical tools for 
conducting sociological research. I have suggested that methodological dualism and 
morphogenetic theorising are indispensable for this purpose. This is true enough as far 
as it goes. But it does not go far enough. The basic morphogenetic model (of: 
structural conditioning -* social interaction -> structural elaboration/reproduction) is 
non-propositional as to why social systems "as a rule" undergo continual change, even 
if the change is for the most part merely quantitative. Nor does it provide any overall 
guidance as to why social systems are sometimes transformed into different kinds of 
social systems with novel properties. This becomes a merely empirical question, 
contingent upon the precise characteristics of any given structure at any given point in 
time. Yet a voluminous output of historical research since the last war has revealed 
that specific kinds of structural mechanisms (specifically the interface between forces 
and relations of production and between social classes) have been deeply implicated 
in every major epochal transformation of social relations since the demise of the 
earliest pre-class communities. 
19 Any collapse of social analysis into the immediate 
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process by which specific structural properties enter into and are reproduced or 
elaborated in a given society is likely to lose sight of this elementary process. 
In order to address issues such as these it is necessary to grasp processes of 
societal change (whether molecular or macroscopic) as being animated by 
contradictions internal and necessary to social systems as preliminary to the empirical 
investigation of specific historical episodes or events. Dialectical thinking draws our 
attention to the fact that ongoing and thoroughgoing systemic change is a function of 
structural contradictions, which it is then the task of social analysis to identify and 
investigate. As John Rees puts it: "A dialectical approach seeks to find the cause of 
change within the system. And if the explanation of change lies within the system, it 
cannot be conceived on the model of linear cause and effect, because this will simply 
reproduce the problem we are trying to solve. If change is internally generated, it must 
be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of 
the system itself. Contradiction is, therefore, the form of explanation of how one type 
of ... society succeeds another.... [But] it is only the form of an explanation, because 
the explanation itself will depend on the concrete, empirical conditions that obtain in 
each society. The exact contradictions and working out of these contradictions will 
vary accordingly. "20 By contrast, in the absence of a dialectical approach to structural 
dynamics, an account of social change can only be a theory of external causality (such 
as Parsons' understanding of "structural differentiation" as an adaptive strategy 
animated by extraneous "disturbances" to the stable equilibrium of societies) or else 
simple "just so" narrative (which in effect collapses historical explanation into 
historical description). 
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A second ambiguity of the morphogenetic-static approach to socio-historical 
analysis is that, in insensitive hands, it can lend legitimacy to the peculiar idea that 
societies are static "moments" or "points" (of structural conditioning and structural 
elaboration/reproduction) interspersed by "processes" of social interaction leading 
from one to the other. But this is simply not dynamic enough, even as methodology. 
For what is lost in this construction is the simple point that even at p1 and p3 (the 
"moments" of structural conditioning and structural remodelling) the structures are 
themselves fluid rather than static (as for instance any physical object is undergoing 
"incessant molecular changes"21 from one moment to the next). By this I mean that 
both the antecedent societal "conditions" of interaction and its "resultants" are in the 
moment of their becoming already being reshaped by interactants and that this 
reshaping is unavoidable and continuous. Thus even where the outcome of structurally 
conditioned social interaction is structural replication, this replicated structure is never 
identical to that which went before. On the contrary, the replicated structure is in this 
case a "dynamic equilibrium", in the sense that it is the outcome of a series of 
quantitative changes which have not yet brought about a qualitative effect. Dialectical 
logic, with its emphasis on movement and change as fundamental to the mode of 
existence of all things, is well-equipped to avoid the fallacy of "misplaced 
concreteness" which has tended to characterise macroscopic sociological theorising of 
all hues. 
Enough said about method. Let us now consider the adequacy of realism as 
ontology. Is "depth realism"22 by itself sufficient to "underlabour" the human 
sciences? Not without conceptual modification, or so I would contend. This is for the 
simple reason that "realism" as such is non-commital in relation to the fundamental 
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question of which strata of reality are basic to or emergent from which (and this 
applies as much to the stratification of nature as to that of society). Instead this 
becomes a matter for individuals to decide on other grounds - specifically on the basis 
of whether they are materialists or idealists or have conceived some kind of uneasy or 
unstable compromise between these unmixables23 After all, it can scarcely be 
doubted that many philosophers, social theorists and even natural scientists who 
would endorse a strong realist view of the world (as enmattered, independent of 
human consciousness, differentiated, even stratified), might as easily insist that the 
universe is the product of a spiritual "first cause" than claim that it is nothing but 
cause and consequence of the law-governed interactive movement of matter through 
ascending levels of complexity of organisation. Indeed, it is far from uncommon for 
working scientists to accept that, say, physical structures explain chemical structures, 
or that that biological structures explain psychological structures, or whatever, and yet 
still make their appeal to some kind of cosmic supersubject (i. e. God) to furnish the 
"basic constituents" of nature and the laws governing their interaction from which 
more complex strata are emergent over time. 24 In this case, of course, the theorist or 
analyst remains a materialist in his or her science but an idealist in his or her 
philosophy. 
This "conventionalist stratagem" is a case of what Engels once described as 
"shamefaced materialism". For it is the practical refutation of idealism during the 
history of scientific advance and investigation (in the sense that God has been shown 
to be superfluous to a rational and empirically testable knowledge of natural processes 
or laws) which has forced its allegiants to make their appeal to a "final instance" of 
undetermined creation beyond current knowledge and therefore outside the reach of 
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rational criticism. 25 Now one should always be suspicious of "final instances" which 
base their authority not on firm scientific knowledge (albeit provisional and 
incomplete) but on its uncertainty or even absence. The possibility that physical 
scientists may never develop a satisfactory theory of the "origins" of the universe 
should not be allowed to give comfort to those idealists whose own belief in a 
spiritualist "first cause" of nature is entirely speculative and intuitive. But it is 
important to be clear that the realist emphasis on stratification and emergence and the 
externality of the world to the knowing subject provides no redoubt against this kind 
of manoeuvre. For it is "equally possible" that materialist or idealist philosophy be 
either emergentist or conflationist in terms of ontology, either reductive or anti- 
reductive in terms of methodology. Indeed, it is undoubtedly the case that a failure to 
recognise this elementary fact has more-often-than-not led philosophers and social 
theorists headlong into the disastrous error of postulating the Cartesian mind-body 
dualism as an alternative to the competing claims of each. 
The above exposition shows that the dispute between realist social theory 
(sociological emergentism) and the various modes of conflationary social theorising is 
quite distinct from and no less vital than that older debate which trades under the label 
of materialism versus idealism. This is despite the fact that the conflict between 
holism and atomism is often treated as closely related to that between idealism and 
materialism, and despite the fact that elisionism is often erroneously portrayed as 
"transcending" the terms of the latter as well as the former. 26 But idealist ontologies of 
society can be either atomistic or holistic, either voluntarist or determinist, either 
subjectivist or objectivist (so long as the "objectivism" in question is understood as 
something other than human intersubjectivity - the Mind of God, etc. - which 
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confronts human beings as an external and hence objective power) Materialist theories 
of society, by contrast, can never be subjectivist or voluntarist. However they can be 
either atomistic or holistic. And in insensitive hands they are always reductive and 
mechanical. 
Comtean and Durkheimian perspectives, for instance, are undoubtedly holistic in 
as much as both regard "society" or "social facts" as the basic unit of sociological 
analysis. Yet these approaches are also idealist (though neither voluntarist or 
subjectivist) in so far as they postulate social ideas (Comte) or cultural norms and 
values (Durkheim) as the building blocks of social structure and as the locomotive of 
societal development. Biologistic, behaviourist and "orthodox" Marxist approaches, 
on the other hand, are obviously materialist accounts of society, although the former 
are as atomistic as the latter are (normally) holistic. The same indeterminate 
relationship holds true between the philosophical claims of idealism and materialism 
and most forms of social theory anchored in an elisionary ontology. Few would doubt 
that the theoretical traditions of symbolic interactionism, social phenomenology, 
social constructionism and post-structuralism, to offer a random sample, are species of 
sociological idealism. Such approaches are idealist because they treat "real objects" 
(cultural and social structures) as products of thought or discourse, as "unknowable in 
themselves", and hence as indistinguishable from the nebulous realm of "general 
meanings". Yet they are obviously radically anti-individualist and anti-holist in as 
much as they both reduce human subjects to social selves (forged in social interaction) 
and "bracket" or otherwise "decentre" overall systems of structural social relations. 
The debate between idealism and materialism is, strictly speaking, less "internal" 
to sociology than that which has taken place between rival forms of conflationary 
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theorising. It has arisen, not so much from ontological and methodological problems 
which have emerged within the discipline, but rather as a kind of by-product of the 
broader ideological collision and subsequent accommodation between religion and 
science (or between theology and secular rationalist philosophy) which characterised 
the 17th century Enlightenment and its aftermath. The respective ontological claims of 
idealism and materialism in philosophy are well enough known to require little 
detailed treatment here. Idealism regards "matter" as either produced by or dependent 
upon "mind" or "consciousness" or (less radically) postulates the mutual existential 
independence of the immaterial and the material. Materialism asserts precisely the 
opposite state of affairs - namely the reducibility of mind to matter, or at the very 
least, the existential dependence of the former upon the latter. 
Ultimately all idealist philosophy, irrespective of self-conceptions to the contrary, 
is dependent upon a theological view of the universe. As we have seen, the claim that 
the material world is the product of ideas, or that the immaterial and the material are 
autonomous factors of existence, has to discover the origins of the universe in an 
initial act of "undetermined" creation, in a "final cause" traceable to an incorporeal 
being. In other words, for idealism to be philosophically respectable, "matter" has to 
be either reducible to mind or "emergent" from it and not vice versa. Materialist 
philosophy, by contrast, because it insists that mind is reducible to or emergent from 
matter, cannot but avoid being resolutely atheistic (which is not to say that all 
materialists are consistent on this basic point! ). 7 Thus materialism as philosophical 
ontology is to a large extent defined by its denial of such entities as the metaphysical 
Cartesian "mind stuff', spirits, angels, deities or assorted other phantoms, and by its 
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insistence that "mind" or "consciousness", and the products of consciousness, are 
necessarily embodied or enmattered. 
Translated into the subject-matter of sociology and social anthropology, of 
course, the concepts of idealism and materialism have inevitably become considerably 
modified, albeit in ways shaped or influenced by the conceptual presuppositions of 
their "parent" philosophical outlooks. Idealism in the social sciences, for instance, is 
not about furnishing an ontological justification of the existential reduction of matter 
to mind, or the lesser view that the material universe is "real" but nonetheless 
presupposes a conscious "law-giver" (stronger and weaker versions of objective 
idealism). Nor is such an approach concerned with arguing the philosophical case for 
treating "things-in-themselves" as mind-dependent in the sense that material objects 
have form and content forced upon them arbitrarily by human consciousness (or 
language) and are hence "unknowable" and inefficacious until constructed as 
meaningful objects of cognition (subjective idealism). Rather the purpose of social 
idealism is to seek out the explanation (or interpretation) of society and social change 
in terms of the products of human consciousness or language. But this is a focus 
which nonetheless always has a certain affinity with the broader philosophical 
assumptions of ontological idealism in one or other of its guises, and it can scarcely 
be doubted that most social idealists have been motivated to embark upon their 
theoretical and other work in the light of these ontological presuppositions. 28 
The same basic point applies to materialism in the human sciences. Social 
materialism, like social idealism, is not concerned with justifying its own ontological 
grounds (this is the task of philosophical materialism), but is instead concerned with 
articulating a theory of society and social process which offers a causal explanation of 
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the contents of human thinking and of the products of social interaction in terms of 
material structures immediately relevant to the human life-process. The crux of the 
debate between idealism and materialism in the social sciences thus centres on the 
question of whether it is "ideal elements" (i. e. the attitudes, norms, values, beliefs, etc. 
of individuals or communities of individuals) or "material elements" (i. e. the 
structures of the sensuous environment, human biology or "species-being", and socio- 
economic relations) which should rightly enjoy explanatory primacy in social 
analysis. This is obviously a quite separate matter to those concerns which are dealt 
with under the terms of the atomism-holism-elisionism debate. 
Now it seems to me uncontentious that sociology and social anthropology have 
for the most part been influenced far more profoundly and directly by philosophical 
idealism than its opposite, notwithstanding notable exceptions to the contrary. 
Whereas most sociologists of a "reductive-conflationary" theoretical orientation have 
been divided on the question of whether to endorse atomist, holist or elisionist social 
ontologies, nearly all have tended towards idealism in one form or another. For 
example, it is a commonplace that Max Weber's social theory and method 
recommends that the explanation of "social facts" has to be sought in the subjective 
ends and values of individuals, and modes of society are accordingly held to be 
defined and organised on the basis of the typical value-orientations and goals which 
motivate their characteristic patterns of social action. The same is true of the 
"objectivist" sociologies of Durkheim and Parsons. These too recommend the analysis 
of social systems in terms of their characteristic "collective sentiments" or "central 
value-systems", albeit "sentiments" or "values" conceived holistically as those 
corresponding to the "needs" or "functional imperatives" of society. 
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Nor is this the end of the story. I have pointed out that most of the elisionary 
perspectives have been quite explicitly idealist. And even those versions of the 
approach (e. g. Giddens' structuration theory) which have claimed to be searching for 
a balance between the two (structures as "rules and resources") have in practice 
veered towards idealism (i. e. by rendering resources "virtual" rather than "real" until 
instantiated by conscious human agency and as having no determinate impact upon 
agents until translated into praxis). But perhaps the one great exception to this general 
picture (aside from Marxian philosophy and social theory) is to be found in that 
(highly ambiguous and not consistently followed) aspect of Weber's substantive 
historical work which embarks upon a "pluralist" or "multi-factoral" analysis of social 
structure and social change? There is an element of truth to this. But Weber's 
substantive conceptual-analytical pluralism is never reconciled with his philosophical 
and methodological writings and furthermore appears to move away from the "either- 
or" polarities of voluntarist idealism versus vulgar materialism only at the heavy cost 
of endorsing the opposite fallacy. I refer, of course, to his autonomisation or 
fragmentation of the social system into its individual elements (culture, economy, 
polity etc. ), and the analysis of these elements (and sub-elements which compose 
them) in their own terms, in abstraction from the social relations which constitute 
them. 
No doubt a major reason why academics (sociologists included) have tended to 
endorse an implicit taken-for-granted idealism is explainable in terms of the 
peculiarity of their institutional role as agents of "knowledge production" or as 
"bearers of discourse" in capitalist society. After all, who would doubt that those who 
spend their working lives dealing with abstract problems in theory, assessing the 
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validity of concepts by means of other concepts, do tend to overstate the efficacy of 
ideas or language in constructing reality. As Andrew Collier sardonically remarks, 
"academics, at least in the arts, are mainly engaged in meta-discourse - that is, talking 
about talking - and do not, in their professional capacity, interact much with extra- 
linguistic realities. They are therefore prone to non-realism about such things. " 29 
Professional intellectuals also naturally tend to overestimate their own role as the 
purveyor of socially efficacious ideas: elitism and idealism are natural bedfellows in 
the ivory towers of academe. A second important explanation of the dominance of 
idealism in philosophy and sociology, aside from the "religious yearnings" of many 
intellectuals or academics, refers us simultaneously to the popularity (in a lesser key) 
of the most crude forms of reductive-conflationary materialism elsewhere in the 
human sciences (e. g. behaviourism and socio-biology). It has always been a 
characteristic of the human sciences to oscillate between the wildest forms of idealism 
(especially in philosophy and sociology) on the one hand and the most vulgar and 
deterministic modes of materialism on the other (e. g. in human biology and 
psychology). 
Once again, this intellectual polarisation is comprehensible, I would contend, in 
terms of the dual experience of people in society of being simultaneously free yet 
unfree, especially in as much as this experience is shaped by class relations and class 
ideology. On the one hand, the "laws of capital" appear, in the eyes of the elite, to 
reduce the propertyless to the status of mere "things" (whether hands or stomachs) 
shaped by outside pressures. Thus the members of the proletariat, in common with all 
material things, appear to the rich and powerful as mere use-values who are swept 
along by historical forces beyond their control. This is the social basis of reductive 
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materialist outlooks in the lower-order human sciences, then transmitted to the non- 
social world. On the other hand, the self-perception of the members of the bourgeoisie 
is not at all conducive to vulgar materialism, since their class location allows not only 
a diminution of punishing social constraints and a widening of social horizons, but 
also the capacity of individuals to function as "macro actors" who are capable of 
shaping the lives of millions through their decisions. This is the social basis of 
voluntarist-idealist outlooks in sociology and philosophy. 
It was out of this dual reality of class society that the classical compromise to the 
dichotomies of voluntarist idealism and mechanical materialism was forged: namely 
Cartesian dualism. This rigid abstraction of "mind" and "self' from the law-governed 
world of biological and physical nature allowed human beings to be treated as 
machine-organisms governed by the "natural laws" of biological and economic 
necessity for six days a week and then gifted the powers of reflection, intentionality 
and "soul" in time for "moral education" on the Sunday! On top of this, Cartesian 
(and later Kantian) dualism sanctioned or lent legitimacy to the mutual alienation of 
the physical and human sciences, served to polarise the social sciences between 
"material" and "cultural" specialisms, and furnished philosophical justification for the 
subsequent development of a tradition of run-of-the-mill pluralist or "multi-factoral" 
sociological theory which has been with us ever since. 
The classical example of pluralist sociology (though in this case it is far from 
"run-of-the-mill"), i. e. Weber's historical and comparative work into the origins and 
trajectory of modernity, is of course rooted foursquare in this abstract materialism- 
idealism dualism first made respectable by Descartes (and developed subsequently by 
Kant). Weber's claim that social structures are composed at root of "ideal elements" 
36 
and "material elements" (the basis of his abstraction of "society" from "economy"), 
which are autonomous or self-governing properties of the social world, was obviously 
an attempt to reconcile the "warring gods" of neo-Kantian and Nietzschean idealism 
with the atomistic materialism of "marginalist" political economy within the social 
sciences. Thus Weber recommends, firstly, that social structures be analytically de- 
composed into distinct "spheres" (the realfaktoren of economic and political 
institutions or forms of social action on the one hand and the idealfaktoren of cultural 
institutions or practices on the other), and, secondly, that social explanation proceed 
on the assumption that the "autonomous" spheres operate in the long run as equivalent 
causal "factors" of macroscopic historical change. Now my own reasons for rejecting 
Weber's analytical pluralism (and the social ontology in which it is rooted) will 
become apparent from some of the arguments to be elaborated in this chapter. For 
now it is important to note only that pluralist sociology is rooted in a compromise 
between the claims of subjective idealism (with its emphasis on the independent 
power of human consciousness to "order" or "construct" an essentially formless 
world) and reductive materialism (with its emphasis on the objective determination of 
human consciousness by biological and environmental facts). That is, in its treatment 
of "ideal factors" and "material factors" as autonomous yet mutually efficacious 
factors of society and history. 
To recap. In the introduction I have sought to define the "problem of sociology" 
as one of developing appropriate conceptual and methodological tools for describing 
and analysing a multi-faceted "object" of knowledge - society. The purpose of my 
exposition here so far has been to show that the same is true of social theory more 
generally - though the "object" in question here is the interface between the human- 
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social and natural worlds. The failure of social philosophers and sociologists to deal 
adequately with their objects of knowledge (as stratified totalities comprised of 
internal and necessary relations of "unity-in-difference") has generated two central 
weaknesses of philosophy and social theory: the fallacy of reductive-conflationary 
social analysis, and the unresolved debate between materialism and idealism (and 
pluralist or "dualist" compromises between the two) in the human sciences. I have 
argued that sociological emergentism and attendant methodological dualism offer a 
solution to the first of these difficulties. The objective of this chapter is to indicate a 
solution to the second difficulty. Thus I propose here to reconstruct sociological 
emergentism as Marxist social theory rooted in a broader anti-reductive materialist 
philosophy of nature. My purpose in doing so is to offer a practical alternative to the 
ontological and analytical positions of idealism and dualism, which I hold to be no 
more acceptable than those of holism, atomism or elisionism. 
To these ends I will organise the work on the basis of an exposition and defence 
of two kinds of materialism - ontological (or philosophical) and analytical-explanatory 
(i. e. anthropological and sociological) - which I hold to be consistent with one 
another. 30 This will entail the following procedure. First I will defend the ontological 
position of transcendental realism, which will be shown to offer a persuasive 
alternative to reductionism. Then I will show how transcendental realism is 
enormously enriched by engaging with Engels' natural-philosophie (otherwise known 
as "dialectical materialism'). 1 My contention here is that the core concepts of realist 
ontology (i. e. "stratification" and "emergence") have their precursors in dialectical 
materialism, and that the former will benefit from the incorporation of the latter's 
emphasis on dialectical motion in governing the formation of each of the "emergent" 
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levels (and attendant generative mechanisms) which comprise natural and social 
reality. Thus a fusion of depth realism and Engels' philosophy of nature not only 
preserves the "rational kernel" of materialism in the human sciences - namely that 
"mind" is always embodied and necessarily anchored in "matter" (and never vice 
versa) - but also supports a dynamic understanding of system dynamics in nature more 
generally whereby the motion of matter through ascending forms of complexity is 
governed by processes of dialectical interaction internal and specific to its different 
levels of organisation. 
Next the product of this "synthesis" between depth realism and dialectical 
materialism at the level of the social sciences (namely a social ontology I shall dub 
critical materialism), will be shown to support an account of society and social 
process which is both anti-reductive in method and non-conflationary in theoretical 
practice. Critical materialism is grasped as the human and social science component 
of emergentist materialism, and is therefore treated as a radicalised form of critical 
naturalism (i. e. the specific application of materialism to the study of human beings 
and human society). 
2 Just as emergentist materialism overcomes the ambiguities of 
philosophical realism (which fudges the question of whether matter is "basic" to mind 
or vice versa and hence leaves open the possibility of a world populated by 
disembodied entities and of an immaterial "first cause" of the universe), so critical 
materialism is precisely a social ontology which grasps the "ideal elements" and other 
"superstructural properties" of social systems as emergent from and anchored in 
underlying material structures (the forces and relations of production and "deeper 
structures" immediately "basic" to these). This critical materialism is, as I have 
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suggested beforehand, consistent with two distinct but compatible methodologies 
(dialectical logic and analytical dualism). 
Thus "emergentist Marxism" is a radicalised version of the realist social theory 
outlined in the introduction. Its point of departure from "orthodox" sociological 
emergentism is its acknowledgement that the socio-cultural emergents which predate 
social interaction, and which condition it in specific ways, are hierarchically 
structured in terms of their explanatory function in determining social systems and 
their developmental dynamics and possibilities. From this perspective, socio- 
economic emergents (and those "substructural" levels they presuppose) vertically 
explain other social and cultural emergents as well as exercising a disproportionate 
weight in the horizontal conditioning of social interaction and its structural 
resultants. 3 In this way, critical materialism, as a particular form of emergentist 
sociology and social anthropology, not only avoids the fallacy of reductive- 
conflationary social theorising, but does so without risking any kind of "realist" or 
"dualist" compromise with idealism, and without collapsing social analysis into the 
historical indeterminacy which flows naturally from a pluralist (i. e. empiricist) 
"theory of factors". 
1.2: PHILOSOPHICAL ONTOLOGY AND SCIENCE: DEPTH REALISM 
AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 
Roy Bhaskar defines "transcendental realism" as a "tradition" in the philosophy of 
science which regards 
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the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that generate 
phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity of science. 
These objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs 
imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure 
and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the 
conditions which allow us access to them. Against empiricism, the objects of 
knowledge are structures, not events; against idealism, they are intransitive 
[i. e. existing independently of consciousness or human activity].... On this 
conception, a constant conjunction of events is no more a necessary than it is 
a sufficient condition for the assumption of the operation of a causal law. 
According to this view, both knowledge and the world are structured, both 
are differentiated and changing; the latter exists independently of the former 
(though not our knowledge of this fact); and experiences and the things and 
causal laws to which it affords us access are normally out of phase with one 
another. On this view, science is not an epiphenomenon of nature, nor is 
nature a product of man. 34 
An important function of Bhaskar's philosophy of science is to establish the case 
for endorsing a "depth model" of reality in opposition to the claims of classical 
empiricism (the view that only "impressions" or "sense data" can be said to comprise 
the "real") and "empirical realism" or "actualism" (the view that the "real" is 
comprised of both "impressions" and "events", the former being experiences of the 
latter). This is achieved by drawing upon transcendental arguments. By this method, 
Bhaskar has little difficulty disposing of the pretensions of classical empiricism: 
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The intelligibility of sense-perception presupposes the intransitivity of the 
objects perceived. For it is in the independent occurrence or existence of 
such objects that the meaning of `perception', and the epistemic significance 
of perception, lies. Among such objects are events, which thus must be 
categorically independent of experiences.... If changing experience of objects 
is to be possible, objects must have a distinct being in time and space from 
the experiences of which they are the objects. For Kepler to see the rim of 
the earth drop away, while Tycho Brahe watches the sun rise, we must 
suppose that there is something that they both see (in different ways). 
Similarly when modem sailors refer to what ancient mariners called a sea 
serpent as a school of porpoises, we must suppose that there is something 
which they are describing in different ways. The intelligibility of scientific 
change (and criticism) and scientific education thus presupposes the 
ontological independence of the objects of experience from the objects of 
which they are the experience.... Events then are categorically independent of 
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Bhaskar thus establishes that the basic problem with an ontology (such as that of 
classical empiricism) which reduces reality to sense impressions is that it leaves the 
"experiences" which compose sense-data unexplained. This approach also rides 
roughshod over the obvious fact that not all events are the subject of experience. For 
these reasons most empiricists are prepared to endorse actualism. Actualists introduce 
a second level or dimension into their explanatory models. This is, of course, the level 
of "events", which experiences are about, and which may often occur unexperienced, 
but whose reality can nonetheless be established by observing their empirical effects 
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(i. e. the "happenings" which are caused by other "happenings"). Now whereas 
Bhaskar's transcendental argument disposes of the warranty of classical empiricism 
(in its Berkeleian and Humean forms), by demonstrating that "experience" 
presupposes the intransitivity of the object world, it is not by itself sufficient to refute 
actualism. In order to achieve this purpose Bhaskar has to be able to show that the 
objects of science are not only intransitive but also structured. In other words, if depth 
realism is to be defensible, Bhaskar has to find some means of demonstrating that 
real-world events are comprehensible in terms of underlying structures and attendant 
generative mechanisms and not simply in terms of "other events". 
To these ends Bhaskar introduces another transcendental argument. "It is not 
necessary that science exists. But given that it does, it is necessary that the world is a 
certain way ... [G]iven that science does or could occur, the world must be a certain 
way. Thus ... that the world 
is structured and differentiated can be established by 
philosophical argument. "36 Bhaskar goes about this task by considering the question 
of what the actuality of experimental science tells us about the nature of its objects. 
"The intelligibility of experimental activity presupposes not just the intransitivity but 
the structured character of the objects investigated under experimental conditions. 07 
Bhaskar points out that the practice of experimental science involves setting up an 
"artificial closure" under laboratory conditions in order to establish the existence of 
those real structures responsible for the causal mechanisms which account for 
observable events. By means of experimental closure, the scientist "triggers" or 
"activates" a "single kind of mechanism or process in relative isolation, free from the 
interfering flux of the open world, so as to observe its detailed workings or record its 
characteristic mode of effect and/or test some hypothesis about them. "38 In this way 
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the scientist identifies the specificity of causal mechanisms pertaining to particular 
structures and the kinds of events or effects which (in closed systems) must 
necessarily follow from their activation. 
But if causal laws are simply "constant conjunctures"39 between events in the 
realm of the actual (which they must be if underlying mechanisms do not explain 
events), this kind of painstaking scientific endeavour must be both pointless and 
impossible. Pointless because one does not need experimental closure to observe 
sequences of events at the level of the actual, since closure would already exist in this 
unidimensional world, of which "constant conjunctures" would be the inevitable 
expression. Pointless because "experimental activity can only be given a satisfactory 
rationale if the causal law it enables us to identify is held to prevail outside the 
contexts under which the sequence of events is generated", this suggesting "there 
must be an ontological distinction"40 between causal laws and sequences of events. 41 
Pointless because if experimental science is simply about engineering events so as to 
bring about other events, it must be a process which "constructs" causal laws, not one 
which discovers pre-existing laws (by activating them in isolation from other 
variables), and is thus scientifically uninteresting. 2 (Indeed, in this sense rather 
absurd also, for in the absence of this distinction between causal laws and patterns of 
events, how do we avoid interpreting certain chance happenings, for example those 
which might disrupt a particular scientific experiment, as anything other than a 
contravention of certain of nature's laws? ). Impossible because one can establish a 
closed system by means of scientific procedure (in which a generative mechanism, the 
events it governs, and the observation of these processes by a knowing subject are 
brought into correspondence) only on the assumption that nature is an open system, 
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comprised of a plurality of causal mechanisms, each of which can be rationally 
apprehended only by means of experimental closure 43 
Bhaskar's transcendental realism therefore provides a philosophical rationale for 
holding to a conception of reality as "ontological depth". But does his approach allow 
us to take the further step of grasping nature as stratified.? My belief is that it does 
succeed in doing this, though it is not the only acceptable way of doing so, or even 
necessarily the best. 44 Bhaskar bases his argument for the stratification of nature on 
the explanatory logic of scientific inquiry itself as this has unfolded historically. He 
makes the legitimate point that science proceeds by uncovering specific generative 
mechanisms before then going on to seek out a causal explanation of these 
mechanisms in terms of others which are necessarily more "basic" or "fundamental" 
(such as the explanation of psychological mechanisms in terms of biological 
mechanisms, 45 or of chemical mechanisms in terms of physical mechanisms). Now 
one important feature of this process of scientific work is that, having established a 
"tree" of sciences, each relating to real aspects of the world, it has been unable to 
establish the redundancy of the higher in favour of the lower. For example, despite the 
best efforts of many generations of practising philosophers of social science to argue 
the case for treating the "real objects" of sociology (i. e. social structures and attendant 
generative mechanisms) as epiphenomena of the "real objects" of cognitive 
psychology and/or human biology (i. e. the psycho-organic structures and attendant 
causal powers of individuals), no practical results have been forthcoming, and nor are 
they expected. But this stratification of the sciences, which has proven highly resistant 
to attempts by "greedy reductionists"46 to dissolve, is precisely good evidence of the 
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relative autonomy and hierarchical layering of their respective objects of knowledge 
in the real world, that is, of the stratification of nature. 
In any case, such "translations" (of the concepts of one science into those of a 
more basic one) are logically impossible, as Bhaskar himself demonstrates, and this is 
additional evidence for the stratification of nature. Thus, against Richard Rorty's 
claim that "[p]hysicalism is probably right in saying that we shall someday be able, 
`in principle', to predict every movement of a person's body (including those of his 
larynx and writing hand) by reference to microstructures within his body", 47 Bhaskar 
offers the following acute counter-argument. "Suppose A goes into a newsagent's and 
says to the proprietor B, `The Guardian, please', and B hands him a copy of it. " Now 
if physicalism is correct in its basic claim that an individual's actions (including 
speech-acts) are "in principle" deducible from the micro-constituents of his or her 
body, it must follow that B would have handed A The Guardian even if A had 
performed some quite different action, such as asking for the Independent or for a 
packet of chewing gum or B to marry him or dancing a jig, and even if A had not been 
there at all. 9,48 
Bhaskar's basic point is that no statements about the "microstructures" of A or B 
explain why this particular passage of interaction is enacted or how it unfolds. It is not 
A's neurobiology which explains his or her preference for this particular newspaper or 
newspapers in general. This is accountable in terms of social biography and social 
positioning within specific socio-cultural relations (the Guardian is produced only in 
UK society, its readership and outlook is overwhelmingly liberal middle class 
professional, not all historical social relations have enabled the manufacture of paper, 
etc. ). Nor is B's action in handing this particular newspaper to A explainable in terms 
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of his or her neurophysiology. For a start, B responds not to "sound waves" issuing 
forth from A, but to the concepts these sounds express, which are meaningful only 
because they are derived from a linguistic structure (external to the interactants) and 
applied concretely in a particular interactional setting. Moreover, B acts on A's 
request for the simple reason that it is in his or her vested interests to do so (i. e. to 
make a livelihood by exchanging goods for money), and of course these vested 
interests are determined by B's social role as proprietor within the social relations of 
commodity production. 
Stratification, rootedness and emergence in depth realism 
Bhaskar's philosophical ontology identifies a hierarchically ordered world of distinct 
strata and attendant generative mechanisms governed by causal relations of vertical 
determination. Such a world view need not rest upon Bhaskar's philosophical 
arguments however. In fact, it can instead be legitimately derived "from the results of 
the sciences", from the development of scientific knowledge itself. From this it 
appears reasonable to draw two conclusions. Firstly that a materialistic view of nature 
(including human nature) is altogether appropriate, on the grounds that 
the material universe existed before there was organic life, and ... 
living 
organisms can only exist as composed of and surrounded by matter. In this 
sense, matter may be said to be more "basic" than life; life in turn may be 
said to be more basic than rationality (in the sense that we are rational 
animals), and hence than human society and its history. This suggests that 
the sciences that explain a more basic layer may have some explanatory 
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primacy over those explaining a less basic layer. Laws of physics and 
chemistry may in some sense explain the laws of biology. 49 
Secondly that a naturalistic approach to the human and social sciences (which stress a 
fundamental methodological unity between these and the natural sciences) is at least 
possible, for the simple reason that it is now philosophically defensible to view the 
world "historically, as a complex of processes of development ... in which there are no 
sharp distinctions, on the one hand, between the various domains of the physical 
world ... and, on the other 
hand, between the physical world as a whole and the human, 
social world. "50 
In this sense, Bhaskar's philosophy of nature is entirely consistent with that form 
of ontological materialism (defended by Marx and Engels) which postulates the 
unilateral existential dependence of the objects of knowledge of the human and social 
sciences upon those of the natural sciences, and the historical development of the 
former out of the latter. From this point of view, the stratification of nature must be 
grasped from the "bottom up" (so to speak), as running from the physico-chemical to 
the human and socio-cultural (via the intermediary of the biological). This is for the 
simple reason that it is impossible to conceive of social or cultural mechanisms 
existing in the absence of biological ones, or of biological mechanisms existing in the 
absence of physico-chemical ones, but perfectly possible to conceive of the converse 
arrangements. 
Nonetheless it is important to be clear that this vertical explanation of higher 
mechanisms by lower ones does not "explain away" the former. The higher are as a 
real as the lower by virtue of the distinct causal powers and properties which pertain 
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uniquely to them. Chemical structures explain biological structures, for example, in 
the sense that the latter arise from the former and could not exist without them, the 
reverse never being the case. But the generative mechanisms of organic structures are 
nonetheless irreducible to those of chemical structures, since nothing about the 
organisational and behavioural properties of the first will tell us anything about those 
of the second. 
Yet this "stratified model" of nature in no way implies that more basic 
mechanisms or strata pack a greater causal punch than higher level ones in accounting 
for the constitution of objects or entities. This point is well made by Steven Rose. "A 
living organism -a human, say - is an assemblage of subatomic particles, an 
assemblage of atoms, an assemblage of molecules, an assemblage of tissues and 
organs. But it is not first a set of atoms, then molecules, then cells; it is all of these 
things at the same time. "51 Nor does Bhaskar's ontology commit us to the peculiar 
idea that more basic strata or mechanisms have explanatory priority over higher level 
ones in shaping the pattern of events in the phenomenal world. "Being a more basic 
stratum does not necessarily mean being a stratum whose effects are more widespread. 
For though animals are governed by zoological laws while inanimate things are not, 
anything and everything may be effected by zoological laws, since animals have 
effects on the inanimate world. , 
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Clearly there is a necessary distinction being made here between relations of 
vertical determination between strata and relations of horizontal causality between 
mechanisms and events/or objects. Events and things are determined conjointly by the 
plurality of mechanisms operative at different levels of reality. 53 So, for instance, 
zoological laws presuppose chemical laws, which in turn presuppose physical laws, 
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living creatures being a combinatory of physico-chemical and organic structures. This 
means that relations of vertical causality between strata, aside from being relations of 
"ontological presupposition", are also often "one-way relations of inclusion"54 of the 
various strata. Thus organic entities (such as animals) will be necessarily subject to a 
broader range of causal mechanisms than inorganic entities (such as rocks), just as 
cultural entities (e. g. individual speakers) will necessarily be subject to a wider range 
of causal mechanisms (those of society, mind, biology, chemistry and physics) than 
biological entities (to which only the last three apply). 
But how is it that higher order mechanisms and structures are explainable by yet 
irreducible to lower order ones? Bhaskar's solution to this problem is to grasp the 
interface between the two in terms of rootedness and emergence: higher order strata 
are rooted in and emergent from lower order strata. "Rootedness" simply denotes the 
elementary fact that "the more complex aspects of reality (e. g. life, mind) presuppose 
the less complex (e. g. matter). "55 The idea here is "of some lower-order or 
microscopic domain providing a basis for the existence of some higher-order property 
or power; as for example the neuro-physiological organisation of human beings may 
be said to provide a basis for their power of speech. "56 "Emergence" is a more 
difficult idea to grasp, not least because it has a complicated intellectual history. For 
realists, however, it has two basic meanings and functions. Firstly as simply another 
way of describing and defending their thesis of the irreducibility of the constituent 
levels of reality: 
We would not try to explain the power of people to think by reference to the 
cells that constitute them, as if cells possessed this power too. Nor would we 
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explain the power of water to extinguish fire by deriving it from the powers 
of its constituents, for oxygen and hydrogen are highly inflammable. In such 
cases objects are said to have emergent powers, that is, powers or liabilities 
which cannot be reduced to those of their constituents. 57 
Secondly as an explanatory thesis which locates the emergence of a higher-order 
stratwin a specific interaction or combination of generative mechanisms internal to 
those objects or structures which exist at a stratum immediately "basic" to it. In this 
sense, "emergent properties" are a function of internally related objects or structures, 
because the relations which define or comprise them as such grant their constituents 
powers and capacities they would not possess apart from their interaction or 
combination as parts of a whole: 
The nature or constitution of an object and its causal powers are internally or 
necessarily related: a plane can fly by virtue of its aerodynamic form, 
engines, etc.; gunpowder can explode by virtue of its unstable chemical 
structure; multinational firms can sell their products dear and buy their 
labour power cheap by virtue of operating in several different countries with 
different levels of development; people can change their behaviour by virtue 
of their ability to monitor their own monitorings, and so on 
58 
Biological reality, for instance, is "emergent" from a specific combination of 
generative mechanisms internal to the chemical level, just as socio-cultural reality is 
"emergent" from a specific interaction of causal powers internal to the biological 
level. 
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Emergent properties are also to be found within particular domains of reality. 
Thus the "physical", the "chemical", the "biological", and the "human-social" levels 
each give rise to higher and lower strata. For example, totally novel powers arise 
within the socio-cultural domain as a result of social interaction. "Even though social 
structures exist only where people reproduce them, they have powers irreducible to 
those of individuals (you can't pay rent to yourself)" 59 or sell goods or pay wages to 
yourself or accumulate capital by yourself. Nor can any of us "fly by flapping our 
arms either singly or in a crowd. Yet we do fly as a result of technology, airplanes, 
ground crew, all de novo products of social activity, qualitatively different from our 
individual acts. , 60 In all these cases, individuals obtain novel characteristics by virtue 
of their insertion within specific kinds of social relations, not simply by pooling their 
individual capacities or powers. Because such properties and powers of individuals 
are not merely "aggregative" products of their interaction they must instead be 
recognised as "emergent properties" of the societal organisation in which their 
interactions are situated. Such is what renders meaningful the idea that society is more 
than the sum of its parts and that its "parts" (i. e. people and their interpersonal 
relations) are transformed by being parts of the social whole. 
Ontological materialism and the dialectics of nature 
I have made the assertion that depth realism would be substantially enriched by 
engaging with (and learning from) the basic concepts of dialectical materialism (as 
this has been understood in the classical Marxist tradition). It is now time to add a 
little substance to this argument. Clearly I do not mean that Marx, Engels, and one or 
two others, are alone in possession of the "master key" (i. e. the "materialist dialectic") 
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to unlock the secrets of nature and society. My purpose is not to rehabilitate Stalinist 
dogmatics or to lend legitimation to any kind of mysticism. Nor am I arguing that 
Marxian materialism has nothing to learn from other philosophical traditions, 
including and especially Bhaskar's depth realism. This should be clear enough from 
what I have said so far in this section. After all, my contention in the foregoing has 
been that the core concepts of Bhaskar's philosophical realism (i. e. stratification, 
rootedness and emergence), plus the logico-theoretical arguments by which he 
demonstrates their authenticity and efficacy, are indispensable to the articulation of a 
defensible anti-reductive materialist or naturalist ontology of being. In view of this, 
what I am proposing is not that dialectical materialism supplant depth realism, or 
obviously that depth realism supplant dialectical materialism, but rather that the best 
elements of each be combined in a new synthesis. 
Now I have already made the point that a consistent stratified model of reality is 
in fact a particular form of ontological materialism - namely an anti-reductive or 
"emergentist" materialism. This being the case, it is mysterious that most leading 
figures of the realist movement do not describe their ontology in these terms. Of 
course, it is true that Bhaskar dubs his view of the mind-body relation "synchronic 
emergent powers materialism". But he does not describe his overall philosophical 
outlook as such. He also leaves "open" the question of whether a materialistic 
explanation is "in principle" possible for mind, on the grounds that it is "equally 
possible" that "mindedness" is the property of an immaterial substance, which does 
not seem to me to be consistent with any form of materialism, emergentist or 
otherwise. 61 
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Perhaps part of the explanation for this preference for the term "realism" over 
"materialism" in the contemporary philosophy of science is that the latter has 
traditionally been associated with reductive-mechanical outlooks in both the physical 
and human-social sciences, and obviously critical realists do not wish to be found 
guilty of the same errors by terminological association. Yet an emergentist 
materialism, such as that endorsed in practice by realists such as Bhaskar and Collier, 
is not in the least bit vulnerable to a micro-regress of higher order strata and attendant 
sciences to lower order ones. Indeed, as I have suggested beforehand, identifying 
depth realism as "emergent powers materialism" has the positive advantage of 
undermining the rational basis of both vulgar materialism (the view that the objects of 
the human and social sciences are "translatable" into the objects of the biological and 
physico-chemical sciences) and "shamefaced" idealism (the postulation of a 
spiritualist "prime cause" in accounting for the universe). This is one of the great 
virtues of dialectical materialism. From its inception in the work of Engels, this has 
been an ontological approach which has explicitly acknowledged the falsity of these 
abstract dualisms. In this sense, dialectical materialism is important because it is 
precisely an anti-reductive materialism, and as such suffers from none of the 
ambiguities associated with philosophical realism. 
I take it that the lack of scientific support for any "mind-first" understanding of 
the universe is sufficient proof of the necessity of a materialist ontology of being 
against those who take a "compromise" position (i. e. ontological realism) on this 
question. There are no good reasons why an ontology of existence should make any 
compromise whatsoever with the idea that "the ideal" or "mind" has any kind of 
existential autonomy or explanatory primacy over "matter". But perhaps those 
54 
allegiants of philosophical realism who accept that their approach is indeed 
"materialistic" or "naturalistic" might still object to my critique on other grounds. 
Two possibilities spring to mind. Firstly that my "anti-realist" argument reveals only a 
semantic ambiguity rather than a substantive conceptual weakness in the realist 
ontology. Secondly that dialectical materialism is not an emergentist ontology at all, 
or at least not a successful one, hamstrung as it is by concepts which are either vague, 
misleading or plain wrong. From this point of view, depth realism has no need of any 
kind of dialogue or encounter with dialectical materialism, only of a change of title to 
something less neutral and more appropriate. 
Now my first response to these (hypothetical) arguments is to freely concede that 
a large measure of my critique of depth realism (at least as this is articulated by 
Bhaskar) is a quibble over terminology. I do not find this an uncomfortable admission 
however. After all, I have already said that my intention is not to replace Bhaskar's 
depth realism (or emergentist materialism) with Engels' dialectical materialism. 
Nonetheless this "semantic quibble" is an important one, for reasons I have already 
discussed. My second response is simply to suggest that certain of the basic concepts 
of dialectical Marxist philosophy are neither misleading or false (though some of them 
are difficult by necessity because they are designed to capture a reality which is itself 
ambiguous because fluid and contradictory rather than static and functional). On the 
contrary, these concepts remain valid and necessary. There are three basic reasons for 
this. 
Firstly dialectical concepts are in fact explicit descriptions of the reality of 
stratification and emergence, though expressed in a different philosophical vocabulary 
to that favoured by contemporary critical realists. As Ted Benton rightly points out: 
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"Engels proposes a hierarchy of `forms of motion' with transitions one to the other.... 
The different domains of the universe are constituted by levels in the hierarchy of 
complexity of laws of motion. "62 This stratification of the world ensures that the 
sciences must also be arranged hierarchically and treated as irreducible to each other. 
This is for the simple reason that at each level of organisation or interaction of matter 
those laws operative at lower levels are "subsumed" or "pushed into the background 
by other, higher laws", which themselves constitute "a leap, a decisive change. "63 As 
Engels' himself puts it: "If I term physics the mechanics of molecules, chemistry the 
physics of atoms, and furthermore biology the chemistry of albumens, I wish thereby 
to express the passing of any of these sciences into one of the others, hence both the 
connection, the continuity, and the distinction, the discrete separation. "64 Such a 
conception of nature as comprised of irreducible levels of interaction and 
organisation, and hence of the necessary "unity-in-difference" of the different 
branches of science, is clearly compatible with "transcendental" realism. But it is 
Engels' utilisation of dialectical-materialist concepts which has allowed him to obtain 
this insight nearly one hundred years ahead of his time. 
Secondly, and more importantly, such concepts are as reasonable a way as any of 
capturing in the most general terms the reality of the world as a "differentiated 
totality": 
What is involved here is a kind of natural scientific ontology of nature as a 
unified, though internally structured and differentiated whole, which Engels 
regards as preferable to the ontology implicit in mechanical reductionism.... 
Engels' ontology is the product of philosophical reflection on what is 
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presupposed by the recent development of the sciences. The convergence, 
the realignment of whole fields of theory which had previously developed 
separately (organic/inorganic chemistry, mechanics/ theory of heat, etc. ) is 
unintelligible, as is the replacement of one theory by another within the same 
specialism, unless these different fields of theoretical discourse are 
apprehended as so many attempts at knowledge of a unitary, though 
internally differentiated, natural universe. This unity of nature is an essential 
precondition for convergence of the sciences, for the repeated discovery of 
"interconnections", whilst the differentiation of nature is implied by the 
discreteness and uneven historical development of the different sciences 65 
Benton thus notes the "points of contact" between Engels' ontology of nature and 
Bhaskar's transcendental realism. But he makes the further point that the latter 
legitimately transcends the former in one important respect: 
Bhaskar's `transcendental' realism argues for the philosophical legitimacy of 
arguments from the character of rational procedures in science (for example 
experimentation) to conclusions of a very general kind about the nature of 
the world as presupposed in the rationality of those procedures.... Engels' 
scientific metaphysics includes arguments and conclusions of this general 
type, but it goes beyond this to represent in a unified and more-or-less 
coherent form a detailed ontology based on current substantive knowledge in 
the different sciences. Engels is here doing no more than generalising from 
procedures employed by scientists themselves in bringing to bear discoveries 
in one discipline upon controversies in an adjacent one, but this 
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generalisation of the procedure results in a quite distinct type of theoretical 
structure (a "world-view") and discourse. 
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Finally, and most importantly of all, Engels' dialectical concepts are successful in 
historicizing stratification and emergence. That is to say, they allow us to grasp the 
dynamics or processes through which higher-order levels of the material world 
develop out of lower-order levels not as "radical contingencies"67 but as integral 
aspects of a continually evolving totality of interrelated systems: 
The great basic thought is that the world is not to be comprehended as a 
complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the 
things apparently stable ... go through an uninterrupted process of 
becoming 
and passing away.... For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, 
sacred. It reveals the transitory nature of everything and in everything; 
nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming 
and passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.... The 
motion of matter is not merely crude mechanical motion, mere change of 
place, it is heat and light, electric and magnetic tension, chemical 
combination and dissociation, life, and finally, consciousness. 
8 
This is the most controversial aspect of Engels' "dialectics of nature". For he is 
often taxed with endorsing an evolutionary teleology of higher forms from lower 
forms, according to which the latter inevitably or necessarily give rise to the former in 
a linear fashion, governed by an all-encompassing "dialectical law" uniformly 
operative at all levels of reality. This, for example, seems to be Benton's view, 
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notwithstanding his acknowledgement of and high praise for Engels' "first 
approximation" to "a concept of emergent qualities and laws. , 69 He accuses Engels of 
mixing with his legitimate "attempt to confront the problem of the emergence of new 
forms and structures as a specifically historical problem ... a dubious ... notion of 
historicity as progressive development .,, 
70 The reader will be unsurprised to learn that 
Engels' "external" and "inessential" use of Hegelian categories is held by Benton to 
be responsible for the alleged tendency of his philosophy to sometimes veer towards 
teleological historicism: 
That Engels suggests, by his indifferent application of the dialectical laws of 
the transition of quantity into quality, and negation of the negation, to all of 
these histories [natural-inorganic, natural-organic, and human-social], that 
they .... share a common 
historicity is, to say the least, unfortunate ... the 
indifferent application of categories of the `dialectic' to different domains in 
nature can give the impression that human history and the history of ... 
nature can be understood through identical philosophical ... categories. 
' 
But such an interpretation fails on a number of counts. Firstly Benton provides no 
solid evidence that Engels does in fact hold that development in nature and society is 
part of a uniform evolutionary process governed by a universal dialectical law or that 
this development is inevitably progressive or linear. Benton's only substantive 
argument against Engels' use of dialectical concepts is that he does not always apply 
these appropriately or successfully when dealing with emergent properties and laws, 
which is hardly proof of any dalliance on his part with the Hegelian notion of an 
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identity of development in nature and society. 72 Indeed, Benton admits that 
"surprisingly enough, Engels does recognise that nature and human society do not 
share a common historicity, the looseness of his appropriation of the dialectic 
notwithstanding. "73 
Secondly Benton appears to believe that a historical account of nature is 
teleological (or "quasi-teleological" - whatever that means) 
74 simply by virtue of the 
fact it postulates a certain directionality or evolutionary movement "from the simple 
to the complex"75 in structural forms. Not only is such a conception manifestly non- 
teleological (by any reasonable definition of the term), 76 it is also far from being 
indefensible. Such a pattern of development is certainly discernible at the biological 
level (the "ratchet" of natural selection generating cumulative organismic 
specialisation and enhanced survival-value). 
77 It is also discernible at the societal level 
(the cumulative development of the productive forces under the stimulus of meeting 
and developing human needs). Indeed, so too at the physico-chemical level, since the 
"consensus view" of physical scientists today is one of "the inevitability and probable 
universality of life", on the grounds that "life is a logical consequence of known 
chemical principles operating on the atomic composition of the universe. "78 In a 
sense, then, Engels is right to suggest that the differentiated elements of nature 
(physico-chemical, biological, human-social, etc. ) have a common historicity. For all 
are "phases" in the development of matter through ascending levels of complexity, 
and all are composed of those "basic" elements which ontologically and historically 
presuppose their existence. Yet it is important to be clear that there is nothing in this 
conception which implies that this "common historicity" of nature is an 
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undifferentiated or unstratified one, or that the evolutionary emergence of higher from 
lower domains of nature was necessary or preordained. 
Finally Benton's "surprise" at not discovering a materialist "inversion" of 
Hegel's logic in Engels' writings is a function of his own arbitrary imposition of the 
Hegelian "system" upon Engels' philosophy. For he simply assumes that Engels' 
dialectical concepts must logically commit him to a monistic and teleological view of 
the universe, on the grounds that these are borrowed from a philosophical system 
which is itself teleological and monistic. Benton does not see that the content of 
concepts is determined by their function within a theoretical discourse. Transposed 
into a different theoretical system their meaning can be and often is transformed. This 
is clear enough if we consider what Engels himself has to say about his own 
application of the dialectical method to the different domains of society and nature. 
For a start, in opposition to Hegel, Engels insists that dialectics is no "proof producing 
instrument", 79 a formula into which the real world has to be fitted, but must instead be 
discovered by means of empirical-scientific investigation into the different facets of 
the world. For him, in other words, there is "no question of building the laws of 
dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it. "80 Of 
equal importance, Engels also recognises that dialectical processes function 
differently for each distinct stratum of reality. "Every kind of thing ... has a peculiar 
way of being negated in such a way that it gives rise to development, and it is just the 
same with every kind of conception or idea. "8' 
That Engels is especially insistent that the dialectic of human-social development 
is a radical departure from the dialectic of unreflective nature is revealed in a key 
passage from his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy: 
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In one point, however, the history of the development of society proves to be 
essentially different from that of nature. In nature - insofar as we ignore 
man's reaction on nature - there are only blind, unconscious agencies acting 
on one another, out of whose interplay the general law comes into operation. 
Whatever happens ... does not happen as a consciously 
desired aim. On the 
other hand, in the history of society the actors are all endowed with 
consciousness, are men acting with deliberation and passion, working 
towards definite goals; nothing happens without conscious purpose, without 
intended aim. 82 
Engels is grappling with the idea that "the structure of the dialectic in society is 
different to that in nature - the former must take account of the development of 
consciousness in a way that the latter need not. "83 In keeping with this broad 
philosophical conception, he goes to some pains to show that the "negation of the 
negation", as this concept is utilised by Marx in Capital to demonstrate the cancelling 
out of bourgeois property relations by socialist common ownership, is not designed to 
"prove" the historical necessity of socialism or the inevitable demise of capitalism, 
but is instead meant to highlight the structural contradictions of the system which 
generate pressures or tendencies towards crises and revolutionary change. 
84 But 
Engels' careful handling of dialectical categories might as well not exist for all the 
attention Benton pays it. Because of his own misconception as to the manner of 
Engels' appropriation of Hegel's legacy, i. e. his unsubstantiated assumption that any 
resort to dialectics is tantamount to teleological and monistic backsliding, Benton can 
find only incoherence in Engels' explication of the historicity of stratification and 
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emergence. Benton makes this error because he has failed to address the meaning and 
function of dialectical concepts within Engels' philosophy. 
I have suggested that dialectical concepts are appropriate and indispensable to the 
analysis of nature for the simple reason that natural evolution is governed by 
processes of dialectical interaction from which higher-order structures develop out of 
lower-order structures over time. There are, however, at least two other good reasons 
for endorsing a "dialectics of nature". Firstly dialectical materialism, like depth 
realism, provides a philosophical rationale or resource for countering reductionism 
and anti-scientific irrationalism or romanticism. Lacking this kind of outlook, natural 
scientists and philosophers of science have traditionally found themselves drawn 
towards reductionist world-views where science is making rapid progress and is 
confident (for want of a sophisticated alternative), and back towards "the mystical 
path" where the contradictions of old established theories are becoming glaringly 
apparent and where the suspicion dawns that growing scientific knowledge of the 
world does not always translate into a more rational world. 85 Secondly the dialectical 
perspective equips practising scientists and philosophers of science with the requisite 
flexibility of thought or "open-mindedness" to view far-reaching transformations of 
scientific knowledge as a natural aspect of its internal development, not as threats to 
the rationality or stability of the enterprise. 86 This is because a dialectical 
understanding of nature is an explicit acknowledgement of its complexity, its fluidity, 
its capacity for endless innovation and development, of the challenge it poses to static 
common-sense, and so of the approximate and provisional nature of scientific 
discoveries. Indeed, there can be no doubt that endorsing a dialectical world-view has 
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greatly assisted many scientists in making important contributions to scientific 
knowledge. 87 
Now my contention is that processes of natural development (the dynamic 
structuring and restructuring of nature) are better understood by interpreting them in 
the light of Engels' so-called "laws of the dialectic": the "unity of opposites", the 
"interaction and interpenetration of opposites", the "transformation of quantity into 
quality", and the "negation of the negation". 83 The basic idea is that these provide us 
with "the general formula of all evolutionary processes - of nature as well as of 
society ... insofar as we view the whole universe - without any exception - as a 
product of formation and transformation and not as the fruit of a conscious creator. , 
89 
Is such a claim a "totalitarian" or "metaphysical"90 one? Not if a dialectical 
conception of nature can be derived from the practice and results of the various 
sciences. If practising natural scientists of whatever persuasion find themselves drawn 
to dialectical method in conducting their researches, or cannot avoid drawing 
dialectical conclusions from their scientific endeavours, it is entirely appropriate to 
conclude that, to the best of our rational knowledge, nature is dialectically structured. 
In fact, the results and activity of science do indeed support this conclusion. 1 
A final observation. There is one important ambiguity of Engels' dialectics which 
requires attention. Engels says that "dialectics [is] ... the science of the general laws of 
motion, both of the external world and of human thought ... two sets of laws which are 
identical in substance. "92 Now I do not think this view is defensible, although I see no 
good reason why endorsing it commits Engels (against his best intentions) to either 
reductionism or determinism. 3 The problem is that dialectical concepts are not "laws" 
at all in a strict scientific sense, since their purpose is not to denote the discrete 
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generative mechanisms responsible for specific phenomena in the world. Rather 
"dialectical laws" are an abstraction from "the features common to physical and social 
processes ... produced by a wide variety of different mechanisms, "94 which are then 
utilised to illuminate particular forms of dialectical motion. As such their function is 
to reveal the dialectical pattern of interaction at work at each level (or between levels) 
of reality, as this is generated by the collision of various generative mechanisms 
which stimulate development and emergence. 
But since the dialectical process specific to each stratum or to the interface 
between strata is the product of the generative mechanisms operative at these levels, it 
is clear enough that the "dialectic of nature" cannot always and everywhere be 
identical in substance. This point is well made by John Rees. "The dialectic cannot 
remain some immutable stratum on top of which everything else changes but which 
itself is immune to change. The dialectic itself is transformed as the natural world and 
the social world develop. "95 However, as Alex Callinicos points out, "this line of 
thought suggests that we should see the dialectic of nature as a broad philosophical 
conception of nature rather than a set of general laws from which more specific ones 
applicable to particular aspects of the world can be deduced. " This interpretation of 
the dialectic of nature "has the advantage that it rules out the kind of dogmatic 
dictation to working scientists which gave the idea a bad name under Stalinism, but it 
implies a fairly loose and open relationship between dialectical philosophy and 
scientific research which ought to be explicitly recognised. "96 
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1.3: EXPLANATORY MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY: 
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY 
As we have seen, philosophical materialism, as an emergentist ontology of nature, 
postulates the existential dependence of the objects of the human and social sciences 
upon the objects of the eco-biological sciences, which in turn presuppose the objects 
of the physico-chemical sciences. So the relations between the various strata of nature 
are those of ontological presupposition and vertical determination. This does not mean 
that objects which are comprised of a variety of different strata are as a rule 
"determined" more by the lower than the higher. Organisms, for instance, are 
governed by zoological laws not the laws of chemistry or physics, although the 
reverse is true of the parts from which they are composed. Nor does it mean that 
objects are shaped or conditioned more by those lower-order vis-ä-vis higher-order 
mechanisms which constitute their "external" life-world. Organisms, for instance, are 
conditioned (in terms of their physical organisation and behavioural tendencies) by 
the multiplicity of generative mechanisms (organismic, physical, chemical and 
sometimes social) which have fashioned the sensuous environment which they 
inhabit. Still less does this perspective necessarily entail that lower-order strata 
historically predate those higher-order strata which they immediately "found" or 
explain. Certainly this is often the case: few would doubt that inorganic matter existed 
long before the emergence of life on earth or that non-conscious life existed long 
before the emergence of conscious life. But this is not always so: human psychology 
(including its causal powers of mind and self) is undoubtedly dependent upon and 
explainable in terms of the physical architecture of the human brain and nervous 
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system, yet the biological and psychological aspects of human development are not 
detachable in either a synchronic or diachronic sense. 
Translated into the domain of the human-social sciences, ontological materialism 
can be compressed into three basic propositions. Firstly that humanity's "being" or 
"existence" (including social being) determines in some sense its "consciousness" and 
"culture" (Thesis 1). Secondly that a particular dimension of "social being" - namely 
the "material" element of social production to procure a livelihood from the material 
environment - has explanatory primacy in accounting for the evolutionary emergence 
of the human species and hence of the origins of human culture (Thesis 2). Thirdly 
that this same dimension of social being, i. e. social labour and the economic relations 
emergent from it, including (where appropriate) relations of economic exploitation, 
has explanatory primacy in accounting for the wider socio-cultural structures of a 
society and the directional logic of overall socio-historical development (Thesis 3). 1 
will now offer an explanation and defence of each of these positions. 
The determination of consciousness and culture by social and material existence 
The Marxist thesis of the determination of consciousness and culture by "being", 
"existence" or simply "life" is the most simple of those cited above and can be 
summarised as three distinct proposals. Firstly there is the claim that mind is an 
emergent property of a certain combination of organic matter (i. e. the human brain 
and nervous system) and can develop only in active interchange with the external 
world (Thesis la). Next there is the claim that it is the biological nature (i. e., psycho- 
organic needs and capacities) of human beings which provide the most basic form of 
explanation of how society and culture are possible and of why these have a history 
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(Thesis lb). Finally there is the claim that the contents or products (ideas, concepts 
etc. ) of human consciousness are necessarily enmattered, in the sense they are always 
derived (in the final analysis) from the material reality of nature and society (Thesis 
1 c). 
I take it that. enough has already been said in this chapter to render Thesis la 
defensible. Not even the most naive of ontological idealists deny that humanity's 
natural powers of mind, self and rationality have a biological basis, or that these same 
capacities are developed and greatly enriched through processes of social learning and 
enculturation. Although there are cultural imperialists who would deny that non-social 
interaction with the physical environment is efficacious in shaping human 
development in these crucial respects, this is not the perspective of those outside this 
charmed circle, and I have demonstrated the falsity of this view elsewhere in the 
present undertaking. 97 Thesis lb is more controversial and unpopular than la, 
especially among social scientists, not least because it is seen as leading inevitably to 
the micro-reductionism of socio-biology. However, properly understood, it entails no 
such thing, and is beyond rational dispute, as I have again tried to show elsewhere. 8 
Yet it is important to be clear that one important reason why naive biologism has 
secured it secured for itself any kind of following amongst philosophers and scientists 
outside sociology is that successive forms of sociological theorising (functionalism, 
hermeneutics, constructionism, structuralism, postmodernism, etc. ) have sought to 
demonstrate the "autonomy" of their subject-matter (socio-cultural reality) by 
implausibly denying the relevance or even existence of a human nature. To their 
eternal discredit, in their efforts to stay abreast of the latest fads in social philosophy, 
a great many Marxists have been to the forefront of this tendency, and in so doing 
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have fallen into a thoroughgoing humanism where they have avoided cultural or 
linguistic reductionism. This point has been brilliantly made by Sebastiano 
Timpanaro: 
The position of the contemporary Marxist seems at time like that of a person 
living on the first floor of a house, who turns to the tenant of the second floor 
and says: "You think you're independent, that you support yourself by 
yourself? You're wrong! Your apartment stands only because it is supported 
on mine, and if mine collapses, yours will too"; and on the other hand to the 
ground floor tenant: "What are you pretending? That you support and 
condition me? What a wretched illusion! The ground floor exists only insofar 
as it is the ground floor to the first floor. Or rather, strictly speaking, the real 
ground floor is the first floor, and your apartment is only a sort of cellar, to 
which no real existence can be assigned. " To tell the truth, the relations 
between the Marxist and the second floor tenant have been perceptibly 
improved for some time, not because the second floor tenant has recognised 
his own "dependence", but because the Marxist has reduced his pretensions 
considerably, and has come to admit that the second floor is very largely 
autonomous from the first, or else that the two apartments "support each 
other". But the contempt for the inhabitant of the ground floor has become 
increasingly pronounced. 99 
Since cultural determinism (or alternatively the humanist emphasis on a kind of 
"undetermined" praxis in shaping the social and natural worlds) is so manifestly 
contradicted by the elementary facts of human experience, and is generally identified 
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as the only alternative to biological reductionism, it is hardly surprising that socio- 
biology remains a force to be reckoned with, despite the devastating criticism to 
which it has been subjected. After all, all parents know their children are not born 
tabula rasa. Indeed, most people would have no difficulty endorsing Timpanaro's 
justifiable stress on 
the passive element of human experience ... the fact that man as a biological 
being, endowed with a certain (not unlimited) adaptability to his external 
environment, and with certain impulses towards activity and the pursuit of 
happiness, subject to old age and death, is not an abstract construction, nor 
one of our prehistoric ancestors, ... now superseded 
by historical and social 
man, but still exists in each of us and in all probability will still exist in the 
future. 100 
But so long as social theory counterposes culturalism to naturalism, failing to 
articulate an understanding of the interface between biology and society, crude 
reductive modes of naturalistic social theory remain enormously appealing to 
academics and lay persons alike, for lack of serious competitors. 
Grasping the relationship between human society and human nature in a way 
which avoids biological and cultural reductionism is exactly what Timpanaro is about. 
His point is not to affirm that "certain historical and social forms such as private 
property or class divisions are inherent in humanity in general", or to deny that "there 
is hardly anything that is `purely natural' left in contemporary man ... that 
has not 
been enriched and remoulded by the social and cultural environment. " Rather his 
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purpose is to warn of the "idealist sophistry" of those "historicist polemics" against 
"man in general" which "maintain that, since the `biological' is always presented to us 
as mediated by the `social', the `biological' is nothing and the `social' is everything. " 
In a brilliant anticipation of the forthcoming "postmodern turn" of contemporary 
academic culture, he asks of his contemporaries: "If we make it [anti-naturalism] ours, 
how are we to defend ourselves from those who will in turn maintain that, since all 
reality (including economic and social reality) is knowable through language (or 
through the thinking mind), language (or the thinking mind) is the sole reality and all 
the rest is abstraction? " 0' If his warning had been heeded, and naive anti-naturalism 
had not become the new orthodoxy in the social sciences, most likely we would not 
have had to endure the reinvigoration of its destructive antithesis of crude biological 
determinism, with its treatment of human beings to "selfish replicators" or "machine- 
organisms", scrapping over access to mates and patches of ground. 
Yet Timpanaro's emphasis on "the passive side of experience" is a one-sided 
view of human nature, which neglects the "active" side of self-conscious redirective 
labour and overamplifies biological constraints vis-ä-vis biological enablements in the 
human condition. 102 This is an understandable weakness, given that Timpanaro is 
concerned with countering the humanist fetishisation of "praxis", which is accorded 
magical properties of making of the world whatever it would like. Nonetheless it is 
necessary to point out, in modification of Timpanaro's position, that our biological 
nature also allows and perhaps impels us to construct and elaborate complex socio- 
cultural relations and to socialise and modify nature in service of our interests and 
needs (biological and cultural). Certainly it is hard to see how anyone can sensibly 
deny that processes of socialisation and enculturation (and hence the routine 
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reproduction of society and culture) presuppose the existence of organisms in secure 
possession of certain natural capacities (mind, self, intentionality, rationality, etc. ). 
103 
Of equal significance, every sensible person knows that, just as every individual must 
live in order to think, so too must "mankind ... 
first of all eat and drink, have shelter 
and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, religion, art, etc. "104 But it is this 
which ensures that scientific analysis of society and societal history must always start 
from the biological "givens" (in this case needs and interests) of the human species, 
and the natural environment which supplies the means of human needs-satisfaction. It 
should go without saying, of course, that the sciences of evolutionary ecology and 
biology have shown us that these human capacities and needs, the exercise and 
satisfaction of which makes possible society and social history, are the historical 
product of a specific law-governed pattern of adaptive evolution, itself forged in the 
interface between organismic needs-satisfaction and the object-world. 
The fundamental point of contact between ontological materialism and 
explanatory (anthropological and sociological) materialism is thus to be found in the 
simple fact that the laws or tendencies of humanity's biological nature are basic to the 
laws of socio-cultural and socio-historical reality. There is, in short, a "chain of 
being"105 extending from physico-chemical reality to biological reality and then to 
socio-cultural reality. This does not mean that the relationship between human 
biology and psychology, on the one hand, and socio-cultural relations, on the other 
hand, is one in which the former is ontologically independent of and historically prior 
to the latter. Humanity's nature or "species-being" is an indissolubly social one, and 
natural and socio-cultural evolution, as this has led from the hominids to fully modern 
homo sapiens, has proceeded hand in hand as integral and mutually reinforcing 
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aspects of a totality. Yet, despite this, it is still valid to say that humanity's psycho- 
organic nature "founds" socio-cultural reality. There are two important reasons for 
this. 
Most obviously, of course, our conscious "species-being" is an emergent property 
of unreflective organic nature, and it is therefore reasonable to say that biological 
mechanisms underpin and explain socio-cultural mechanisms, albeit via the 
intermediary of social-psychological mechanisms in this case. More importantly, 
though, we have already seen that relations of vertical causality between strata are not 
necessarily those in which the more basic strata enjoy an ontologically separate 
existence to those which it "founds". On the contrary, one-way relations of 
ontological presupposition and vertical causation can exist between strata even where 
they have a simultaneous historical origin and where the higher has integral effects on 
the lower. So our species-being is the historical product of biological and social 
mechanisms combined, but at the same time our biological and psychological 
capacities and needs, as these are the historical products of natural selection, are 
always prior to the specific or actual socio-cultural relations which we inhabit. The 
species-being of individuals is thus always and everywhere an antecedent condition of 
their socio-cultural interaction and learning, of any particular social structure into 
which they are born, and therefore of the reproduction or elaboration of all historical 
socio-cultural systems. 
Turning now to Thesis lc. In what sense are the products or contents of human 
consciousness "determined" by the facts of the material and social environments 
which individuals inhabit? At times Marx seems to suggest the relationship between 
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"thought" and "life", or between ideas and reality, is one in which the former 
passively "mirrors" or "records" the latter: 
My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the 
Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel the process of thinking, which 
he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of "the 
Idea", is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external 
appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but 
the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of 
thought. 106 
Yet such an interpretation of Marx's meaning sits uneasily with key tenets of his 
philosophy. Firstly with his theory of knowledge which holds that the phenomenal 
forms of reality are often poor guides to its underlying structures, this necessitating 
scientific analyses of the world. Secondly with his theory of alienation, which is 
designed to show that "in a society where human beings [cannot] control either their 
natural environment or the social and economic mechanism it [is] inevitable that they 
... 
fail to ... comprehend their world. 
"107 Furthermore, it is clear that both Marx and 
Engels use the language of "reflection" as a polemical device to distinguish their own 
position in the most general way from that of the Hegelian school, which insisted 
upon the construction of the material world by and through thought. It has no other 
function in their writings. For wherever Marx or Engels go beyond general formulas, 
when specifying the relationship between thought and existence, their analysis 
immediately becomes more subtle and qualified. 
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Engels, for instance, makes the point that "[o]nce it has arisen ... every ideology 
develops in conjunction with the given conceptual material and elaborates on it; 
otherwise it would not be an ideology, that is, dealing with ideas as autonomous 
entities which develop independently and are subject to their own laws. s108 Elsewhere 
he makes the more general point that thought can never simply mirror reality because 
reality is itself in continual motion and change: 
The concept of a thing and its reality ... run side 
by side like two asymptotes, 
always approaching each other yet never meeting. The difference between 
the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly 
and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept 
... the concept ... 
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, 
from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more 
than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions 
because reality only corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even 
then approaching it only asympomatically.... From the moment we accept the 
theory of evolution all our concepts of organic life correspond only 
approximately to reality. Otherwise there could be no change. On the day 
when concepts and reality completely coincide in the organic world 
development comes to an end. The concept fish includes life in water and 
breathing through gills: how are you going to get from fish to amphibian 
without breaking through this concept? 
109 
Nonetheless Marx and Engels are right to suggest that material reality 
"determines" the products or contents of human consciousness, and not vice versa, 
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even if the "determination" of the latter by the former is neither mechanical nor 
absolute. Two points are relevant to this issue. For one thing, as Engels points out, "if 
the ... question 
is raised [of] what thought and consciousness are and where they come 
from, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man 
himself is a product of nature, which has developed in and along with its environment; 
hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis 
also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature's interconnections but are 
in correspondence with them. " 110 For another thing, it is clear that human thought 
always has a context, an external referent, to which it is related or oriented: ideas are 
always about something. This "something" is, for lack of plausible other candidates, 
nothing other than the social and natural worlds in which individuals are situated, 
which forms the medium and focus of their interactions. As Antonio Labriola 
famously puts it: "Ideas do not fall from heaven, and nothing comes to us in a 
dream. """ 
The point Labriola is making is this. The linguistic signs we use to communicate 
with others, the resources which we draw upon to act socially, the norms or rules 
which regulate our social conduct, the technical knowledge which we use to produce 
our livelihood, none of these are ever spontaneous creations of the human mind, but 
are always appropriated (albeit creatively) from a socio-cultural environment which 
we find in existence at birth. None of us, for instance, have any real choice over 
whether or not we learn or make use of the linguistic concepts native to our culture. 
This we must do if we are to communicate with others, and communication is not 
simply an objective capacity of human beings but also an objective need of our 
species sociality. Equally, not even the greatest of geniuses pluck their ideas out of 
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thin air. These are always the product of painstaking conceptual labours and are 
developed in response to an existing cultural context which defines the problems to be 
dealt with and the intellectual materials from which a novel solution to these might be 
fashioned: there could not be an Einstein before a Newton or a Marx before a Ricardo. 
Further, nor do any of us have a real choice over whether or not we utilise the stock of 
tools, technology and technical know-how at our disposal, or enter into definite kinds 
of economic relations in doing so, all of which are products of social activity. This we 
must do if we are to ensure our own physical survival or well-being and that of our 
dependants. All of this is indicative of the fact that socio-cultural productions are 
developed historically, not by means of the relentless unfolding of human reason as a 
force standing apart from nature or society, but by means of the dynamic "lived 
relation" between social labour and the material environment, the latter of which is 
always the "inorganic body"' 
12 of human thought and interaction. 
The upshot of all this is that individuals must reflect upon the social and material 
worlds they inhabit with others, because these constitute the given circumstances 
which frame their lives, defining the possibilities and limitations of their activity at 
any given point in time. These "circumstances" are always the starting point of any 
analysis of ideology or consciousness, because thought is always a response to 
existential problems, to real-world processes, even where it is an "active" or 
"creative" response which seeks to understand the world in order to change it. Yet 
analysis of the material conditions of human thinking and action is only the starting 
point of the analysis, because it must also be recognised that "men are the producers 
of their conceptions, ideas, etc. ", 113 and that these ideas are often interventions against 
existing conditions. Translated into practical activity these ideas can sometimes bring 
77 
into being a modified or even transformed set of circumstances and relations, which 
then confront individuals with a new range of existential problems which have to be 
dealt with in thought and deed, and which therefore condition consciousness and 
interaction rather differently than previously. This seems to me what Marx is getting 
at when he argues: "Men, developing their material production and their material 
intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the 
products of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that 
determines consciousness. "' 14 This emphasis on the dynamic interplay between 
"conditions" and "consciousness", though always starting out from the "conditions" in 
which "consciousness" is situated, is what distinguishes a dialectical materialist 
analysis of reality from a reductive or mechanical one, the latter of which sees 
"consciousness" as mere adaptation to or passive reflection of antecedent 
circumstances or relations. 
Anthropological materialism: social labour and the origins of human beings and 
human culture 
Turning now to Thesis 2. In chapter two I argue that Marx and Engels furnish an 
account of human nature or "species-being" which in effect provides a naturalistic 
foundation or anchorage point for their theory of society and history. This is one 
important sense in sociological and historical materialism can be said to be 
"materialistic". In chapter two I also argue that Marx and Engels grasp human nature 
as a "stratified totality", that is, as a unitary psycho-organic system of distinct 
properties and powers (including sociality, consciousness, self, rationality, labour and 
language). From this perspective, human nature (i. e. the nature of modem homo 
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sapiens) is the evolutionary end-product of a process by and through which certain 
"core" properties of our earliest non-human ancestors (elementary sociality, tool-use 
and co-operative labour) provided a foundation for the subsequent physiological 
restructuring and corresponding elaboration of the wider and richer range of properties 
outlined above which precisely define us as a species qualitatively distinct from the 
hominoid apes. 
Now this stratified conception of human nature is articulated on a philosophical 
level by Marx, who takes these properties and capacities of human nature "as given", 
as founding the socio-cultural laws which his social theory is designed to unravel. By 
contrast, the task of investigating their historical origins and development fell to 
Engels, whose purpose is to provide a scientific basis for Marx's speculative 
anthropology. In his The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, 
Engels offers an historical account of the formation of modern humans and of society 
and culture, which stresses the role of both purely natural-evolutionary processes, and 
of the historical interface between social labour for material subsistence and the 
physical environment, in bringing about these outcomes. What is distinctive about 
Engels' approach? How does it fare in the light of our greater scientific knowledge of 
human evolution in the years since his death? I will address both of these questions in 
turn. 
Here, in a compressed form, is Engels' account of human origins: 
Many hundreds of thousands of years ago, during an epoch not yet definitely 
determinable ... a race of anthropoid apes 
lived in the tropical zone ... in 
bands in the trees.... These apes began to lose the habit of using their hands 
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to walk and adopted a more and more erect posture. This was the first 
decisive step in the transition from ape to man. Other diverse functions must 
have devolved upon the hands. The first operations for which our ancestors 
gradually learned to adapt their hands ... could have 
been only simple ones.... 
But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could 
henceforth attain ever greater dexterity and skill, and the greater flexibility 
thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation. 
Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of 
labour... But the hand did not exist by itself.... Much more important is the 
direct ... reaction of the 
hand on the rest of the organism.... [O]ur simian 
ancestors were gregarious ... the development of labour necessarily helped to 
bring the members of society together by increasing the cases of mutual 
support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantages of this joint 
activity to every individual. Men-in-the-making arrived at the point where 
they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the 
undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by 
modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the 
organs of the mouth gradually learned to produce one articulate sound after 
another.... The reaction of labour and speech on the development of the brain 
and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of 
abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever renewed 
impulse to further development. 115 
In a nutshell, "Engels' position ... sees 
human evolution as going through a 
number of interlinked stages: two-legged walking, tool-making and use, development 
of the hand, sociability, brain and speech development, more control over nature, 
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more sociability, more brain and speech development. "' 16 His ideas on evolution are 
normally assumed to be a mere "materialist" restatement of Darwin's theory. But, 
although dependent upon the research of his illustrious contemporary, in fact Engels 
modifies Darwin's evolutionary sequence (of stages leading from ape to human) in 
one important respect. Darwin and his successors argued that the development of the 
brain and its attendant intellectual powers must have happened prior to the transition 
to bipedalism and tool-use and manufacture, on the grounds that only an increase in 
brain-power would allow these latter developments to take place. Engels, by contrast, 
claimed that the reverse must be true. His argument was that two-legged walking and 
the resultant freeing of the hands for tool-use, tool-making and attendant co-operative 
labour occurred before the reorganisation of the brain and increase in intellect, this 
providing the initial impetus for subsequent developments. The archaeologist-Bruce 
Trigger explains: 
Engels argued that an increasingly terrestrial life-style had encouraged ... 
increasing use of tools. This caused natural selection in favour of bipedalism 
and manual dexterity as well as ... a more complex 
division of labour. Tool 
making and the development of a capacity for language the better to co- 
ordinate productive activities led to the gradual transformation of the brain 
of an ape into that of a modern human being. 
17 
Now what is remarkable about Engels' account is the extent to which it has been 
vindicated in basic essentials by developments in archaeology, palaeontology and 
palaeoanthropology in recent years. Consider the question of the "first impulse" 
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behind the evolution of the human brain and consciousness. Was it the freeing of the 
hands for tool-making and co-operative labour which stimulated brain development 
(Engels) or was it brain development which provided an impulse towards bipedalism 
and social labour (Darwin)? Up until the 1950s, Darwin's "idealist" view of human 
evolution was virtual orthodoxy, and Engels' alternative either unknown or rejected 
out of hand. Indeed, such was the dominance of the Darwinian orthodoxy, that for 
more than forty years (from 1912 to 1955) it blew off course the whole study of 
human origins. This it did by encouraging the uncritical acceptance by scientists of 
one of the greatest scientific frauds ever perpetrated - the so-called "Piltdown Affair". 
The Piltdown skull (an ape-like jaw plus large modem-looking cranium) was 
"discovered" in a gravel pit in southern England by amateur archaeologist Charles 
Dawson. The whole British scientific establishment (with one or two notable 
exceptions) accepted the Piltdown skull as the "missing link" separating humans from 
the apes. As Richard Leakey points out, this was not because the skull "was 
demonstrably old and genuine, but because it matched powerful preconceptions of 
what our ancestors were like ... the first man was clearly intelligent ... and an 
Englishman. , 118 
Eventually the "fossil" was revealed as a blatant forgery: a human skull grafted to 
the jaw of an orang-utan and treated to give the impression of age. But its near 
universal acceptance as the genuine article meant that authentic finds (which indicated 
that bipedalism and co-operative labour predated brain development) were ignored or 
ridiculed for decades. 
119 In fact, Darwin's sequence was not completely abandoned by 
the scientific community until 1974, following the discovery by Donald Johnson "of a 
complete three and half million year old skeleton with an ape sized brain and an erect 
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posture. s120 More than a hundred years after the publication of Origin of the Species, 
Engels had finally been proven right against Darwin on the question of the first 
impulse behind human evolution. Here, as in other areas of scientific research, it is 
clear that our knowledge would have developed far more rapidly and smoothly if 
those entrusted with its development had held from the outset a thoroughgoing 
materialist understanding of nature (in this case of human nature). 
But I have suggested that the whole of Engels' account, not just "this or that" 
aspect of his argument, is broadly consistent with contemporary scientific knowledge 
of human origins and prehistory. It is time to add a little substance to this claim. 
Obviously I am not saying that every detail of Engels' understanding is correct (this 
would be remarkable indeed and if true a negation of dialectics! ) or that there are not 
substantial gaps in his explanation. One important weakness of Engels' account is that 
it is does not specify those material circumstances external to biological selective 
mechanisms which ensured that evolution in the direction of bipedalism was a viable 
and useful adaptive strategy. Instead Engels simply states that our distant hominoid 
ancestors "lost the habit" of quadrupedalism, which of course has voluntarist 
connotations. Engels also overstates the role of tool-use and tool-making in 
stimulating evolution in the direction of sociality, consciousness and culture (and 
attendant physiological restructuring). A broader range of factors were of crucial 
importance in this respect, as we shall soon see. 
Yet neither of these weaknesses is especially damaging to Engels' enterprise. 
After all, Marx and Engels do recommend in The German Ideology that materialist 
analysis of society and history proceed from the anterior biological and environmental 
facts of human existence. Therefore, any specification of the physical circumstances 
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conducive to human evolution can only deepen and enrich a materialist understanding 
of our origins. And, of course, Engels' "failure" to follow through his own (and 
Marx's) recommendation in The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to 
Man is largely explainable in terms of the absence in his own day of knowledge of 
those geological and ecological circumstances which prevailed in human prehistory, 
for which he can hardly be faulted. More significantly, although Engels' unilateral 
emphasis on the role of tool-making and use in stimulating selection in the direction 
of brain development, intellect and language has been shown to be over-simple, at the 
same time the new archaeology and palaeoanthropology has shown that the primary 
impulse behind the evolution from hominoid to modem human being was nothing 
other than social labour to procure material subsistence, that is, co-operative 
economic activity in general (of which tool-making was nonetheless a crucial 
ingredient). This can hardly be seen as contradicting the fundamental point of 
Marxian materialism in historical social anthropology: the explication of human and 
cultural origins in terms of socio-economic relationships and technology. 
In any case, the "gap" in Engels' account can be filled now in a way which does 
not in the least compromise it. Modern archaeology and palaeontology have shown 
that it was the formation of the East African Rift Valley ten million years ago, 
resulting in dramatic changes in climate and drainage, and with this the development 
of "far more complex and varied mosaic of habitats", which most likely was 
"instrumental in the evolutionary origin of the first upright hominoid. s121 The reason 
for this is that these geological-climatic changes resulted in the gradual fragmentation 
of the formerly dense forest cover east of the Rift Valley (which provided the habitat 
of the earliest hominoid bands). This in turn forced many of the hominoids to struggle 
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for subsistence upon a new open savannah terrain where escape to the safety of the 
trees was not always an option and where foodstuffs were less plentiful, more 
dispersed, and hence harder to come by. 
Now to understand why these environmental changes triggered selection in the 
direction of bipedalism for certain of the hominoid species it is important to grasp two 
points. Firstly, as David Pilbeam points out, since "the contexts in which ... primates 
... stand or walk upright are 
for the most part when they are feeding ... on the ground", 
it is reasonable to conclude that the first hominids (which were much smaller than 
modern gorillas and chimpanzees) "would have walked upright readily when ... on the 
ground. "122 Secondly, as Peter Rodman and Henry McHenry point out, bipedalism in 
humans is a far more efficient mode of locomotion than quadrupedalism in the 
modem great apes, because the latter is a compromise between walking on the ground 
and climbing in the trees. "If you're an ape, and you find yourself in ecological 
circumstances where a more efficient mode of locomotion would be advantageous, the 
evolution of bipedalism is a likely outcome. " 
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Of course, the dispersal of food sources in the new savannah terrain provided 
exactly these kinds of circumstances. "Bipedalism provided the possibility of 
improved efficiency of travel with modification only of hind limbs while leaving the 
[ape] structure of the limbs free for ... feeding. " 
124 Therefore, the habitual behavioural 
tendency of the hominoid apes to stand and walk when feeding on the ground became 
reinforced and genetically enhanced by selection, because they were placed in a 
situation where they were forced to move from place to place in search of food, 
"taking fruit, berries and nuts from low bushes. "125 It was this development, marking 
the transition from hominoid to hominid, which freed the hand from its primary 
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function of tree-climbing and made possible the development of tool-use and co- 
operative labour on a scale and intensity not seen among the modern great apes 
(whose ancestors did not move away from their traditional arboreal haunts). From 
this, in turn, followed the beginnings of tool-making, the reorganisation of the brain, 
the emergence of consciousness and eventually language, culminating in the cultural 
mode of modern homo sapiens, over a period of about 2.5 million years. 
Yet it is important to stress that there was nothing inevitable in the subsequent 
pattern of evolution from small-brained bipedal ape to large-brained modern human 
being. Again, this adaptive strategy depended on a new host of environmental changes 
coming into being, as Richard Leakey explains: 
The initial appearance of the hominid family 7.5 million years ago coincided 
with global cooling and local geological events that fragmented and thinned 
the previously carpet-like forest cover in East Africa. What of the origin of 
the genus Homo? Does it "coincide" with anything significant? Yes it does: 
another global cooling event, much bigger than before. Huge ice mountains 
built up in Antarctica close to 2.6 million years ago, and for the first time 
significant amounts of ice formed in the Arctic. The frigid grip produced 
cooler, drier climates in the rest of the globe, including the varied highland 
terrain of eastern Africa. Such climatic changes break up habitats, and may 
drive pulses of extinction throughout the plant and animal worlds. But they 
may also cause speciation, the development of new species from isolated 
populations, adapting to new conditions. Among the African antelopes, 
whose fossil record is as good as any terrestrial vertebrates, can be, this pulse 
of extinction and speciation at around 2.6 million years ago is clearly seen. 
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Suddenly, a range of existing species vanished and a crop of new ones 
appeared. Glimpses of this pattern are also seen, albeit less clearly, in other 
grazing and browsing animals of Africa. I suggest that it is to be found in the 
hominids, with the evolution of australopithecines and of Homo. 126 
In these circumstances, the biological evolution of the hominids (upright apes) 
moved in at least two different directions. "One was a further exaggeration of the 
basic hominid form. This resulted in the robust australopithecines.... These creatures 
were able to process large amounts of tough plant foods, the kind found in and 
environments. The second ... was something of a breakthrough, one that is recognised 
by the appellation Homo. Because the traditional hominid diet became more difficult 
to subsist on, there was the potential for expanding the diet, not specialising it, as the 
robust australopithecines did. The expansion involved making meat an important food 
source, not just an occasional item, as it was with earlier hominids and is still for 
baboons and chimpanzees. " 127 What was the significance of this development? 
Now every biological species will have as big a brain as it can afford to build (in 
energy terms), for the simple reason that intelligence greatly enhances adaptive 
survival value. This is why "throughout evolutionary history ... animals have become 
brainier: mammals are brainier than reptiles and amphibians ... [a]nd within mammals 
.., primates are the 
best endowed of all. "128 But those primates, already better 
endowed in terms of brain size and intellect than any other species, who are able to 
adapt their diet in such a way as to greatly increase their capacity to generate and 
conserve energy, will obviously have far more scope to undergo brain reorganisation 
and development in the direction of enhanced intellect. This is exactly what did 
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happen to our hominid ancestors. The addition of meat to the previous mostly 
herbivorous diet of those hominids destined to become the first of the homo line 
provided them with far higher levels of energy than those hominids who adapted in 
the direction of dietary specialisation in plant foods alone (because meat is far richer 
in calories, fat and protein than vegetation). Over countless generations - from homo 
habilis to homo erectus and on to homo sapiens - the "surplus" of bodily energy was 
"reinvested" in brain and intellectual growth under the aegis of natural selection, a 
process culminating in the formation of the brain of modem humans (which 
constitutes just 2% of total body weight yet uses up 20% of total energy). 
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But none of this could have occurred unless our hominid ancestors had 
discovered a means of stabilising the food supply upon which their new mixed diet 
depended. This means was precisely the innovation of tool-making within the hunter- 
gatherer mode of economic subsistence in its earliest or crudest form: 
The initial expansion of brain size in the hominids, which established the 
genus Homo ... "required an adaptation that required more complex 
behaviour: the hunting-and-gathering way of life in embryo. But it also 
fuelled itself, in a kind of positive feedback.... The dietary shift in Homo 
drove the change in pattern of tooth development and facial shape.... Our 
ancestors achieved this dietary shift through technology, and thus opened the 
road to the potential - but not ... not 
inevitable - development of yet bigger 
brains. Primates have great difficulty in getting at the meat of large, tough- 
skinned animals. With a sharp stone flake, however, even the toughest hide 
can be sliced through, literally opening up a new nutritional world. In a very 
real sense, by taking a crude hammer stone and striking it against a pebble to 
88 
produce a small, sharp flake, our earliest Homo ancestors began to control 
their world in a way that no other creature has done before or since.... Here, 
we have the fruits of ingenuity, part of the evolutionary package. Our 
ancestors made these tools, but in a real sense, these tools made our 
ancestors. By the same token, they made us what we are today.... In the 
enlarged brain, the newly emerging tool-making ability, ... the beginnings of 
a hunting-and-gathering subsistence, the interconnectedness of things, we 
recognise hints of ourselves, our humanity. 
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Such social labour and co-operative tool-making was also efficacious in 
reshaping the physical organisation of our hominid and homo ancestors in a wide 
range of ways, which are only just beginning to be understood by evolutionary 
biologists. The development by homo habilis of an embryonic form of the hunter- 
gatherer mode of subsistence itself gave a boost towards the further evolution of a 
more efficient bipedal body plan. In particular, as Dean Falk has pointed out, the 
demands of co-operative hunting required improved modes of locomotion (as a rule 
animals are less static than plant foods! ), which in turn required a reorganisation of 
the blood vessels (to prevent overheating of the brain during strenuous physical 
activity). Natural selection then operated along this pathway: more efficient 
bipedalism giving rise to increasingly complex drainage and circulatory system, 
which in turn stimulated the further development of our ancestors' capacity to run an 
efficient hunting economy. 
131 At the same time, research by Ralph Holloway has 
shown that tool- making skills and cognitive skills have marched forward in concert 
as part of an "evolutionary package". Holloway observes that tool-making and 
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cognitive skills have a close proximity in the brain, which indicates a common origin, 
and speculates (reasonably) that since the fossil record suggests that tool-making 
considerably predates the process of brain enlargement, it is most likely that the initial 
spur for the latter is provided by the former. 
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But I have suggested that, whatever the initial spur for the growth of the brain and 
attendant intellectual development, its subsequent cumulative expansion and 
development cannot be attributed simply to the evolution of the increasing manual 
skills of tool-making. Of greater importance in this process was the emergence of new 
socio-economic relations alongside this technology of subsistence. Glynn Isaac and 
his colleagues have provided persuasive evidence for supposing that the development 
of the hunter-gatherer mode of economic activity (involving "home bases" and a 
sexual division of labour whereby females did most of the gathering of plant foods 
and men most of the hunting and scavenging) went hand in hand with a new adaptive 
strategy of egalitarian food-sharing (whereby food was transported to the home base 
and distributed according to need and consumed socially). 133 The move towards a 
food- sharing economy made good sense in adaptive terms because it reinforced social 
solidarity and communal ties (necessary for integrated hunting and gathering) and 
ensured a stable environment for the reproduction of the band and the rearing of the 
young. 
The significance of this development in evolutionary terms was that it encouraged 
selection in favour of increased sociality, which in turn allowed the construction of 
increasingly complex social relations and rich social interactions, this allowing the 
emergence and cumulative enrichment of "social chess" among members of the band. 
Yet learning to cope with greater societal complexity (the formation of alliances, the 
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interpretation of and orientation towards the behaviour of others, mastering the 
intricacies of reciprocity, the understanding of rituals, etc. ), on top of the demands of 
the material environment and of tool-making, itself required an enormous expansion 
in intellect or consciousness. Because of this the dialectic of tool-making, co- 
operative hunting and gathering and food-sharing drove the "evolutionary ratchet" in 
the direction of brain development and growing intellectual powers of mind and 
abstraction. Again, the logic of this particular evolutionary sequence is brilliantly 
summarised by Richard Leakey: 
With the advent of Homo and the appearance of the hunting-and-gathering 
way of life, the game of social chess would have become more demanding. 
There would indeed have been reproductive advantages to the possession of 
a more acute mental model, one that would have been aided by a sharper 
consciousness. Natural selection would have worked with this, moving 
consciousness to higher and higher levels. This gradual unfolding 
consciousness not only fashioned a new kind of reality in our heads, it also 
changed us into a new kind of animal. The two million year heritage of a 
hunting-and- gathering life, rudimentary at first but ultimately superbly 
refined, left its mark on our minds as much as it did on our bodies. On top of 
the technical skills of planning, co-ordination and technology there was, 
equally importantly, the social skill of co-operation. A sense of common 
goals and values, a desire to further the common good, co-operation was 
more than simply individuals working together. It became a set of rules of 
conduct, of morals, an understanding of right and wrong in a complex social 
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system. Without co-operation - within bands, among bands, through tribal 
groups - our technical skills would have been severely blunted. 
134 
These same socio-economic mechanisms also provide the most plausible 
explanation of why language and dialogic self-consciousness evolved. For most 
anthropologists and archaeologists the acquisition of language marks the point of no 
return in the development from upright ape to modern human being. Certainly 
language was the crucial breakthrough in terms of allowing our ancestors to develop a 
sense of self far denser and richer than anything to be found in the modem great apes, 
and in allowing a further enormous expansion in technical know-how, plus a further 
giant hike in the complexity and density of social life, all of which were undoubtedly 
beneficial to the reproductive success of the homo line. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
the formation of the brain of modern homo sapiens (itself substantially larger than the 
brain of homo erectus) was itself stimulated primarily by the development of 
language. As Harry Jerrison points out: "Technology has long since been regarded as 
the driving force behind human brain expansion. [This] ... seems to me to be an 
inadequate explanation, not least because tool-making can be accomplished with very 
little brain tissue. The production of simple, useful speech, on the other hand, requires 
a substantial amount of brain tissue. " 135 
Yet language and the dialogic self, which together constitute the foundations of 
human culture, would not have arisen in the absence of the denser social networks 
which formed around the hunter-gatherer and food-sharing modes of the new co- 
operative economy. In such communities, communication is necessarily more intense 
and sophisticated than the vocalisation which goes on in even the most social of 
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primate bands. This is because abstract communication greatly enhances the planning 
and co-ordination of co-operative labour and tool-making in a complex social 
economy. "With a shift towards a mixed economy of hunting and gathering, in which 
daily divisions of troops are routine in the separate food quests, the need for 
organisation and agreement becomes yet more intensified. A sophisticated degree of 
communication is important, as it is for overall increased sociality. , 
136 And so, given 
the socio-economic mode of the homo species, the development of a spoken language 
and appropriate reorganisation of the larynx, the pharynx, the tongue and lips hardly 
constitutes a surprising adaptive move or evolutionary "good trick": 
In all likelihood, a rudimentary form of verbal communication arose as long 
ago as two million years..., at the time of Homo habilis, and there may even 
have been language of some sort among the australopithecines. The 
emergence of Homo erectus was probably marked by a further development 
of this ability, with perhaps a greater vocabulary and a capacity for basic 
sentence structure. The evidence suggesting ritual acts in later Homo erectus 
populations might well indicate that there had been a further refinement of 
language to convey more subtle concepts. Finally the symbolism and 
imagery embodied in the art that flourished from 30,000 years ago onwards 
surely signals the origins of modern language capacity, including the 
capacity to articulate complex abstract ideas. 
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But of all this means that social labour within a co-operative food-sharing 
economy is the "missing link" which explains the emergence of modem human beings 
and the subsequent flowering of human culture, as Engels rightly insisted. For, in 
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summary, the dominant view in contemporary evolutionary biology, palaeontology 
and archaeology locates the successive enlargements of the brain over 2.5 million or 
so years in the growing dependence of our ancestors "on communicative and 
cognitive skills, which in turn were necessary for the transmission of knowledge about 
increased tool-making, for co-operative gathering and hunting, and for coping with 
the much denser networks of social interaction which grew out of both these 
activities. "138 This perspective, though not universally accepted, 139 is the dominant 
one because backed up by the archaeological record: the evidence of "home bases" 
and tool-making among homo habilis, the expansion of the habilis and erectus 
populations beyond their African homelands into cooler and less hospitable climes 
(which suggests a greater reliance on technology and culture), the decline of the 
relative size differences between male and female during the same period (which is 
suggestive of the growing importance of society and culture in providing a defence 
against predators), the evidence of fire use by homo erectus, of ritual burial sites, 
ochre skin painting and hut building among archaic homo sapiens. Such 
archaeological data is, as Charles Woolfson has said, strongly indicative that "the 
broad outlines of Engels' theory are, by and large, confirmed ... and that, in this 
respect, Engels' essay is a brilliant scientific anticipation of what is now thought to be 
the likely pattern of human evolution. "140 
Socio-historical materialism: base, superstructure and social change 
My exposition so far has outlined and defended two key explanatory hypothesis of 
critical materialism: (i) the determination of "consciousness" (including social 
consciousness) and "culture" by "being" (including social being) or "nature" (Thesis 
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1); (ii) the explanatory primacy of co-operative economic activity in determining the 
evolutionary emergence of human nature and the origins of human culture (Thesis 2). 
All of this brings me on to the third component of critical materialism: the 
explanatory primacy of the mode of economic production in determining social 
systems and overall trajectories of socio-historical development (Thesis 3). For 
convenience this thesis can be divided into two parts. First into the claim that the 
political, ideological and ideational "superstructure" of a society is determined by its 
economic "base" or "basis" (Thesis 3a). This is a statement of vertical causality in 
social systems. Second into the claim that societal evolution (together with the 
revolutionary movement from one type of social system to another) is governed 
primarily by the interface between the forces and relations of production and by the 
dynamic of class conflict fixed by the economic base (Thesis 3b). This is a statement 
of horizontal causality in societal development, which renders meaningful a 
materialist theory of history. Since I have addressed the vexed question of the 
relationship between base, superstructure and social change in greater detail in chapter 
four, I will here content myself with a summary treatment of the relevant issues here, 
in effect "setting the scene" for the later discussions. 
Base and superstructure 
The first point to make is that the Marxist distinction of base from superstructure does 
not correspond to a simple contrast between "economy" and "society". There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly Marx, unlike for instance Max Weber, is fully alive to the fact 
that economic relations are not simply technico-natural relations between individuals 
and scarce objects of utility, but are also social relations between people and between 
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the class "positions" which people occupy in society vis-ä-vis the means of production 
and subsistence. Because of this there can be no legitimate abstraction of society from 
economy, or of the science of economics from the science of sociology, of the kind 
recommended by Weber. Secondly the Marxist application of the base-superstructure 
model is not simply restricted to outlining a hierarchy of structural causality in society 
(the determination of politico-ideological forms by the forces and relations of 
production), although of course this is one of its most important functions, but extends 
much deeper and wider than this. 
More broadly, in fact, the base-superstructure model is designed to illuminate the 
"rootedness" of the social and cultural structures constitutive of social systems in 
those deeper non-social structures "basic" to these which have direct relevance in 
explaining society and history. From this point of view, superstructural social forms 
have their roots in the socio-structural "level", and structural social forms have their 
roots in non-social substructural levels or strata. Base-superstructure, in its wider 
application, is thus theoretical shorthand for a tripartite model of hierarchically 
ordered structures: substructure (human biology and its natural powers), structure (the 
mode of production and surplus extraction of a society), and superstructure (those 
social relations and ideological forms which are not themselves integral aspects of the 
structure). 141 Now I would say that it is reasonable to "reconstruct" the base- 
superstructure model, in the light of the realist philosophy of science, as one in which 
the higher-order strata are "emergent" from the lower-order strata. Certainly this kind 
of interpretation is consistent with Marx and Engels' commitment to an anti-reductive 
form of materialism in both philosophy and social theory. But this means that the 
relations between structures in this "chain of being" are best grasped as those of 
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ontological presupposition (the higher existing only by virtue of the lower and not 
vice versa) and vertical determination (the lower explaining the higher without 
explaining them away). 
I have addressed the ways in which a society's (or system of society's) mode of 
production is efficacious in vertically determining certain of its (their) non-economic 
institutions and ideologies in chapter four. 142 Therefore I will give this matter no 
consideration here. Instead I will address the more contentious issue of whether 
economic structure can plausibly be seen as ontologically basic to politico-ideological 
and ideational superstructure in social analysis. My argument is that this is indeed the 
case. However the unilateral ontological dependence of superstructure upon structure 
is plausible only if grasped diachronically, as specifying the historical origins of 
distinct cultural and political institutions in the development of the forces and 
relations of production. As a matter of historical record, the first human social 
relations were co-operative economic relations, and it was the development of these 
economic relations which provided a basis for a more diversified social and cultural 
existence. These economic relations (the hunter-gatherer mode of economic 
subsistence of homo habilis, homo erectus, archaic humans, and finally fully modern 
homo sapiens) were themselves in turn the historical product of a dialectic of 
economic labour and biological elaboration, and it is this which provides the link 
between a materialist anthropology of humanity and society and a materialist 
sociology of politics, culture and history, the former founding the latter. By contrast, if 
grasped synchronically, as specifying the one-way ontological dependence of 
superstructure upon structure in a specific society or at a given point in time, this 
argument is for the most part unsuccessful (because superstructural forms, especially 
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politico-military relations, where these are not directly relations of production, often 
function to "fix" or stabilise the relations of production which vertically explain 
them). 
The second point to make is that Marx's base-superstructure model, in its 
narrower application (as a thesis of the relationship between mode of production and 
non-economic social structures) does not map neatly on to a distinction between 
"structure" and "culture", as is often imagined. The distinction between "structure" 
and "culture" is a broader one, and one rooted in the simple recognition that the social 
world is populated by material and cultural structures, both of which are aspects of a 
social world which (from the point of view of every generation of individuals) is 
"already made". Realists quite rightly argue that material and cultural structures are 
both emergent properties of the social activities of the dead generations, which 
confront the living as a set of constraints, enablements and impulses upon their 
thinking and conduct. Both are "basic" to social interaction and human agency in this 
sense. But, this having been said, it is nonetheless necessary to draw a distinction 
between structure and culture, for the obvious reason that these terms refer us to 
"societal emergents" which are different in kind. "Structure", for instance, refers us to 
relations governing the production of use-values and the appropriation-distribution of 
allocative and authoritative resources in a society. "Culture", by contrast, refers us to 
the ensemble of ideological and ideational structures of a society (i. e. systems of 
communication, meaning, legitimation and knowledge). 
Now because the base-superstructure model, in its narrower application, does not 
correspond exactly to a simple contrast between "economic emergents" and "cultural 
emergents", it can hardly be construed as logically excluding the possibility that the 
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"economic structure" of society is itself comprised of "material" and "cultural" 
elements. Furthermore, because the superstructure of any society is determined not 
simply by the economic structure upon which it rests, but also by the substructure 
basic to the economic level (humanity's biologically-given needs and capacities), nor 
can it be plausibly affirmed that Marx wishes to categorise all superstructural spheres 
or properties as "reflexes" of economic conditions or class interests. In fact, Marx is 
committed to neither of these positions often attributed to him. He does not affirm the 
unilateral determination of superstructure by structure, nor the purely "material" 
nature of structure. 143 
Whatever Marx's own view, however, what cannot be doubted is that certain 
cultural structures are an integral part of the material basis of a society (broadly 
defined), others are neither base nor superstructure but are interwoven with and 
essential to both, and that still others are shaped as much by substructural levels as by 
the structural level of economic and class relations. Into the first category fall cultural 
emergents such as scientific knowledge of natural laws, "recipe knowledge" of the 
material world, and the technical know-how derived from scientific and practical 
knowledges of nature combined. These are an indispensable part of the base for two 
simple reasons. Firstly because they are the emergent products of modes of 
constitutive social labour which immerse human agents most immediately and 
directly in the "natural terrain" upon which their social relations and interactions are 
based (i. e. practical labour on the material world to procure a livelihood and scientific 
labour designed to reveal the underlying structures of nature by rational procedures of 
experiment and empirical checking). This renders these cultural emergents "material" 
in a way that political and ideological structures are not (the latter of which are 
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emergent from the "artificial terrain" 44 of society and express the vested interests and 
outlooks of specific agential groupings in social relations). Secondly because the 
primary function of both scientific and recipe knowledge is to extend practical human 
control over nature so as to develop material production in the service of human needs 
and social interests. 
Into the second category fall the linguistic structures of a society. These are 
simultaneously base and superstructure because indispensable to every complex form 
of social activity (and hence social structure), all of which are dependent upon the 
communication of meaning in interaction. This does not free them from an "ultimate" 
material determination, of course. But the material basis of linguistic structures 
nonetheless lies outside society itself, in the biological needs and capacities of 
humanity's species-being, as these were generated historically in the interface 
between co-operative labour and physical reality. Finally, into the third category fall a 
whole range of cultural forms (religious, artistic, philosophic, etc. ). Certainly these 
are, for the most part, shaped in terms of their content and function by economic 
conditions and class relations and positioning, though often indirectly via intermediate 
superstructural mechanisms. But since "men, while living in society, do not thereby 
cease to live in nature, and to receive from it occasion and material for their curiosity 
and for their imagination", las it is hardly a matter of contention that certain cultural 
structures will inevitably embody some-or-other expression of the "general human 
condition". 
This is clearest of all in the case of artistic and religious productions. These are 
never straightforward articulations of economic or class mechanisms, though of 
course we can be sure that these will be present, not least because people living 
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naturally do not cease to live socially. In fact, they are also expressive of general 
human emotions, aspirations and needs (for fellowship, community, meaning, order, 
love, sexual relations, aesthetic expression, or of the pain and anger of their absence or 
frustration, of fear and lament of old age, sickness and death, etc. ), which are 
themselves comprehensible only in terms of the biological constitution of human 
beings. 146 
A final point of clarification before proceeding. A common mistake of Marxist 
and non-Marxist interpreters of Marx is to treat his couplet of base and superstructure 
as pretty much the same thing as his distinction between "being" and "consciousness". 
This is not the case. The couplet of being (including social being) and consciousness 
(including social consciousness) is the most general concept of all in Marxist theory, 
and as such it corresponds neither to the broader or narrower applications of the base- 
superstructure model (though obviously it is closer to the first than the second). On 
the contrary, it refers not only to vertical relations between those emergent structures 
(biological, psychological, socio-economic, socio-cultural, etc. ) which "bound" and 
"found" human agency and interaction in determinate ways, but to the totality of 
social and material relationships (anterior and adjacent) into which individuals are 
inserted at birth or enter into during their life-cycle. Thus, whereas Marx's base- 
superstructure model establishes the case for a materialist account of the emergent 
entities which constitute and which immediately found a social system, his couplet of 
being-consciousness establishes the case for a materialist ontology and method in the 
human sciences generally. This it does on the grounds that human beings are not born 
with concepts, values, beliefs or properties of self-consciousness "ready-made" (the 
human "spirit" or "essence", etc. ), but instead acquire these through active ongoing 
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interaction with subjects and the sensuous object-world (the "inorganic body" of 
human thought and conduct) within an inherited social and material environment 
shaped by both natural laws and by a history of human manipulation of these laws. 
By grasping the determination of consciousness by being in this sense (and not 
under the narrower terms of base-superstructure), it becomes possible to avoid the 
dilemma that Marx's materialism is suggestive of an implausible abstraction of 
thought from action, or of ideas (superstructure) from social practices such as 
economic production (base). 147 Of course, when analysing social practices, the 
theorist cannot dispense with the ideas or beliefs (i. e. forms of consciousness) which 
energise or motivate them. But this is beside the point, for such an analysis pertains to 
the "life-world" of human social and physiological interaction, not to the properties of 
a social and physical environment which is "already made". To repeat it once more. 
Base-superstructure is about the emergent properties of human biology and social 
interaction and their hierarchical ordering in a social system. By contrast, being- 
consciousness is a thesis of the "determination" of the consciousness of living 
individuals by the totality of material and social circumstances and relations (physical, 
social-structural, social-interactional) in which they are placed or enter into during 
their life-process. 
Structure, superstructure and history 
I have said that Marxian materialism is also committed to a theory of history (Thesis 
3b). According to this, socio-historical processes are governed by the motion of the 
forces of production, the contradiction between forces and relations of production, and 
the dynamic of class conflict emergent from these structural contradictions of the 
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mode of production. These are universal mechanisms of societal motion (in class 
societies), though the precise form which they take is determined by the nature of the 
relations of production which prevail in a particular social system. Yet it is important 
to grasp that this historical materialism is not a theory of social change as such, but 
rather of a particular form of social change. That is to say, historical materialism is an 
attempt to theorise societal evolution, the developmental tendencies or "logics" which 
impart to societal change a certain directionality towards more developed social forms 
out of less developed social forms, and the mechanisms (structural contradictions and 
attendant class struggle) which bring about the revolutionary overthrow of one form 
of social system by another. This being the case, a mere postulation of momentous 
historical events which have no apparent economic locus or cause is not sufficient to 
refute historical materialism, despite the contrary belief of most anti-Marxist scholars. 
In a nutshell, then, Thesis 3b is a theory of horizontal causality in social systems, and 
it is only by virtue of its status as such that it is possible to speak of a "materialist 
conception of history" as opposed to a "pluralist" or "multi-factoral" one. 
My purpose here is not to enter into an exposition or defence of Marx's theory of 
history. Instead I would like to briefly address one issue. This is the question of 
whether privileging the "economic base" vis-ä-vis the politico-ideological and 
ideational superstructures of society in a causal explanation of historical process is 
inherently disreputable in the sense of being logically unsustainable. For most 
philosophers and social theorists the answer to this is a definite yes. For them it makes 
no sense to postulate the primacy of socio-economic mechanisms (i. e. the mode of 
production and attendant class relations) in imparting directionality to systemic 
evolution and transformation for the simple reason that all historical events are 
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determined conjointly by the plurality of generative mechanisms (economic, political, 
linguistic, ideological, etc. ) at work in society. None of these mechanisms can be 
attributed any kind of explanatory primacy in governing societal dynamics because all 
are necessary and indispensable to any passage of social interaction leading to any 
determinate socio-historical outcome. There cannot be a development of the 
productive forces, for example, unless individuals draw upon a linguistic and cultural 
structure to communicate meaning during economic production. There cannot be a 
social revolution, to offer another example, unless merely economic conflicts are 
generalised into political and ideological struggles: subordinate social agents have to 
draw upon economic, political and ideological structures if they are to defeat 
entrenched elite groupings and refashion social relations in their favour. 
This objection is not at all a decisive one. Of course, it is true that a range of 
social mechanisms (and non-social ones besides) are efficacious in explaining 
interactional processes and socio-historical outcomes. But I have already pointed out 
that Marx's double distinction between base-superstructure and between being and 
consciousness does not imply a denial of this elementary fact: economic structures 
and processes are never simply "material", but are also "social" and "cultural", and in 
a certain sense "political" too. The purpose of Marx's materialist conception of 
history is less to deny a key role to politics and culture in shaping the historical 
movement of social systems, and more to affirm that particular kinds of political and 
cultural mechanisms (i. e. those which are directly connected to or expressive of the 
structural contradictions between the forces and relations of production and social 
classes) are fundamental in explaining the developmental possibilities and ultimate 
fate of all social systems. 
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This is still a strong claim, a materialist theory of systemic dynamics in the sense 
of attributing explanatory primacy to those cultural forms which are integral aspects 
of the forces of production (in shaping economic development), and to those political 
and ideological struggles which are thrown up by the fettering of the productive forces 
by the relations of production and resultant class malintegration. For it is not the case 
that any kind of politics or culture will suffice to bring about societal development or 
(especially) societal transformation: those forms of politics and ideology which soar 
above the "contradictions and struggles of real life" will be of interest only to 
antiquarians, and will have little substantive systemic or historical impact. But it is 
nonetheless clear that Marx's historical materialism does not involve a neglect of 
politics, culture or ideology, as is commonly asserted. Yet, since it is precisely the 
developmental dynamic of the forces of production, and the fettering of the productive 
forces by relations of production, which facilitates the political and ideological 
struggles which governs societal elaboration/transformation, it is quite legitimate to 
regard the "economic" as the decisive factor of historical advance. 
Now these general points allow us to obtain a balanced assessment of the 
following much-maligned argument of Engels: 
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the 
superstructure - political forms of the class struggle and its results, such as 
constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., 
juridical forms, and especially the reflections of all these real struggles in the 
brains of the participants, political, legal, philosophical theories, religious 
views and their further development into systems of dogma - also exercise 
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their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
determine their form in particular. There is an interaction of all these 
elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things 
and events whose inner connection is so remote and so impossible to prove 
that we can regard it as non-existent and neglect it), the economic movement 
is finally bound to assert itself. 148 
The standard objection to Engels' formulation is twofold. First that it crudely and 
falsely abstracts economic relations from social relations and social consciousness, 
suggesting a relationship of "external causality" between structure and superstructure. 
Contra Engels, we are told, "social being" and "social consciousness", economy and 
society, are "interpenetrated", presupposing one another so closely that it is scarcely 
plausible to separate them even in thought. Second that it compounds this error by 
insisting that economic generative mechanisms are privileged in the sense that these 
alone exercise the decisive influence in determining socio-historical outcomes. In the 
latter case, of course, Engels is taxed by the critics for transforming historical 
materialism into a monistic theory of horizontal causality in social systems, according 
to which economic structures or "economic conditions" are "the ultimately 
determining factor in history". 
Neither of these criticisms is valid. The first is the easiest to dispose of. At the 
risk of repetition, if the distinction between structure and superstructure is interpreted, 
not as a broad distinction between "social being" and "social consciousness", but as a 
specification of the hierarchical ordering of emergent structures in social systems, it is 
clear that no implausible abstraction of "consciousness" from the practices of 
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economic production or class struggle is implied here. The second objection to 
Engels' above abbreviated statement of historical materialism has more substance to it 
than the first. His argument here and elsewhere is clumsy in the sense that it can be 
interpreted as expressing the view that the economy always and everywhere 
determines the long-term fate of any society or social system, even if in the short or 
medium term superstructural factors (law, polity, ideology, etc. ) are capable of 
arresting or facilitating its historical dynamic. However, notwithstanding the 
ambiguities of Engels' terminology here and elsewhere, it does seem more reasonable 
to interpret his account of the historical interface between structure and superstructure, 
not as "determination in the final analysis" (as the Althusserians would have it), but as 
a statement of reciprocal but unequal interaction between the two. 149 Now such an 
understanding of structural dynamics certainly is logically consistent with a 
materialist theory of history. Yet it is one which avoids economic monism without 
collapsing into pluralism. For, according to this view, although socio-historical 
outcomes are shaped "horizontally" by a plurality of socio-cultural mechanisms, a 
"structured dialectic" 5° if you like, at the same time those mechanisms derived from 
the structure have a long-run tendency to "assert their own movement as necessary" 
vis-ä-vis those derived from the superstructure. 
But is Engels' interpretation of historical materialism as an account of the 
"reciprocal but unequal interaction" between structure and superstructure theoretically 
defensible? An affirmative answer to this question is implicit in my defence of Marx's 
structural and historical sociology outlined in chapter four. There I argue that the 
i 
"interaction of two unequal forces" (socio-economic base and politico-ideological 
superstructure) which provide history with its dynamic is a function of two kinds of 
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structural relationships. The first of these is the contradiction internal to most modes 
of production between forces and relations of production. This supports Engels' thesis 
of the "dominance" of the "economic movement", even against obstruction from 
"conservative" elements of the superstructure, by virtue of the tendency of class 
relations to fetter the productive forces in a way which brings about convulsive crises 
and societal decline. How does this work? 
Because class-based relations of production, and the superstructural forms which 
act to stabilise them, eventually become a barrier to crisis-free economic growth, they 
inevitably fall under ever increasing pressure from internal and external forces 
(domestic class unrest and intra-class economic and military competition from rival 
states) to undergo reorganisation by whatever means in the interests of unfettered 
economic development. Often these pressures build up until they become irresistible 
forces for progressive change. In this case, "economic dominance" manifests itself 
"positively", in the sense of stimulating or motivating class agents to engage in 
struggles to reform or overturn social relations, even if this is only top-down reform 
which preserves in a modified form the powers and privileges of existing elites. On 
other occasions, however, "progressive" classes pioneering new forms of production 
and wealth creation fail to break the power of ossified property forms and their 
attendant superstructures, or entrenched elites fail to respond appropriately to the 
economic constraints (introducing counter-productive or token reforms, etc. ). In this 
case, "economic dominance" asserts itself "negatively", by means of the "common 
ruination of the contending classes" 5' or even "barbarism"' 52 (i. e. the internal 
disintegration or regression of a society or its subordination to economically and 
hence militarily stronger states). 
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The second form of structural relationship which explains the tendency of the 
"economic movement to assert itself as necessary" is that of the "relative autonomy" 
and "structural dependence" of the superstructure from and upon the economic base. 
This works as follows. Firstly, since "core" superstructural forms (such as polity, 
education and law) are indispensable to the vested interests of propertied elites to 
secure their privileged position in the relations of production, it is uncontroversial that 
these will tend to develop in ways which promote (or which at the very least do not 
contradict) the dominant economic relationship between exploiting and exploited 
classes. Secondly, since those agents who occupy positions of power and authority in 
superstructural relations or institutions draw their (normally privileged) life-chances 
from the surplus product or surplus value pumped out of the direct producers by the 
exploiting class, it follows also that they (in common with previous generations of 
superstructural role-incumbents) will undergo greater or lesser directional pressure to 
identify their interests and functions with those of propertied elites, meaning that over 
time there will be a strong tendency for superstructural emergents to be forced into 
line with structural emergents. 153 
Naturally this does not mean that those superstructures closely tied to the 
economic base must develop in ways which guarantee the reproduction of existing 
class relations. Their relative autonomy is such that those elite groupings who live off 
the surplus in cultural and political spheres (i. e. those who command the armies, the 
police and the priesthoods) do tend to develop particular interests of their own 
(particularly in obtaining for themselves and the institutions they control higher 
prestige and material privileges than those which accrue to those operating in other 
branches of society. The relative autonomy of the politico-ideological superstructure 
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from the economic base may even become a drain on the mode of surplus extraction, 
endangering the relations of production upon which the reproduction of social 
institutions and material culture is "ultimately" dependent. '54 Again, in these 
circumstances, the "structural dependence" of the superstructures on the relations of 
production allows the "dominance" of the economic in a negative way. The failure of 
the superstructures to adequately safeguard the relations of exploitation in which they 
are rooted must ultimately lead either to their overthrow by subordinate classes, or the 
weakening or even collapse of society under pressure from economic decline and 
internal strife, or failing this the military or economic subordination or destruction of 
society at the hands of propertied elites from foreign territories. But the prohibitive 
sanctions of allowing those superstructural emergents which are "functional" to 
dominant property relations to "get out of line" is for the most part sufficient to ensure 
that those with vested interests in their preservation prevent them from doing so or 
rapidly bring them to book if they do. 
The existence of such relationships of structural dependence (of polity, law, 
major cultural institutions, etc., upon economic production and exploitation) is what 
justifies the Marxist view that societies are systems or totalities, following their own 
logics of development, rather than a heterogeneous ensemble of "autonomous" 
structures or practices, moving in no particular direction. The latter view is, of course, 
virtual orthodoxy among contemporary postmodernist scholars, and for many 
Weberians, for whom history is "meaningless flux". Both sets of theorists follow 
Nietzsche's example in reducing social reality to a "flat space" of competing power 
centres, none of which are anterior or basic to the others. By doing so they avoid the 
error of dissolving the economic, political and ideological aspects of society into one 
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another only at the heavy price of undermining any conception of society as a "unity- 
in-difference". 
But the either-or dichotomies of monism versus pluralism are no more exhaustive 
of the scientific possibilities than are those of individualism versus holism or 
voluntarism versus determinism. A "principle of pluralism" cannot be inferred from 
the failings of monistic reductionism, any more than the failings of holism prove the 
case for individualism or vice versa, but has to be justified on theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Yet most practitioners of "multi-factoral" historical sociology 
appear oblivious to this fact. For them it is a matter of "common-sense" that either 
historical dynamics are determined by socio-economic mechanisms alone or they are 
the indeterminate resultant of a multiplicity of distinct or "autonomous" causal factors 
(economic, political, military or ideological), none of which have any greater 
explanatory significance than the others in shaping societal outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental aim of this chapter has been to show that a fully adequate social 
theory and sociology must be constituted as a specific application of emergentist 
materialism to the human and social worlds. Thus, whereas previously I have been 
concerned with demonstrating the efficacy of an emergentist ontology of society and 
attendant methodology of social analysis, in opposition to various forms of reductive 
social theorising, here I have sought to show that sociological emergentism is both 
supportive of a dialectical materialist understanding of society and history and is 
substantially deepened and enriched by being reconstructed as such. Failing this it 
becomes vulnerable either to idealist regress (the fate of practically every major form 
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of sociological theory) or to a depthless descriptive empiricism (as exemplified by 
Weberian and postmodernist theory) which is incapable of coming to terms with the 
fact of evolutionary directionality in societal development. Indeed, as in the case of 
Weberian and postmodemist approaches, the attempt to show that neither materialism 
nor idealism offers adequate understandings of society and social process invariably 
ends up collapsing into idealism in practice. So it is that postmodernists end up with 
"textualism" (the reduction of social structure and social interaction to "discursive 
practices"). And so it is that Weberians end up treating ideology and culture as 
"freefloating" phenomena, as magically uncaused by anything external or anterior to 
itself (e. g. Weber's postulation of a mystical "rationalisation process" as lying at the 
historical root of capitalism and attempt to show that religious ethics are not 
explainable in terms of class relations or material circumstances). 
By contrast, my conclusion that neither idealism nor pluralism are defensible, 
either as ontology or method in the social sciences, is drawn logically from the 
philosophical ontology of depth realism, which as we have seen is based upon the 
activity and results of the empirical sciences. The stratification of nature, in particular 
the relations of ontological presupposition and vertical determination which lead from 
lower-order to higher-order structures of the material world, is plainly inconsistent 
with theoretical models of the social world which either treat "culture" or 
"consciousness" or "discourse" as its primary reality or which collapse it into a 
depthless space of autonomous practices or structures where everything determines 
everything else in a kaleidoscopic fashion. Such is indicative of the fact that 
explanation of "ideal elements" must always be sought in underlying structures, 
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whether the "situational logics" defined by emergent social relations or the non-social 
structures anterior or basic to these (e. g. human biological needs and interests). 
Yet because the higher-order ideological and ideational structures of human- 
social reality are never autonomous of the social and material circumstances of their 
production and reproduction, but are rather shaped crucially by the life-worlds of their 
human authors and bearers (as determined by their positioning in social relations), this 
is strongly suggestive that the ultimate explanation of societal evolution and/or 
transformation must also be a "materialist" one. Paradoxically, this is acknowledged 
by Weber, in one of his more insightful moments, where he points out that human 
agents will not for the most part tolerate too great a discrepancy between their cultural 
values or beliefs and their material interests. As we have seen, since those material 
social structures which frame the life-experiences and life-chances of differently 
situated individuals in effect exert directional pressure upon agents to reproduce and 
elaborate cultural structures ("ideal interests") in a manner which is broadly consistent 
with their vested social interests and experiences in social relations, it follows that 
there is a long-run tendency in any social system for the latter to "accommodate" or 
"correspond" to the former. Naturally this does not mean that "ideal elements" 
passively register "material elements", or that the former are not indispensable to any 
passage of social interaction leading to systemic elaboration or reproduction. But it 
does mean that those "ideal elements" which feed into structural statics or 
modification or even transformation are always energised by and expressive of the 
"contradictions of real life", the latter of which explain why such cultural properties 
are efficacious in these crucial respects and determine also the systemic possibilities 
which result from their translation into social agency. 
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Thus emergentist Marxism, as social theory, can logically sustain an 
understanding of society as "vertical determination" (of superstructure by structure 
and substructure) and of history as "horizontal determination" (reciprocal but unequal 
interaction between base and superstructure in shaping socio-systemic outcomes). I 
will pursue these themes in chapter four. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to 
obtain an adequate understanding of the human agents (and their social interaction) 
who are alone responsible for society and history-making. This is the task of the next 
two chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ORGANISMS, SUBJECTS AND 
SOCIETY 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the foundations of an understanding of 
human agency and social interaction which is compatible with realism and Marxism. 
This will be conducted as follows. Firstly I will offer an introduction and defence of 
Marx's theory of human nature and account for its necessary theoretical function in 
historical materialism and any useable theory of society. My basic argument here is 
that the Marxian theory of "species-being" allows us to grasp certain fundamental 
facts about social relations and social process which would otherwise be baffling, and 
offers an account of human nature which is in keeping with the findings of 
contemporary research into human origins. Secondly I will seek to add more 
theoretical substance to the above by considering the adequacy or otherwise of 
"naturalistic" and "sociological" accounts of subjects, agency and society. This will 
suffice to buttress my defence of realist social theory (in the foregoing analysis) by 
revealing the shortcomings of endorsing an "understratified" view of individuals (as 
agents and interactants) which collapses them into the "flat place" of either social 
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interaction or their "pre-given" psycho-organic or subjective properties (i. e. as 
organisms or subjects). Taken together, my critique of naturalistic and sociological 
models of the interface between individual and society is designed to reveal the 
theoretical utility of Marx's distinction between species-being and social being. My 
central claim is that following Marx's example provides the theorist with the 
conceptual resources to avoid the abstract polarities of "naive naturalism" versus 
"sociological imperialism". 
2.1: MARX'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN NATURE 
Despite fashionable "anti-humanist" and "anti-naturalist" interpretations to the 
contrary, the anthropological dimension of historical materialism is spelt out in no 
uncertain terms in Marx's Comments on James Mill, The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 and the Grundrisse. It is also quite manifest in Marx's and 
Engels' collaborative work The German Ideology. The starting point of Marx's and 
Engels' social theory is precisely their rejection of the idealist view of Hegel and his 
followers that the human and natural worlds are but epiphenomena of God or 
"Absolute Spirit", and that human beings are themselves a semi-divine species, a race 
of rational beings, set apart from the rest of organic nature by the Creator's "ultimate 
purpose". In place of idealism, Marx and Engels postulate the materialist datum that 
instead of being counterposed to nature, human beings should be recognised as a 
constituent part of nature, an aspect of nature's biological evolution, as absolutely 
continuous with nature, as completely dependent upon nature, and as totally immersed 
in nature: 
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The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the 
fact that man (like the animals) lives on inorganic nature; and the more 
universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of 
inorganic nature on which he lives.... The universality of man appears in 
practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic 
body - both inasmuch as nature is (i) his direct means of life, (2) the 
material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Man lives on 
nature ... nature 
is his body, with which he must remain in continuous 
interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked 
to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of 
nature. ' 
Indeed, it is this recognition that the material roots of human society, culture and 
history reside precisely in organic and inorganic nature which doubtless informs 
Marx's claim in the Manuscripts that "history itself is a real part of natural history - of 
nature developing into man. ,2 And it is, of course, this same naturalistic conception of 
the "microfoundations" of social life which underpins Marx's critique of Lassalle's 
argument that "labour is the source of all wealth and culture" in his Critique of the 
Gotha Programme. Thus, for Marx, "labour is not the source of all wealth.... Nature is 
just as much the source of use-values (and it is surely of such that material wealth 
consists! ) as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human 
labour-power. "3 
Philosophical materialism, once translated into social theory, thus postulates the 
essential complicity between human beings and nature, between human history and 
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natural history. Such an understanding dictates in turn that social theory has both a 
definite method and point of departure when analysing human society and history: 
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living 
human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical [i. e. 
biological] organisation of these individuals and their consequent 
relationship to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go into the actual 
physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds 
himself - geological, oro-hydrographical, climatic, and so on. The writing of 
history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification 
in the course of history through the actions of men. 4 
In other words, the scientific or materialist investigation of humanity's life- 
process must start from the biological constitution of human beings and from the 
physical structure of the material environment with and within which they are 
compelled to interact in the production and/or procurement of their cultural and 
economic needs. Only after elaborating these "natural bases" - "the actual physical 
nature of man [and] the natural conditions in which man finds himself' - can 
sociological and historical analysis proceed; in effect by examining the manner in 
which the psycho-organic and environmental foundations of human society are 
modified or even transformed through history by the socio-cultural mode and activity 
of modern homo sapiens. 
The materialist conception that instead of standing apart from nature human 
beings are in fact a constituent part of nature is only the starting point of Marx's and 
Engels' philosophical anthropology. The fact that humanity is a part of nature, arising 
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as a product of biological evolution, and remaining always dependent on the physical 
environment for its intellectual and material sustenance or livelihood, does not mean 
that human beings should not be clearly differentiated from the rest of nature. It 
should be recalled that Marxian philosophy and social theory was developed not only 
in opposition to Hegelian idealism but also the mechanical materialism of the radical 
enlightenment. A genuinely dialectical materialism demanded a transformation of the 
meaning of materialism as it was then understood by Feuerbach and the utopian 
socialists. Marx and Engels were thus amongst the first to recognise that mechanical 
materialism inevitably ends up negating itself in a kind of elitist idealism, since in 
order to overcome the radical determination of human beings by the biological, 
environmental and socio-cultural facts of their life-process, it has to postulate the 
existence of "great individuals", "visionaries" or "charismatic leaders" who are 
magically emancipated from these conditional pressures. As Marx puts it: "The 
materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances, and that, therefore, 
changed men are products of other circumstances, forgets that it is men who change 
circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this doctrine is 
bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. "5 
The Marxian solution to the impasse of mechanical materialism is a dynamic one. 
Rather than portraying human beings as determined by a mute or static biological 
constitution, and as merely adapting themselves to a pre-given and essentially 
unchanging physical environment, Marx and Engels instead posit the role of creative 
human agency in modifying or even transforming the natural and social worlds. They 
also stress the manner in which the changed circumstances which result from this 
activity (and the actual process of changing these circumstances) simultaneously 
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changes the nature of its human authors. Thus "Men, developing their material 
production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their actual world, also 
their thinking and the product of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines 
life, but life that determines consciousness. "6 
So, in contrast to Feuerbach and his followers, Marx and Engels stress both the 
essential unity between humanity and nature and the radical difference between the 
two. Although for them philosophical materialism still constitutes the basis of the 
analysis of both nature and society, it is nonetheless the case that the peculiar status 
and function of the species-capacities of human matter (as a force for consciously 
reacting upon and modifying the social and material facts of human existence), 
requires a distinct materialist approach which transcends behaviourism and 
determinism, and which makes a clean break with the mechanical causality associated 
with the purely physical sciences. 
It follows from the Marxian critique of mechanical materialism that the key to 
understanding human society and history lies in uncovering the defining 
characteristics of humanity's species-being. This is because in the absence of such an 
account of the psycho-organic powers and dispositions of human persons it is 
impossible to explain how they are able to differentiate themselves from the rest of 
organic and inorganic nature and react back upon it in a redirective or transformative 
way. What, then, is the Marxian theory of human nature? On the one hand, of course, 
Marx and Engels clearly reject the notion of an unchanging human nature (i. e. a 
human nature which is not the product of evolutionary history and which is not 
amendable to further evolutionary change under certain circumstances). To endorse 
such a metaphysical abstraction as this would, from their point of view, constitute a 
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violation of the dialectical method which stresses the historical status of all of 
nature's elements and interconnections. One of Marx's major criticisms of Feuerbach 
was that the latter conceived of human nature as an eternal essence, totally abstracted 
from the socio-cultural mode of modern homo sapiens, from humanity's natural 
history, and from the specific social relations emergent from these bases. "[T]he 
essence of man ... can with 
him [Feuerbach] be regarded only [my emphasis] as 
`species', as an inner, mute, general characteristic which unites the many individuals 
only in a general way. "7 For Marx, by contrast, the concrete or actual characteristics 
of human persons have to be regarded as a simultaneously socio-cultural and 
evolutionary psycho-organic construction. "[B]ecause he [Feuerbach] still remains in 
the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not 
under their existing conditions of life, which have made them what they are, he never 
arrives at the actually existing, active men, but stops at the abstraction `man'. "8 
On the other hand, however, Marx and Engels certainly did accept that human 
persons in widely different societies, societal contexts and historical epochs share 
fundamental characteristics in common. This apparent contradiction between 
humanity's species-nature and its socio-cultural nature dissolves once we recognise 
that these two aspects of the human life-process are interwoven and mutually 
reinforcing, with each providing necessary enabling preconditions for the historical 
development of the other. Norman Geras's attribution to Marx of an analytical 
distinction between "human nature" and the "nature of humanity"9 (or between 
"species-being" and "social being") thus appears to me to rightly identify a contrast in 
Marx's work between the relatively permanent (albeit historically produced) 
characteristics and tendencies of human persons which exist in a wide variety of 
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societies throughout history and those provisional and contingent characteristics 
which individuals take on as a result of their immersion within specific kinds of socio- 
cultural relationships. From this point of view, the precise nature of human beings in 
any concrete societal and historical context depends on the interrelationship between 
"human nature" and "the nature of humanity" - that is, on the interface between their 
"species-being" and their "social being". It follows from this, in turn, that the task of 
social analysis is not to conflate these two dimensions of "human reality" (i. e. its 
social and non-social components), or reduce one to the other, but to examine their 
interplay over time. 
But what are these relatively enduring attributes or dispositions of modem homo 
sapiens which transcend specific cultures or societies? Broadly, the Marxian 
conception of human nature defines it in terms of a wide range of powers, capacities, 
qualities and tendencies which are quite unique to human beings (to the best of our 
current scientific knowledge). These include sociality, intelligence, self- 
consciousness, rationality, linguistic capacity, redirective-constitutive labour, as well 
as certain universal emotional dispositions and elementary behavioural norms. 1° The 
Marxian conception of human nature also defines it in terms of a range of universal 
psycho- organic needs and interests (to be specified). " Now the "capacities" and 
"tendencies" component of human nature is theoretically significant for Marx because 
it furnishes historical materialism with an explanation of how human society and 
socio-cultural development is possible. The theoretical function of the "needs" and 
"interests" component of human nature, by contrast, is to furnish historical 
materialism with part of the explanation of why society and history have a dynamic. 
Addressing the former, Marx stresses four species-capacities in particular - namely 
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intelligence, self- consciousness, sociability and labour. These he appears to regard as 
especially essential enabling prerequisites of humanity's socio-cultural mode of 
existence, of humanity's cultural history, and of the wider species-powers which 
human beings have acquired during the course of their social and biological 
development. To grasp his meaning here let us examine briefly the role of each of 
these "human capacities" in historical materialism. 
The fairly self-evident role in historical materialism of human "intellect" or 
"consciousness" (i. e. the powers of abstraction, reflection and intentionality) and self- 
consciousness (i. e. the "I" who does the reflecting and purposive acting) as a gift of 
human nature (or the interface between human biology and the object-world it 
encounters from birth) rather than a product of social conditioning and cultural 
learning has long been a source of discomfort to those Marxists and non-Marxists who 
would like to pigeonhole Marx and Engels as "social determinists", "anti-humanists" 
or "anti-naturalists". And yet it is Marx's contention that one of the more important 
species-capacities peculiar to human beings, which sets them apart from the animals, 
is precisely conscious intelligence and self-consciousness, since it is these powers 
which enable human beings to meet their material and other needs in a wide variety of 
ways and which make human society and culture possible. As Marx himself argues: 
"The animal is one immediately with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself 
from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will 
and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity.... Conscious life-activity 
distinguishes man immediately from animal life- activity. "12 
Human beings are thus capable of utilising their superior mental equipment to 
reflect upon their conditions of existence, subjectively raising themselves above the 
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social and material facts of their "life-world" in order to formulate new or innovative 
ways of changing or even transforming these conditions, before translating reflections 
and abstractions into conscious intentional practical activity geared towards these 
ends. In other words, unlike other animals, which are condemned by their biology to 
simply reproducing themselves and their narrow range of specialised behaviours, 
human beings can transform themselves and their social and material circumstances 
precisely because they possess the mental power to abstract themselves from their 
activity and the products of their activity and hence dream up innovative ways of 
modifying or improving them. It should go without saying, of course, that without this 
universal species-capacity for conscious and self-conscious activity there can be no 
more possibility of human beings qualitatively differentiating themselves from the rest 
of nature than there can be of a distinctively human history. 
It is important to stress, however, that Marx and Engels do not regard these 
human qualities of consciousness and self-consciousness as purely static or 
contemplative ones. Rather their contention is that these species-powers, although an 
essential prerequisite of human society and social history, have nonetheless been 
developed socially and historically. From this perspective, although human persons 
are biologically endowed with the capacity to engage in self-conscious reflection upon 
the social and material circumstances of their life-process, they develop and refine 
these (and other powers) by putting them to work - i. e. by translating them into 
concrete practices or activities in relation to the world. Thus, whereas Marx and 
Engels argue that human consciousness and self-consciousness is dependent for its 
historical development upon the cumulative progress of practical human activity in 
the material world, they are also clear that human consciousness and self- 
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consciousness are on their own insufficient preconditions for the existence of a 
recognisably human society or history. 
It follows from these arguments that abstract appeals to "mind", "consciousness" 
or "rationality" will not alone suffice to provide the "genetic microfoundations" of 
complex socio-cultural organisation and elaboration. On the contrary, as Marx and 
Engels were the first to grasp, it is precisely because human beings are by nature 
conscious and self-conscious producers, i. e. labouring animals, that society and 
humanity have a history as opposed to an endless cycle of mere adaptation to external 
circumstances: "Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion 
or by anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence ... Men have 
history because they must produce their life, and because they must produce it ... in a 
particular way. "13 
It is this conception of the interrelationship between human practical activity - i. e. 
labour - and human consciousness which allows us to make sense of Marx's famous 
assertion that "labour is the essence man ... it is just in his work upon the objective 
world ... that man proves 
himself to be a species-being ... through his production 
nature appears as his work and his reality. " 14 There is no question here of Marx 
reducing human nature to "labour" or "production", as is often suggested, for human 
beings can only be producers (as opposed to mere adaptors) given the species- 
dispositions of abstraction, reflection and intentionality listed above, which 
themselves are emergent from the organic structure of the human brain. (That Marx 
held this view is explicit in his own claim that the redirective labour of human beings 
"is conditioned by their physical organisation; their consciousness is determined in 
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just the same way. ") 15 Rather than deny the reality of species-dispositions other than 
labour, Marx's point is instead that labour constitutes both a practical demonstration 
of the existence and importance of these wider capacities - i. e. the sphere of activity 
where they are manifest - and the vehicle by means of which these capacities are 
tested and developed in practice. Thus, precisely by engaging in redirective and 
constitutive labour upon the physical world in the realisation and expansion of their 
subsistence, human beings expand their control and practical knowledge of nature, 
and simultaneously refine and enhance their own natural powers and attributes of 
sociality, intelligence, self-consciousness and rationality. 
Of crucial importance in understanding these above aspects of human nature, and 
their relationship to Marxian sociology, is the final dimension of species-being I 
referred to earlier - namely human beings as essentially social or co-operative 
animals. The importance of this element of human nature, for Marx and Engels, is that 
it allows them to account for the fact of humanity's perpetual immersion in socio- 
cultural relations without resorting to some or other convoluted version of the "ruse of 
reason". This in turn enables them to expose the totally fallacious logic which dwells 
behind liberal social theory's efforts to abstract individuals, and their properties and 
characteristics, from the historically developed social relations of which they are a 
constituent part. Much of the power of Marx's critique of political economy stems 
from the fact that he scrupulously uncovers the social and historical prerequisites of 
the primitive theoretical categories of private property and the atomised individual 
which lie at the heart of liberal social and political thought, noting how the social 
relations of commodity production generate the impression that "in this society of free 
competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in 
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earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human 
conglomerate. " 16 In contrast to the claims of the methodological individualists of his 
own day, Marx's argument is that it is simply because human beings are sociable by 
nature which explains why they are to be found in society in the first place: 
The human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon [an animal 
which lives in communities], not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal 
which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an 
isolated individual outside society ... 
is as much of an absurdity as is the 
development of language without human beings living together and talking 
to each other. 17 
From this point of view, precisely the fact that human beings are social animals 
by nature renders the task of counterposing an anthropology of human beings to a 
sociology of human relations an utterly pointless endeavour. The sociable or co- 
operative mode of humanity's species-life ensures that an anthropology of human 
beings is closely related to a sociology of society. And so to counterpose human 
nature to social relations (or anthropology to sociology) is as foolish as to abstract the 
individual from society and to treat him or her as being in possession of a privatised 
rationality and individuated subjectivity which is divorced from the social 
characteristics of the human species. 
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Marx's theory of human nature as a structure of tendencies and powers: a 
defence 
The above concludes by exposition of Marx's account of the "capacities" and 
"tendencies" peculiar to human organisms. Whatever one makes of its veracity or 
otherwise, what cannot be doubted is its internal coherence. But how useful and 
plausible is the Marxian account? Considerably so, I would be inclined to argue. The 
following arguments will hopefully make a useful contribution to establishing that 
this is indeed the case. 
Materialism versus idealism 
One important strength of Marx's thesis that humanity's natural psycho-organic 
powers of sociality, intelligence, self-consciousness, rationality and language are 
historically developed and enhanced (and in a certain sense historically produced) 
through the interplay between nature and productive labour, is that it enables us to 
break decisively with the elitist and idealist notions of human nature and human 
personhood associated with most hitherto existing western philosophy (which treats 
human persons as definable wholly in terms of "consciousness, "mind", "self- 
consciousness or "self-identity" conceived apart from their practical activity as 
"abstractly mental labour"). This point is well made by Alex Callinicos: 
The proposition that men and women are first and foremost producers 
radically challenged basic assumptions about society that had been accepted 
by almost all earlier thinkers. Aristotle had defined man as a rational animal. 
This definition separates the power to think and reason from all other 
activities, and especially from the daily drudgery of manual work to which 
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most people in history have been condemned.... Aristotle was the product of 
a slave society. The ruling class of the ancient world despised manual labour 
as an activity fit only for their slaves. (The Roman legal definition of a slave 
was instrumentum vocale -a tool that talks. ) Aristotle's image of the good 
man is that of a slave-owner who, free from the need to work for his living, 
is able to pursue the higher things of the mind. The same separation of 
mental and material labour, itself a reflection of the class societies in which 
they lived, was made by all the great bourgeois philosophers, from Descartes 
to Hegel. All treated the life of the mind as the only important thing about 
human beings, and all assumed that someone else would do the work to 
provide them with the sordid material goods - food, clothing, lodging - that 
they needed in order to pursue the truth. 
18 
Now the substance of Marx's objection to those views of human beings which 
reduce them to their mental powers of "consciousness" or "rationality" can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly to define human beings as rational animals alone is to 
abstract "consciousness" from its biological and socio-historical prerequisites. 
Secondly, and more importantly, this preoccupation with the spiritual life of the 
species (and human individuals), which completely ignores the ways in which human 
beings are combined in socio-cultural relationships, hides from view the social and 
material preconditions which enable certain individuals to specialise as producers of 
ideas (as thinkers, theorists, theologians, philosophers, etc. ). Finally such concepts of 
human nature mystify the most fundamental source of progress in human knowledge. 
For this is seen falsely as stemming in its entirety from the "abstractly mental labour" 
of ideologues, rather than from (i) the practical interchange between human beings 
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and nature (via the labour-process) in the production and expansion of their needs, and 
(ii) the practical struggles of the downtrodden to comprehend and alter for the better 
the circumstances of their lives. 
Sociality and its emergent properties 
Unlike cultural determinists of a functionalist, structuralist or "postmodern" 
persuasion, an endorsement of Marx's account of human nature allows the theorist to 
explain why people are to be found in societies in the first place. We can, in short, 
follow Marx's example in accepting that human beings are by nature intensely 
sociable or collaborative creatures, genetically predisposed to form and live within 
collectivities or communities, due to their psychological and physical need for identity 
and fellowship with those of their own kind. Such a position is hardly controversial 
amongst a growing number of contemporary anthropologists and evolutionary 
biologists, for whom the biological evolution of modem homo sapiens has involved 
the natural selection of genes which greatly encourage sociable and co-operative 
behaviours and interactions. 19 Relatively untouched by the intellectual fads of 
postmodernism and post-structuralism, and protected from the abstract individualism 
of orthodox liberal social theory by the nature of the empirical archaeological and 
anthropological data, many would endorse the following account of the evolutionary 
origins of genetic human sociality provided by Nancy Makepiece Tanner: 
Selection in favour of sociability would intensely favour the more intelligent 
young who could effectively execute the new behaviour.... Reorganisation 
(of the brain) could have happened quite rapidly: young who did not make it 
and died before reproductive age did not pass on their genes. Selection 
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would have favoured young who were curious, playful and cued in to the 
behaviour of other group members, imitating tool making skills and 
environmental know-how, learning to recognise and interact with a wide and 
diverse social network. ° 
By way of contrast with Marx's approach, a useful illustration of the conceptual 
weakness which overcomes social analysis where it neglects the sociality of human 
nature is to be found in John Rawls' famous theory of "justice" and "community". 21 
As is well enough known, Rawls bases his principle of distributive justice on certain 
strong assumptions about the nature of human beings (although paradoxically he 
describes these as "weak assumptions"). These are that humans are "distinct 
individuals" prior to forming "relationships and engag[ing] ... in co-operative 
arrangements with others", 
22 and that their social interactions entail "mutual 
disinterest", which (in the circumstances of "moderate scarcity) necessitate the need to 
construct principles of justice to regulate conflict. From this perspective, "a sense of 
community describes a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an 
ingredient or constituent of their identity. "23 The function of justice is accordingly to 
supply an objective mechanism to reconcile the conflicts and competitive self-interest 
of mutually disinterested and asocial selves. 
But Rawls' failure to acknowledge that human beings are predisposed by their 
genetic makeup towards sociality perhaps informs his complete lack of purchase on 
the self-evident fact that "people conceive their identity - the subject and not just the 
object of their feelings and aspirations - as defined to some extent by the community 
x, 24 
of which they are a part. Certainly Rawls cannot accept that human persons are 
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constituted as the persons they are partly by their socio-historical situation. 25 Yet it is, 
of course, the reality of the communal allegiances in which individuals subjectively 
invest themselves, as these are shaped by cultural tradition and informed by the 
sociality of human nature, which demonstrate the poverty of treating human persons 
as purely individuated selves. These normative and emotional commitments of 
persons to their communities are often of such intensity that "communal identities" 
are often incorporated into their very sense of self. This community need not 
necessarily be identified with a total society or nation-state (although for many 
individuals it undoubtedly is); it may in fact be identified with a particular "micro" 
environment of human interaction (e. g. family or neighbourhood) or in terms of 
membership of a particular social class or ethnic group. Indeed, much of the enduring 
appeal and strength of nationalist and ethnic identities in the modem world, ruthlessly 
exploited for their own vested interests by imperialists and racists alike, is most likely 
the product of the inherent human need of persons to define themselves in relation to 
some kind of human community (imaginary or real, alienated or otherwise) of which 
they believe themselves to be members. 26 
Social labour and language 
Endorsing Marx's entirely reasonable belief in the innateness of conscious human 
sociality and labour (i. e. social labour) also provides us with the conceptual resources 
to explain how another of humanity's species-powers - the biological capacity to 
acquire and use language - becomes translated into the actuality of linguistic- 
acquisition and use. For it is by engaging in ongoing social interaction, particularly 
that which involves practical activity in relation to the world, that human infants learn 
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and develop their linguistic skills. And it is by immersing themselves in the daily 
constitutive practices of social life (i. e. food-procurement, shelter-building, tool- 
manufacture, etc. ) that anthropologists best obtain a reliable grasp upon the linguistic 
norms and cultural traditions of "alien" societies. 
7 By logical extension, in a 
historical and evolutionary sense, it is nothing other than the collaborative or social 
mode of human nature (particularly where it is mediated by co-operative labour) 
which allows the translation of the elementary forms of human consciousness and 
rationality into verbal or written modes of communication, which then feed back into 
the evolution of human sociality, facilitating in turn the further historical development 
of rationality and consciousness. Thus Marx is right to argue that "[l]anguage is as old 
as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as 
well, and only therefore does it exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises 
from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. "28 
This latter argument concerning the socio-historical basis of language is often 
treated with the utmost scorn by naive naturalists. But it is not in the least bit 
controversial. It is, of course, no accident that the only animal (and other) species to 
acquire some form of complex "language" are those which are biologically oriented 
towards a social mode of economic existence. Those species which engage in some or 
other form of social co-operation in procuring (and/or distributing) their means of 
subsistence precisely require some form of communication to co-ordinate their social 
and economic activities. Social labour is thus uniquely adaptive from the point of view 
of natural selection in the direction of language acquisition and use. Glynn Isaac 
makes the argument as follows: 
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It is clear that the adaptive value of food-gathering and division of labour 
would be greatly enhanced by improvements in communications; 
specifically, the passage of information other than that relating to the 
emotions, becomes highly adaptive. This has proven to be the case in other 
zoological phyla that have made the acquisition of food a collective 
responsibility, as is shown, for instance, by the so-called language of the 
bees and other social insects. 
29 
But it is important to be clear that this emphasis on the socio-economic basis of 
language-acquisition in general throughout organic nature should not blind us to the 
novelty of human language. The difference between human language and the primitive 
modes of communication found in some animal and other species is that the former is 
an emergent property of conscious beings, and as such expresses abstract concepts 
removed from immediate reality, whereas the latter is the property of unreflective 
creatures, and as such constitutes rudimentary patterns of sound (or chemical signals 
and/or bodily movements) which are utilised unconsciously to co-ordinate immediate 
and instinctual behaviours. Nonetheless, irrespective of these crucial differences 
between human consciousness and language and the modes of consciousness and 
communication associated with other species, three general points can be made with 
certainty. Firstly the forms of consciousness of all gregarious species are necessarily 
social in character, irrespective of whether these "mentalities" constitute the "herd 
consciousness" of unreflective creatures or the "reflexive consciousness" of human 
beings. Secondly there can be no language worthy of the name outside social 
relationships 
30 Finally complex forms of verbal communication can only arise in 
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biological species whose sociality has a practical application in a co- operative mode 
of economic activity. 
Thus, unlike post-structuralist and postmodern approaches which fetishise human 
"language", seeing it as the key to explaining society and culture (hence separating 
human beings, society and history from material reality), the materialist conception of 
human beings (as inherently social producers) animates an account of human agency 
and social interaction which allows contemporary anthropology to actually 
comprehend the development of human language. The paleaoanthropologist Richard 
Leakey explains: 
The question of why language evolved was once easily answered. It was 
believed that the organisation required of a band of people involved in co- 
operative hunting demanded an efficient mode of communication, that is, 
speech. But in fact hunters rarely talk when they are in search of prey, and 
the hunting dogs of Africa conduct highly complex and co-ordinated hunts 
without the benefit of language as we know it. This hypothesis for the origin 
must therefore be seen as far too simplistic.... Our ancestors moved from 
being opportunistic omnivores to operating a food-sharing economy based 
on meat and plant foods. This eventually led to the establishment of a 
hunting-and-gathering economy.... The emergent hominid way of life 
involved co-operation in food-gathering, systematic and reliable sharing of 
food, social life focusing on a series of temporary home bases and probably a 
division of labour. Language within this context is clearly much more 
beneficial than it would otherwise be for mundane tasks, such as passing on 
instructions for making stone tools or planning a hunting expedition. 
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Certainly, language would facilitate these activities, but they do not demand 
the spoken word in the same way that a co-operative economy and complex 
social life do 31 
Social labour and socio-cultural evolution 
Despite the ritualistic abuse heaped upon it by those who accuse Marx and Engels of 
"economic reductionism" or "productive force determinism", another great strength of 
the Marxist conception of human beings as essentially conscious producers is that it 
establishes the conceptual foundations of an entirely plausible and (to my mind) 
uncontentious materialist theory of agency (and hence socio-cultural development or 
"progress"). Given these aforesaid species powers and dispositions (of sociality, 
intelligence, self-consciousness, rationality and labour), Marx's argument is simply 
that human beings, being "somewhat rational" social producers, will tend to act in 
ways which develop their modes of social labour (provided social and material 
constraints are not prohibitive). This they will do in order to reduce their vulnerability 
to the capricious forces of nature and to meet and expand their needs in more efficient, 
less arduous, less time-consuming and more innovative ways. Yet in doing so human 
beings will inevitably develop their knowledge, along with these above species 
capacities and traits, since the development of the tools and techniques of social 
labour, and the growth in the productive forces this allows, simultaneously enables the 
accumulation of a deeper and broader base of practical know-how in relation to nature 
which each successive generation of persons can reflect and react upon in seeking to 
further develop its needs. 
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From this point of view, therefore, the cumulative growth in the product and 
technology of social labour - which necessarily accompanies improvements in the 
productivity and economic output of the human labour-process - correspondingly 
generates cumulative advances in human knowledge of practical constitutive tasks vis- 
ä-vis the material environment. This in turn enables a simultaneous and ongoing 
historical refinement of the human powers of abstraction, reflection, rational thought 
and linguistic ability. At the same time, however, in developing their productive 
forces human beings also allow themselves the capacity to construct and sustain 
increasingly sophisticated and differentiated socio-cultural relations (e. g. systems of 
material culture and distinct political and other institutions). This is because an 
expanding economic output creates the possibility of a greater societal investment of 
human and material resources in social functions other than those directly involved in 
the production or procurement of the means of subsistence. 
Note how well this materialist conception of human nature, and the labour theory 
of culture which stems from it, fits hand in glove with the latest research hypotheses 
of palaeoanthropology, archaeology and neuro-biology into humanity's socio-cultural 
origins and development: 
Modern homo sapiens have a number of distinct advantages over their 
nearest relatives today: a somewhat larger brain size in proportion to body 
weight, a hand structure which makes the operation and manipulation of 
tools vastly easier than even for a chimpanzee, vocal cords which, unlike 
those of the apes, permits the clear articulation of sounds, and the capacity to 
live in social groups. It is undoubtedly the social character of human 
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relationships which has enabled them to exploit their other, perhaps 
marginal, evolutionary advantages. From this and the use of tools comes the 
key characteristic of human beings living in society: the change in their 
relationship to the natural world as they attempt to control and manipulate it. 
From this and the activity of goods production to satisfy wants, which flows 
from it, comes the steady transformation of human social relationships which 
has characterised the history of the past few thousand years 32 
Marx's theory of human nature as a structure of needs and interests: a defence 
Enough has now been said in defence of Marx's account of those species capacities or 
causal powers which are definitional of human nature. But if the species powers of 
intelligence, self-consciousness, sociality and labour have a quite definite analytical 
function in historical materialism (in providing a "genetic" explanation of why human 
persons are predisposed towards living in societies or communities and how complex 
socio-cultural relations and "history" are possible) then what explanatory role do 
human needs and interests perform? An extremely important one, I would contend. As 
suggested earlier, apart from providing historical materialism with its "fundamental 
premises" ([m]en must be in a position to live in order ... to make history.... But life 
involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various 
other things.... The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy 
these needs, the production of material life itself'), 33 the concept of human needs and 
interests also furnishes Marxian theory with an elementary "micro" explanation of the 
ongoing process of social conflict and class struggle which provide socio-cultural 
elaboration/transformation with its historical dynamic. The simple fact that human 
beings have basic material needs (i. e. for sufficient food, clothing, shelter, hygiene, 
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sexual relations, leisure, 34 voluntary or "free" social intercourse, 35 fellowship and 
identity with their own kind, 36 "breadth and variety of activity", 37 "fresh air and 
sunlight", 38 health and safety at the workplace, 39 etc., to ensure their psychological 
and physical "well-being"), and thereby possess interests in ensuring that these needs 
are met, supplies them with urgent imperatives to modify or even overthrow those 
hierarchical or unegalitarian (i. e. class-divided) social relations (and attendant vested 
social interests) which retard or deny all of them. 
As should be clear from the above such needs and interests are not confined to or 
defined by the mere satisfaction of the minimum standards required to ensure human 
survival. The social and productive mode of humanity's species-being ensures that 
what counts as satisfying human "well-being" is always conditioned by the level of 
development of the productive forces: the more advanced are the productive forces of 
a society, the greater is the abundance of material resources which might be 
distributed amongst its members, and the higher or more generous the cultural 
definition of basic human needs contained therein. Nor are such historically generated 
human needs and interests mere artificial socio-cultural wants or desires. If social 
relations are capable of sustaining a level of economic output and productivity which 
is capable of improving the "life-chances" and cultural and political opportunities of 
the entire societal community it is perfectly acceptable to regard the continuing 
retardation or frustration of these by vested social interests as a denial of real needs 
and interests. In view of this, where social relations permit the possibility of higher 
generalised human life-chances, greater political representation or enfranchisement in 
the running of society, and improved access to culture, education and leisure, human 
persons will quite rightly regard their psycho-organic well-being as being 
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compromised (and will therefore be discontented and angry) if this potential is not 
realised or at least striven for by those in positions of power or authority. Furthermore, 
where a majority of human persons discover a mismatch between the capacity and 
success of society in improving their life-chances they will sooner or later become 
embroiled in convulsive social struggles, and sometimes organised into collective 
agents, geared towards modifying or overturning those social relations and vested 
interests implicated in the denial of their elementary needs and interests. 
Equally importantly, insofar as class-divided societies always entail exploitation 
(i. e. the forcible appropriation of surplus product by an unproductive elite from the 
direct producers), and insofar as exploitation always involves the denial of material 
and cultural resources and adequate political representation to a majority of a 
society's members which might otherwise have been employed to improve their well- 
being, we are also compelled to endorse Marx's view that asymmetrical or 
hierarchical social relations are contrary to objective human needs and interests. Of 
course, Marx is not denying that class divided societies and capitalism in particular 
are "progressive" in a certain sense compared to those societies which went before 
(i. e. in the sense of allowing the development of the productive forces). But 
nonetheless his ethical critique of class society and capitalism is undoubtedly 
informed by his Promethean humanism. Certainly Marx is entirely justified in his 
belief that objective human needs and interests, far from being definable in narrowly 
"economistic" terms, should instead be defined more broadly in terms of the degree of 
general economic, political and cultural "freedom" or "welfare" which is realisable by 
a specific societal community given the level of development of its material 
productive forces 
40 
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Furthermore, as properties of an intelligent, sociable and essentially co-operative 
species, human needs and interests are always defined by persons in accordance with 
normative-ethical principles of "distributive justice" and "fairness" of a relatively 
egalitarian character (again within the constraints imposed by the level of economic 
development of society). The plain fact that human beings, irrespective of historical 
and socio-cultural context, have tended to articulate normative principles of justice 
and fairness in terms of the obligation of society to maintain its members at socially 
acceptable standards, in terms of the immorality of "free-riding", and in terms of the 
ethical undesirability of permitting the existence of grossly unegalitarian social 
relations, 41 is itself demonstrative of the manner in which human sociability and 
rationality combined provide a certain stimulus to the universal production of certain 
normative definitions of human needs and interests which are not reducible to the 
specific social relations which individuals inhabit and which are a powerful 
motivational source of their social agency aimed at societal reform or transformation. 
A final plea 
Despite the obvious centrality of the above account of human nature or species-being 
to Marx's and Engels' own version of historical materialism (including their theory of 
human agency and social structure) there are those of a "structuralist" persuasion who 
continue to deny its role in the Marxian theoretical system. For some (unfathomable) 
reason, the concept of human nature is deemed by many to be a "metaphysical" or 
"mystical" category, a product of Marx's immature romantic anti-capitalism, which 
can have no legitimate function in his mature scientific and historically informed 
works. But one only has to consider how incoherent say Marx's theory of alienated 
141 
labour (the centrepiece of his critique of political economy) would be in the absence 
of an explicit or implicit conception of human nature as something other or more than 
a socio-cultural product to realise how untenable such an interpretation must be. 
Only by grasping that Marx conceives of human beings as both a socio-cultural 
product (as well as producer of society and culture) and a psycho-organic species- 
being can one come to grips with many of the arguments contained especially in his 
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The whole point of Marx's 
discussion here is that alienated labour denotes the estrangement of human persons 
both from their own historically developed socio-cultural needs and from certain of 
their biologically-given dispositions as a species. According to Marx, not only does 
capitalism (and political economy) estrange the individual from his or her social 
relations, it also encourages a kind of fetishism which serves to subordinate society to 
the individual, treating social relations, the very manifestation of human sociability, as 
the mere outcome of anterior individuated selves and privatised utility-maximisation 
strategies. Now if Marx was not of this opinion, if humanity was not regarded by him 
as an irreducibly social species, possessing an objective need for fellowship and 
community, and yet alienated from its sociability (as well as from many of its wider 
natural needs and powers listed earlier) by commodity production and exploitative 
class relations, what would be the point of his claim that capitalist society "alienates 
species-life and individual life [my emphasis] ... turning the latter, as an abstraction, 
into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form ... [thereby] 
incorporating private property into the very essence of man"? 42 
The point of making this argument is not primarily academic. Its fundamental 
purpose is not to offer yet another account of "what Marx really said" or "what Marx 
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really meant to say" (but didn't get round to). Rather my argument here is that 
reference to human capacities, needs and interests, and to human subjects as the bearer 
of these capacities, needs and interests (of the kind endorsed by historical 
materialism), is ethically, politically and analytically indispensable to any useable 
social theory. 
Consider the alternative. Sociology and philosophy claim to appropriate a human 
world characterised by a multitude of social pathologies. Mass poverty, 
unemployment, social inequality, truncated civil and political rights, the ever-present 
threat of war and nuclear destruction, and so on and so forth, these are but a few of the 
more pressing "problems" of our epoch, and ones which many of the most 
distinguished and resourceful practitioners of contemporary social theory apparently 
believe they can grasp only by "erasing the face of mankind" from social theory and 
society alike and treating the human subject as a fully social construct. But this 
beggars the problem. One can speak intelligibly of social "pathologies" (and indeed of 
"dehumanisation", "human rights" which are denied, "exploitation", "alienation", 
"disenchantment" or "anomie") only if one takes as given the existence of human 
needs, interests and potentialities (as derivative from human nature) which are being 
frustrated, and if one assumes likewise the existence of a human being who possesses 
enough of a "self' to appreciate that his or her needs and capacities are not being 
fulfilled or fully developed by society. Without an anchorage in common humanity 
there can be no objective yardstick by which one might assess the degree to which 
social conditions are pathological or functional, alienating or fulfilling. And without a 
non-social component of personal identity there cannot be a human subject who is 
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capable of sensing that his or her human needs and capacities are being retarded or 
affirmed by society. 
2.2: NATURALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 
Enough has now been said in elaboration of Marx's theory of human nature. But what 
can be said of alternative accounts of the relationship between human nature and 
social order? There are two major forms of naturalism in modern social theory: socio- 
biology and utilitarianism. Both of these "schools" of liberal social thought are 
equally committed to micro-reduction in method and upwards conflation in theory, 
although they differ over which level of "human reality" (organisms or subjects) 
should be attributed explanatory primacy in accounting for social relations or culture. 
(i) Socio-biology. For socio-biologists the "atomistic" explanatory programme is 
at its most radical. All of the salient features of social behaviour are explainable 
wholly in terms of the general biological characteristics of human nature and the 
specific genetic variations ("natural inequalities") which exist between individuals. 
And all important human social practices or institutions must be understood by 
"discovering" the functional benefits they perform in enhancing the "reproductive 
fitness" of the human genotype and the specific genes or "complexes" of genes 
responsible for their emergence. 
(ii) Utilitarianism. More generally, however, it is recommended by naturalists 
that social explanation proceed with resort either to an "economic model" of human 
agency and social interaction (as is argued by marginalist economics and by most 
versions of rational choice and social exchange theory) or to a broader "hermeneutic 
model" of social behaviour which complements homo economicus with additional 
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normative and affectual characteristics (as is argued by more sophisticated rational 
choice theorists). For the former social action (and hence society) is grasped in terms 
of a narrow economist rationalism: interactants are regarded simply as "utility- 
optimisers", as self-interested atoms, acting socially on the basis of the most 
instrumental means-ends calculations (of a cost-benefit type) of how best to meet their 
personal wants or desires. For the latter, by contrast, individuated "utility- 
maximisation" is often watered down to "utility-satisfaction", 43 and although rational 
conduct of this kind is still regarded as the most salient feature of society, a certain 
space is allowed to account for all those baffling social and human properties which 
cannot so easily be "read-off' from the self-interested pursuits or egoistic 
psychological makeup of "rational man". 
44 
The naturalistic conception of individuals and society: socio-biology 
Socio-biological explanations of subjects are synonymous with socio-biological 
explanations of human society and history. There is no gap between the different 
levels of analysis. As the "founding father" of the discipline E. O. Wilson puts it: 
"sociobiology [is] the systematic study of the biological basis of all social 
behaviour.... There is no a priori reason why any proportion of human social 
behaviour must be excluded from the domain of sociobiological analysis. "45 Yet there 
is a large amount of fudge and vacillation amongst socio-biologists on the question of 
the meaning of their central assertion that all human social behaviour should be 
explained biologically. Sometimes the argument seems to be simply that "genes hold 
culture on a leash", 46 i. e. that the possible range of human behaviours is biologically 
determined. But this is merely a truism which does not in the least reduce to the claim 
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that the specific character of human motivation and social organisation "is itself a 
direct consequence of gene action". 47 Normally, of course, the socio-biological 
manifesto is firmly committed to the thesis of direct genetic control or determination 
of human social behaviours and institutions by biological human nature. 
This is why Wilson, for instance, contends that "sociology and the other social 
sciences ... are the last branches of 
biology waiting to be included in the Modem 
Synthesis. "48 And this is why Richard Dawkins, to offer another example, makes the 
claim that human beings "are survival machines - robot vehicles programmed to 
preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. "49 From this perspective, then, social 
interaction and relationships are the unconscious tool or expression of the human 
genotype and the competitive Darwinian selective mechanisms of its atomised 
constituents. Socio-biology is thus firmly committed to the denial of irreducible 
emergent properties of human neurobiology (e. g. personal psychology and self- 
consciousness) and of social interaction (structure and social systems). In principle all 
of the human sciences are but "branches of biology". 
Socio-biology's conception of human nature and social interaction: a critique 
In all important respects, socio-biology's picture of human nature and of individual 
subjects is identical to that of Social Darwinism and Hobbesian behaviourism: 
Roughly, humans are seen as [instinctually] self-aggrandising, selfish 
animals whose social organisation, even in its co-operative aspects, is a 
consequence of natural selection for traits that maximise reproductive 
fitness. In particular, humans are characterised by territoriality, tribalism, 
indoctrinability, blind faith, xenophobia, and a variety of manifestations of 
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aggression. Unselfish behaviour is really a form of selfishness in which the 
individual is motivated by an expectation of reciprocal reward. Self- 
righteousness, gratitude and sympathy are examples of [reciprocal altruism], 
while aggressively moral behaviour is a way of keeping cheaters in line 50 
But, quite apart from its arbitrariness, this formulation suffers from a number of 
grave conceptual defects. Firstly the philosophical legitimation of socio-biology's 
understanding of human beings is dependent on a highly suspect interpretation of 
scanty pre-historical and historical data. Raymond Dart's influential The Predatory 
Transition from Ape to Man gave the above concept of human nature the scientific 
credibility it had lost during the fall from grace of the Darwinian "racism of empire" 
after World War Two. 
51 Dart's thesis involved two key elements: (i) the notion 
endorsed by many anthropologists of the day (and subsequently popularised by the 
author and playwright Robert Ardrey) 
52 that modem humanity was directly descended 
from a ferocious carnivorous hominid (australopithecus africanus) which hunted into 
extinction its altogether more peaceable relative (australopithecus robustus); and (ii) 
the argument that the high incidence of damage inflicted upon fossils of africanus and 
baboons (discovered at Makapansgat in South Africa), and the large volume of 
particular bone fragments of human and other species buried alongside these remains 
(e. g. human leg-bones and upper arm-bones and baboon hindquarters) evidenced our 
ancestor's genocidal and cannibalistic violence towards each other and predatory and 
carnivorous aggression towards other species. 
Dart's radical conclusion that "[t]he loathsome cruelty of mankind to man ... from 
the earliest Egyptian and Sumerian records to the most recent atrocities of the Second 
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World War ... forms one of his inescapable, characteristic and differentiative features 
... explicable only 
in terms of his cannibalistic origins"53 was seized on 
enthusiastically by contemporaneous psychologists and biologists (most notably 
Konrad Lorenz). 54 More recently the same theme has been taken up by socio- 
biologists, for whom contemporary "single origins" theories of some archaeologists 
show that modem humans began with a single African female ancestor whose 
offspring "replac[ed] ancient indigenous humans around the world ... in an abrupt and 
violent manner. "55 
Yet Dart subsequently admitted that he had misunderstood the significance of 
fossil-damage at Makapansgat (which was caused largely by natural erosion not by 
hominid violence). And his own views on human origins have been overtaken by 
more contemporary developments in palaeontology and archaeology (africanus was 
not, after all, a savage carnivore predisposed towards gratuitous violence; homo 
habilis, a food-sharing tool-maker, not africanus, was a direct ancestor of modem 
homo sapiens). 56 Despite this, however, the enthusiasm of socio-biologists for 
indulging in post hoc constructions of human nature which precisely regurgitate 
Dart's own original (and subsequently retracted) conclusions remains resolutely 
undiminished. Likewise the "single origins" school's almost unanimous rejection of 
the idea that modem humans displaced other archaic humans by violence or territorial 
imperialism (in favour of the view that "during the few thousand years of possible co- 
existence of neanderthals and modern homo sapiens extensive gene flow could have 
occurred between the two groups, " with the latter displacing the former simply due to 
greater success in procuring an existence from the environment) 57 has equally and 
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predictably failed to dent socio-biology's faith in the primordial existence of their 
Spencerian-Hobbesian xenophobe. 
Secondly, aside from the non-existent evidence from science in support of socio- 
biology's theory of human nature, there is the plain truth that it has been substantially 
undermined by an enormous volume of anthropological research into the societies of 
the earliest modem human beings and of their more recent archaic ancestors over the 
past 30 years in particular. 58 Whereas 19th century (and early 20th century) 
anthropology was content to dismiss "rude" societies as forms of "barbarism" or 
"savagery", lacking in culture and genuine social organisation (doubtless influenced 
by Thomas Hobbes' vivid portrait of human life in a state of nature: "No arts; no 
letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent 
death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"), 59 modem 
anthropologists should be congratulated for demonstrating that the earliest human 
societies (scavenger-forager and hunter-gatherer bands) were intensely social 
enterprises, entailing little differentiation between the "public" and "private" spheres, 
comprising rich and diverse traditions of symbolic culture, and enjoying what 
Marshall Sahlins describes as "relative affluence ... in which all the people's wants are 
easily satisfied. "6o 
Particularly important, for our purposes, is the knowledge furnished by the new 
anthropology that the original hunting and gathering societies (which characterised 
human socio-cultural existence and development for more than two million years 
during the formative period of modem homo sapiens) were a very great distance from 
being peopled by the acquisitive, individualistic, competitive, aggressive, territorial 
and xenophobic human beings beloved of liberal social theory. Quite the reverse in 
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fact. For contrary to the expectations of today's socio-biologists, not only did hunter- 
gatherer peoples stubbornly refuse to construct those social institutions and cultural 
practices which "Hobbesian man" dictates they should (private property, the state, the 
market, stratification by class or gender, inter-tribal violence and aggressive economic 
competition, etc. ), but they also engaged in egalitarian food- sharing and collaborative 
(i. e. participatory) democratic decision-making as a matter of course. 61 
Leacock, Friedl and Lee summarise the available historical and comparative data 
as follows: 
Individual decision-makings are possible for men and women with respect to 
their daily routines.... Men and women are free to decide how they will 
spend each day: whether to go hunting or gathering, and with whom.... There 
is no differential access to resources through private land ownership and no 
specialisation of labour beyond that of sex.... The basic principle of 
egalitarian band societies [is] that people ma[ke] decisions about the 
activities of which they are responsible.... Food is never consumed alone by a 
family: it is always shared out among members of a living group or band.... 
Each member of the camp receives an equitable share.... This principle of 
generalised reciprocity has been reported of hunter-gatherers in every 
continent and every kind of environment.... Sharing deeply pervades the 
behaviour and values of ... 
foragers, within the family and between families, 
and it is extended to the boundaries of the social universe. Just as the 
principle of profit and rationality is central to the capitalist ethic, so is 
sharing central to the conduct of social life in foraging societies 62 
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And Richard Lee reports similar conclusions in his own research into the ! Kung 
of the Kalahari (one of the few surviving hunter-gatherer societies): 
The ! Kung are a fiercely egalitarian people, and they have evolved a series of 
important cultural practices to maintain this equality, first by cutting down to 
size the arrogant and boastful, and second by helping those down on their 
luck to get back in the game ... Men are encouraged to hunt as best they can, 
but the correct demeanour for the successful hunter is modesty and 
understatement ... Whatever their skills ! Kung leaders have no formal 
authority. They can only persuade, but never enforce their will on others ... 
None is arrogant, overbearing, boastful or aloof. In ! Kung terms, these traits 
absolutely disqualify a person as a leader ... Another trait emphatically not 
found among traditional camp leaders is a desire for wealth or 
acquisitiveness ... Disputes 
between groups over food are not unknown 
among the ! Kung, but they are rare. 63 
Now socio-biologists can only deal with the uncomfortable facts of the 
ethnographic record by resorting to their customary sleight-of-hand. E. O. Wilson, for 
instance, explains away the absence of economic competition, class and gender 
inequality, warfare and imperialism in "primitive communism" by simply asserting 
that "[i]t is to be expected that some isolated cultures will escape the[se] processes for 
generations at a time, in effect reverting to what ethnographers refer to as a pacific 
state. "TM Therefore, in order to insulate his a priori concept of human nature and 
attendant social behaviour from empirical refutation, Wilson is compelled to ignore 
the totality of human development, pre-history and history up until the past 8,000 
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years whilst continuing to endorse a view of human origins for which not a shred of 
scientific evidence exists ("the most distinctive human qualities", we are told, 
emerged through "intertribal warfare, " "genocide" and "genosorption" during the 
"autocatalytic phase"65 of evolution). 
Yet, despite Wilson, given the fact that "[h]unting and gathering was a permanent 
and stable feature of our biological evolution through homo erectus to early homo 
sapiens and finally to modem man, " ... [and] given the importance of hunting and 
gathering through the many thousands of generations of our forebears, " it does seem 
altogether more reasonable to suppose "that this way of life is an indelible part of 
what makes us human. , 66 In other words, if a human nature exists it is far more 
plausible to believe that "it was moulded by natural selection during the 2.5 million 
year long epoch of hunting and gathering between the first appearance of homo habilis 
and the first planting of crops by 8th millennium BC homo sapiens. , 67 But this means 
that insofar as it exists human nature is far more likely to be the bearer of sociable, 
communal, altruistic, co-operative (and probably egalitarian) 68 behavioural traits and 
predispositions than those Darwinian and Hobbesian attributes which are reckoned by 
socio-biologists to acclimatise human beings to life in hierarchically and 
competitively structured societies. 
The anthropologist Richard Lee is thus quite right to insist: 
It is the long experience of egalitarian sharing that has moulded our past. 
Despite our seeming adaptation to life in hierarchical societies, and despite 
the rather dismal track record of human rights in many parts of the world, 
there are signs that humankind retains a deep-rooted sense of egalitarianism, 
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a deep rooted commitment to the norm of reciprocity, a deep rooted ... sense 
of community ... [F]or all its economic and military power and its near 
monopoly of the ideological apparatus, the capitalist state has not succeeded 
in eradicating innumerable pockets of communalism. 9 
And likewise the pre-historian Bernard Campbell is equally correct to point out: 
Anthropology teaches us clearly that Man lived at one with nature until, with 
the beginnings of agriculture, he began to tamper with the eco-system: an 
expansion of his population followed. It was not until the development of the 
temple towns (around 5000BC) that we find evidence of inflicted death and 
warfare. This is too recent an event to have had any influence on the 
evolution of human nature... Man is not programmed to kill and make war ... 
his ability to do so is learned from his elders and peers when his society 
demands it. 70 
Thus, contra the claims of socio-biology, since the mode of environmental 
adaptation of modem homo sapiens involves social and cultural learning par 
excellence, and since this mode of adaptation has been generated by the natural 
selection of genes which have encouraged intelligence, sociability, group co-operation 
and egalitarian food-sharing to an unprecedented degree, it seems entirely plausible to 
suppose that there can be no genetic or biological imperatives towards aggression, 
violence, hierarchy or individualistic "self-aggrandisement" intrinsic to human nature. 
Precisely because the socio-cultural mode of subsistence of human beings is utterly 
dependent upon evolutionary adaptability in the direction of mental dexterity, 
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sociality, co-operation and egalitarianism, it is clear enough that humans no more 
require genes which facilitate individualism, competitiveness, aggression or 
domination than they require those which generate camouflage, fur, sharp teeth or 
claws, physical size and strength, or speed of foot. 7' To put it another way, the fact 
that human genes can be transmitted quite satisfactorily across the generations without 
any of these above physiological or genetic traits (given humanity's cultural and 
technological mode of existence) must offer little encouragement to any belief in the 
evolutionary persistence of such innate dispositions in modem homo sapiens. 
Furthermore an acknowledgement of the reality that a recognisably human social 
existence has to depend upon a high level of brain power, rationality, and collective 
collaboration or co-operation between individuals precisely demonstrates that the 
most adaptable human genes (from the point of view of "reproductive fitness") must 
be those which reinforce or enhance these traits at the expense of those which do not. 
Yet socio-biologists rarely take the time to consider the extent to which empirical 
data of the above kind into human origins and pre-history is compatible with their 
abstract "model of man". On the contrary, the "instinctual nature" of humankind is 
often deduced not from research into human conduct and social interaction but from 
studies of related higher primates, in particular data culled from researches into the 
behaviour of chimpanzees and gorillas. Typically socio-biologists exploit the well- 
known fact that these modem ape species probably have ancestors in common with 
human beings (human beings and chimpanzees share 97.5% of the same genes) 72 to 
infer the biological nature of the latter from the former. Hardly surprisingly, given 
their prior commitments, human beings are not reckoned to do very well out of this 
comparison. According to Lumsden and Wilson, for example, research into ape 
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behaviour demonstrates that Marxism and sociology generally rests on the "romantic 
fallacy" of blaming the "social environment" (rather than the enduring facts of human 
biology and hence psychology) for the pathologies of the modem world. Since ape 
"communities" are we are informed innately aggressive, individualistic, competitive 
and hierarchical (being held together socially only by a rigid pecking order of 
"dominance" imposed upon the group by the most successfully aggressive "alpha" 
male), it necessarily follows that human societies are fashioned in the same way, 
meaning that Marxism's and sociology's "key error" is to "conceive of human nature 
as relatively unstructured and largely or wholly the product of external socio- 
economic forces. 73 
But these arguments will not do at all. Ignoring Lumsden's and Wilson's 
erroneous interpretation of Marx's account of "species-being" (which should be 
evident from my discussion in section 2.1), three major difficulties with their 
conceptual strategy of drawing conclusions about human nature and social action 
from primatological researches are worthy of note. Firstly, and most obviously, it is 
important to point out the peculiar crudity of Lumsden's and Wilson's comparison of 
the purely biological nature of humans and the higher primates. For instance, although 
it is undoubtedly the case that human beings and chimpanzees have nearly identical 
genes, it is also certain that the internal organisation of these genes in each species is 
radically different. 
Since the 2.5% genetic variation between humans and chimps, together with these 
profound differences in their genetic configuration, is responsible for (or enabling of) 
such immense variations in degrees of sociality, intelligence, self-consciousness and 
cultural learning between the species (not to mention a whole range of emergent 
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properties possessed by the former but not the latter), it is far from clear why 
Lumsden and Wilson consider it reasonable or useful to draw certain conclusions 
about human nature and interaction directly from the study of ape biology and/or 
behaviour. Although I would not wish to dissent from the view that studying the 
biology and behaviour of non-human primates can yield useful insights about human 
origins, evolution, capacities and needs (the latter of which might exert a certain 
diffused pressure or guidance upon human social behaviour), it is clear that the 
authors of Genes, Mind and Culture have radically overstepped the mark here. After 
all, it should go without saying that, far from illuminating the "nature" of human 
beings, the micro-reductionary strategy of Lumsden and Wilson abstracts from the 
human "life-world" precisely those properties of co-operation, sociality, mind, self 
and rationality which define it as such! 
Secondly, it follows from my argument that the real "romantic fallacy" is to be 
found not in Marx's insistence that social relations and interaction are efficacious in 
conditioning the concrete "natures" of human beings in specific historical settings, but 
rather "in any `naked ape' claim that we can read off from ape behaviour some inbuilt 
genetic impulse of human behaviour. , 
74 As Chris Harman rightly points out, such a 
claim 
ignores a most important feature of the human genetic makeup which 
separates us from our closest cousins. They are genetically programmed in 
narrow ways that provide them with the behaviour appropriate to a limited 
range of environments, while we are characterised by an immense flexibility 
in our behaviour that enables us, virtually alone in the animal world, to thrive 
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on any part of the globe. This is a fundamental difference between us and the 
existing apes. So gorillas are not to be found outside tropical rain forests, 
chimps outside wooded regions in sub-Saharan Africa, gibbons outside the 
tree tops of south east Asia, orang-utans outside a few islands in Indonesia. 
By contrast, humans have been able to live across a vast swathe of Africa, 
Europe and Asia for at least half a million years. Our genetic "speciality" is 
precisely that we are not specialised, not constrained by any limited range of 
"instinctive" behaviour. 75 
Finally those studies into ape behaviour from which Lumsden and Wilson 
apparently derive or support their conclusions about human nature and social 
behaviour have in recent years been revealed as "over-simple" by more contemporary 
research in primatology and related fields: 
Until the 1960s nearly all studies of apes were carried out in zoos, like Solly 
Zuckerman's famous 1930s account of life in the chimpanzee enclosure at 
London Zoo. They fitted the apes into a wider model of behaviour based on 
baboon studies (although baboons are monkeys and have quite substantial 
genetic differences with all the apes). They were seen as almost completely 
vegetarian, with little learning capacity and nothing that could, by any stretch 
of the imagination, be called culture. Above all, they were seen as innately 
aggressive, with the males involved in continual, vicious sexual competition 
for females and kept in line by a single dominant male. [But] in the last 30 
years studies of chimps, pygmy chimps and gorillas in the wild have 
challenged any such model, suggesting that drawing conclusions about ape 
behaviour from life in zoo cages is about as valid as drawing conclusions 
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about human behaviour from case studies of long term inmates in 
Dartmoor. 76 
Indeed, the main conclusions which have been drawn from these recent studies 
into ape behaviour "in the wild" have proven extremely damaging to the arguments of 
Lumsden and Wilson and their fellow socio-biologists. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
(i) Chimps and pygmy chimps are much more sociable than used to be 
thought. Aggressive confrontations are much less frequent than friendly 
interactions. Most aggressive confrontations are settled without violence. (ii) 
Males are not involved in continual bitter competition to dominate females.... 
Females initiate many sexual contacts and their co-operation is essential if 
males are to have special relationships with them. (iii) The role of 
"dominance" among chimps and gorillas has been overstated in the past. 
There is no single hierarchy for all activities among chimps, and among 
gorillas "dominance" often seems much closer to what we would call 
leadership than to domination. (iv) There is much more learned and socially 
transmitted behaviour than used to be thought, and much more use of 
primitive tools. Chimps use stones to break nuts, sticks to collect termites 
from holes, and leaves as sponges to pick up liquids for drinking. (v) Chimps 
are not completely vegetarian. They hunt small animals (for instance, small 
monkeys) when the opportunity arises and so get about 10% of their diet 
from non-vegetarian sources. And hunting is a social activity: some chimps 
will chase the monkeys, others will lie in wait, ambush and kill them. (vi) 
Apes do not behave as competing individuals when it comes to consuming 
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food. If one chimp finds a source of good food ... 
it lets others know. And 
although common chimpanzees consume vegetarian foodstuffs individually 
(except for the mother who provides food for her young offspring), they 
share meat with each other, while pygmy chimps share some vegetarian food 
as well. (vii) Elementary forms of communication play a significant role 
among apes. Gestures are used not merely to attract attention but also to 
indicate certain intentions - as when a female pygmy chimp tells a male how 
she wants sex. A range of sounds are used for different purposes, for 
signalling danger or a plentiful source of food. (viii) The social behaviour of 
apes varies from band to band within each species, showing that it depends 
not merely on instinctive, genetically programmed factors, but also on the 
natural terrain they live off and the learned techniques they have for coping 
with this. 7 
At the risk of oversimplification, then, contemporary primatological research has 
revealed not only that the egalitarian and sociable tendencies of ape behaviour are 
more significant and enduring than its "anti-social" tendencies, but that a significant 
portion of ape behaviour is clearly beyond the ken of the purely biological sciences. 
As is the case for modem homo sapiens the mode of biological adaptation to the 
environment of the higher non-human primates involves genetic selection in the 
direction of sociality, group learning (though not symbolic culture), tool-use (though 
not tool-manufacture), and rudimentary food-sharing. The only difference between 
human beings and (especially) gorillas and chimpanzees in these crucial respects is 
that the process of biological evolution has been pushed much further in this direction 
for the former than for the latter. Unlike chimps and gorillas, for instance, human 
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beings are social and cultural animals par excellence, and this is why the tendency 
towards food-sharing behaviour found in their hunter-gatherer communities was (and 
is) far more developed than it is in the forager-scavenger bands of the modem apes. In 
view of these facts let us for once (but only once! ) take a leaf out of socio- biology's 
book. That is to say, let us acknowledge that the absence of inherent anti-social 
tendencies towards hierarchy, domination, aggression, individualism, territorialism 
and gratuitous violence (allegedly manifest in the behaviour of humanity's primate 
cousins) is a fairly reasonable guide to their absence in the psycho-organic makeup 
and "natural" behavioural dispositions of modem human beings. After all, why should 
we be seen as possessing such "innate traits" or "instinctual social behaviours" if little 
evidence of their existence can be found in our nearest biological relatives? 
The fourth (and for our purposes) final difficulty with socio-biology's portrait of 
human nature and social interaction concerns its elementary confusion of those human 
behavioural traits which emerge through the interplay between organism and 
environment and those which can truly be said to be relatively permanent 
characteristics of human nature irrespective of variations in social and natural 
circumstances. A useful example of this confusion of the interactional and biological 
properties of human beings is, of course, to be found in socio-biology's treatment of 
territorialism and warfare in human history. The argument here is that these social 
phenomena are simply a "special case" of the eternal laws of biological adaptability 
which animate the entirety of organic nature. As is the case for all biological 
organisms, human beings are we are told "survival machines" predetermined by their 
biological makeup to enhance the reproductive success of their genes: imperialism 
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and inter-state warfare are but socio-cultural manifestations of the genetic imperatives 
of biological human nature. 
But, again despite biologism, modem environmental biology and physical 
anthropology have both made it plain enough that aggressive or violent behaviour in 
all higher animal species (and not just in human beings and their nearest relatives) 
cannot be seen merely as innate properties of the organism (pre-programmed by 
genetic imperatives) but arise as much (if not more) from the behavioural exigencies 
forced upon the organism by the environmental circumstances in which it finds itself 
and (as in social species) by the particular character of its relations with those of its 
own kind. Indeed, far from most animals being genetically predisposed towards 
violence and aggression, it seems that they are instinctually predisposed towards 
avoiding violent encounters where these might endanger life or limb or involve them 
in conflict with the members of other species which are perceived as unthreatening or 
lacking in hostile intent. It is only where environmental and social circumstances 
involve severe resource-stress or over-population that intra-species (and certain forms 
of inter-species) violence and aggression become commonplace. This point is well 
made by Richard Leakey: 
Conflicts over mates, food and territory are commonplace in the natural 
world, but animals have an elaborate style of combat when settling a dispute 
with another member of the species, and, for the most part, they avoid 
inflicting serious damage on each other. One of the important factors about 
animal conflict is that it is more likely to happen under some types of 
circumstances than others. Factors such as availability of resources and 
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territorial crowding have an important effect on the level of violence running 
through groups of animals. 8 
But one cannot sensibly address the sorts of issues raised by the foregoing within 
the conceptual frame of socio-biology's understanding of human nature and social 
order. The a priori designation of human beings as self-aggrandising, territorial, 
individualistic, competitive and aggressive rules out-of-court any serious (i. e. non 
tautological) consideration of the role of social co-operation in human life and 
society, and this despite the impossibility of even imagining how, for instance, 
capitalist society could continue to function without a continuous daily input of self- 
sacrificing, altruistic and collaborative acts of social co-operation by millions of 
individuals (as evidenced by the chaos that engulfs the capitalist labour-process or 
public services when workers withdraw good-will and "work-to-rule"). A serious 
treatment of these matters would require a far more positive appraisal of the nature of 
human nature and behaviour than biologism is prepared to concede and a recognition 
of how so many of the allegedly innate characteristics and traits of human personality, 
allegedly manifest in social interaction and structure, arise from the interaction of 
persons with the particular social and material environments they inhabit. 
It is precisely because many socio-biologists have an intuitive grasp that this is 
the case which explains their equivocation and vacillation on this point. It is, after all, 
patently absurd to insist that human biology is transmitted to society and yet to deny 
the reciprocal causal impact of society on the individual characteristics and social 
activity of human beings. Yet to admit a place for the societal and material 
environments of interaction in any causal account of human motivation and behaviour 
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is to call into question the adequacy of every one of socio-biology's concrete 
explanations of socio-cultural phenomena, all of which are gifted a biological raison 
d'etre. In other words, to concede the reality of innate human sociability, reciprocism, 
altruism, egalitarianism and communalism entails an acceptance of the historico- 
evolutionary construction of these emergent properties of human biology during the 
process of humanity's unique social and economic modes of interaction with physical 
nature ("co-operative man" not "Darwinian man" has adaptive survival-value). 
Similarly, to concede the irreducibility of the social environment, and its independent 
causal powers in shaping human individuals and their social interaction, entails an 
acceptance of the possibility that a change in socio-cultural organisation might bring 
about profound alterations in the characteristics, motivations and behaviours of people 
and thereby bring about equally profound changes in their social action and 
interaction. 
To accept the implications of these sorts of arguments, which accord well with 
historical evidence, is complete anathema to our socio-biologists, who are reluctant to 
court the idea that much of what they hold to be intrinsic in human nature is really the 
consequence of the immersion of individuals in specific kinds of structured social 
relations. Such conclusions would suggest that the majority of social and human 
pathologies which afflict the modern world - e. g. class exploitation, race and gender 
oppression, poverty, inequality, imperialism, etc. - could be eradicated with a 
transformation of social structure without any corresponding psychic damage to 
human nature. More seditiously still, such conclusions would appear to lend support 
to the idea that human nature (forged as it was in the epoch of egalitarian-communal 
hunting and gathering) would actually benefit psychically from the eradication of 
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hierarchical, unequal and competitive modes of social organisation which precisely 
negate or alienate humanity's sociability. 
It is, of course, impossible to say to what extent a return to egalitarian and 
communal ways of living would generate a psychological and material improvement 
in the lives of the majority of contemporary human beings. But it is likely to be quite 
substantial. To the best of our knowledge, for example, hunter-gatherer societies did 
not (and do not) generate the strains which lead individuals to suffer nervous 
breakdowns or become susceptible to psychotic illness. Nor is there any evidence that 
they suffer(ed) either from systematic gender conflict79 or from any kind of "crime 
problem" as we would understand it. Moreover, despite having only a fraction of the 
per capita economic income generated by modern class societies, pre-class 
communities have normally managed to support a standard of living (measured in 
terms of nutritional intake per head) superior to most of today's "developing" 
countries and the overwhelming majority of pre-capitalist class societies. 80 
I conclude that it is simply not the case that "socio-biology can make valid points 
without overreaching itself', 
81 as one sophisticated opponent of reductionism has 
recently asserted. A commitment to the factual existence and explanatory salience of 
human nature (and for that matter of natural selection as the motive force behind 
human evolution) need not and should not entail any kind of flirtation with socio- 
biology. The fundamental problem of biologism is not only its incapacity to account 
for the emergent properties of human biology and human agency (i. e. personal 
psychology and subjectivity, social interaction and socio-cultural organisation) but its 
failure to develop a satisfactory theory of human nature and of organic evolution in 
general. In other words, socio-biology fails as a theory of human subjects because it 
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fails as a theory of human organisms (and indeed of organisms generally). It is for this 
reason that many of the most effective critiques of biologism have come as much from 
practising biologists as from sociologists and anthropologists. After all, it should go 
without saying that an approach which does not stand a chance of coming to grips 
with the biological nature of animals which do not possess those "inconvenient" 
properties of rationality, language and culture is ill-equipped to comprehend the 
nature of animals which do. 
The naturalistic conception of individuals and society: utilitarianism 
If biologism represents the logical consequences of "upwards conflationism" when it 
is pushed to its unpalatable limits then utilitarianism represents one step (but only one 
step! ) backwards from the abyss. Micro-reductionism still reigns, however, for 
whereas biologism recommends the dissolution of structure, culture and interaction 
into the human genotype (and hence the collapse of the social sciences in micro- 
biology), utilitarianism recommends that social analysis address itself simply to the 
individual subject, his/her desires or wants, and the finite resources which constrain 
his or her rational options for action. In other words, unlike socio-biology (which 
ultimately abolishes human subjects as causal agents by treating significant social 
action and interaction as a mere by-product of the unconscious drive of the human 
organism to enhance or safeguard the "reproductive fitness" of its genes), the 
utilitarian theory of action rehabilitates the sovereign individual as author of his or her 
agency, portraying it as motivated by subjective preferences and as structured in 
"logical" ways by the rationality of the human mind (which given the reality of 
"natural scarcity" ensures that individuals generally pursue competitive instrumental 
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self-interest above the collective good). Human agents are thus portrayed by 
utilitarianism as atomised individuals, self-interested "utility-optimisers" (or in lesser 
versions of the approach "utility-satisficers"), acting socially on the basis of the most 
instrumentally rational means-ends cost-benefit calculations of how to best realise 
their personal desires, selecting which utilities will best meet primary wants, and 
calculating the most rational instrumental means of "maximising" or "satisficing" 
these wants. These are the core assumptions which run through the various forms of 
modern utilitarianism (e. g. marginalism, rational choice theory and social exchange 
theory). 
The utilitarian conception of individuals and society: a critique 
Alex Callinicos has made the point that the fundamental problem with "utilitarian 
man", stemming from the theory of utility's conflation of "all the manifold 
relationships of people ... 
[as] definite manifestations of definite qualities of 
individuals ... in the one relation of usefulness", 
82 is that he is incapable of engaging 
in what Charles Taylor describes as "strong evaluation" of desires and wants. 
"Utilitarian man" is merely a "simple weigher" of his options. That is to say, he 
contents himself wholly with measuring the utility of his desires and wants (against 
the yard stick of individuated self-interest) without any consideration of whether these 
are moral or immoral, refined or unrefined, socially beneficial or pernicious, 
"profound [or] superficial, noble [or] base ... fragmented or integrated, alienated or 
free, saintly or merely human. , 83 By contrast, the "strong evaluator" which Taylor 
recommends to us as typical of human subjects and their social conduct judges the 
desirability of her wants not simply on the basis of personal utility but in the light of 
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broader substantive (i. e. ethical and social) considerations which she appropriates 
from society and internalises as her own. Instead of human agents being "reflective in 
a minimal sense" (i. e. reflective in the sense that they "evaluate ... courses of action, 
and sometimes ... act ... out of that evaluation as against the 
impress of immediate 
desire", as is the case for "utilitarian man", real human persons order and act upon 
their desires and motivations not "only in virtue of the attraction of the 
consummations but also in virtue of the kind of life and kind of subject"84 that they 
wish or imagine themselves to be. 
In other words, human persons as "strong evaluators" do not regard the "ends" or 
"goals" of social interaction as "random" or "given", as matters of subjective 
quantification of individual utility, but rather assess these critically in accordance with 
normative and moral judgements as to what is or what ought to be the case in society 
at large and what is or is not appropriate behaviour for them in the light of the 
subjective identities they posses. Why else, for example, do revolutionary socialists 
sacrifice the optimisation of their private utility by disqualifying themselves from 
pursuing certain forms of well-paid and prestigious occupations in the role-ensemble 
of capitalist society or by devoting time and energy to the thankless task of flogging 
socialist newspapers on street corners when they could be putting their feet up in front 
of the telly or going to a football match? Yet if subjects are indeed "strong evaluators" 
instead of "simple weighers", and there is little good reason to doubt it, then surely we 
have the right to expect our utilitarians to recognise this fact and practise a little 
"strong evaluation" of their own when examining the social world. 
Aside from the fact that this "evaluative realism" entails treating "human agents' 
... moral 
judgements as factual assertions capable of being true and false like all such 
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assertions and rejecting the moral non-cognitivism ... that is so deeply embedded in 
modern Western culture", 85 it is also clear enough that it presupposes a conception of 
human nature and of individuated subjectivity which cannot be reconciled with the 
utilitarian theory of action. The very existence of Parsons' "normative man" (and 
indeed of Weber's "non-rational" modes of social action) attest not only to the 
irreducibility and causal efficacy of the socio-cultural levels of the human world but 
also to the existence of a human person who possesses the capacity and inclination 
(indeed imperative) to become a normative or moral subject and interactant. 
These above considerations bring to light both the inadequacies of utilitarianism's 
treatment of the normative-ethical dimensions of human subjectivity as reducible to 
individual self-interest and the impoverished nature of its concept of formal 
rationality. These problems are closely related. As Amartya Sen points out, the failure 
to recognise the existence and salience of human subjects as irreducibly moral beings 
(whose morality is in part I would contend conditioned by the sociability, 
communalism and egalitarianism of human nature) leads to the neglect of "trust", 
"commitment", "sympathy", "altruism" and "reciprocity" as aspects of their affectual 
and normative endowment and as powerful sources of motivation informing their 
social interaction. 86 The result is precisely the abject (though seldom acknowledged) 
failure of contemporary rational choice theory to resolve the so-called "free-rider" 
problem and the associated "Prisoner's Dilemma". 
The free rider problem 
Consider, first of all, the question of "free-riding". According to utilitarianism, since 
human persons are primarily self-interested utility-optimisers, there is absolutely no 
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good (i. e. formally rational) incentive for them to "join or support organisations that 
provide benefits they will gain even if they do not join the organisation. Why, for 
example, should a person join a trade union (at the cost of time or money) if they will 
receive any negotiated wage increases in any case? "87 Why, for that matter, should 
any individual pay taxes to the central government given that (s)he may benefit from 
public services without having to do so? 
But perhaps the fact that people do join trade unions and pay their taxes should 
itself suffice to call into question the adequacy of "utilitarian man" and his 
instrumentally rational action as a general feature of human social relationships even 
within modern capitalist societies. After all, although it is undoubtedly the case that a 
fully adequate explanation of collective agency oriented towards "public goods" is 
impossible without reference to the independent causal impact of socio-cultural 
organisation in conditioning the social interests and social powers of individuals, it is 
nonetheless important to stress that such sociological accounts of agency rely upon a 
conception of human subjects that is quite at odds with that offered by utilitarianism. 
It is, in fact, far more reasonable and sensible to suggest that the manifest reality of 
widespread reciprocity, altruism, trust, sympathy and commitment in human 
motivation and social interaction, particularly in the context of capitalist social 
relations which systematically generate countervailing pressures towards self-interest 
and competitive individualism, is precisely illustrative not of a "hidden agenda" of 
privatised "utility-optimisation" but of certain anti- utilitarian facts of human nature 
and subjectivity. 
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The prisoner's dilemma 
Turning now to the question of the "Prisoner's Dilemma". Given that it is asserted by 
utilitarianism that individuals are moved primarily by instrumental rationality, it is 
difficult to see how rational choice theorists can explain why, for instance, political 
prisoners as often as not choose not to confess their "guilt", renounce their "crimes", 
or betray their comrades, despite the fact that a failure on their part to follow the 
"instrumentally rational but collectively sub-optimal choice" is likely to result in their 
"least preferred solution (i. e. the maximum gaol sentence). "88 Treatment of persons as 
Sen's "rational fools", trapped by their narrow self-interest into "grassing-up" their 
friends and colleagues under pressure, or into abstaining from organising collectively 
in pursuit of "public goods", not only runs counter to many of the most important 
facts of human society, but can be explained plausibly only by assuming that they are 
the kind of beings predisposed towards the aforesaid non-utilitarian motivational 
emotions and behavioural norms. Thus political prisoners often do not betray their 
confederates, despite torture and the threat of imprisonment or death, because they 
trust others not to betray them, or because they cannot bear the thought of putting 
others (especially "significant others") through the same experience they are going 
through themselves, or because their commitment to their comrades (or a particular 
cause or organisation) is sufficient to override considerations of personal utility. 
Such motivational states are not "irrational" or "non-rational", as utilitarianism 
seems to suggest. For these have not only enhanced the environmental adaptability of 
the human genotype, but also provide individuals with good reasons for supposing 
that collective agency in support of public goals and/or resistance to the pressures of 
the Prisoner's Dilemma is not always self-defeating even in terms of personal utility. 89 
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The fact that persons are more rational than is allowed for by utilitarianism (being 
capable of assessing the modifications engendered in the "game" of rational choice by 
non-utilitarian normative and affectual motivations and commitments, and of refusing 
to regard the pursuit of self-interest as always uniquely rational) is itself a fairly clear 
demonstration of the irredeemable crudity of treating instrumental rationality as the 
benchmark of rationality and of reducing human behaviour to the imperatives of 
"utilitarian man". 
The fact that some rational choice and social exchange theorists are prepared to 
admit the existence of "limiting conditions"90 on the applicability of their 
instrumentally rational models of social action is precisely illustrative of the inability 
of utilitarianism to come to grips with the diversity of human motivation and the 
complexity of socio-cultural relations. Typically such "limiting conditions" are 
introduced by contemporary utilitarians to dismiss as species of "non-rational" or 
"irrational" activity those vast tracts of human behaviour and relationships which 
contradict the universality of self-interested utility-satisfaction: 
These limiting conditions generally include those "valuables that are not for 
sale". Examples include love, approval, praise and admiration. What they 
share in common is that they cannot be purchased or given in a calculated 
manner. Unless they are perceived as genuine statements of true feelings, 
expressions of love, praise and the like are worthless to the recipient. The 
reciprocal debts that accumulate in instrumental relationships may simply 
not work the same way when people are bound together in intimate 
relationships. For example, after helping a co-worker in an instrumental 
relationship, most people feel that the other is indebted to them. Reciprocity 
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is expected at an appropriate time regardless of the sincerity with which the 
help was offered. By contrast, in an intimate relationship, a different calculus 
may be in operation. People's willingness to make sacrifices without 
expecting reciprocity is greatly increased. Further, actions which might - in 
other situations - be regarded as entailing sacrifices may in an intimate 
relationship be regarded as pleasurable contributions to a relationship. In 
sum, reward and cost perspectives have serious limitations when applied to 
relationships between lovers, family members or close friends. The limited 
applicability arises because expressions of love, admiration, or the like are 
not governed by the same norms of reciprocity. On the one hand, they cannot 
usually be purchased. On the other hand, they cannot ordinarily be 
simulated; that is, offered cynically, independent of genuine feelings. 91 
But given the existence of these "limiting conditions" one is entitled to inquire of 
utilitarians just how much of human agency and relationships is rightly beyond the 
ken of their explanatory models. After all, if a majority of social phenomena can be 
legitimately constructed as a "limiting condition" on the generality of instrumental 
conduct in society it is difficult to grasp the sense or "utility" of regarding the 
utilitarian theory of action as the key to splitting the "sociological atom". Yet deny the 
general applicability of the utilitarian theory of action we must, and for two basic 
reasons. Firstly, it is a matter of historical fact that those hunter-gatherer communities 
which have characterised the overwhelming majority of human existence and socio- 
cultural development knew precisely nothing of cost-benefit transactions. Secondly, 
even under the sway of those "instrumental" relationships and institutions of 
contemporary capitalist society, it is clear enough that non-utilitarian motivations and 
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interactions not only have a far from marginal presence but are absolutely 
indispensable to the functioning and reproduction of these institutions or relations. 
A recognition of these aforesaid capacities and dispositions of trust, sympathy, 
solidarity, loyalty and altruism as elements of human nature rather than as a gift of 
social experience and cultural learning also better allow us to do what liberal 
philosophers and social theorists have been struggling to do for generations: provide 
the normative principles of "reciprocal altruism", "distributive justice" and "fairness" 
with a plausible naturalistic foundation. As Ian Craib rightly notes: "[t]he question of 
norms has always haunted liberal political theory, and it haunts rational choice 
theory. , 92 Precisely because liberalism (and utilitarianism) accepts as its starting point 
a metaphysical individualism whereby the individual is regarded as inherently selfish 
and as prior to the social relations into which (s)he enters to "barter, to truck, to 
exchange one thing for another", the very existence of normative or ethical belief- 
systems in society which ostensibly recommend social behaviours governed by 
anything other than the pursuit of self-interested or instrumental goals has always 
posed something of a difficulty for those who would follow in the footsteps of Adam 
Smith and J. S. Mill. 
Predicated upon these preconceptions, the utilitarian argument that instrumental 
rationality is the benchmark of human rationality, and that social action is genuinely 
rational only in so far as it is consistent with purely instrumental considerations of 
individual utility, has forced contemporary rational choice and social exchange 
theorists to regard non-utilitarian norms and values as something of an oddity, as 
mysterious and rather suspicious entities, as essentially non-rational or irrational 
components of human motivation or behaviour. This is why Jon Elster, for instance, 
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argues that "social norms provide an important kind of motivation for action that is 
irreducible to rationality ... the operation of norms is to a large extent blind, 
compulsive, mechanical or even unconscious. , 93 And this is why, more generally, 
modern utilitarians draw crude analytical distinctions between "normative" and 
"rational" motivations underlying social interaction, with the former always being 
seen as "having a character that cannot be explained in ... rational terms", as operating 
through "shame and guilt", and as "result[ing] from psychological propensities about 
which we know little. 
"94 
The inadequacies of this utilitarian account of social norms (which in fact 
explicitly disqualifies itself from explaining them! ) are fairly obvious and need not 
detain us long. It will suffice for our purposes to note how this most radical of 
individualist programmes designed precisely to "bring men back in"95 to social 
analysis, paradoxically ends up implicitly endorsing a fairly strong form of 
determinism which is the equal of anything to be found in the Parsonian and 
Durkheimian traditions. Given that utilitarianism is committed to the notion that the 
ends of social interaction are often explainable in terms of non-rational or irrational 
commitments, and since therefore persons cannot be said to have good reasons for 
endorsing these commitments, rational choice theorists are forced to appeal to the 
"compulsive" power of norms and values in structuring social interaction (isn't this 
precisely the Parsonian schema to which George Homans counterposed his social 
psychology? ) Instead of selecting from the cultural system those norms or values 
which appear to fit the reality of their life-process (given their location in social 
relations), and instead of being able to assess critically the veracity of norms and 
values against a yardstick of human "well-being", ethnographic experience or 
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empirical evidence (as is suggested by "evaluative realism"), individuals are strung 
between the twin determinations of their instrumentally rational imperative to seek 
out remorselessly the most efficient means to satisfy their random ends and the 
irresistible tidal-pull of the random (normative and ethical) goals which inform their 
social interaction. 
In contrast to such accounts, to stress yet again (at the risk of labouring the 
point! ) the eminently plausible idea that human beings have been endowed by natural 
selection with species-dispositions towards sociality, communalism and altruism (and 
as I have contended towards egalitarianism also), the problematic nature of anti- 
utilitarian norms and values disappears. Once one rejects the a priori notion of 
individualists that human persons are essentially asocial animals, who enter into co- 
operative relations simply in order to maximise their personal welfare and interests, 
one is no longer confronted with the liberal dilemma of how to guarantee the co- 
existence of individual and society without the latter necessarily curtailing the 
freedom and liberty of the former. 
From this perspective, the universal existence throughout human history and 
society of normative principles of "fairness", "distributive justice" and "reciprocal 
altruism" (and those interesting common themes I have pointed out earlier which run 
through the diversity of socio-cultural forms these have taken) evidence not the 
irrationality and randomness of the normative (and affectual) ends of social 
interaction. On the contrary, they evidence the manner of which the non-utilitarian 
modes of human subjectivity encourage persons to seek out ethical standards or 
concepts which make sense of (and which legitimise or critique) the actual socio- 
cultural relations in which they always find themselves. But this means that one no 
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longer has to follow the example of utilitarians in seeking out (invariably implausible) 
"instrumental" explanations of why individuals appear impelled to produce these 
normative concepts (e. g. James Coleman's contention that "fair exchange" - the 
principle of distributive justice - can be explained in terms of the logic of immediate 
contractual exchange; or Peter Blau's argument that reciprocity arises from the 
rational need of individuals to correct imbalances in exchange- relationships). 96 
Instead it is enough to observe that these are precisely the kind of normative 
emergents one would expect from an intensely social and co-operative species blessed 
with the causal powers of self, intelligence and rational thought. 
2.3: SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 
The crucial thing which all non-realist forms of social theory have in common is a 
treatment of self-consciousness and self-identity as socially dependent and of human 
nature as definable in terms of its "plasticity" or "openness". There are, however, 
crucial differences between holists and elisionists on the question of how the social 
self should be conceptualised, which translate into different accounts of the 
explanatory function of the subject and of human agency in social analysis. For 
holists, on the one hand, the "sociological model" of the individual-society connection 
underwrites a treatment of agents and their social activity as animated by macroscopic 
"laws" of structure or culture, operative via "top-down" processes of socialisation or 
ideological conditioning, which transform "indeterminate organisms" into human 
subjects and social interactants capable of functioning as agents of societal 
reproduction. This view is often referred to as "the oversocialised conception of 
people", since it portrays individuals and their doings as passive "puppets" or 
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"supports" of the social system. For elisionists, on the other hand, the "sociological 
model" of the individual-society connection facilitates a treatment of agents and their 
social interaction as explainable in terms of the socio-cultural practices which 
allegedly constitute in one and the same process both society and the subject. 
Normally, though not always (post-structuralism being the notable exception), this 
view supports a radically less deterministic portrait of the subject than is to be found 
in holism, and hence provides far greater scope for agency to intervene against society 
than is allowed for by either functionalism or structuralism. For although self is 
regarded here as entirely dependent upon social interaction to arise and develop (i. e. 
into personal identity), it nonetheless allows those who possess it the capacity to 
reflexively monitor their activity and "do otherwise" when confronted with any 
situation. 
Anthony Giddens' summary of his own position on the relationship between self 
and society might just as easily have been written by any of the elisionists discussed 
in this chapter: 
No culture could exist without society. But, equally, no society could exist 
without culture. Without culture we would not be "human" at all, in the 
sense in which we usually understand that term. We would have no language 
in which to express ourselves, and our ability to think or reason would be 
severely limited.... The fact that from birth to death we are involved in 
interaction with others certainly conditions our personalities, the values we 
hold, and the behaviour in which we engage. Yet socialisation is also at the 
very origin of our individuality and freedom. In the course of socialisation 
each of us develops a sense of self-identity, and the capacity for independent 
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thought or action. Socialisation is the process whereby the helpless infant 
gradually becomes a self-aware, knowledgeable person, skilled in the ways 
of the culture into which she or he is born 97 
In the analysis that follows I will focus entirely upon elisionist conceptions of the 
tripartite relationship between human nature, self and society. I make no apology for 
my corresponding disregard of holist theorisations of the interconnections between 
these same strata of reality, for I take it that structural determinism is no longer 
acceptable in sociology (even if sociological imperialism evidently still is for many 
people). Indeed, it is because "sociological imperialism" remains very much in vogue 
in elisionist accounts of the organism-self-society connection, and because elisionary 
theorising is very much in vogue in contemporary sociology, that I will devote the 
bulk of my analysis to addressing their views on this question. To these ends, having 
elaborated briefly the characteristic views of each major version of elisionary social 
theory on the human being and the individual subject and their connection to social 
relations (i. e. symbolic interactionism, post-structuralism and structuration theory), I 
will consider the adequacy of each of their specific views on these matters, though not 
necessarily in the order presented above. 
Individuals and society in sociological elisionism: a brief outline 
(i) Symbolic interactionism. Interactionists conceive of social reality as fluid and as 
negotiable as "talk" or "conversation" (since it is nothing but an aggregation of 
symbolically-mediated exchange-relations between individuals). Now what is true of 
society generally, from the interactionist perspective, is also true of the human 
organism and the individual subject. Four observations are in order here. Firstly, 
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whilst rejecting the functionalist and structuralist portrait of unsocialised human 
beings as tabula rasa, interactionists do nonetheless tend to reduce human nature to a 
handful of (unspecified) organic drives and to the nebulous concept of "flexibility" or 
"plasticity". Secondly self-identity (like the character of society as a whole) is 
portrayed by interactionists as "negotiated or "constructed" in the course of 
interaction, and its content is regarded here as the product of the meanings or 
expectations which are applied to individuals by other individuals during their mutual 
interactions (e. g. Cooley's "looking glass self"). 98 
From this perspective, the personal attributes of individuals change in accordance 
with the institutional contexts they enter into, or the mechanisms of "societal reaction" 
or "labelling" to which they are subject. 
9 This means that the most enduring aspects 
of human subjectivity or personality are those which are continually validated by 
others, especially by "significant others": 
In the symbolic interaction perspective, identities are viewed as socially 
constructed and situational. This view ... is in marked contrast to 
conventional psychological theories of personality which view personal traits 
as rather permanently established traits that "reside" within the individual.... 
The self is, in other words, a situational product of interaction. However, it is 
not exclusively situational in that some qualities are regularly validated by 
others. This leads individuals to rather permanently regard themselves as 
short or tall, pretty or ugly, smart or dumb, and to present themselves to 
others in a congruent manner. All others are obviously not equally important 
in this regard. Those persons whose reactions are especially important in 
shaping self-concepts are referred to as "significant others". Typical 
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examples include parents, especially for young children, and close friends.... 
From this perspective, one's self-concept could entail any qualities that were 
generally responded to by others. 100 
Thirdly the very existence of human self-consciousness is treated by 
interactionists as dependent upon language acquisition and use (Mead's "internal 
conversation" between the "I" and the "me") and the immersion of individuals in 
particular kinds of social activity (children's play and games) during the process of 
their "primary" socialisation. '°' By "taking on the role" or "acting out the part" of 
"significant others" (especially primary carers), young children gradually develop 
reflexive self-awareness, learning to imagine themselves as objects from the 
perspective of other subjects. Finally the transition of self-consciousness into a full- 
fledged self-identity is seen by interactionists as emergent from specific social 
practices. By immersing themselves in co-operative games and institutional roles, 
older children and adults internalise the attitudes, perspectives and obligations of the 
"Generalised Other" (i. e. of the total society or specific social group of which they are 
members) during their "secondary" socialisation, translating these into a social 
conscience which becomes part of their subjective endowment. 
102 Thus, in summary, 
for interactionists "[t]he individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the 
other members of his social group; and the structure of his self expresses or reflects a 
general behaviour pattern of this social group to which he belongs. " 03 Persons are 
defined here as social selves, and social selves are normally identified with the 
institutional roles ("careers") individuals appropriate from society and internalise as a 
constituent element of their personal identity. 
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(ii) Post-structuralism and postmodernism. Post-structuralism and post- 
modernism offer a similar basic portrait of social reality (in certain key respects) to 
those developed by symbolic interactionists. After all, these approaches share in 
common an emphasis on the centrality of language in constituting society (whether 
this is seen in terms of "symbolic communication" or "discursive practices") and on 
the essentially unstable, fragmentary and heterogeneous character of social relations 
(these being arbitrary cultural impositions on a fundamentally chaotic reality). Now it 
seems to me that exactly the same kind of argument is also true of subjects and 
organisms. This is because for post-structuralists, as for interactionists, the treatment 
of society as analogous to "talk" or "discourse" is designed to convey the image of 
subjects and of human nature as cultural constructs and as relatively plastic and 
negotiable. Yet this fundamental point of contact between these approaches also 
marks the crucial theoretical difference between them on the question of the 
individual-society connection. For unlike interactionists, who seek to gift individuals 
certain enduring properties of subjectivity or person-hood (by dint of the "validations" 
of "significant others" and their immersion within the collective expectations or 
sentiments of the social group or "Generalised Other" to which they belong), 
exponents of post- structuralism and postmodemism wish to radicalise the "situational 
self' of their predecessors and contemporaries, pushing it to its logical terminus, in 
effect denying personal identity any fixity or stability whatsoever. 
Thus, for post-structuralists and postmodernists, the emphasis on the plural and 
fragmented nature of the world is designed to reveal the residual autonomy of the self 
as an illusion spun from the cloth of the ubiquitous "metaphysics of presence" (i. e. the 
idea that the subject has immediate access to external reality and the contents of his or 
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her own consciousness). Accordingly post-structuralists utilise the "linguistic 
analogy" in a significantly different way than do interactionists. Here it is employed to 
paint a portrait of self as constituted by an endless shifting play of "signification and 
differentiation" which knows no "territoriality" or stable co-ordinates of organisation. 
Therefore, from this perspective, in much the same way that a language can function 
only because words differ from each other, the meaning of subjects is given not by 
their own discrete properties, causal powers or "inner essence", but by their 
"otherness" vis-ä-vis the constituent elements of the "assemblages" or "multiplicities" 
of which they are a part. 
This basic orientation of post-structuralist sociology and social theory is well 
summarised by Roger Gottlieb: 
Just as there is no final theory, or given reality, so the "subject" -a unified, 
knowable, discrete self residing at the heart of each person's identity - is also 
a fiction. This notion is another fantasy of Western thought. Personal identity 
is as variable, shifting and plastic as any text. As there can be no final 
reading of the world, or of a book, so there can be no final reading of a 
person. We simply interpret endlessly between the limits of birth and death. 
There is no "inner truth" to persons, books or the world. All of these, in fact, 
are "textual". Human beings and language, knowledge and interpretation, 
cannot finally be distinguished. 
104 
(iii) Structuration theory. As we have seen, Giddens' structuration theory is 
primarily designed to provide a solution to the antinomies of "subjectivist" or 
"activist" and "objectivist" or "structuralist" sociological perspectives by means of his 
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"duality of structure" thesis. Nonetheless its author has also sought to develop a 
theory of consciousness and self which "radicalises" G. H. Mead's social psychology 
by combining certain of its insights with others derived from the work of Freud and 
Jean Piaget. Giddens summarises his approach as follows: 
There are major differences between the perspectives of Freud, Mead and 
Piaget; yet it is possible to suggest a picture of [self] development which 
draws on them all. All three authors accept that, in the early months of 
infancy, a baby has no distinct understanding of the nature of objects and 
persons in its environment or of its own separate identity. Throughout the 
first two years or so of life, before the mastery of developed linguistic skills, 
most of the child's learning is unconscious because she or he has as yet no 
awareness of self. Freud was probably right to claim that ways of coping 
with anxiety established during this early period - related, in particular, to 
interaction with mother and father - remains important in later personality 
development. It is likely that children learn to become self-aware beings 
through the process suggested by Mead - the differentiating of an "I" and a 
"me". Children who have acquired a sense of self retain egocentric modes of 
thinking, however, as Piaget indicated. The development of the child's 
autonomy probably involves greater emotional difficulties than either Mead 
or Piaget seemed to realise - this is where Freud's ideas are particularly 
relevant. Being able to cope with early anxieties may well influence how far 
a child is later able to move successfully through the stages of cognition 
distinguished by Piaget. los 
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Starting from a position which rejects tout court the concept of a naturalistic self 
(on the grounds that "a transcendental philosophy of the ego terminates in an 
irremediable solipsism"), 106 and which denies the possibility of non-social interaction 
with the object-world entering into the articulation of self and self-identity (on the 
grounds that this is mediated by emotions "which are themselves constituted by social 
routines"), 107 Giddens claims that the emergence of self-consciousness and self- 
identity is a process made possible by the "unconscious sociality" of the new-born 
("the sense of ontological security ... organised cognitively through basic trust")108 
and instantiated by language-use contextualised within routinised social practices: 
The mutuality with early caretakers which basic trust presumes is a 
substantially unconscious sociality which precedes an "I" and a "me", and is 
a prior basis of any differentiation between the two.... [A]cquired routines, 
and forms of mastery associated with them, in the early life of the human 
being, are much more than just modes of adjusting to a pre-given world of 
persons and objects. They are constitutive of an emotional acceptance of the 
reality of the "external world" without which a secure human existence is 
impossible. Such acceptance is at the same time the origin of self-identity 
through learning what is not-me. 109 
Human nature and the social self in post-structuralism: a critique 
Since post-structuralist and postmodernist approaches have offered the most radical 
version of the "de-centring" of the self concept and "theoretical anti-humanism", a 
consideration of their characteristic views on these questions seems as good a place as 
any to commence my critique. However before considering to what extent logical 
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argumentation and empirico-historical data supports post-structuralist attempts to 
render the self the product of a welter of sub-individual drives and trans-individual 
processes, it is worth taking the time to elaborate the great strength of anti-humanist 
and anti-naturalist treatments of the individual. I refer, of course, to the devastating 
critique furnished by authors such as Foucault and Derrida of the Cartesian concept of 
the self. The errors of this orthodox "philosophy of the subject" have been exposed 
here as consisting of subjectivism, rationalism, empiricism and atomism. Post- 
structuralists are quite right to argue that the self cannot be seen as purely individuated 
or "self-defining", as independent from culture, as "essentially unconnected to other 
people", as existing "distinct from the body" (i. e. as a unity of consciousness), as 
"only peripherally burdened with emotions", and as "individually capable of 
universally valid knowledge. "' 10 Post-structuralists are equally correct to argue that 
Durkheimian and Freudian insights into the nature of human consciousness have 
successfully destabilised the sovereign individual of liberal social theory from two 
directions simultaneously. Thus, from this perspective, since individual motivations 
are shaped by a welter of unconscious drives and discursive practices, it follows that 
subjects can be neither the authors of their own thinking nor the foundation of all 
meaning, knowledge or culture. The case for post- structuralism's "de-centring" of the 
self, in the sense described above, appears to me to be overwhelming. 
If the important insight of post-structuralist treatments of the self is that 
subjectivity "ain't all in the head", it is nonetheless one which has to be recovered 
from a morass of error. Where post-structuralism goes wrong is in its insistence that 
"de-centred" subjects entails no unitary subjects whatsoever. After all, one can readily 
accept that individuals are constituted as social actors through ongoing processes of 
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socialisation and enculturation, that they possess dimensions of mind irreducible to 
consciousness and self-consciousness, and that personal identity is constructed 
through the mediation of autobiographical experiences which contain an indispensable 
social element, yet still insist that individuals possess nonetheless properties of 
subjectivity irreducible to unconscious psychological mechanisms and cultural 
practices of discursive signification. 
For one thing, the fact that the human mind does possess dimensions or "levels" 
below conscious self-awareness (as Freud rightly insists) does not automatically mean 
that it should not be conceived of as a relatively structured whole of some description, 
that is, as part of a unitary psycho-organic system operating relatively autonomously 
in relation to the environment. And for another thing one can legitimately argue that 
the human mind is "de-centred" in the sense that it operates through processes which 
are partly unconscious or semi-conscious, and which are consequently "unauthored" 
by intentional subjects, yet still legitimately make the observation that human beings 
possess also conscious elements of mind which do initiate reflective monitoring of 
action and intentional agency and which do "author" most of their socially significant 
behaviour. Indeed, since most social behaviour of individuals is immediately and 
plausibly accountable in terms of intentional explanation (rather than in terms of 
unconscious psychological "instincts" or "drives"), it does seem rather over-ambitious 
(to say the least) for post-structuralists to enlist Freudian psychology as an ally in their 
attempt to dispense with the human subject altogether. 
A useful illustration of the profound logical and theoretical problems which befall 
post-structuralism's attempts to efface human nature and the individual subject from 
social analysis is to be gleaned from Foucault's work, particularly from his A History 
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of Sexuality (volumes I, II and III), Discipline and Punish, and The Order of Things. 
As we have seen, the central explanatory concept here is that of "power/knowledge", 
which denotes relations of domination coded into signifying practices, whose function 
is to impose determinate structure and content on human thinking, self-identity and 
activity. In Foucault's words: "The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized 
on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is 
the product of a relation of power, exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, 
desires and forces. "' 11 Now at the same time as Foucault stresses the omnipotence of 
power, and its role in allowing the very existence of individuals as selves and social 
actors, it is also clear that he wishes to portray power as an unstable and "inherently 
antagonistic" relationship. "Power is war, a war continued by other means. "' 
12 This 
encourages Foucault to argue that "where there is power ... there is resistance to 
power. " 113 Yet he is quite clear that resistance does not stand a chance of usurping or 
overturning power. This is because resistance "is never in a position of exteriority 
with respect to power", 
114 meaning that power can only be challenged by a counter- 
power which in so doing becomes itself power, a new mode of domination over 
bodies, collectivities and things. 
But the major problem associated with Foucault's concept of individuals as 
"docile bodies" (i. e. as entirely animated by power relations) is that it denies him the 
intellectual resources to "ground" his corresponding contention (central to his 
genealogies or archaeologies of modernity) that power always encounters resistance. 
If "power is always already there", if individuals are but a "prime effect" of power, 
then the capacity of persons to resist power becomes unfathomable. To repeat an 
earlier point in a different context. As mere "docile bodies", individuals cannot 
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possibly imagine socio-cultural relations other than the ones they inhabit, they cannot 
possibly possess needs or wants or interests which they recognise as their own or 
which they regard as frustrated by society or rival social groups, and neither can they 
possess either good reasons or impelling motives for struggling against existing 
"apparatuses" of "power/knowledge". 
It was, of course, his awareness of this dilemma which led Foucault to postulate 
(initially) the "body and its pleasures" (human nature? ) and (latterly) the 
"technologies of the self' (the individual subject? ) as the locus of resistance to 
relations of "power/ knowledge". Foucault now introduces into his social theory 
concepts of (presumably associal or pre-social) "needs" and "desires" apparently 
repressed by "civilisation". And now he portrays subjects as formed independently of 
power relations or discursive practices: "[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, 
and only insofar as they are free. " 115 In Foucault's mature writings the freedom of 
individuals from the "techniques of domination" is understood in terms of an 
"aesthetic of existence", whereby individuals engage in "reflective and voluntary 
practices" which "fix the rules of their conduct", allowing them to "transform 
themselves ... and modify themselves. "116 From this 
latter perspective, far from the 
social self being the "effect" of power, it is rather a process of self-construction 
engaged in by "free" individuals, which itself gives form to individual autonomy. 
Where all of this leaves Foucault's earlier denial of an explanatory role for human 
nature and his disavowal of the idea of an antecedently existing self at the centre of 
each individual's personal identity is far from clear. On a theoretical level, of course, 
Foucault never saw fit to reconcile the contradiction between "docile bodies" and 
"free subjects". The anti-humanism and anti-naturalism of his earlier writings was 
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never formally repudiated in his middle or later ones. Voluntarist idealism replaced 
cultural determinism, but without any explanation of how the latter related to the 
former or to the "philosophy of difference". Where before individuals were portrayed 
as the passive objects of the power relations into which they were inserted, now they 
were magically emancipated from these relational determinations, being gifted unique 
powers of self-determination and needs and interests irreducible to the imprint of 
society. Doubtless part of the reason explaining Foucault's paralysis and equivocation 
on the question of the relationship between "docile bodies" and "free subjects" was 
his belated recognition that a formal break with the concepts and concerns of his 
earlier work would precisely capsize his post-structuralism (i. e. by bringing into 
disrepute the idea that reality - social, physical and psychical - is simply a 
structureless collection of fragments, with each particle lacking enduring 
characteristics of its own, and deriving instead its identity from the random and 
chaotic contacts it has with other particles within the "network" of which they are all a 
part). For to furnish a theoretical account of how individuals can function as "free 
subjects", interpreting the needs of the "body and its pleasures" as a locus of 
resistance to power relations, would have required an explicit reapproachment with 
the "essentialist" assumptions of humanism and naturalism and the despised 
"philosophy of the subject". 
Whatever Foucault's own views on the formal status of the human being and the 
individual subject in his later years, however, what cannot be doubted is that his 
enterprise depends for its overall coherence upon a recognition of the explanatory 
salience of both these dimensions of human reality. Why is this? Firstly Foucault's 
concept of the "body and its pleasures" must refer (albeit in a rather restrictive 
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utilitarian way) to organismic needs and interests specific to human nature if it is to 
stand as any kind of solution to the problem of struggle and resistance. For it must be 
assumed that the psycho-organic needs and interests of human nature exert a strong 
conditional influence upon the subjectivities and conscious preferences of individuals, 
allowing them to articulate these as their own, if it is to be allowed that the "body and 
its pleasures" stand as a fundamental locus of opposition to specific discursive 
practices or "techniques of domination. " Secondly Foucault's concept of the 
"technologies of the self' (i. e. practices of self-constitution and self-government), 
which he appears to regard as definitional of "free subjects", can be set in motion only 
given the presumption that individuals enter into these practices in secure possession 
of certain "determinate" or "structured" properties of subjectivity. This is because 
individuals can be deemed capable of self-government and self-construction only if it 
is accepted that they are (i) voluntarist, purposive, innovative and intentional beings 
by nature, and (ii) in possession of sufficient continuity of reflexive self- 
consciousness - prior to their immersion or involvement in the "technologies of the 
self' - to assume responsibility for their own conduct and "give form to themselves. " I 
conclude that the unresolved tensions of Foucault's project stand as a salutary 
testament to the formidable logical and substantive problems which beset any 
sustained attempt to eradicate "the face of mankind" and the non-social self from 
social analysis. 
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Human nature and the social self in symbolic interactionism and structuration 
theory: a critique 
The "sociological conception of agency", as this is presented by interactionists and by 
Giddens, is to an important extent an elaboration and development of themes and 
assumptions which are to be found in the work of G. H. Mead and Erving Goffman 
(although, as I have already suggested, Giddens does "supplement" Mead's insights 
with his own concept of "innate sociality" and with others derived from Piaget and 
Freud). Despite variations in emphasis, philosophical vocabulary, and the detail of 
their respective arguments, what each of these theorists have in common is the core 
assumption "that selves have social origins and are expressed in social contexts" 
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and that human nature and consciousness be regarded as indeterminate or unformed 
until form and content is forced upon it by the immersion of individuals within 
processes of social interaction or socio-cultural practices. To this one might be 
tempted to retort: so what else is new? After all, stated baldly in the above terms, this 
portrait of individuals does seem remarkably similar to the one painted by post- 
structuralists and postmodernists. 
There are, however, two important differences between the ideas of interactionists 
and structurationists on the one hand, and those of post-structuralists and 
postmodernists on the other, which are worthy of note. Firstly the account of the 
formation of the social self in the former is far more systematic or "theorised" than in 
the latter. Since Mead, Berger, Giddens and company regard the self as a concrete 
product of interaction, rather than as emergent from some nebulous or ill-defined 
process of discursive "signification and differentiation", they are constrained to offer 
sociological analysis in place of the abstract impressionism of the "philosophy of 
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difference". This means that rather more attention is given here to the developmental 
stages through which self-awareness and self-identity emerges and to the specific 
kinds of social activity and forms of socialisation upon which the self is allegedly 
dependent. Secondly, as I have suggested beforehand, theorists rooted in the traditions 
of interactionism and structuration theory do not endorse the post-structuralist view 
that endorsing the social self is tantamount to displacing the subject altogether as a 
"centre" capable of initiating or even "authoring" thought and action. From this 
perspective, though the self is indeed socially and culturally dependent, this does not 
mean that the subject is reducible to his or her social relations, since interaction and 
socialisation furnish the individual with certain capacities - notably the ability to 
reflexively monitor behaviour and respond innovatively to any situation - which 
enable him or her to avoid being constituted as a mere "effect" of discourse, culture or 
"relationships" of whatever sort. 
The respective treatments of the human being and the individual subject furnished 
by exponents of interactionism and structuration theory may be questioned on a 
number of counts. I will begin this task by examining Mead's account of the social 
origins of self-consciousness and self-identity, since his views on this issue are 
generally endorsed by interactionists, by phenomenologists such as Berger and 
Luckmann, and (albeit in a modified form) by Giddens as well. After this I will 
examine the unhappy fate of the "social self' in symbolic interactionism, arguing that 
the radical "social situationalism" of interactionists disqualifies them from explaining 
how individuals "negotiate" their self-identities or find the "internal resources" to 
resist societal pressures which encourage self-redefinition. Finally I will examine 
Giddens' "radicalisation" of Mead's social psychology, especially his attempt to 
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overcome the radical plasticity of the "situational subject" (by postulating self-identity 
as the product of the individual's reflections on his or her social biography) and his 
appeal to the "basic trust" inherent in human beings (as this is instantiated in 
"acquired social routines" derived therefrom) to explain the possibility of self- 
awareness. Here I will argue that the former does not overcome the "problem of 
resistance" or motive- formation which has undermined post-structuralism and 
interactionism and that the latter is an illegitimate use of anthropology designed to 
undercut the possibility of a non-social basis of self and of naturalistic sources of 
personal identity. 
Mind, self and society in G. H. Mead's social behaviourism: a critique 
To recap. Mead and his co-thinkers identify self-awareness with the "internal 
conversation" between two aspects of "mind", that is, between the "I" and the "me". 
Self-awareness emerges only when the individual has learned to recognise himself or 
herself as a "me" as well as an "I". This is a capacity which is dependent upon 
language acquisition and use and the participation of individuals in specific forms of 
social activity and cultural learning. As Mark Abrahamson summarises Mead's 
approach: "the essence of self-consciousness, the `me' in Mead's theory, is a 
recognition of oneself as seen by others, which emerges through child's play, playing 
the part of the other. " 118 
Now the fundamental problem with Mead's social psychology is that it must 
presuppose that which it is designed to explain. Why is this? Firstly the process of 
children's play, and the capacity of infants to regard themselves as objects for others 
which it entails, is itself dependent on the fact that children are able to hold "internal 
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conversations" between themselves and others they are personifying in their play. 
This in turn seems to suggest that they are already aware of the distinction between "I- 
not me", and of the difference between subjects and objects in their social 
environment, prior to engaging in play. In other words, the fact of child's play (e. g. 
Jack's capacity to imagine himself as "Fireman Sam" rescuing Jack from the flames) 
appears inexplicable unless one takes it as given that children take into their play 
precisely those qualities of subjectivity which motivate and enable them to see 
themselves as an object in the eyes of other subjects. Secondly, contra Mead, the 
"internal conversations" which are constitutive of children's play do not seem to be 
dependent upon the prior initiation of infants into language use (although these are 
doubtless enhanced enormously by linguistic competence). In fact pre-linguistic 
children appear to play the role of others vis-ä-vis themselves by imitating the actions, 
gestures, movements and vocal expressions of "significant others", and by 
"conversing" with themselves and others using imaginary words strung together 
without coherent order or pattern. In summary, then, the self cannot emerge from 
children's play if it is required to explain children' play, and language-acquisition and 
use cannot be indispensable to the "me" aspect of the self if pre-linguistic children are 
capable of objectifying themselves in their play. 
No doubt defenders of the "sociological model of agency" might respond to the 
first part of my argument by claiming it involves a misunderstanding of Mead's 
theory of mind. It could be argued, for instance, that Mead regarded the ability of 
children to imagine themselves as objects for themselves (i. e. as a "me") and their 
ability to "play the role of the other" as distinct capacities, with the former emerging 
from the latter. On this view, the "me" which is constitutive of self-consciousness is 
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not pre- supposed by the fact of child's play because it is the process of "taking the 
part of the other" which teaches the child to imagine himself or herself as an object for 
others. But there are three difficulties with this kind of viewpoint which invalidate it 
as a solution to the problem highlighted above. 
Firstly this interpretation has a rather insecure basis in Mead's own work. In fact 
Mead does not always distinguish clearly between these capacities or processes (i. e. 
between "taking the role of the other" and self-objectification). And, as often as not, 
he seems to argue that either the developmental sequence be placed the other way 
round (with "taking the view of the other" emerging from self-objectification) or that 
self be treated as involving self-objectification (rather than as constituting its 
outcome): 
Mind, or thought, involves the subjective structuring of a situation to permit 
purposive behaviour; namely, to call forth desired reactions. For such 
purposive behaviour to occur, the person must be able to take the view of the 
other, which requires self-consciousness. Self, or self-consciousness, entails 
a capacity to regard oneself as an object. The emergence of a self, or 
conception of "me", results from a reflective interpretation of others' 
reactions. 
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Secondly Mead's account of the emergence of self-awareness appears to be 
ambiguous and confused in a more fundamental way. For having apparently argued 
that self-consciousness is synonymous with the capacity of the individual to regard 
himself or herself as an object for another person (which itself involves or depends 
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upon "taking the view of the other"), Mead goes on to contradict his own thesis, 
suggesting (in the same passage quoted above) that the act of taking an external view 
on oneself requires self-consciousness. 
Finally, whatever Mead's real view on the genesis of self, what cannot be 
doubted is that none of the above interpretations or modifications of his approach 
counteract my original objection. Thus it is debatable, to say the least, whether it is 
possible for a child to "take the role of the other", and hence embark upon "internal 
conversations" between herself/himself and other roles she/he is playing, without 
simultaneously imagining herself/himself as an object for other persons. That is to 
say, it is difficult to imagine how, for instance, Jack can play the role of the fireman 
rescuing Jack from the flames (or of Jack being rescued by the fireman) unless it is 
assumed that he already possesses enough of a self to imagine himself as an object for 
another (i. e. as an object for the fireman). This being the case, it does seem likely that 
self-awareness pre-dates both child's play and the acquisition by human beings of 
linguistic competence. In view of this the only interesting question which remains is 
whether a fully social account of self-consciousness can be given which places its 
genesis prior to language acquisition and children's play. Possibly it can. But it is 
nonetheless instructive that no such account has been forthcoming from the camp of 
interactionism. 
A second major problem with the Meadian theory of mind lies in its treatment of 
the "me" (and not the "I") as synonymous with or definitional of self-consciousness. 
The reason why interactionists identify the former with self-awareness is that doing so 
makes it altogether easier for them to justify their a priori belief that the subject is 
socially and linguistically dependent. The "I" is, accordingly, identified with a 
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synthesis of social experience and organic drives, comprising socialised and 
unsocialised aspects, whereas the "me" is identified with the possibility of purposive 
or planned behaviour, and with reason and reflection, and is reckoned to be dependent 
upon the individual being able to take an external stance on himself or herself. But 
there is once again much ambiguity and confusion on this point in Mead's work. For 
having apparently made reflexive thought and meaningful planned goal-oriented 
action dependent upon the dialogical articulation by the individual of a "me" 
("[s]ociety ... is the series of `games' out of which the child's experience of diversity 
leads to a conception of a generalised other and the capacity to ... think and plan in a 
deliberate, conscious manner"), 120 Mead elsewhere indicates that it is the "I" which 
thinks and acts, and which is the source of individual originality, creativity and 
spontaneity. 
So it is that two commentators sympathetic to Mead's project can attribute to him 
an account of self-formation which portrays the "I" as very much more than a unity of 
psycho-organic drives and product of socialisation: 
the "me" ... is merely the sum total of 
definitions of oneself given by society 
and above all oneself seen through the ideas of significant others.... The "I" 
on the other hand is the moving centre of all of these descriptions which are 
derived from others. It is the source of impulse, energy and reflection. The 
individual is never wholly fixed by the labels, projects and obligations which 
society gives. Corresponding to society's "conversation of gestures" there is 
an internal conversation which uses the given language of the "me" but may 
create wholly new meanings. 121 
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An explanation of Mead's dilemma is to be found in his unsuccessful attempt to 
reconcile a fully social explanation of the subject with an emphasis on the individual 
as "sovereign artificer" or author of his or her own thinking and activity. The trouble 
with this laudable attempt of Mead's to defend the uniqueness of the individual from 
the encroachments of the "social self' is that its identification of "mind" with self- 
consciousness, and of self-consciousness with the "me" aspect of personal identity, 
has effectively denied its author the theoretical resources to explain how the "I" can be 
held to own the positive qualities or powers he would attribute to it. This results in a 
curious gap in Mead's argument. For aside from informing his readers that the "I" is 
partly socialised and partly unsocialised, and that it is the source of originality, 
creativity and individuality, Mead does not tell us anything much about this 
dimension of the self at all. We do not even find out whether it is the socialised or 
unsocialised aspects of the "I" which carry the greater explanatory weight in shaping 
the capacity of the individual for innovative thought and action. Theoretically 
disarmed in this way, Mead does not (and cannot) offer any grounds to justify the 
independence of the "I" from the "me". Instead he is forced to resort to merely 
asserting the positive attributes of the "I", establishing their existence by a kind of 
verbal fiat. 
It is doubtless this ambiguity in Mead's work concerning the status of the elusive 
"I" which has allowed subsequent practitioners of "high" symbolic interactionism and 
social constructionism (and more recently of structuration theory) to downplay its 
significance and effectively treat it as dependent upon the "me" aspect of the self (as 
they understand it). So it is that Giddens, for example, can now claim Mead's "I" for 
sociological imperialism ("intersubjectivity does not derive from subjectivity, but the 
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other way round'). 122 A common feature of interactionism and structuration theory is 
thus their mutual conflation of self-consciousness, personal identity and social 
identity. This involves three conceptual moves. Firstly self-awareness is regarded as 
fully developed only where the individual has either acquired the outlook and 
attitudes of the "Generalised Other" (subject to a lengthy period of socialisation and 
cultural learning) or where the "unconscious sociality" or "basic trust" inherent in the 
individual is translated, via the medium of socialisation and cultural learning, into an 
"emotional acceptance of the reality of the `external world'. "123 Secondly self-identity 
or personal identity is not always distinguished clearly from self-awareness, which is 
an inevitable consequence of the latter being seen as emergent from the individual's 
integration into the institutional roles, cultural expectations or social practices of his 
or her society or social group. 
Finally self-identity is treated as interchangeable with social identity, just as the 
individual as subject is treated as synonymous with the individual as role-incumbent 
or social practitioner. This is because (i) an individual's self-definition is said to be 
dependent upon his or her constitution as a social actor, and (ii) the social 
consciousness and behaviour of the individual is regarded as having its locus in 
processes of enculturation and routinised conduct within institutions. Indeed, 
symbolic interactionism's apparent view that self-identity (and hence social identity) 
is synonymous with self-image or the "presentation of self in everyday life"124 appears 
to be a logical extension of the above manoeuvres, since different role- expectations 
require the actor to "perform" different "parts" and don and doff different "persona" 
appropriate to the various institutional settings he or she occupies. 
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Human nature and the social self in symbolic interactionism: a critique 
The fact that this account of the individual is profoundly unsatisfactory is perhaps 
obvious to everyone other than the naivest students of sociology. This is perhaps most 
obvious in the work of interactionists, which I will discuss first. Aside from the 
dubious moral consequences of endorsing the idea that the unsocialised "I" possesses 
few "determinate" or "recognisable" human qualities (it is instructive that sociologists 
often refer to unsocialised infants as "feral" children), perhaps the most fundamental 
difficulties with the interactionist approach are those of a logical character. I refer here 
to the fact that it is uncompelling to regard the self that is presented to others in 
everyday life as equivalent to the self which actually does the self-presenting. I refer 
also to the fact that the self cannot be equivalent to the personal and social identities 
of an individual, and nor can it be defined as "a repertoire of behaviour appropriate to 
a different set of contingencies", 
125 for the simple reason that it is required a priori to 
assemble or construct these identities and to decide which behaviours are appropriate 
to which circumstances. 
Another way of making these arguments is to observe that there has to be more 
to the subject than "frontstage" and "backstage" performances, or indeed a fully 
articulated self-image or self-identity, since an antecedently existing self has to be 
postulated in order to explain why the individual initiates these "presentations" of 
self-identity or how the individual is capable of appropriating a personal identity from 
society. After all, even Erving Goffman's portrait of individuals as social performers, 
as image peddlers, has to take it as given that individuals possess certain enduring 
properties of subjectivity - namely that they are capable of "negotiating" or 
"constructing" their identities and are "by nature" relentless, cunning schemers with 
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an insatiable appetite for social approval. I contend that specifying these capacities 
must make reference to a determinate human nature and to the non-social dimensions 
of self. 
Not only is interactionism's conflation of self, self-identity and social identity 
logically suspect, it is also lacking in empirical credentials. Doubtless there are many 
characteristics of individuals which are susceptible to self-redefinition due to the 
impact of processes of labelling or societal reaction. But, again, aside from the fact 
that the act of self-negotiation and self-renegotiation presupposes a factual and 
analytical distinction between self-consciousness and personal identity, it is equally 
certain that individuals are often highly resistant to attempts by "society" or social 
group to destabilise or transform their self-perceptions. To deny this, which 
interactionists in all consistency must do, is paradoxically to deny the existence of 
self- construction or self-negotiation to which practitioners of this perspective are 
formally committed. Yet this capacity of individuals is certainly real enough, as is 
evidenced by the fact that they do somehow discover the inner resources to 
continually resist or negate the cultural "definitions" or "expectations" or "attitudes" 
which "significant others" or the "Generalised Other" would impose on them. This is 
why, for instance, the inmates of Goffman's "total institutions" do not always or 
everywhere submit to practices of "de-personalisation" designed to strip them of their 
individuality or destroy their identities. 126 And this is why, to offer another example, 
no amount of "public labelling" or "societal reaction" to the effect that communism is 
a pipedream or that capitalism "works" will convince the committed socialist to alter 
his or her beliefs to the contrary. 
. ý... ý, m 
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Nor will it do for interactionists to contend that the capacity of individuals to 
resist or negate the definitions or attitudes of the "Generalised Other" is derived 
entirely from the counter-influence exerted upon personal identity by the attitudes of 
"significant others" (i. e. the validations of parents or close friends). For although it is 
uncontroversial that the self-images of individuals are profoundly influenced by how 
they interpret the views of "significant others" towards them, it is also uncontentious 
that individuals seek to resist or negate the pressures which "significant others" would 
foist on them as readily as those which are derived from the wider society. Why else 
do children seek to usurp the authority and frustrate the expectations of their parents 
and teachers? Why else do individuals sometimes reject the cultural and political 
values and life-style of the broader agential collectivities into which they are born and 
within which they have been reared? Like Foucauldian post-structuralism, interact- 
ionism's "over-social" view of individuals founders on the problem of resistance. 
One way in which interactionists attempt to come to grips with those elements of 
"personality" which are apparently resistant to "re-negotiation" is by claiming that 
these properties of persons, inasmuch as they are derived from the "Generalised 
Other", are unlikely to encounter much in the way of situational disconfirmations. 
Another strategy of interactionists is to argue that the influence of "significant others" 
and the "Generalised Other" counteract one another, with each furnishing resources 
which allow the individual to partially resist or negate the other. But neither of these 
"solutions" render the "social self' of interactionism sufficiently robust to account for 
the enduring properties of individual personality. 
Solution (a) does not work because the "Generalised Other" has already been 
deemed by interactionists to be an endlessly fluid or structureless entity, subject to 
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ongoing renegotiation or redefinition by social actors, and so cannot provide the 
individual with the stable objective "frame" or "context" which would allow him or 
her to ingest the common attitudes constitutive of a relatively enduring self-identity 
capable of transcending any specific institutional setting. Solution (a) also fails 
because if the "Generalised Other" is an endlessly malleable "structure", and cannot 
therefore constitute a stable source of self-identity, it follows that the primary basis of 
an individual's more lasting personal characteristics must be the validations and 
expectations of "significant others". Yet I have already furnished examples which 
indicate that individuals do resist or negate the expectations and definitions of 
"significant others". Solution (b) is equally unsuccessful since it is unclear why 
influences derived from "significant others" should be gifted the strength to 
counteract those derived from the "Generalised Other" (or vice versa), meaning that 
the decision to prioritise one over the other when accounting for the ability of the 
individual to resist social pressures is entirely arbitrary. Solution (b) also fails because 
it is not at all difficult to propose cases where individuals have maintained a 
consistent and enduring personal identity despite pressures to "renegotiate" from 
"significant others" and the "Generalised Other", or where individuals have found the 
capacities and motives to resist the pressures of one without utilising the resources or 
legitimations furnished by the other. 
Whatever one makes of the above efforts of interactionists to explain the relative 
stability of self-identity, there can be little doubt that their tendency to elide human 
organisms, persons and social actors has sponsored a portrait of individuals (for 
purposes of analysis and explanation) as nothing other than role-incumbents, engaging 
in "performances", and assuming those identities which are validated or reinforced by 
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those they interact with. This in turn has allowed interactionists to compact or elide 
self-identity and social identity, where the latter is understood as the role-identities or 
"masks" which individuals don and doff in appropriate institutional contexts. One 
obvious flaw of this kind of approach is that such views of personal identity as "play 
acting" or "putting on a performance" lead to dubious notions such as the "sick role" 
or the "deviant career" which one finds scattered throughout the sociological 
literature. It often seems that individuals can no longer be anything so mundane as 
genuinely ill (in a physical or psychological sense), or as pressurised into illness or 
crime by structural or cultural constraints (e. g. poverty, unemployment, the values of 
consumerism or acquisitive individualism, etc. ), despite the obvious plausibility of 
accepting the possibility of this. Nor can individuals be motivated in their thoughts 
and deeds by a sense of their human needs or interests, existing outside the social 
roles and institutional settings they occupy, and internalised as a constituent part of 
their self-identity, despite the fact that many people (most obviously full-time "human 
rights" campaigners, for example) precisely select their institutional roles on the basis 
of a keen understanding of the interests they share in common with others as members 
of the same species. 
The second obvious difficulty with this approach is that its compacting of self- 
identity and social identity (and hence of self and self-presentation) has effectively 
undermined the common-sense idea that it is possible and desirable to distinguish 
between what individuals claim to be and what they really are. For if subjects are 
simply their "performances", the roles they "act out", the images they "present" to 
others and themselves, and if these are mostly situational constructs and subject to 
novel transformations, there can be no sense in distinguishing between image and 
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substance when assessing who "we" are or what "we" believe. Yet it does not seem 
unreasonable to draw precisely this distinction. After all, only a fool would be so 
naive as to suggest that, for instance, a person who expresses racist ideas inside but 
not outside the workplace is one thing in the former and another in the latter. On the 
contrary, the personal identity of the racist is identical in every situation she 
encounters, even if his or her presentation of self is tailored to meet the demands of 
the moment. 
Human nature and the social self in structuration theory: a critique 
Doubtless it is these inadequacies of the "situational self' and "overplastic" human 
being of symbolic interactionism which has encouraged Anthony Giddens to attempt 
their "transcendence" (along with all hitherto existing sociological concepts) within 
the territory of his structuration theory. I have suggested that a fundamental difficulty 
with any concept of the self as the product of social meanings or definitions 
internalised by individuals during their situational encounters with other individuals is 
that it is ill-equipped to explain either the relative permanence or stability of self- 
identity or how or why individuals resist or even negate attempts by "society" or 
"social group" to mould or reshape their personal identities in ways not sanctioned by 
them. Now Giddens' contribution is to indicate a possible solution to these problems 
of interactionism without abandoning a fully sociological concept of the individual or 
of consciousness. 
To these ends he puts forward two arguments. Firstly Giddens disposes of the 
pre-social self and the naturalistic dimensions of human experience on the grounds 
that the organismic urges of the body are socially specified and the objects of nature 
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impinge on individuals only through cultural mediation. 127 Secondly Giddens 
contends that "[s]elf-identity is not a distinct trait, or even a collection of traits 
possessed by an individual ... [but] is the self as reflexively understood by the person 
in terms of her or his biography. "128 This reputedly allows him to circumnavigate the 
problem of explaining the uniqueness of the individual, and of the possibility of a 
relatively enduring self-identity which is capable of motivating resistance to 
situational remodelling, since the social biography of each individual is "unique to 
each ... as a constellation ... but uniquely social in composition", 
129 whereas an 
accumulation of social experiences across the human life-cycle functions as a bulwark 
against pressures to renegotiate self-identity in any specific institutional setting which 
an individual might enter or encounter. 
Giddens' claim that human consciousness, self-consciousness and self-identity 
are constituted entirely within and by social practices, and that therefore "all 
existential problems are answered in a social context", 130 depends for its adequacy on 
his ability to make out a case for two separate but related arguments. These are, 
firstly, that "the self-subsistent natural world ... impinges on us through social 
mediation alone" and, secondly, that "possession of an `I' differentiated from all that 
which is `not-me' is socially and only socially conferred. "131 Yet nowhere does 
Giddens offer a systematic theoretical justification of either of these positions, both of 
which are merely asserted on the basis of a rejection of Descartes' atomistic subjects 
and of the "pre-given self' of conventional psychological theory. 
This lamentable failure to defend his "own corner", so to speak, is only the 
beginning of Giddens' difficulties. A more fundamental problem with his concept of 
the "social self' (and of his reduction of consciousness to social consciousness) is that 
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it is embroiled in the same kind of logical bind which has ensnared all sociological 
accounts of the subject. I refer here to my earlier argument that a blanket rejection of 
the "naturalistic self' simply cannot explain how individuals are capable of organising 
their experiences in a way which allows them to undergo processes of socialisation 
and enculturation (each has to recognise that social expectations apply to the same 
person - i. e. to "myself' and not someone else - over time) or how individuals are able 
to construct their own identities (by recognising or identifying themselves in their 
own activities or experiences). I refer also the fact that an explanatory concept of the 
pre-social self is required to explain why individuals are motivated to utilise properties 
derived from their socialisation and enculturation to construct for themselves enduring 
personal identities (since this refers us to the needs and emotions of a unitary psycho- 
organic system translated into consciousness and expressed, to some degree at least, in 
meaningful intentional agency). 
These logical and conceptual difficulties are complemented by others more 
specific to Giddens' enterprise. As Margaret Archer rightly points out, Giddens' claim 
that "self-consciousness has no primacy over awareness of others", or that "trust in 
others is at the origins of the experience of the stable external world", 132 is hopelessly 
confused. The basic problem here is that the earliest human experience of and 
interaction with other human beings, from the "perspective" of the new-born, is not 
with subjects or persons but with objects. As far as babies are concerned there is 
(initially) no difference between "society" and "nature", between subjects and objects, 
between the organic and the inorganic, or between the animate and the inanimate, 
since all are experienced sensually by the unsocialised infant (as sources of 
organismic frustration or reward, comfort or discomfort) as aspects of an 
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undifferentiated world of things. But this means that "[t]rust in others cannot be the 
source of experiencing the stable external world, since at the start of life other people 
can only be experienced as part and parcel of that external world. "133 
Giddens' claim to the contrary not only entails an "illegitimate imputation of 
adult concepts (distinguishing people from animals and objects) to a baby who has no 
ability yet to make such distinctions", 134 but also undermines his explanation of the 
genesis of self- consciousness in terms of "ontological security" or "basic trust" 
instantiated in "acquired social routines". For if an individual is to be deemed capable 
of feeling either "secure" or "insecure", or "trusting" or "untrusting", in the context of 
his or her social relations, what has to be postulated a priori is a "self which [knows] 
itself to be continuous over time and space", and which can "either become secure ... 
or [is] enough of a self to feel itself endangered in these crucial respects. " 
135 In other 
words, since "[i]n its security or insecurity ... the `I' necessarily ha[s] to be there as 
prior to either" 136 (given that individuals have to be granted the capacity to interpret 
their biographical experiences and emotions as their "own", as belonging to the same 
person over space and time, if they are to regard themselves as secure or otherwise), it 
has to be admitted that Giddens' attempt to derive subjectivity from intersubjectivity 
simply does not work. 
If it is accepted that self-consciousness cannot have social origins it does seem 
entirely reasonable to suppose that its genesis is a function of the dialectical interface 
between the human organism and the object-world in the broadest possible sense (if 
one is not to endorse the "pre-given self'). But this means that Giddens is plainly 
mistaken in his belief that human beings cannot have socially unmediated relations 
with objects or with nature. Giddens' argument is that human thought and 
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consciousness is necessarily expressed in language, meaning that the objects of 
physical nature and the psycho-organic "drives" of human biology are always socially 
mediated and culturally specified. Yet we have seen already that the earliest 
interaction of the human being with persons and things (which takes place prior to 
socialisation or enculturation) is not refracted through language or society, since the 
baby-organism in possession of no cultural concepts, and unaware of the social 
relations into which it has been inserted, encounters an undifferentiated object-world 
only through its sensory equipment and organismic urges, meaning that its earliest 
biographical experiences are moulded primarily by biological mediation with physical 
reality. 
Giddens does have two lines of defence still open to him, however, which might 
rescue his "social self" from these above difficulties. The first of these is his 
"anthropological turn" of appealing to "unconscious sociality", "basic trust" or 
"ontological security" (as pre-social "givens" of human nature) to explain how 
individuals differentiate between subjects and objects. Giddens' argument here is 
twofold. Firstly he contends that the unsocialised human being is the bearer of a 
"mute sociality" which allows individuals to unconsciously feel trust or confidence in 
their primary carers but not in mere things. In his words, "[t]he mutuality with early 
caretakers which basic trust presumes is a substantially unconscious sociality which 
precedes an `I' and a `me', and is a prior basis of any differentiation between the 
two. "137 Secondly he contends that this inherited capacity of individuals to 
differentiate between subjects and objects is translated (via the medium of 
socialisation and language-acquisition within routinised social practices) into a 
growing awareness of the "I-not me" distinction characteristic of self-consciousness (a 
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process which entails the cultural specification of the latter, as individuals utilise their 
social biographical experiences to appropriate their hitherto unconscious sociality as 
conscious self- identity). 
These conceptual manoeuvres provide a basis to Giddens' argument that "the 
self-subsistent natural world only impinges upon us through social mediation" and 
that "the distinction between `I/not-me' impinges on us through social mediation 
alone °'138 This is because the concept of "unconscious sociality" functions here as a 
kind analytical bridgehead connecting the pre-social individual with his or her social 
biography in a way which bypasses the need to refer to the interface between 
organism and nature when accounting for the genesis of self. From this point of view, 
although the concept of "innate sociality" explains the possibility of self- 
consciousness (by allowing unsocialised individuals to distinguish unconsciously 
between subjects and objects), it is nonetheless the immersion of individuals within 
social and linguistic practices during their ongoing social biographies which explains 
the genesis of self and the content of self-identity. The problem of explaining how 
"trust in others" can be "at the origins of the experience of the stable external world", 
or how self- consciousness can have "no primacy over awareness of others" (given 
that the pre-social human being confronts initially only a world of things through 
organismic and sensory mediation), is thus resolved by Giddens by "imputing ... to the 
inborn unconscious ... that which practical consciousness cannot 
deliver through 
undifferentiated object/person interactions where social routines are indistinguishable 
from routine occurrences. "139 
But this argument won't do at all. The basic problem with Giddens' appeal to 
"unconscious sociality" to undermine the possibility of a naturalistic concept of self 
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and consciousness is that it is radically undertheorised. Giddens offers no arguments 
from evolutionary biology (i. e. in terms of natural genetic selection in response to 
environmental pressures) which might justify or explain its reputed existence or 
salience as a "given" of human nature. On the contrary, Giddens simply asserts the 
reality of "unconscious sociality", establishing its existence by means of "theoretical 
fiat" or verbal imputation. In fact good selection arguments can be offered which 
support a notion of "innate sociality" peculiar to human beings and the higher 
primates. As we have seen such arguments have been forthcoming in recent times 
from a number of scientists working in the fields of palaeoanthropology, zoology, 
primatology and evolutionary neurobiology to explain the facts of hominid evolution 
and human pre-history. And, interest declared, I have utilised certain of their insights 
to provide a naturalistic underpinning to the theory of agency outlined in the present 
chapter. But Giddens does not draw on any of these researches, possibly because 
doing so would commit him to a stronger concept of human nature than he is prepared 
to admit. It is this omission which lends support to my claim that his concept of 
"unconscious sociality" is simply a post hoc untheorised improvisation designed to 
insulate the social self from disconfirming arguments. 
In any case, even if Giddens is right to argue that human beings possess an 
"innate sociality" (and I do agree with him on this point), it is difficult to see how this 
"innate sociality" translates directly into "ontological security ... in relation to a world 
of persons and objects organised cognitively through basic trust", 140 as he suggests is 
the case. If the concept of "human nature" is to play an explanatory function in social 
theory it surely must do so by specifying a range of capacities, needs, interests and 
dispositions specific to human beings (subject to empirical and comparative research) 
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rather than by imputing a uniform psycho-emotional makeup to human beings which 
underwrites a preference for stability or routine in social life. From the former 
understanding of human nature we can reasonably infer a number of propositions. For 
example, as I have pointed out earlier, a concept of human capacities and interests is 
necessary to specify how and why human beings "make history". Equally I have 
argued that a concept of human nature along these lines can be used to sustain a 
naturalistic concept of "justice". But a specification of human nature in these terms 
cannot possibly yield a human organism in secure possession of the ability to 
distinguish at birth between persons and things or to experience "trust" in the security 
or routines of the external world. Indeed, I would imagine that compelling arguments 
in terms of genetic selection or biological evolution can be made which rule out the 
possibility of "unconscious sociality" being translatable into "basic trust" or 
ontological security ... 
in relation to society and nature. " After all, blind trust in the 
external world is hardly conducive to ensuring the "reproductive fitness" of the human 
organism in an environment of potential hazards. 
My contention is that if the concept of "innate sociality" is not to overreach itself 
it must refer to the fact that human beings are genetically wired in a way which equips 
them for cultural learning and economic co-operation, meaning that individuals 
possess a psychological need for fellowship, community and trust and the biological 
capacities (adept hand and vocal organs and enhanced brain power) to sustain 
complicated co-operative arrangements. The concept of "unconscious sociality" 
cannot, conversely, be used to impute "basic trust" to the new-born as a 
"psychological given", since this transforms a mute capacity or even psychic need or 
disposition of human sociality (to trust in others) into an actually existing mental state 
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of pre-social individuals, sponsoring the peculiar idea that our subjectivities are 
directly programmed by our organic drives. 
One difficulty with Giddens' endorsement of this view is that it creates a tension 
at the heart of his philosophy of the subject. This is because Giddens' rejection of the 
role of socially unmediated experiences in forging self-identity does not square with 
his appeal to the "unconscious sociality" of human nature in determining the 
subjective orientation of unsocialised individuals towards "ontological security" in 
their dealings with people and things. A second difficulty with Giddens' appeal to the 
role of "unconscious sociality" in servicing "basic trust" is that this argument appears 
lacking in empirical credentials and frankly implausible to boot. How can it be 
ascertained whether the new-born child feels secure or otherwise in its dealings with 
external reality? How can it be established that the new-born child "trusts" others to 
always act in ways which always satisfy its needs or demands? Because neither of 
these things can be established or inferred from the evidence there is simply no point 
in endorsing them. Yet this is precisely Giddens' preferred strategy in attempting to 
make out a case for the "social self'. 
In fact it does seem more reasonable to suppose, contra Giddens, that "trust" in 
the security of the world is not an anthropological "given", but is rather "a secondary 
and subsequent development, contingently dependent upon objective routines turning 
out to be really and reliably routine - and thus contingent upon ... the outside world 
being so, rather than being a predicate for meeting stable external reality. "141 After all, 
even if we accept (for the sake of argument) that babies enter the world with a "sense 
of ontological security ... organised cognitively through basic trust", experience 
is 
likely to teach them otherwise rather quickly, not least because the world is not so 
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"routinised" or "reliable" that their urges are always satisfied or even responded to on 
demand. But this means that Giddens' appeal to "basic trust" cannot function to 
dispose of the logical and substantive difficulties of his own attempt to derive 
subjectivity from intersubjectivity. The pre-social self and the naturalistic sources of 
self-identity cannot be transcended with resort to "conventionalist stratagems" of any 
kind. 
If Giddens has to concede that the unsocialised or pre-social human being does 
indeed have socially unmediated relations with nature, which are instrumental in the 
genesis of self, it nonetheless remains open to him to argue that the subsequent 
initiation of individuals into culture and language ensures that all hitherto experiences 
of human beings are socially mediated and are mediated by nothing else but society. 
This is, in fact, Giddens' second line of defence of his "social self', albeit one he 
develops without abandoning his blanket rejection of the naturalistic sources of self- 
awareness (which logic indicates he must). This kind of response is not in the least bit 
compelling, however. For if it has to be admitted that physiological interaction with 
non-social reality is instrumental in allowing the human organism to constitute itself 
as a self, then there are no good reasons why these same non-social relations should 
be denied input into forming the content of self-identity, irrespective of the fact that 
the latter can be specified or articulated only by drawing upon cultural and linguistic 
resources. 
Another way of making this point is to observe that our sensory or organismic 
interactions with nature do not simply cease once we have been constituted as 
socialised individuals, and nor do they magically desist from shaping the kinds of 
people we are or can be or the kinds of perceptions or attitudes we are inclined to 
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hold. "After all it seems impossible to construe being bitten by a dog as a socially 
mediated experience (and of no avail to say this depends upon a society which keeps 
domestic pets for the same goes of near-drowning incidents), yet this event may be 
responsible for the person later selecting those social practices to which they will 
expose themselves. " 142 But this means that "interactions with the natural world, 
physiologically mediated and reflexively understood, can shape our social 
biographies, and not vice versa as Giddens suggests is always the case. " 43 And what 
is true of the relationship between individual and nature is true also of the relationship 
between culture and nature. Thus, socially and culturally mediated our non-social 
relations with physical nature undoubtedly are, but equally our social relations and 
cultural concepts are mediated by our organismic needs and interests, and by our 
collaborative relations with the physical environment in our efforts to harness it to our 
human and social interests. 
A final major problem with Giddens' disqualification from human experience of 
"all socially unmediated interactions", and "restriction of reflexivity to that which can 
be socially mediated" via the medium of language, is that it effectively denies human 
beings "any form of private life" 44 or personal psychology. The implications of 
endorsing this kind of view are drawn out by John Shotter, who approvingly cites 
Giddens to the effect that 
motives, intentions, sentiments are not inner things represented in outer 
behaviour, but are in the mediatory activity (joint action) going on between 
individuals.... As such, one might say, motives etc. exist less "in" us than in 
the institutions between us.... To be appropriate to its circumstances, an 
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action need not be guided by an "inner" representation of the "outer" 
circumstances at all ... an action can be informed not so much by factors 
present in the source from which it issues, as by the context into which it is 
directed . 
145 
This view is not exactly sociological determinism, but it is sociological 
imperialism. What prevents Giddens' philosophy of the subject being the former, on 
the one hand, is its defensible emphasis on self-negotiation and upon self-identity as 
the product of an individual's reflexive monitoring of his or her social biographical 
experiences. This explains how individuals "can do otherwise" in Giddens' theory, 
allowing him to break with Parsons' and Althusser's "oversocialised conception of 
man". What makes Giddens' account of agency a species of the latter, on the other 
hand, is its characteristic view that individual motives (inasmuch as these are 
translated into conscious wants or beliefs) "exist ... in the institutions between us", 
meaning that all meaningful and intentional human activity has a necessary external 
locus in society or culture. This is, of course, yet another statement of structuration 
theory's denial of the naturalistic self and of the possibility of socially unmediated 
interactions between human beings and physical nature. Thus, from this perspective, 
although individuals are not the passive recipients of the "central value system" or the 
"dominant ideology" (since they are free to select from society and culture that which 
they identify with or endorse), they nonetheless can specify their ideas, desires, 
beliefs, etc. only by drawing upon society and culture, meaning that all intentional 
action is socially and culturally dependent. 
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But to deny individuals their "inner selves" or "private passions" is scarcely 
plausible, and for three basic reasons. Firstly it does not seem unreasonable to contend 
that many of the "routinised practices" engaged in by individuals (such as walking, 
jogging, swimming, gardening, sunbathing, bird-watching, etc. ) are motivated by 
reasons or desires which have no necessary social referent or specification (in the 
sense of depending upon material resources or cultural norms generated by society). 
But this means that an explanation of why individuals pursue these and other activities 
(social or otherwise) has to be found in the personality differences which exist 
between them. Secondly, far from all of the rules which guide intentional individual 
agency being appropriated from society, or depending upon linguistic mediation (as 
Giddens insists is always the case), it does seem plausible to postulate the existence of 
"private rules", which are forged by individuals during the process of their organismic 
or sensory interaction with the physical world, and which therefore refer us to 
personal proclivities emergent from the interface between the human being and 
nature. 
Giddens would reject the possibility of "private rules", on the grounds that 
rational thought is necessary expressed in language, and language is necessarily social 
or "public" in character. This argument is toothless, however, entailing as it does 
elementary errors of categorisation. For although it is true enough that "private rules" 
of conduct can only be articulated via the mediation of language, hence ruling out the 
possibility of "private language", it does not follow from this that the subjective 
dispositions or preferences of individuals which have motivated the construction of 
these rules have their locus or origin in social rather than personal experience. These 
arguments are well made by Margaret Archer: 
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If we reintroduce physiological interaction with nature, then there seems 
nothing objectionable about the notion of asocial rules being forged in this 
process. Instead, repeated experiences of falling through thin ice, with 
physically unpleasant circumstances, could lead to the personal 
"formulation" of a rule about prior testing. Obedience to the rule is umpired 
by natural reality, which, being incapable of abrogating its own laws, leads 
to cracked ice and re-dunking, thus physically reinforcing the advisability of 
rule-keeping. However, just as the defence of personal psychology [does] not 
turn upon defending the traditional terminology of traits and attributes, 
neither does the defence of private life ultimately rest upon the possibility of 
private language. It is perfectly possible to grant the universal use of public 
language for the expression of private experience, without accepting that the 
feelings, urges or beliefs which people express in it are social rather than 
personal. 146 
Finally Giddens' view that all human reasons and intentions are supplied by the 
social context in which individuals find themselves fails because it disqualifies him 
from explaining why individuals in specific institutional or cultural settings reject or 
oppose certain or all of the attitudes, values, rules, role-obligations or interests 
characteristic of their society or social group or both. This in turn renders it entirely 
mysterious why, for instance, members of the bourgeoisie occasionally "go over" to 
the workers, 147 or why more generally "individual decisions about appropriate action 
collide with institutional definitions, as they often do. "148 For although individuals 
possess here the agential capacities to resist in thought and deed institutional 
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definitions or specifications of their desires and beliefs, they do not possess the inner 
motives or inner passions which might encourage them to do so. 
Doubtless Giddens would respond to this argument by claiming that individuals 
never negate the social environment in which their beliefs and desires are specified, 
but instead exchange one set of socio-cultural attitudes or sentiments for another, 
rather like you or I might swap one pair of shoes for another. Certainly it is 
uncontentious that individuals do often (or even normally) draw upon cultural 
resources to resist cultural expectations or attitudes drawn from other cultural 
resources (as, for instance, Tony Benn has drawn upon the ideas of socialism to 
negate the values associated with his bourgeois background and upbringing). But this 
does not overcome my objection, since Giddens still requires some account of the self 
which allows individuals to don and doff motives or intentions, and he is still faced 
with the difficulty of explaining why certain individuals reject or resist those 
"situational influences" which are "closer to home" so to speak (i. e. which fit better 
with the social interests and cultural milieu of the "collectivities" to which they 
belong) in favour of those whose impact or effect is less direct or pressing. I contend 
that explaining why individuals resist those cultural influences which their social 
positioning and enculturation should have stripped them of external motives for so 
doing demonstrates the need for social theory to endorse the existence of a stratum of 
personal psychology or personality, irreducible to the imprint of society, and "forged 
in the space between biology and society"149 and nature. After all, as Archer rightly 
points out, "the fact that [society] can be refused (the hermit), reviled (the prophet), 
re-visioned (the idealist) or rejected (the recidivist) are forms of repudiation too varied 
to be explained by reaction formation"' 50 to socio-cultural stimuli. 
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The foregoing arguments establish, against Giddens, that personal identity and 
social identity are not the same thing. Since neither the genesis nor the content of self- 
identity is entirely explainable in terms of "social practices" or the social biographies 
of individuals, it follows that social theory must endorse a stratified model of the 
human agent, which distinguishes between the self as social actor (with attendant 
identities or self-presentations) and the self as the "bearer" of an underlying and 
relatively stable "personality" or "personal psychology". By collapsing individuals 
into their social biographies, Giddens destroys this distinction between human 
subjects and social selves, and by doing so renders his analysis of agency vulnerable 
to the kind of reductionism which has undermined interactionism. So it is that 
Giddens, in common with Goffman, more often than not treats individuals simply as 
"performers", as image-peddlers, acting out "parts", slavishly following "routines", 
striving to "keep face" or "maintain tact" in their dealings with others. 151 The end- 
result of all of this is a rather impoverished concept of the individual and an 
ambiguous conception of "agency", as has been noted by a number of commentators. 
Nigel Thrift, for example, rightly points out that, despite Giddens' avowed 
intention to restore knowledgeability to the subject, his treatment of individuals as 
practitioners, engaging in routinised rule-governed institutional action, sponsors an 
"anonymous agent" who is "devoid of spontaneity and creativity". 152 In a similar vein, 
Margareta Bertilsson makes out the telling indictment that Giddens' conflation of 
persons and actors undermines his commitment to the subject, since in practice his 
concept of "agency" refers not to subjects but to the "dominant set of practices" which 
comprise a society. 153 Ian Craib, to offer a further example, is justifiably critical of 
Giddens' incorporation of certain of Goffman's insights into his structuration theory, 
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making the insightful observation that this has led to an unwarranted overemphasis in 
Giddens' work on "how people go on" in place of an understanding of "what goes on" 
and why. ' 54 
Craib also argues, again rightly, that Giddens' analytical treatment of subjects as 
synonymous with actors has led to his portrayal of "an emotionally impoverished 
world in which terms like morality and trust lose most of their strength and a 
comparatively empty notion of tact takes over. " 55 The culprit here, of course, is 
Giddens' identification of the concepts of "trust" and "morality" with social 
procedures of "self-presentation" rather than with enduring normative and emotional 
emergents of humanity's psychological makeup (i. e. love, commitment, loyalty, 
fairness, justice, etc. ). 156 That such a dissolution of subjects into their "social 
practices" underwrites a superficial analysis of "personality" or "personal 
psychology" is, of course, thrown into sharp exposure by Giddens' grossly reductive 
attempt to explain away mental illness as resulting from a breakdown of the rules of 
tact and composure governing social interaction. '57 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude this chapter I would like to make explicit two fundamental arguments 
which have been the centrepiece of my defence of Marx's philosophical anthropology 
and my critique of the "naturalistic" and "sociological" models of the organism- 
subject- society connection. These constitute the "fundamental premises" of any 
workable theory of human agency and social interaction. Firstly, my exposure of the 
inadequacies of both biologism's and utilitarianism's portrait of human nature and 
individual subjectivity, and of contemporary sociology's dissolution or conflation of 
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both at the level of processes of "interaction or "enculturation", entails not the 
abandonment of the concepts of "species-being" and the "naturalistic self' but rather 
their reformulation in a far more rigorous form open to scientific procedures of 
empirical validation and disconfirmation. Contra naive anti-naturalism, a strong 
explanatory account of human nature, and of the non-social subject, has an 
indispensable analytical function in social theory in providing "microfoundations" for 
the theory of social structure and human agency and (as should be clear from some of 
my arguments in the preceding sections) in furnishing the social analyst with clear 
ethical and political orientations (i. e. a naturalistic principle of justice). What, then, 
can we say with any certainty about the nature of human nature and the subject? 
(i) Human nature can be defined only with resort to meticulous historical and 
comparative research into human origins, pre-history and socio-cultural evolution. 
Only by following this procedure is it possible to demonstrate empirically which 
powers and properties of human beings are explainable in terms of species-being and 
which are explainable in terms of social structure or agential or institutional context. 
To reiterate my earlier argument, I would recommend that the theorist utilise Norman 
Geras's attribution to Marx of an analytical and factual distinction between "human 
nature" and the "nature of humanity", with the former referring to those needs, 
capacities or dispositions of human beings which have an enduring and relatively 
permanent historical existence (as revealed by the anthropological record) and the 
latter referring to those ephemeral cultural characteristics which humans acquire as a 
result of their immersion in historically specific social relations and within specific 
institutional and agential contexts within social relations (as revealed by historical and 
comparative sociological research). 
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From this historical and comparative perspective Marx's own account of human 
nature appears strikingly vindicated. Humanity's species-being is clearly revealed as 
being predisposed towards labour, rationality, sociability, communalism, altruism, 
certain emotional and even normative dispositions which are explainable in terms of 
sociality, and quite plausibly towards egalitarianism as well. Certainly human nature 
cannot be seen as uniquely adapted to life in competitive hierarchical societies, as 
would be claimed by most methodological individualists. For it seems indisputable 
that human beings were forged biologically by natural selection to cope with and 
sustain socio-cultural relations organised along intensely communal lines, and even in 
unequal class-divided societies it is apparent that co-operative and egalitarian 
principles of social behaviour are rather more important to the daily life and routine 
reproduction of social relations than those said to characterise "Darwinian-Hobbesian 
man" or for that matter "utilitarian man". Indeed, it is a matter of historical fact that 
the overwhelming majority of human existence has been based on a hunting and 
gathering mode of economic subsistence, which depended upon an unprecedented 
degree of social co-operation and egalitarian food-sharing, and in which behavioural 
and attitudinal norms sustaining individualism, utilitarianism, territorialism, economic 
competition, hierarchy, territorialism and inequality did not even enjoy a marginal 
presence. 
(ii) Human nature, as again is clearly revealed by anthropology, is definable in 
terms of both its behavioural and psychological plasticity and the flexibility of its 
adaptability to the physical environment. That is to say, human nature may be 
characterised in terms of its unique capacity to enable a highly diverse range of 
personality-types, motivations, mentalities and modes of socio-cultural praxis and its 
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power to emancipate human beings from dependence upon a narrow range of material 
environments or circumstances. As far as the latter is concerned, humans thus possess 
what Marx once described as a "universal nature". For a lack of narrow biological 
specialisation allows modern homo sapiens to prosper in a wide range of natural 
habitats (on this planet at any rate). 
(iii) Human nature is characterised by its equally unique capacity to allow its 
bearers to exercise personal judgement and individual choice within the constraints 
and enablements prestructured by society and nature. That is to say, human nature 
provides the biological capacity (indeed imperative) for individuals to interpret their 
interaction with the object-world in terms of the "I-not me" distinction constitutive of 
self, and as such allows human organisms to construct themselves as subjects or 
persons (i. e. self-aware beings who are relatively autonomous of their social and 
material environments). As "strong evaluators" (rather than "simple weighers") 
human persons are irreducibly moral beings, who exercise their judgement and make 
their choices on a qualitative as well as a quantitative basis (though the substance of 
their moral and ethical beliefs is conditioned rather more directly and profoundly by 
their social being than by their species-being). Talk of "socio-cultural determination" 
or "biological drives" or "natural necessity" will not therefore suffice in any causal 
account of human agency or social interaction. For human nature is precisely that 
which allows subjects or self-conscious agents to reflexively monitor and appraise the 
external conditioning influences which impact upon them, select in accordance with 
normative considerations which behavioural responses they deem appropriate to the 
social and material facts of their life-process, and then act innovatively, purposively 
and voluntarily in the light of these considerations and choices. 
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(iv) Human nature cannot be defined in terms of instinctual endowment, given the 
negligible role this plays in human motivation and behaviour. This is because the 
uniquely human mode of environmental adaptation is centred upon cultural learning 
par excellence, and has thus entailed the gradual eradication from human (or more 
accurately pre-human) biology those genes which sustain or enhance instinctual 
behavioural responses to environmental stimuli. All too often naive naturalists (socio- 
biologists are particularly guilty of this) repeat the "common-sense" error of 
laypersons of confusing biological instincts (genetically pre-programmed elaborate 
behaviour patterns - e. g. the mating rituals of many non-human species) with 
biological reflexes (unconscious bodily responses - e. g. blinking, suckling, crying, 
smiling, reaching out an arm to break a fall, recoiling sharply from a source of pain, 
etc. ) when accounting for human social behaviour. Yet even the so-called human "sex 
instinct", beloved of pop psychology, is perhaps better understood simply as an 
elementary human biological need rather than an elaborate predetermined pattern of 
behaviour. Competent or healthy human adults are not, of course, driven by sexual 
compulsions they cannot control or understand, and nor are they impelled to engage in 
specific patterns of sexual ritual (as is proven by the enormous cultural variation in 
courtship traditions and in the sex act itself). More generally, the biological 
helplessness of the human child at birth (and its corresponding dependence on society 
and culture to survive and develop satisfactorily) is itself precisely demonstrative of 
humanity's lack of instinctual endowment: To a very large extent, then, cultural 
learning and evolution has replaced biological instinct and evolution in modem homo 
sapiens, a fact evidenced by the virtually non-existent genetic and physical differences 
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"between the [cave]men of the Aurignacian and Magdalenian cultures ... on the one 
hand, and present day men on the other". '58 
(v) Most importantly, perhaps, to refer to human nature and subjectivity is to 
specify an ensemble of species powers, capacities, dispositions and psycho-organic 
needs and interests which logically must be held to exist in order to account for the 
existence of human society and culture. This is a transcendental argument. Thus it is, 
for example, quite valid to endorse Marx's attribution of the properties and powers of 
intelligence, self-consciousness, sociality, rationality, intentionality, purposiveness, 
creativity, linguistic capacity and labour to human nature and/or the "naturalistic self' 
(amongst other things), for such qualities must be possessed by human organisms or 
persons if they are to be the kind of beings capable of sustaining and elaborating 
complex socio-cultural relations. Conversely, it is quite invalid to attribute any of the 
characteristics of biologism's or utilitarianism's abstract "model of man" to human 
nature (and its emergents of mind and self), because aside from the fact that most of 
these dispositions are absent from the larger part of the ethnographic biography of 
human society, it is also the case that not one of them is functional to humanity's 
socio-cultural mode of environmental adaptation. 
The concept of human nature (and the naturalistic subject emergent from it) thus 
should not (and cannot) be used to explain the ethnographic specifics of human 
societies, the form of socio-cultural relations, the character and history of political and 
economic institutions, or even the constitution of human "mentalities" or 
"spiritualities" to be found in different socio-historical settings. All of this can be 
explained only by examining the historical interface between structure, culture, 
interaction and environment in the life of actual empirical societies. What the concept 
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of human nature can do, however, is provide a means of explaining the handful of 
constants which can be found in most societies past and present, 159 offer the 
beginnings of a purchase on the diversity of the anthropological record, and supply an 
important element of the explanation of social conflict and change (i. e. in terms of 
suppression of basic human needs and interests which encourages resistance and 
struggle against the vested social interests and social relations which sustain them). 
Furthermore the concept of human nature is useful inasmuch as it enables the analyst 
to furnish social theory with an ethical and political yardstick for measuring the 
degree to which empirical societies are respectively constraining or enabling of real 
human needs or interests ("evaluative realism" and the concept of human "well- 
being") 
So much for the psycho-organic and subjective "microfoundations" of social 
theory and social life. But what can be said about the socio-cultural relations, agential 
collectivities and institutional roles which constitute the subject-matter of sociology? 
The second key argument I would like to draw from the preceding is that endorsing 
the explanatory function of human nature and the naturalistic self in social analysis is 
not at all tantamount to perpetrating the "naturalistic fallacy" of collapsing society and 
culture into human biology, human nature or human subjects. In contrast to the 
"upwards conflationary" approaches, my contention is that a fully adequate analysis 
of society has to study the causal interface between the "macro" (structural and 
cultural), "meso" (interactional and agential) and "micro" (biological and subjective) 
levels of social systems. None is more fundamental than the others (in the sense of 
explaining society), for all embody their own emergent properties, and all generate 
their own causal powers and independent effects. 
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Thus, at the same time as humanity's species-being and attendant powers and 
capacities are transmitted "upstream" into social interaction and socio-cultural 
relations (supplying the power which energises the social system, constraining and 
enabling socio-cultural production and reproduction, and providing a certain impetus 
towards the universal articulation of particular kinds of cultural norms or principles), 
structural-cultural and agential conditioning influences are transmitted "downstream" 
to human persons (investing in them specific social interests and capacities, shaping 
unconsciously much of their psychological and spiritual makeup, and furnishing them 
with the cultural resources to construct personal and social identities for themselves). 
At the "micro" level the result of this complex dialectical interaction between these 
distinct layers of human and social reality is precisely the individual as the bearer or 
embodiment of a complex articulation of psycho-organic and socio-cultural 
properties. That is to say, human persons are simultaneously constituted as the 
concrete bearers of the specific social relations, agential collectivities and institutional 
roles of which they are a part (social being), of the capacities, powers, needs and 
interests inherent in them as members of a particular biological species (species- 
being), and of the process which welds these human and social elements together in 
the life of the individual (personal biography mediated by social and non-social 
experience). 
It is the simple fact that the socio-cultural and agential properties of social 
systems are presupposed in the goals or ends which animate social interaction, and are 
often drawn upon by persons in order to realise their wants or desires, which counts as 
the decisive rebuttal of naturalistic conceptions of agency or interaction. Theories of 
human nature (and individuated subjectivity) will not therefore alone suffice in social 
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analysis, because the "nature of humanity" of a particular historical epoch is always 
moulded by the interface between species-being and social being in the life-process of 
human individuals. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUBJECTS, ACTORS AND AGENTS 
In the foregoing chapter I have sought to lay down the foundations or "basic 
premises" of a theory of social interaction consistent with social realism and critical 
materialism. My basic argument there is that sociology requires a strong explanatory 
concept of both human nature and the non-social self if it is to avoid an amoral and 
apolitical indifference to human problems and social struggles and if it is to obtain an 
explanatory purchase on society and history. Now my contention is that upon these 
"microfoundations" of society arises an "interaction order", which is conditioned 
simultaneously by those anterior structural relations which constrain and enable the 
social conduct and consciousness of interactants, and by those natural properties and 
powers pertaining to individuals (as subjects and organisms) which enable them to 
function as agents of social order and/or social change. The purpose of this chapter is 
to conceptualise the constitution of this "interaction order" and to grasp its 
relationship to the structural properties of social systems and the psycho-organic and 
subjective capacities of individuals. 
To these ends, the subject-matter of the forthcoming analysis will be organised as 
follows. Firstly I will introduce and explicate the concept of "social interaction" or 
"social action". Then I will relate the "interaction order" to the structural properties of 
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society by furnishing an "interest-explanation" of human agency, my argument being 
that interests (human and social) function as the bridgehead which connects 
interaction to structure. Next I will outline a realist "stratified model" of individuals as 
"actors", "agents" and "persons" (and as the bearers of personal and social identities) 
and demonstrate its efficacy by means of a critical examination of the unhappy 
consequences which befall social action theory's treatment of individuals simply as 
role-incumbents or social practitioners. Finally I will relate the above "stratified 
model" of interaction to the subjective levels of human reality by theorising those 
properties of persons (mind, self and personal identity) which allow them to become 
actors or agents and self-construct social identities. 
These tasks achieved, my completion of a useable and fully adequate Marxist 
account of social agency will have to wait upon the analysis contained in chapter four. 
It will be recalled that chapter one contains an exposition of the explanatory primacy 
of social labour in bringing about the evolutionary elaboration/transformation of the 
human species, as part of my defence of anthropological materialism in the human 
sciences. In chapter four I will radicalise the realist conception of social agency into 
one rooted in sociological materialism, by arguing the case for the explanatory 
primacy of social labour in bringing about subsequent socio-cultural elaboration, and 
for the explanatory primacy of class agency in bringing about societal transformation 
or reproduction. 
3.1: THE CONCEPT AND NATURE OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 
What is social interaction? The obvious answer (and one which has considerable 
intuitive appeal) is that it is simply the self-conscious, meaningful and intentional 
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"doings" or activities of human individuals insofar as these enter them into mutual 
relationships or interpersonal encounters. Social interaction can thus be understood as 
a particular form of human agency (i. e. as human agency which entails the active 
involvement of individuals in mutual interactional relationships), and it can be 
distinguished from mere behaviour by its reflexive and redirective character. Social 
interaction can be further differentiated between collective action and individual 
action, with the former referring to those practices or pursuits which involve the co- 
ordination of individual activity towards the attainment of common goals (i. e. 
collaborative action), and the latter referring to those types of human activity which, 
although socio-culturally conditioned and often dependent upon socio-cultural 
resources, do not do so (e. g. reading a book, listening to a CD, engaging in petty-theft 
or sabotage at the workplace, committing suicide, etc. ). Social interaction is, in short, 
the obverse of social structure. Whereas the concept of social structure refers us to the 
patterned and enduring socio-cultural relationships which predate and post-date 
human action and interaction, and which exercise a conditioning influence upon both, 
the concept of social interaction refers us to the daily flux or flow of human activity 
which takes place within these anterior structural and cultural contexts, and which 
(often unintentionally) brings about their reproduction or modification over time. 
Social interaction also typically involves different types of social action. Max 
Weber's attempt to conceptualise these is still the most interesting and exhaustive on 
offer. ' As is well known, Weber's "ideal typical" typology distinguishes analytically 
between : (i) traditional action (i. e. social conduct which is performed on the basis of 
inherited custom or habit or routine); (ii) affectual action (i. e. social conduct 
motivated by emotional dispositions or commitments); (iii) rational goal-oriented 
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action (i. e. social conduct which involves assessing rationally the utility of a project or 
goal and the most appropriate, i. e., optimal or instrumentally efficient, means of 
achieving it); and (iv) value-oriented rational action (i. e. social conduct which is 
oriented consistently towards the attainment of a valued end-state or ultimate goal, 
which subordinates all other considerations to this overriding purpose, and which does 
not involve a rigorous consideration of the most "optimal" means or utility-costs of 
achieving it). 
There are, of course, a number of profound difficulties with this formulation. In 
the first place, there is Weber's misconceived attempt to distinguish analytically 
between different modes of society on the basis of the allegedly "typical" modes of 
social action to be found within them and his failure to contextualise adequately 
rational action within concrete socio-cultural relations. Both of these problems stem 
largely from Weber's dalliance with neo-Kantian idealism (i. e. his effort to categorise 
societal types in terms of the value-orientations which motivate social action) and 
from his reduction of all interactional, agential and structural properties of society to 
the beliefs and values of atomised individuals. Secondly, and following on from this 
latter consideration, there is also a peculiar crudity to Weber's analytical distinctions 
between the different forms of "non-rational" action. Aside from the problem of 
attributing the correct motive to a particular social act (is it affectual, traditional, 
value-rational or instrumentally rational? ), the typology appears to be undermined by 
the difficulty inherent in drawing unambiguous analytical distinctions between the 
various forms of non-rational action (e. g. an individual might have affectual 
attachments to a goal which is valued above all others or might value the goal because 
of the impact of ingrained tradition). 
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Finally, and most crucially, Weber's attempt to distinguish between rational goal- 
oriented action (in his view the only genuinely rational action-orientation) and all the 
other forms of non-rational social action appears irredeemably crass, hamstrung by a 
crude utilitarian conception of rationality. Motivated by his ideological (or value- 
rational! ) commitment to establish the uniquely rational character of capitalism, and 
the necessarily irrational nature of all conceivable alternatives, Weber's model fails to 
demonstrate that instrumentally rational action (i. e. social action that involves purely 
formal means-ends calculations necessarily indifferent to ethical or valuational 
judgements concerning the substantive content of the ends or goals being pursued) can 
be separated from rational value-oriented action (i. e. social action which embodies 
substantive evaluative commitments concerning the desirability of ends). Thus, 
despite Weber, far from the institutions and social relations of capitalist society (e. g. 
the market, a monetary system, the business enterprise, private property, the wage- 
form, etc. ) being comprehensible simply in terms of formal rationality, owing their 
salience to their technical efficiency in relating means to ends, these phenomena 
always involve substantive ethical and valuational judgements concerning the 
desirability of the kinds of objectives being pursued. (For example, a belief in the 
uniquely rational character of capitalist institutions is rooted in the substantive 
evaluation that it is especially rational to subordinate a consideration of the social 
content of ends to the dictates of means-ends calculability. More generally, 
instrumental rationality appears to be rooted in the substantive belief that "the ends 
justify the means")? 
The above critique might seem to lend credence to the arguments of those who 
believe that any attempt to build a useable general typology of social action is ill- 
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conceived. This is neither my intention nor my belief. There is one basic strength 
which can be attributed to Weber's theory of action, and one which provides one of 
the cornerstones of a reformulated model of interaction. This is his insistence that 
social action is precisely comprehensible, and hence capable of being scientifically 
interpreted and analysed, due to its basic behavioural and attitudinal rationality. In 
other words, the rational kernel of Weber's theory of action is his endorsement of 
what contemporary analytical philosophers would describe as "the orthodox 
conception of agents". From this point of view, beliefs and values are rational if they 
are internally coherent or non-contradictory, and social action is rational if it is 
consistent with beliefs or values. The researcher attributes meaning to the social 
actions of individuals by assuming that persons act relatively consistently in the light 
of their beliefs, desires or goals; the identification of the values, objectives and 
expectations of the interactant in turn provides the key to understanding his or her 
activity. 
Now this "orthodox conception of agents", which rightly takes as given the 
universal existence of human behavioural and attitudinal rationality, must assume also 
the existence of a universal human nature. As Macdonald and Petit observe, a 
fundamental precondition of the possibility of understanding the language and culture 
of an "alien" society is the existence of what might be termed a "Principle of Charity" 
rooted in an underlying "Principle of Humanity". Broadly, for cross-cultural 
communication and "radical translation" to be possible, "[i]t is essential ... that we 
agree in a large number of judgements, " which itself is dependent upon the fact that 
the "common behaviour of mankind" acts as "the system of reference by means of 
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which we interpret an unknown language". 5 The point is well made by David 
Wiggins: 
Presented with the human form we entertain immediately a multitude of 
however tentative expectations. We interpret the speech and conduct of the 
remotest human strangers in the light of the maxim that we should interpret 
them in such a way as to ascribe beliefs, needs and concerns to them that will 
diminish to the minimum the need to postulate 'inexplicable" disagreements 
between us and them. We entertain the idea, unless we are irremediably 
conceited or colonialist in mentality, that there may be something we 
ourselves can learn from strangers about the true, the good and the rational.... 
In the absence of a belief in such a thing as human nature, I do not think that 
there is any idea of inexplicable error or disagreement that is available to us. 
In short, then, common human behaviour presupposes a common human nature 
and a common objective structure of physical nature within which human persons are 
compelled to act and interact. Without these twin reference points (material reality and 
human nature) there appears no plausible way of explaining how cross-cultural 
communication or linguistic acquisition is possible. Thus a workable reformulation of 
Weber's account of social action must be rooted in "the orthodox conception of 
agents" (i. e. the assumption that human beings are "somewhat rational" in thought and 
deed), which in turn must be rooted in the enduring facts of human nature. 
Yet a fundamental problem with Weber's model of interaction is its failure to 
make this above conception of rational action (i. e. action that is relatively consistent 
with beliefs and goals) definitional of formal rationality. For this criteria of rationality 
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does not entail substantive considerations. The second fundamental problem of 
Weber's typology is, as we have seen, the crude distinctions it draws between 
different forms of "non-rational" action and between "rational" and "non-rational" 
action. Nonetheless these weaknesses do not rule out of court a defensible account of 
social action. Once we recognise that a concept of formal rationality involving no 
substantive judgements commits us to a species of rationality possessed by all 
competent human individuals in every human society (rather than the instrumental 
rationality unique to capitalism), we provide ourselves with the beginnings of an 
adequate understanding of human action and social interaction. Formally rational 
action is simply social action which is consistent with the goals, desires and beliefs of 
the interactant, and because it is an elementary form of action to be found equally in 
all societies, it is an utterly pointless endeavour to attempt distinguishing between 
different societal types on the basis of the allegedly "rational" or "non-rational" value- 
patterns which animate them. 
Moreover, once we ally this insight with Weber's own recognition that the "ideal- 
types" of action should be seen as analytical rather than empirical distinctions, it then 
becomes possible to grasp that concrete actions will often entail a diverse range of 
motivations or orientations, none of which will necessarily compromise their formal 
rationality. In other words, there is not always a clear distinction to be made between 
rational and other modes of social action: emotional, traditional and ethical 
orientations towards action may often be rooted in rational commitments. A useable 
typology of human action and interaction should distinguish between rational and 
non-rational action only on the basis of a rigorous assessment of the consistency with 
which individuals act in accordance with their beliefs and desires within the fetters 
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and enablements prestructured by the socio-cultural relations they inhabit. More 
importantly, however, a theory of action should make its primary concern the 
identification and explication of the different modes of "somewhat rational" social 
action (emotional, traditional, value-rational) which energise society, as these are 
conditioned by the agential, cultural, structural and systemic dimensions of social 
reality. 
3.2: THE FUNCTION OF INTERESTS AND NORMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 
In my introduction to this chapter I suggested that interest-explanation offers a 
solution to the problem of relating interaction and structure. But what form should this 
take? The most influential versions of "interest-explanation" in the social sciences - 
especially those associated with contemporary rational choice and social exchange 
theory - have tended to identify interests with individuated wants or desires. 
According to Jon Elster? and James Coleman, 8 for example, the analytical foundations 
of social interaction and social order are human agents and the resources they seek to 
control or monopolise. Human individuals are seen as rational agents who possess 
subjective desires and wants which organise and motivate their interactions with 
others. These wants and desires constitute their interests, and individual and collective 
action is rational inasmuch as it is "future-oriented and instrumentally efficient 
behaviour consistent with interests. " For both authors, allegiance to methodological 
individualism thus dictates that interests be seen "as a taken-for-granted, natural, pre- 
constituted state of affairs", 
9 rooted in the random self-interested ends of individuals. 
How plausible is this view? 
238 
Now although I would not wish to deny that one can speak meaningfully of 
human interests - i. e. as the ends or objectives of social interaction which can 
logically be inferred from the existence of elementary human needs which require 
fulfilling - it seems entirely questionable to me that one should treat these as the 
random subjective desires or wants of individuals. Similarly, although it is perfectly 
valid to presume that individuals are "somewhat rational", and act socially in order to 
realise their individual preferences, it would be quite mistaken to predicate a theory of 
social interaction (and of the relationship between structure and interaction) on this 
basis. Why is this? 
Firstly there are quite formidable theoretical difficulties associated with interest- 
explanation couched in terms of subjective preference. This has been thrown into 
sharp relief by both sides of the Marxist-liberal debate in political science. According 
to "orthodox" political theory, "the point of the concept of interests is to relate an 
agent's wants to the objective environment on which his or her opportunities for 
realising those wants depend". 10 As Giddens puts it: "interests are logically connected 
to wants". 11 As Alex Callinicos has pointed out, for pluralists, social interaction 
(insofar as it is significant in bringing about societal change or statics) is to be 
explained in terms of interests which are definable as the "expressed preferences" of 
individuals (the "subjective conception of interests"). 12 For Marxists, by contrast, 
social interaction is to be explained in terms of interests defined as those "counter- 
factual wants" which individuals would hold if they were in full possession of the 
knowledge or information to make an informed decision as to what these should be 
(the "objective conception of interests" as Callinicos describes it). 13 
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The advantage of the latter over the former definition of interests is that it allows 
the theorist some purchase on the fact that "an agent may not always be aware of his 
or her interests". 14 For example, I may be unable to articulate my real interests due to 
the "mobilisation of bias" in the political sphere or the impact of artificially induced 
wants in the economic sphere. 15 Whilst revealing the "subjectivist" inadequacies of 
pluralist interest-explanations, however, it is clear enough that Marxist treatments of 
interests as "counterfactual wants" have fundamental weaknesses of their own. In the 
first place, such accounts do not overcome the spectre of the "randomness of ends" 
which has undermined pluralism. For if it is still individual wants which animate 
social agency it is hard to see how these can be conceived objectively. In the second 
place, given that individuals act on their actual preferences rather than on their 
"counterfactual wants", and given that interests are identified with the latter, it is 
uncertain how this approach differs from pluralism as a causal explanation of social 
interaction, or how it can justify "interest-explanations" in the social sciences at all. It 
seems to me that conceptions of interests in terms of subjective wants must either 
naively ignore the fact that interests cannot always be clearly articulated by oppressed 
or powerless groups or sever the link between expressed wants and interests (and 
between social agency and human and social interests). It is, of course, these kinds of 
problems associated with orthodox modes of "interest-explanation" which have 
encouraged many contemporary social theorists to abandon the category of interests 
altogether. 16 
Secondly, the satisfaction of subjective judgements of utility, i. e. of the wants and 
desires of individuals, may not always enhance the "life-chances" or "well-being" of 
human beings. I may desire to indulge in unprotected sexual intercourse, eat 
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contaminated beef burgers, drink enormous quantities of alcohol, or inhale narcotic 
substances. Yet by doing so I am risking premature death or permanent disability. The 
concept of human interests thus presupposes an objective standard of human needs 
which may not always correspond to subjective individual wants. Human beings have 
an objective interest in obtaining or satisfying those elementary psycho-organic needs 
(i. e. food, shelter, clothing, cultural and leisure opportunities, sexual relations, full 
participation in and integration into their social relations, etc. ) which satisfy or 
enhance their well-being. But they have no interest whatsoever in pursuing those 
wants which do not. 
Thirdly, although it is uncontentious that individuals are motivated to a large 
extent by their subjective desires and wants, it is equally certain that these normally 
are anchored in the objective biological and psychological needs of humanity's 
species-being. Human persons might desire and want all kinds of things, but since 
many of their desires are supplementary or secondary to their real needs, these are 
likely to be recognised by individuals as such, and will not normally be a primary 
motivational source of their social agency. In other words, the "preference set" of 
human. persons will always comprise "first-order" and "second-order" desires, 
"primary" and "secondary" wants, with the former corresponding broadly to their 
objective needs as members of the human species, and providing them with 
particularly impelling reasons for acting socially in their defence or pursuit. 
It follows from this that the kinds of social agency which are significant from the 
point of view of societal elaboration and transformation tend to be motivated not by 
individuals pursuing their privatised wants but by collectivities of individuals 
pursuing common goals which are defined in terms t )f general human needs and 
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interests. That is to say, individuals do not normally bind themselves together into 
collective or corporate agents committed to the pursuit of societal change or statics in 
order to satisfy mere privatised utility-maximisation, but rather do so in order to bring 
about the reproduction, reform or overthrow of social relations which affirm or deny 
their basic human needs, and which are conducive or contrary to their fundamental 
human interests. For example, although members of the working class in modem 
capitalism no doubt would express a subjective preference for foreign instead of 
domestic holidays, or brand new rather than second-hand motor cars, it is highly 
doubtful that such concerns are uppermost in their minds when they join trade unions 
or offer their support to political organisations. On the contrary, the reason why 
workers tend to align themselves with corporate agents of this kind has rather more to 
do with defending their livelihood and life-chances than any drive towards the 
gratuitous pursuit of mere random preferences. 
The same is true even of members of the bourgeoisie, who form themselves into 
corporate agents, not for anything so trivial as the desire for a few more consumer 
goods or a little extra spending power, but rather to defend the very apparatus of 
profit-making by which they obtain their income and by which (as they see it) society 
obtains its wealth and prosperity. '7 Interests defined in terms of privatised wants or 
desires are, then, too inconsequential and arbitrary a source of human motivation to 
sustain an account of social agency which can explain the formation of corporate 
agents oriented towards macro-elaboration or reproduction or the life and death social 
struggles which bring about societal change. Psychologistic and individualistic 
conceptions of human interests cannot provide secure microfoundations for the theory 
of agency or interaction. 
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Finally, and most importantly, to reduce social interaction to the pursuit of human 
interests is, in any case, to completely ignore the impact of structured social relations 
in overdetermining the objective agential interests of individuals. A naturalistic 
conception of "interests" will not alone suffice for it is the location of individuals in 
agential collectivities, structured in turn by prevailing social relations, which furnishes 
them with definite social interests which are not at all reducible to their elementary 
psycho-organic needs and interests as members of a particular biological species. All 
human beings have the same biological needs for food, drink, clothing, shelter and 
sexual relations at the requisite quality and quantity to maintain human well-being. 
All human beings have, moreover, roughly similar psychological needs - including the 
need for identity, fellowship, community, egalitarian living, and a measure of control 
or empowerment (i. e. freedom) in the daily running of their lives. Indeed, in so far as 
human persons possess these psycho-organic needs they possess also objective human 
interests in realising or satisfying them, and it is undoubtedly the case that such 
interests when acted upon have been the motivational source of much of the 
"struggles from below" which have provided human history and socio-cultural 
development with its dynamic. Despite this, however, it remains the case that social 
struggles motivated by the denial of basic human needs can exist only in the context 
of hierarchical social relations which systematically generate significant asymmetries 
or inequalities in material resources and human life-chances (i. e. in class-divided 
societies). For it is only in the context of social relations which negate or repress the 
objective species needs of human beings that it becomes meaningful to speak of 
human interests being the source of social struggles aimed at recovering or protecting 
them. 
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Furthermore, the mediation of human needs and interests through hierarchical 
social relations ensures that these often take on emergent properties and become 
associated with specific social powers ("structural capacities"). For example, although 
employers and wage-workers in modem capitalist society share human needs and 
interests in common of the kind specified above, the inter-agential relations which 
pertain between them, overdetermined by the total social structure of which they are a 
part, ensure that these take on a specific socio-cultural and historical coloration. The 
effective monopoly possession by the bourgeoisie of the means of economic 
production and subsistence, and its subdivision into mutually competing economic 
units, ensure that the human needs and interests of its members translate into social 
interests defined by the competitive accumulation of capital, the appropriation of 
surplus value from labour, and hence the suppression of general living standards 
below the cultural average. ' 8 At the same time it is the specific causal powers or 
"structural capacities" which members of the bourgeoisie derive from their monopoly 
control or possession of production and exchange (i. e. the power to exploit, hire and 
fire, to withdraw investment, to relocate capital, etc. ) which normally enable them to 
safeguard these common agential interests against other social groupings. 
By contrast, the separation of the proletariat from the means of production and 
subsistence, and the consequential need of its members to alienate their labour-power 
as a commodity, translate into social interests rooted in resistance to exploitation, the 
pursuit of higher wages, increased health and safety at the workplace, and a reduction 
in the working week. Equally, since the proletariat of modern capitalism is a majority 
class which produces value (and hence surplus value) at the point of production, it 
follows from this that its members are the owners of causal powers (i. e. the power to 
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strike, to work-to-rule, to picket, etc. ) which can paralyse the profit system in the 
pursuit of these (above) social interests. Here neither category of "social interest" 
(capitalist or proletarian), nor the structural capacities which correspond to each of 
them, can be collapsed into the undifferentiated category of "human nature". For 
although anchored in human needs, these social interests can only emerge given the 
specific structural and agential configuration of capitalist society. The failure of 
rational choice theory to recognise the existence of irreducible social interests and 
social powers, forged in the interplay between the structural and agential dimensions 
of social systems, thus leads to an embarrassing exclusion "from theoretical 
examination all processes related to the social construction, reproduction and 
transformation of such interests", and of "how they relate to other major features of 
societies (such as institutions, structures, roles etc. ) ... and ... to specific historical and 
socio-cultural contexts". 19 
The need for social analysis to embrace a stratified conception of "interests" is 
thus clear and unambiguous. From this perspective, the concept of interests refers to 
naturalistic interests (i. e. human interests, definable in terms of the goals, objectives 
or end-states which have to be acted upon and brought into being if human persons 
are to satisfy their objective species needs) and social interests (i. e. the specific social 
practices or strategies - "modes of articulation" and the "structural capacities" they 
bring into play - by which individuals may realise or enhance their human needs, as 
overdetermined by their immersion in particular kinds of social relations, and by their 
agential location within these social relations). To return to my earlier example, the 
differential location of capitalists and workers in the relations of production ensure 
that each can satisfy or guarantee their well-being or life-chances only by pursuing 
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different (and mutually antagonistic) social "modes of realisation" of their needs, 
which involve in turn the exercise of their specific structural powers. 
One advantage of this account over "orthodox" interest-explanations of social 
agency is that it overcomes the "randomness of ends" associated with subjectivist 
definitions of interests without breaking the link between wants and interests (human 
interests pertain to "primary" or "first-order" wants which correspond to human needs 
deducible from human nature) and without denying interests a causal role in 
explaining social agency (human and social interests, anchored in objective human 
needs, not random subjective "preferences", are the major source of social agency 
aimed at societal reform or reproduction). Thus interests can still be conceptualised as 
the motor which powers social agency (furnishing persons with impelling reasons to 
act collectively in defence of their life-chances) and as the hinge which connects 
interaction to structure (structures furnish individuals with agential interests which 
motivate their collective struggles to change or reproduce social systems). 
A second great strength of the realist account is that the analytical distinction it 
draws between needs and wants, and its identification of the former but not the latter 
with interests, allows the theorist to account for the distance between the subjective 
"preference set" of individuals and their objective needs without making the 
disastrous error of assuming that ideology or power can ever be so absolute that it can 
function to prevent persons from recognising or acting upon the more fundamental of 
their human and social interests. To repeat an earlier point, since interests relate to 
both elementary human needs and the social mechanisms by which they can be 
satisfied in a given structural and agential context, it follows that the "preference set" 
of individuals will generally comprise those wants which correspond with their real 
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interests as well as those which do not. Thus although unequal power-relations and the 
impact of dominant ideology does indeed prevent the members of subordinate groups 
from fully articulating or recognising those desires which, if put into practice, would 
improve their welfare, and does furthermore induce artificial wants which do not 
enhance and often damage their life-chances, these can no more prevent the oppressed 
or exploited recognising the reality of their own alienation than they can eradicate 
their capacity to resist it in pursuit of at least some of their basic material needs and 
interests. 
The relationship between interests and norms in social theory 
Not only does rational choice theory's "naturalistic model" of agency furnish a 
grossly reductive and inadequate account of interests (treating these as reducible to 
subjective wants) but it also sponsors a somewhat cavalier treatment of the 
relationship between social norms and human and social interests. For Coleman, for 
instance, norms are derived from interests which, being taken-for-granted, are 
assumed to be "norm-free" prior to their social construction (which occurs, we are 
told, because rational individuals need to regulate self-interest) . 
20 For Elster, by 
contrast, "motivation in terms of interests, and motivation in terms of norms relate in 
a zero-sum manner ... the more actors follow their self-interest the less they follow 
social norms and vice versa". 21 
The falsity of rational choice theory's reduction of social interests to human (and 
individual) interests is relatively easy to substantiate (and has already in large measure 
been substantiated in the foregoing). It is enough to add to what has already been said 
that this thesis has been disproved beyond reasonable doubt by the radical differences 
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in the way the various exploiting and exploited classes which have characterised 
socio-cultural life over the past 10,000 years or so have articulated their material 
interests. 22 Coleman's and Elster's treatment of the relationship between norms and 
interests, hamstrung as it is by the crude distinction between the "social" and the 
"natural" (and in Elster's case between the "irrational" and the "rational") does not 
fare any better. Firstly it is utterly fallacious to regard human and social interests as 
"norm-free". The very process of recognising and articulating interests is a normative 
one. The normative articulation of social interests refers us to the simple fact that 
human beings are endowed by their natural powers of intelligence, self-consciousness 
and rationality to recognise the reality of their psycho-organic needs and to act in 
accordance with them. The normative articulation of social interests refers us to the 
structured historical socio-cultural and agential contexts through which human 
interests are mediated and thereby "mutate" into emergent phenomena. 
Secondly, it is also quite wrong to regard norms as unconnected to interests 
(however these are conceived), for it is obviously the case that the location of 
individuals in specific structural relations and agential collectivities grants them 
definite and empirically specifiable material interests which in turn exert conditioning 
influences on the kinds of norms and beliefs they are likely to endorse. Elster's own 
example of a Sicilian vendetta, whereby the agent has to choose between acting in 
accordance with the social norm of vengeance (as an honour saving device) or acting 
in accordance with the instrumentally rational and self-interested strategy of letting 
bygones be bygones (in order to avoid the risk of being killed), does not support the 
factual distinction between interests and norms he would like to make. 
23 Not only are 
both these strategies (instrumental self-interest versus honour-saving vengeance) 
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rooted in normative-valuational orientations but neither is comprehensible without 
reference to social interests. 
Thus, given the institutional context of Mafia rivalries, it is undoubtedly the case 
that following both the above courses of action would be "rational" from the point of 
view of underworld business interests. Mafia vendettas, far from being motivated 
primarily by romantic considerations, are pursued to eradicate or discourage economic 
competition from rival criminal organisations. Unleashing the vendetta might indeed 
risk the lives of the gangsters who embark upon it. But at the same time a failure to 
follow it through might also endanger the goals and interests of their organisation by 
giving the "green light" to rivals who would interpret this as a sign of weakness. Far 
from norms being unrelated to interests then, as Elster would have it, often these can 
be explained only in terms of interests. Given the fact that interests relate both to 
elementary human needs and to the social practices which individuals have to follow 
in order to defend or improve their life-chances (as overdetermined by their place in 
stratified social relations) it would be peculiar indeed if these did not play a major role 
in normative production and articulation. 
Of course, one response to the argument that interests always involve norms is to 
assert that rational self-interest knows no cultural boundaries. This is the preferred 
strategy of Elster who counters the claim that "rationality is simply a Western norm ... 
with the ... proposition that rationality in its more general 
features is universal. "24 In 
his words, "there can be no society where people as a rule knowingly refuse to choose 
the best means to realise their goals. "25 Unfortunately for Elster, however, this kind of 
manoeuvre will not do at all. In the first place, the above defence of the primacy of 
allegedly pre-social "interests" over socially constructed "norms" is ill-equipped to 
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deal with the fact that norms are not shaped unilaterally by socio-cultural relations. In 
fact these are simultaneously conditioned by human needs and interests of a relatively 
enduring kind. Although the conditional influence of species-being on the articulation 
of "thought material" normally adds up to little more than a "framework" of 
constraints and enablements within which cultural production takes place, there are 
instances where it plays a more positive causal role in shaping the content of certain 
norms (as is evidenced by the socio-cultural universality of egalitarian norms of 
"fairness" and "distributive justice"). 6 
Secondly, aside from Elster's formulation being empirically false (most historical 
societal types have not been characterised by instrumental rationality or economic 
individualism), 27 it is also hopelessly confused (e. g. note the unreflective collapse of 
"rationality" into "instrumental rationality" or "self-interest"). Although Elster is quite 
right to point out that formal rationality has a universal historical significance and 
salience in human society, he is utterly mistaken to equate this with individuated 
utility-optimisation -a mode of rationality that has only come into its own since the 
emergence of petty capitalist and capitalist social relations over the past 450 years or 
so. 28 Thus a failure on Elster's part to articulate a stratified or differentiated concept of 
rationality, which is capable of grasping the analytical distinction between formal 
rationality (the logical consistency with which individuals order their beliefs and act 
in accordance with beliefs and desires) and substantive rationality (the specific 
cultural forms which rational thought and action takes in different kinds of society 
"and in different institutional contexts within a society"), 
29 allows him to flatten the 
historical diversity and complexity of humanity's socio-cultural "life-worlds". And 
this in turn encourages his sanctioning of and contextless generalisations which if not 
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false are merely truistic (e. g. "like the platitude that in all societies, as a rule, people 
choose the best means to realise their goals"). 30 
3.3: PERSONS, AGENTS AND ACTORS: A REALIST MODEL OF 
INTERACTION 
The preceding discussion introduces the concept of "social interaction" or "social 
action" and seeks to make out a case for grasping the interface between interaction 
and structure in terms of interests (human and social). The analysis so far can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly social interaction is defined here as those intentional 
and self-conscious goal-oriented "doings" of people which involve the co-ordination 
of individual activities, the immersion of individuals in mutual interpersonal 
encounters, or the location of individuals in socio-cultural relations which either 
provide them with reasons for acting or which furnish them with the resources to do 
so. Secondly human agency and social interaction is conceived as being "somewhat 
rational" in formal terms (both attitudinally and behaviourally). Finally my contention 
is that it is precisely this "formal rationality" of human nature which makes it 
reasonable to suppose that interactants generally seek to act socially in accordance 
with their interests. Thus although socially structured power or ideology (or both) is 
often sufficient to partially deflect individuals in subordinate positions from either 
comprehending the relationship between their human and social interests (i. e. by 
mystifying which social interests or "modes of articulation" are appropriate to 
defending or enhancing their life-chances)31 or acting entirely consistently in 
accordance with either, these are rarely sufficient to prevent them from recognising 
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that they do indeed possess fundamental human needs ("primary wants") or from 
attempting to act upon these wherever circumstances permit. 
Now whatever the merits of the above formulations it is doubtful whether these 
add up to a fully adequate account of social interaction (or of the relationship between 
interaction and structure). This is because this understanding of the "interaction order" 
is a relatively undifferentiated one which consequently compacts or flattens the rich 
complexity of social action, and the specific modes of social practice which comprise 
it, into a homogeneous standard or model. A fully adequate account of interaction has 
to recognise that the different forms of individual and collective action which animate 
society must be distinguished analytically from one another not only on the basis of 
the typical kinds of subjective motivation or orientation which underpin them but in 
terms of the objective structural, institutional and agential "collectivities" within 
which social interaction is contextualised. This is because it is these latter "frames" of 
action which determine the range of social practices which are permissible within 
their respective boundaries and the nature of the social powers exercised by human 
agents by dint of their membership of them. Furthermore, I have made the point (in 
chapter two) that a fully adequate understanding of society also has to theorise the 
properties/powers and needs/interests inherent in human beings by dint of their 
membership of a particular biological species (i. e. articulate and defend a "strong" 
explanatory account of human nature). For whereas the former explains how it is 
human beings can engage in goal-oriented activity, the latter provides a large measure 
of the explanation of why they actually do so (i. e. why human agents seek to translate 
their species-powers into intentional social activity aimed at the reproduction, 
modification or transformation of the social relations they inhabit). 
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In place of an undifferentiated category of "social interaction", in short, is 
required a stratified typology of both the distinct social properties which social action 
takes on as a result of its anchorage within different societal contexts and the distinct 
species-attributes and imperatives of human beings that generate the power which 
animates social action (and hence the entire social system). Whereas "social 
interaction" or "social action" is best grasped as a kind of "umbrella" concept 
covering the manifold types of goal-directed individual and collective activity 
operative in society, a realist reconstruction of this concept enables the theorist to 
investigate the interplay between the emergent properties of human persons and their 
social interaction in shaping socio-cultural processes and outcomes. 
To these ends, I would endorse Margaret Archer's injunction to stratify the 
category of "people" into a tripartite distinction between "Subjects", "Social Agents" 
and "Institutional Actors", with the latter concepts referring, respectively, to 
individuals either as members of agential collectivities (e. g. nation-states, ethnic 
groups or social classes) or as bearers of institutional roles. 32 Thus, from this 
perspective, constructing a satisfactory account of individuals and their social 
interaction entails drawing an analytical distinction between "species-being" (the 
psycho-organic tendencies, attributes, needs and interests of human beings), "agential 
action" or "social agency" (the individual and collective activities of human persons 
insofar as these are conditioned responses to the objective distribution of "life- 
chances" structured by their membership of agential collectivities and by inter- 
agential relations) and "institutional action" or "role-action" (the individuated and 
collaborative activities of people as conditioned by the institutional roles they 
appropriate from society and personify in subjectively specific ways). 
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Further analytical distinctions can (and should) be made within this typology. 
Firstly "species-being" can be stratified into its constituent elements (thereby allowing 
the theorist to distinguish between primary and secondary characteristics of human 
nature and the relative importance of each in accounting for social process). 33 
Secondly "social agency" or "agential action" can be internally differentiated between 
individual agency (i. e. the individual's personal responses or reactions to his or her 
material and cultural "conditions of life" as conditioned by the agential collectivity of 
which he or she is a member) and collective agency (i. e. the group responses of 
persons - articulate or inarticulate, organised or unorganised - to their agential 
circumstances). Finally "agential action" can also be internally differentiated between 
what Margaret Archer has described as primary agency (i. e. those relatively 
uncoordinated and unorganised responses or reactions - atomistic or collective, 
articulate or inarticulate - by individuals to their agential and inter-agential situations 
in society)34 and corporate agency or organisational agency (i. e. the institutional 
forms of co-ordinated or collaborative action by the members of a collectivity which 
is either self-consciously oriented towards the attainment of public or strategic goals - 
e. g. political struggles, military conflicts, diplomatic transactions, commercial 
explorations", 35 etc. - or towards the pursuit of societal reform or even 
transformation). Organisational agents might thus include "vested interest groups, 
promotive interest groups, social movements and defensive associations. "36 Equally, 
in rare cases, they might also constitute political organisations geared towards the 
pursuit of a revolutionary transformation of an existing social system and its 
replacement by an entirely different one - the "unprecedented form of agency" as 
Perry Anderson describes it. 37 Typically organisational agency is a mode of social 
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action which is self-consciously oriented towards the defence or pursuit of agential 
interests, as these are "overdetermined" by the structured relations between agential 
collectivities. 
Now although the aforementioned distinction between "institutional action" and 
"agential action" (or between the "Role Actor" and the "Social Agent") is 
indispensable in theorising the dynamics of social interaction, and how this feeds into 
institutional change or statics in the role-ensemble of society (more on this later), it is 
nonetheless important to stress that it is the latter which enjoys explanatory primacy in 
bringing about macro (i. e. structural) change or stasis in social systems. This is 
because the structural relations between agential collectivities, by shaping 
asymmetrically the distribution of finite material resources available to each, and by 
defining the objective social interests which the members of a collectivity have in 
common vis-ä-vis the members of another, provide social agents with a powerful 
impetus towards (or compelling reasons for) engaging in collective action aimed at the 
defence, reform or overturning of existing social relations. Social agency is, then, a 
privileged mode of social action because it relates individuals most directly or 
intimately to the systemic features of the societies they inhabit. By contrast, there is of 
course no corresponding dynamic underlying role-action within the institutional 
framework of society which could conceivably be held responsible for generating the 
same societal effects. This is because inasmuch as individuals are the bearers of social 
roles they are "bound in" by the normative requirements which go with them and 
there are fairly stringent limits to the degree to which they can reinterpret their social 
roles and yet remain incumbents of them. 
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It is precisely the causal primacy of the nexus between human nature and social 
agency in accounting for how and why structural and cultural change or stability takes 
place which justifies my focus upon these particular aspects of the "people" which 
animate social systems in the analysis that follows. The basic tripartite model for 
approaching the explanation of societal change or its absence must therefore be rooted 
in the dialectical interplay between "species-being" and "social agency" (the latter as 
conditioned by overall structural social relations), with "institutional action" emerging 
from "agential action", and both institutional action and social agency having their 
anchorage or "microfoundations" in the species properties and dispositions inherent in 
self-conscious human beings. Since time and space do not allow a full treatment or 
defence of the analytical distinctions I have drawn in the concept of interaction, I will 
devote the remainder of this section to justifying just two of them - namely those 
between corporate and primary agency and between social agency and role-action. 8 
First I will examine the interface between corporate agency and primary agency in 
generating structural-cultural and agential elaboration or statics in social systems. 
Then I will examine the interface between social agency and role-action in generating 
institutional elaboration or statics within the role-ensemble of society. These tasks 
completed, the final section of this chapter (3.4) will be devoted to accounting for 
those properties of persons (mind, self-consciousness and personal identity) which 
allow them to become agents and actors and self-construct social identities. 
Corporate agency and primary agency 
What is the relationship between corporate agency and primary agency? As the 
organised and self-conscious political expression of agential interests it is, of course, 
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easy to regard corporate agency as a uniquely privileged mode of social interaction in 
so far as bringing about structural-cultural change or stable reproduction is concerned. 
This is because "only those who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to 
themselves and others, and have organised in order to get it, can engage in concerted 
action to re-shape the structural or cultural feature in question. "39 By contrast, primary 
agency, as a mode of social agency which lacks collective organisation and worked- 
out political objectives or strategies, and which in the normal course of events 
generates aggregate societal effects unknowingly and unintentionally simply by being 
a part of the social environment (as individuals "react and respond to their context as 
part and parcel of living in it"), 40 can just as easily be portrayed as simply a "passive" 
enablement of societal change or statics. From this point of view, the best way of 
interpreting the distinction between organisational and primary agency is to regard the 
former as alone acting positively in bringing about structural or cultural 
morphogenesis or stasis, whereas the latter functions instead to furnish the "raw 
material" (i. e. social interests and structural powers) which motivate and enable 
individuals sharing a common location in social relations to form organisational 
agents geared towards furthering or defending their life-chances. 
One obvious strength of this account is that it is capable of specifying the 
differential circumstances which have to obtain if structural-cultural and agential 
change or stability are to occur in a society. Such an account begins with corporate 
agents engaging in self-conscious social action and interacting strategically with 
primary agents in pursuit of their agential interests in a given structural and cultural 
environment. In acting strategically on their interests, corporate agents generate 
(intentionally or unintentionally) molecular changes in the social environment they 
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share with primary agents, pressurising the latter to respond to their changing 
conditions of life in different ways, either by formulating their own corporate agents 
or by reacting in a relatively unorganised and sometimes spontaneous (atomistic or 
associational) manner. This "unleashes a stream of ... environmental pressures and 
problems which affect the attainment of the [former's] promotive interests", 41 forcing 
them to modify their own strategic agency, as they seek to continue the pursuit of their 
interests in a context reshaped by the corporate and primary responses of the latter. At 
the "macro" (i. e. systemic) level this process will result "in either morphostasis or 
morphogenesis depending on the outcome of interaction. s42 At the same time, 
however, "since social interaction is the sole mechanism governing stability or 
change, what goes on during it also determines the morphostasis or morphogenesis of 
[a]gency itself. " This is because "in its attempt to sustain or transform the social 
system, [agency] is inexorably drawn into sustaining or transforming the categories of 
[c]orporate and [p]rimary [a]gents themselves. "a3 
Now in social systems characterised by a conjunction of cultural hegemony (i. e. a 
dominant culture shared in common by the various elite groupings which constitute its 
socially dominant class) and structural monolithism ("the superimposition of elites 
and a heavy concentration of resources which together [constrain the] crystallisation 
of opposition"), 44 as was notably the case in many of the ancient and medieval Asiatic 
societies which comprised the "tributary mode of production", the processes that 
might lead to structural-cultural and agential elaboration are more often and more 
likely to be short-circuited by countervailing pressures towards stable reproduction. (I 
will not say that agential pressures towards change in these societies were 
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extinguished altogether since "morphostatic" social systems, as opposed to 
"morphostatic" situations within societies, exist only in the imagination). 
One important reason for this state of affairs is that primary agents, in these 
societal circumstances, encounter both powerful ideological constraints on their 
ability to articulate cultural dissent (i. e. a hegemonic dominant culture embodying few 
manifest exploitable internal contradictions) and equally powerful material and 
institutional constraints on their ability to articulate and mobilise their agential powers 
or "structural capacities" in an effective manner. In the tributary mode of production, 
for instance, this took the form of a powerful centralised state apparatus which 
possessed the organisational capacities - military and political - to prevent the direct 
producers translating their fermenting unrest into corporate agency oriented towards 
societal reform or revolution. 45 A second reason for this state of affairs is that the 
ruling classes which dominate relatively stagnant societies are as much constrained by 
"the absence of ideational or organisational alternatives"46 as they are enabled by the 
manner in which cultural hegemony and structural monolithism dovetail in curtailing 
effective organised opposition to their rule. In these circumstances structural and 
cultural domination tend to complement one another in ensuring that system 
reproduction predominates over system elaboration, since elites "have no immediate 
alternative but to live together" and "every interest in continuing to do so. "47 
If stable system reproduction may often arise from what Archer describes as "the 
superimposition of structure and culture", 48 which operates to hold back the 
emergence of corporate agents from the ranks of the propertyless and disenfranchised, 
it follows that system elaboration or transformation is best facilitated by social 
relations which pre-empt or break down the material and ideological hegemony of 
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powerful social groups which erode the incapacity of primary agents to fully articulate 
and promote their interests. Such a state of affairs has not been untypical of most 
historical societies (it is societal stagnancy not change which is a special case and 
requires particular explanation), because it is only in exceptional cases that the overall 
configuration of a social system allows unopposed domination by a unified class or 
elite. Normally of course social systems provide a greater-or-lesser scope for "the 
progressive expansion of corporate agents, of those who are numbered among them, 
and a divergence of the interests represented by them, thus resulting in substantial 
conflict between them. "49 This in turn generates the potential for social change. For 
unless there are especially stringent structural and cultural constraints operative within 
hierarchical social relations which function to discourage primary agents from 
articulating their interests and organising collectively in their defence or promotion 
there is no compelling reason to suppose they will not do so. 
The drama of morphogenesis/morphostasis thus involves the following process. 
Corporate agents, the organisational capacities of dominant elites or classes, act 
purposively in defence or pursuit of their agential interests, thereby shaping the social 
environment which primary agents inhabit, forcing the latter to respond to their 
changing (and usually worsening) social and material circumstances. This reaction of 
primary agents to the strategic pressures placed on them by corporate agents will 
either take the form of passive aggregate responses to environmental stimuli (in which 
case system dynamics will at best offer them stagnant and at worst declining life- 
chances) or it will take the form of organised resistance (in which case system 
elaboration at least offers them the promise, contingent upon a successful struggle 
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against their oppressors, of improved life-chances and a greater degree of societal 
enfranchisement generally). 
Which of these scenarios is most likely to develop in any specific interactional 
context is contingent not only upon the structural and cultural configuration of the 
social system in question, and the structural powers and material resources which 
primary agents possess or can mobilise, but also upon their general state of 
consciousness (anger or apathy, demoralisation or willingness to fight, greater or 
lesser political awareness of agential interests, etc. ) on the eve of a major crisis. On 
the one hand, where the responses of primary agents to the strategic pressures exerted 
upon them by corporate agents are merely passive aggregate ones, or where these 
assume organised forms which are quickly curtailed or extinguished by dominant 
elites (due often to the economic and political immaturity of subordinate groups), the 
overall result is agential elaboration by and structural reform on behalf of the 
propertied and powerful alone, as dominant groups adjust their strategies and goals in 
accordance with the ever-changing problems and pressures posed by the mere 
environmental presence and reactions of the propertyless or otherwise oppressed to 
their social situation. Hence the "morphostasis " of structure and agency. On the other 
hand, where the responses of primary agents to the effects of corporate agency take 
the form of organised collaborative resistance to the powerful and propertied, which 
can no longer simply be crushed (given the maturing political and economic strength 
of the former), the result is the growth of the category of corporate agents, the decline 
of that of primary agents amongst the previously unorganised (as the former become 
absorbed or transformed into the latter), and the initiation of "bottom-up" processes of 
reform or transformation in the interests of the disenfranchised or propertyless where 
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social struggles are successful. Hence the "morphogenesis" of structure and agency 
respectively. 
The morphogenesis of structure and agency: the example of British social policy 
I will illustrate this rather abstract picture of the dynamics of societal and agential 
elaboration with the concrete example of the evolution of British social and welfare 
policy between 1750 and present times. It is (or should be) common knowledge that 
during the early phase of industrialisation (1750-1860), prior to working class suffrage 
in the latter 19th century, the state power was transparently and unequivocally a 
"committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie" and landed gentry. 
This state of affairs was reflected in the pattern of social policy during this period. 
Some of the most significant innovations in social policy introduced by the state here 
included the formation of a police force independent of the military (created to control 
"riotous assembly" and safeguard the property of the wealthy in the growing urban 
centres), 50 the construction of a large-scale system of penal institutions (to incarcerate 
the mass of urban paupers, beggars and petty-thieves generated by the expulsion of 
the peasantry from the land and the violent fluctuations in the labour market), 51 and 
the strengthening (or introduction) of vicious legal sanctions designed to counteract 
"property crime" (hangings, floggings, mutilations, deportations etc. ). 52 
Other crucial policy initiatives were the following. Firstly the revamped Masters 
and Servants Act - originally introduced in 1721 - which granted employers draconian 
contractual powers over their workers. Secondly the Combination Acts of 1799 and 
1800, which criminalised working class political and economic organisation and 
agitation. Thirdly the New Poor Law of 1834, which was designed to terrorise 
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workers into accepting bare subsistence wages and the most inhuman of working 
conditions under threat of the workhouse. Fourthly the Enclosure Acts, which 
arbitrarily redefined common property as private property and which lent state 
backing to the efforts of landlords and capitalist farmers to turf the peasantry off the 
land. Finally laws against vagrancy and trespass, and the periodic banning of trade 
union organisation and the right to demonstrate (during periods of heightened class 
tension and social unrest). 53 
My account of the "morphogenesis" of the "interventionist" British state thus 
commences with structural and agential "morphostasis". In this scenario, the grossly 
asymmetrical balance of power between the propertied and the propertyless (i. e. the 
abstraction of the newly forming proletariat from any formal or informal 
representation in the institutional structures of economy and polity) enabled the 
corporate agents of the former to pursue their interests largely unhampered by the 
latter. Agential elaboration during this period, in so far as it was causally efficacious 
in stimulating social policy initiatives, was enacted exclusively by the propertied, in 
response to the problems posed by the presence and reactions of (initially) primary 
agents to a social world not of their own making, involving the introduction of new 
organisational capacities (legal and institutional) designed to allow the continued 
pursuit of their interests in a social environment modified by social interaction. By 
contrast, organised agential responses by the propertyless during the later part of this 
period (e. g. the Luddite revolt of 1811-13, the Chartist movement of 1837-48, and the 
formation of the earliest trade unions in the 1820s), rooted as it was in an undeveloped 
minority working class, tended to be short-lived, and was destroyed by military 
263 
repression before it had a chance to establish and elaborate itself and generate a 
strategic impact upon state policy-making. 54 
The initial faltering efforts of primary agents to self-organise in resistance to 
exploitation were, in short, shipwrecked by a combination of the organised power of a 
confident ruling class and their own political and economic immaturity. Because of 
this agential elaboration by the working class was no more advanced at the close of 
this period than it was at the beginning. The "nightwatchman state", concerned only 
with establishing the political and economic preconditions of untrammelled 
capitalism, hence reigned supreme. And even those few social policy initiatives (e. g. 
the Factory Acts of 1825,1833,1844 and 1847) which appeared to benefit labour (by 
reducing the number of work-hours children had to submit to employers) were 
stimulated not so much by working class pressure but by concerns amongst sections 
of the bourgeoisie and the state elite that overworked children were subject to "moral 
degradation" (and were thus in need of ethical education if they were not to become a 
threat to "legitimate" society), hampered the future stability or flexibility of the labour 
market, and generated the potential for unrest amongst their elders (whose wages were 
being undercut). 55 In any case, of course, pressure from other sections of the business 
lobby ensured that the factory legislation of this period had either a negligible impact 
on the reality of child exploitation (the new laws were not rigorously enforced and 
sanctions were not readily applied to transgressors) or worsened the living standards 
of the proletariat as a whole (working class parents were not paid higher wages to 
reimburse them for the loss of their children's income). 56 
In the subsequent period of British history (1860-1939) the domination exercised 
by the propertied classes over the state was to become substantially modified (though 
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not, of course, eradicated or even seriously undermined). The pattern of structural and 
societal reform still remained for the most part "top-down" , controlled mostly by the 
corporate agents of the state and capital, and was motivated as much by external rather 
than internal agential pressures. But at the same time the gradual consolidation by the 
working class of their own corporate capacities (i. e. trade union organisation and 
latterly party political organisation), which were developed in response to the huge 
strategic pressures placed on them by the corporate agents of the propertied during the 
previous period, did ensure that subsequent social and welfare reform became 
somewhat "watered down" (a little less stick and a little more carrot). 
The limited and inadequate social reforms from the mid 19`h to the early 20`h 
century were motivated primarily by three major agential concerns. Firstly political 
fear by the elite of an increasingly mobilised and organised working class and its 
potential to press for radical reforms or even "socialist reconstruction" (even where it 
was not yet doing so). Secondly its corresponding awareness that a measure of reform 
(especially in health, social security and education) was necessary to maintain the 
competitiveness of British capital vis-a-vis international rivals. Thirdly its attempts to 
prevent the "moral contamination of the "respectable" working class by the "feckless 
residuum" of casualised workers who were reputedly prone to "malingering" and 
riotous assembly. The corporate agents of the working class thus had to be conceded a 
certain measure of progressive legislation to contain their grievances (or potential 
demands) within the bounds of the existing social order and to negate the appeal of 
socialism. At the same time the utmost repression had to be exercised to liquidate the 
threat of the "residuum" by means of slum-clearance, the sterilisation or deportation 
of "undesirables", and the disqualification of its members from any welfare 
265 
protection. Furthermore the cumulative experiences of military weakness (as exposed 
by the Crimean and Boer wars) combined with relative economic decline (as revealed 
by the speed in which Germany, the USA, Japan and France were catching up and in 
some cases overtaking Britain in terms of labour productivity and volume of output) 
ensured that measures would have to be taken to improve the health, education and 
hence motivation of the working class if the long-term survival of the empire was to 
be safeguarded . 
57 
That such agential concerns were to the forefront of social policy during this 
period is evidenced by the very nature of the welfare legislation provided. The public 
health legislation of the 1870s, for instance, was not the product of working class or 
union agitation, but was introduced by the state to stabilise the labour market and 
safeguard the health of the rich (in the wake of a number of large-scale cholera 
outbreaks - originating in the urban slums - which for the bourgeoisie had the 
unfortunate "side effect" of wiping out skilled workers and members of their own 
class as well as the unskilled, unemployed, and "undeserving poor"). 58 Moreover a 
concern with improving the efficiency of Britain's economy and armed forces was, for 
example, the dominant motivation informing the introduction of the 1906 Education 
Act (which sought to give local authorities the - discretionary, of course! - power to 
finance the provision of school meals for working class children). 59 
More generally, of course, state provision had to be held within the most stringent 
fiscal limits (to limit the tax burden on capital) and was specifically designed not to 
compromise in the slightest the stable reproduction of the low wage economy. 60 At all 
costs the workers and their families had to be discouraged from indulging in the 
delights of unproductive "sponging" (or punished by means of welfare 
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disenfranchisement or stigmatisation for a life of unproductive or "dissolute" 
conduct). Social services and welfare relief had therefore to co-exist with the 
workhouse system and be as sparse and punitive as possible. Indeed, even where 
market considerations had no direct relevance to social policy - as was true, for 
example, of the provision of old age pensions in 1908 - the cold hand of liberal 
financial orthodoxy ensured that the provision offered was paltry to say the least. So it 
was that Lloyd-George's "new deal" for the elderly added up to a mere 5s a week for 
individuals and 7s 6d for couples (which was insufficient to lift its incumbents out of 
absolute poverty) and was restricted to people over seventy years of age (during a 
period where average life expectancy for workers was considerably less than this). 61 
Furthermore the social hierarchies and politico-ethical values of the propertied 
had to be manifest in social policy and welfare reform lest the workers perceive they 
were receiving "something for nothing" and come to expect "user-friendly" 
socialistic-type reforms from a benevolent state in the future. National Insurance, for 
instance (in its original incarnation in the 1911 Act), aside from being funded largely 
from the wages of the working class (the "1 in 5 rule"), was to be held to the bare 
physical minimum to ensure subsistence, and was to discriminate on the basis of 
"deserving" and "undeserving" poor. 62 The same liberal moralism and social 
authoritarianism was also evident in the workings of the Old Age Pensions legislation 
of 1908, which sought to exclude from coverage those infirm workers who were 
unable to "prove" that they had been habitually employed in a "respectable" trade. 63 
And, in a similar vein (to offer another example), education provision which was first 
proposed during the 1830s (the heyday of Chartism) to counter to the perceived 
"seditious" influence of the informal schooling provided within the working class 
267 
community, was later introduced (in the 1870 Act) and subsequently strengthened (in 
the 1891 and 1902 Acts) with the quite explicit purpose of "gentling the masses" - i. e. 
preaching a respect for property, nation and empire - and introducing working class 
children to the bare minimum of literacy and numeracy necessary for their future roles 
in the labour market 64 
The major reason why the workers' movement was prepared to go along with 
welfare reforms which were at best perfunctory (and at worst punitive) is explainable 
rather more in terms of ideological than material weaknesses. For the trade union 
bureaucracy now possessed the political and organisational resources to campaign 
energetically for genuinely progressive welfare reform in the interests of the 
propertyless, and this was especially the case following the concession of the working 
class franchise and the formation of the Labour Representative Council in 1900 
(excepting of course the period from 1894-1907 in the aftermath of Taff Vale). The 
pro-liberal political stance of the labour movement, forged as much by poor 
education, intellectual poverty and a lack of knowledge of socialist theory as it was by 
sound argument (though also by a large measure of political opportunism), ensured 
that its political and industrial leaders could imagine no alternative to the orthodox 
deflationary economic programme practised by bourgeois governments prior to the 
1930s. Consequently a system of universal state benefits or pro-labour intervention in 
the workings of the market to counteract the boom-slump cycle was for them a 
utopian hope. Indeed, this was a belief which lamentably became enshrined in the 
"do-nothing" social policies of the first Labour administrations of 1924 and 1929-31, 
whose most disgraceful failing was their refusal to combat growing unemployment 
and to alleviate the poverty caused by unemployment. 65 
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Nonetheless, despite the ideational poverty of the union leadership (and latterly) 
of the Labour Party's parliamentary elite), the very existence of these reforms, and of 
others which were campaigned for by the unions (most notably the introduction of old 
age pensions in 1908) would quite possibly not have emerged at all were it not for the 
pressures exerted on the state and capital by the developing . 
industrial and political 
organisational agencies of the working class. It is, in this respect, an interesting 
historical fact to note that the working class franchise (introduced in the 1867 and 
1884 Acts) was only conceded by the state following the introduction of many of 
these early tentative moves towards a welfare state worthy of the name and following 
the defeat of the revolutionary Chartist movement of 1837-48 (which itself gave the 
subsequent development of the trade union movement in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s 
a huge impetus). 66 
A more complex pattern of social policy has been evident in the early post-war 
years (1945-74). Initially the dynamics of societal elaboration were no longer 
expressed simply in terms of "top-down" reform (exploiting the ideological weakness 
of oppositional corporate agents) but expressed for the first time also powerful and 
ideologically coherent "bottom-up" pressures for change. The construction of the 
Beveridgean welfare state between 1945 and 1951 reflected the convergence of two 
powerful social blocs: state monopoly capital and organised labour. Capital required a 
comprehensive welfare state not only in order to placate a working class radicalised 
by the experience of thirty years of war and depression and of promises of "a home fit 
for heroes", but in order to equip the workers with the higher level of cultural and 
technological know-how required for successful competition in the post-colonial 
world (mere literacy and numeracy would no longer suffice! ). The labour movement, 
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by contrast, wanted progressive welfare legislation and quality public services for the 
simple purpose of improving the quality of life of its members, and it emerged from 
the war with the organisational resources (industrial and political) to campaign 
effectively for them. 67 
This temporary and uneasy alliance between rival corporate agents representing 
opposed social classes was made possible by the economic logic of "state monopoly 
capitalism" and the ideological forms it gave rise to. The effective discrediting of 
supply-side monetarist economics by the Great Depression allowed the dominance of 
a new intellectual orthodoxy - Keynesian demand management and deficit budgeting - 
which held that governments could guarantee economic growth and stability by 
boosting domestic demand through full employment, government borrowing and 
public expenditure. 68 Not only did this new Keynesian orthodoxy render welfarism 
less ideologically unpalatable to those vested interest groups organised in defence of 
capital, hence weakening their resistance to the demands of the TUC and Labour 
Party, but it also gifted the labour movement the ideological capacities it had 
previously lacked to argue convincingly for radical reform in all areas of social life 
(the neo-classical argument that inequality, poverty, deflation and the minimal state 
were indispensable to economic success could now be trumped). 
The end-result of social interaction between rival corporate agents here was hence 
the relatively benign "Butskellism" which dominated the thinking of Labour and 
Conservative governments alike throughout the post-war boom. 69 The greater 
ideological and organisational power of the labour movement (which in the context of 
full-employment could only gather strength and with it the confidence to fight for yet 
wider political, social and economic reforms), in harness with the greater capacity of 
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capital and the state to surrender reforms (in the context of the boom), allowed the 
construction of a social environment (the "permissive" society as today's reactionaries 
describe it) in which manifold new corporate agents (oriented on a wide and broad 
base of issues - including race, gender, environment, etc. ) could emerge and flourish. 
Here corporate agency and primary agency now found itself immersed in a social 
environment positively bloated with promotive interests groups, in which the 
unorganised sections of the populace were declining (the morphogenesis of agency), 
and in which laissez-faire capitalism developed into organised or corporate welfare 
capitalism (the morphogenesis of structure). 
It is a commonplace that the subsequent period of state welfare reform and social 
policy (1974 to the present day) has seen the initiatives and trends of the previous 
period thrown into sharp reverse. Why has this been the case? As we have seen the so- 
called "Butskellism" (welfare state capitalism), which generated a social environment 
in which the organisation of primary agents (into unions, political parties, pressure 
groups, single-issue campaigns, etc. ) gathered pace, was rooted in and dependent upon 
a particular combination of economic, class and ideological circumstances, which was 
itself the outcome of the previous 100 years or so of social interaction. The balance of 
class forces brought about by a strong, articulate and mobilised labour movement, in 
harness with the changing economic needs of capital and the changed economic logic 
of corporate capitalism (which together allowed an ideological convergence of sorts 
between capital and labour on the issue of welfare and social reform), created in the 
conditions of the long post-war boom a temporary and unstable truce between the 
rival corporate blocs. 
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Now so long as this truce remained in place the state elite could take on the 
coloration of a corporate actor which stood above the opposing class interests of civil 
society (or more generally between oppressors and oppressed). The trouble was, of 
course, that the state submitted voluntarily to the political demands of organised 
labour (and other corporate agents rooted in the oppressed) only inasmuch as these 
could be reconciled with the interests of the propertied, and this in turn was dependent 
on the post-war economic boom continuing indefinitely. Once the limits of capitalist 
expansion were reached at the close of the 1960s, and the system crashed into a new 
period of chronic crises and generalised stagnancy from the 1970s onwards, the 
compromise became unworkable, and the class aspect of the state was thrown into 
sharp relief. Hence the sharp "rightwards turn" in social policy since the mid 1970s. 
The state and corporate capital now acted together to "roll back" welfare spending and 
the gains of the labour movement and other promotive interest groups. 70 A new 
"morphostatic" situation gradually emerged in social policy as oppositional groups 
generally found themselves unable to influence government thinking, as the trade 
union movement declined in membership, confidence, militancy and organisational 
capacity, and as the major party political opposition (the Labour Party) meekly 
adapted itself to the agential interests of big business and its allies in the state 
machine. In the latter case, of course, the capitulation of "New Labour" to big 
business has been carried through by cravenly exploiting the demoralisation of the 
workers' movement to justify a stampede to the right which rendered its politics 
indistinguishable from those of the unabashedly pro-bourgeois parties). 7' 
Again the question needs to be asked: how was it that one of the most organised 
and powerful labour movements in the western world (the product of patient advance 
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over a century or more) became demoralised and defeated by the strategic corporate 
actions of the state and capital within the space of a mere ten years? Once more the 
answer is to be found in the ideological vacuity of Labourism, which fed into a 
weakness of leadership when the crisis of the 1970s finally broke. As argued earlier, 
the changing "needs" and logic of capital in the immediate post-war context of "state 
capitalism", as expressed intellectually in neo-Keynesian economic theory, provided 
the leadership of the labour movement with the ideological resources to justify the 
gradualist and reformist stance it had adopted unwaveringly since its origins. 
Previously when capitalism had lurched into crisis, as it did in the 1930s, the TUC's 
and Labour Party's uncritical acceptance of supply-side economics (the so-called 
"Treasury View") ensured the political and industrial paralysis of its organisational 
powers. Just at the point where the workers required strong leadership and firm action 
to combat mass sackings, the erosion of workplace rights, wage cuts and public 
spending cutbacks, the corporate agents of labour were unable to offer it, bound as 
they were to the idea that crises could only be combated by a policy of retrenchment, 
deflation and wage controls. 72 
With the renewed onset of the pre-war boom-slump pattern and generalised 0 
economic stagnation in the period after the mid-1970s, and the resultant effective 
discrediting of Keynesianism as a viable alternative to monetarism, the same 
intellectual paralysis inevitably resurfaced. As before the leadership of the labour 
movement found itself politically disarmed by its inability to justify reforms in a 
context where it was no longer respectable to believe that one could "spend one's way 
out of a crisis". A failure to articulate a genuinely socialist ideational and political 
opposition to capitalism (which would have demonstrated that a fight for socialist 
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relations of production was the only solution to the crisis) ensured that no concerted or 
unified opposition to attacks on welfare, public spending, full employment, employee 
rights and conditions, and trade union organisation was ever mounted. 73 
My account of the morphogenesis of structure and agency in relation to welfare 
reform and social policy thus concludes unhappily with stagnation or "morphostasis", 
as progressive social elaboration runs into the limits imposed by bourgeois social 
relations in the epoch of long-term capitalist decline. 74 The future for welfare and 
progressive social legislation looks bleak indeed, as the government continually seeks 
to implement never-ending rounds of cuts in health, education and social security (as a 
proportion of GDP and as measured in terms of a failure to provide annually a level of 
resources which would prevent a cumulative decline in the quality of provision), as 
the official political opposition devote their policy not to improving the situation of 
the working class, minorities and the poor but to reassuring business that "the 
economy is safe in our hands", and as the trade union bureaucracy "sits on its hands" 
and insists that the workers must "wait for Labour". Such political opportunism and 
ideological vacuity must always be the norm where the crisis of capitalism is so deep 
and so intractable that reformism can no longer justify itself by delivering reforms. At 
the time of writing society stands at the cross-roads of the organic crisis where further 
progressive agential and structural morphogenesis cannot be contained within the 
boundaries of the existing social system and can only be released by the revolutionary 
replacement of capitalism with a classless socialist society. Yet, given the political 
stance of corporate labour ("reformism without reforms"), 75 the morphostatic scenario 
seems likely to persist until such time as the propertyless, under-privileged and 
oppressed break with the reformist politics of the trade union bureaucracy and replace 
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the Labour Party with new corporate agents capable of better representing their 
interests. 
Morphogenesis and structural transformation: the dynamics of social revolutions 
Although the foregoing conceptualisation of the dynamics of societal morphogenesis/ 
stasis works reasonably well as an account of the dynamics of structural-cultural and 
agential elaboration within the bounds of a given social system (here corporate agents 
do indeed appear to be the sole "positive" causes of social change or stasis), I now 
want to argue that it has limitations as an account of those "bottom-up" revolutionary 
social struggles which seek to overturn social systems in the interests of the 
propertyless. This is because primary agents are, in hierarchical societies entering into 
organic crisis, more often than not the major source of the social struggles which 
shake them to their foundations, spontaneously exploding into radical unrest or 
protest, often outflanking those corporate agents (in terms of militancy) which 
reputedly represent their interests, and acquiring elementary organisational forms in 
the very act or process of entering into struggle. This was notably the case, for 
instance, in the 1905 revolution in Russia. Here the (largely) non-unionised working 
class responded to the privations caused by Russia's disastrous war against Japan (in 
the context of political repression and economic backwardness) by spontaneously 
erupting into a wave of "wildcat" strikes and civil disruption. This in turn gave rise on 
their part to the organisation of mass demonstrations and a general strike, the 
establishment of soviets or workers' councils (i. e. organs of proletarian political and 
administrative self-government), and even an attempted insurrection against the 
ancien regime, and all of this without the slightest prompting by the opposition parties 
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(which were completely non-plussed by events). 76 The same basic pattern has also 
been repeated many times since in other revolutionary and semi-revolutionary 
situations - for instance in the Portuguese revolution of 1974, and in the events of 
May 1968 in France. 77 
One important reason for this capacity of primary agents to set in motion sudden 
and dramatic processes of (prospective) societal change is that, despite their lack of 
organisation and a worked out political strategy for pursuing their interests, they often 
embody a keen political awareness of their own agential interests, and with this a high 
degree of anger and resentment at the manner of which society and its vested interests 
operate to deny or frustrate these. In these situations it often requires only the 
introduction of a particularly insensitive government policy, the outbreak of a political 
scandal or crisis, a major military defeat, or a dramatic change in the fortunes of the 
economy, to ignite the "touchpaper" of mass unrest or protest amongst those who 
have hitherto appeared to act entirely passively, apathetically and atomistically in 
response to structural and agential pressures. At the same time, however, processes of 
radical primary agency, precisely because they are initiated by people who lack fully 
articulated political goals or strategies, and who lack furthermore tactical experience 
of agential struggles and organisational know-how of how to conduct these 
successfully, do require corporate agents oriented on their interests if they are to stand 
a realistic chance of fully formulating and achieving their objectives. For when 
confronted by the organised power of the state and capital the propertyless simply 
cannot afford the luxury of an "on-the-spot" or "trial and error" learning process in the 
heat of the struggle between them. 
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The failure of the 1905 revolution in Russia, and of more recent revolutionary 
socialist opportunities in China (1925-27), Germany (1919-23), Chile (1972-73) and 
Iran (1979-80), are chilling reminders of the unhappy consequences which can befall 
the working class movement where it lacks organisational capacities and experienced 
(and non-opportunistic) political leadership. 8 Conversely, the equally unhappy fate 
of, for instance, the British Labour Party and trade union movement in recent years 
(the "great moving rightwards show")79 is a salient testament to the political 
degeneration and paralysis which can engulf corporate agents where the primary 
agents they are anchored in and purport to represent lack the confidence (in this case 
due to the experience of class betrayal and defeat) to pressurise their representatives to 
campaign energetically in defence of their real (i. e. objectively structured) interests. 80 
It was, of course, an awareness of the complexity of the interplay between 
corporate and primary agency in bringing about system change or stasis which led the 
greatest of proletarian revolutionists, i. e. Lenin, to rethink his own elitist formulae of 
What is to be Done? 81 His subsequent realisation (in response to the events of the 
1905 revolution) that the working class could spontaneously acquire a revolutionary 
socialist outlook and some of the organisational capacities to act upon it (instilled in 
them to some degree by the exigencies of collaborative labour and factory discipline) 
encouraged him to postulate a more dialectical relationship between class and party 
(or between primary agency and corporate agency) whereby both would perform a 
positive causal role in ushering in a socialist society. On this view, instead of 
initiating a socialist uprising, the function of the revolutionary party was to offer 
organisational know-how and advice on tactics and strategy to the working class prior 
to and during their entry into the fray, to demonstrate in practice (by gaining the trust 
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of the workers) its right to assume a leading role in any revolutionary situation, and to 
act as the memory of the working class movement (i. e. distil the lessons - theoretical 
and practical - of its previous defeats) and thereby ensure that the revolutionary 
workers would not subsequently repeat the errors of previous struggles. At the same 
time, however, the function of the revolutionary party was also to learn from the 
experiences and insights of workers in struggle, to strive to involve the most able and 
militant workers in party activity, and to utilise their spontaneity, militancy, creativity 
and enthusiasm in order to blow away the bureaucratic sclerosis instilled by party 
routine and procedure (which often ensured that the Bolsheviks were more to the 
rearguard rather than to the vanguard of potentially revolutionary situations). 82 
The invaluable lesson to be learned from generations of activists wrestling with 
the problems of socialist organisation and its relationship to working class struggle is 
simply that both primary and corporate agency can equally be a positive force for 
societal change. Indeed, certain kinds of societal change - namely the revolutionary 
transformation or overturning of a social system - are quite impossible unless primary 
and organisational agents both play a positive causal role in social struggles. For these 
can only succeed given mass participation by the organised and hitherto unorganised 
alike. It is only where corporate agents attempt to substitute themselves for primary 
agents during social upheavals, or where primary agents are forced to embark upon 
radical struggles in the absence of corporate agents oriented on their interests, that 
movements aimed at revolutionary structural and cultural remodelling tend to fail. 83 It 
should go without saying, of course, that social movements "from below" powered by 
both organisational and primary agents are those which stand the better chances of 
ushering in structural or cultural reform within a given social system. 
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The key difficulty with the realist conception of social agency is, therefore, that it 
drives too deep a wedge between corporate and primary agents, making it something 
of a mystery how the latter can spontaneously transform themselves into the former, 
and in doing so often outflank and outdo established organisations formally based on 
their interests. In other words, if primary agents are to be conceived simply as "objects 
to whom things happen", as collectivities of individuals who "neither articulate 
projects nor mobilise for their attainment", or who "cannot be strategically involved in 
the modelling or remodelling of structure or culture", 84 it becomes impossible to 
explain how many of the fiercest class struggles in history could have occurred at all. 
After all, such class struggles often take place in social contexts where "morphostatic" 
situations prevail (i. e. where vested interest groups have extinguished or curtailed the 
emergence of corporate agents pertaining to the disenfranchised), 85 and furthermore 
are often responsible for creating the corporate or organisational forms which enable 
subordinate groups to win for themselves an effective say in future strategic decision- 
making. 86 
The purpose of making this argument is not to suggest that the realist 
understanding of primary agency is simply wrong or misplaced. Rather it is to suggest 
that it is over-simple, capable of grasping certain ways of being a primary agent but 
not of others. To bridge the chasm between primary agency and corporate agency it is 
necessary to define the latter simply in terms of the organisational capacities which 
primary agents self-construct in response to the strategic pressures exerted upon them 
by vested interest groups without making any assumptions as to whether or not the 
former are capable of strategic collective action or collaborative political mobilisation 
in defence of their interests. This is, I suggest, an empirical question, contingent upon 
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an analysis of the society and social situation in question. From this viewpoint, 
instead of being necessarily passive or apathetic, primary agents will or will not be so 
depending on the level of political radicalism, militancy and self-awareness of their 
agential interests which they may or may not have achieved. 
To speak of primary agency, then, is to address not only the unorganised 
responses of the under-privileged and propertyless to their social situation, but also 
their general state of consciousness and that of their most "advanced" sections at any 
particular time. Though both appropriate organisational forms and radical political 
consciousness are indispensable components of any revolutionary transformation of 
social relations, they cannot be conflated into a single analytical category (i. e. of 
"corporate agency"). This is because corporate agents tend to be thrown up by the 
social struggles of primary agents (which indicates the former are capable of 
articulating projects and engaging in collaborative strategic action) 87 and have often 
operated deliberately to repress (i. e. "constitutionalise") the militancy and struggles of 
those primary agents they represent, hampering the prospects of radical structural 
change in their interests. 88 The "unprecedented form of agency" (socialist revolution) 
thus requires not simply mass participation by primary agents (who in the process of 
acting and struggling in defence of their interests assume organisational capacities) 
but also the intervention of a particular form of corporate agent (i. e. a revolutionary 
Marxist party independent of reformist organisations and yet anchored in the 
workplace and community of the propertyless) if it is to succeed. 89 
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Social agency and institutional action 
The necessity of drawing an analytical distinction between the social agent and the 
role-actor, and of conceiving of the latter as emergent from the former, can be 
demonstrated easily enough by revealing the shortcomings of so-called "social action" 
perspectives of the kind to be found in most versions of the "sociological conception 
of agency". For symbolic interactionists, functionalists, and social constructionists 
alike, human beings are generally regarded as synonymous with social selves, and 
social selves are regarded as synonymous with social actors whose interests are 
definable in terms of the social roles (especially the normative "rules" which are 
applicable to roles) which they appropriate from society as their own and impersonate 
or personify in specific ways. 90 From this perspective, in other words, social 
interaction is explainable in terms of the normative rules which are said to govern or 
"pre-script" the institutional roles which individuals select from society and "act out" 
in a particularistic style. 
The problems with social action theory as it is conceived above may be usefully 
summarised as follows. Firstly, quite apart from "putting out of business" the human 
person emergent from the interface between the psycho-organic makeup of 
humanity's "species-being" and the experiential life-process of the individual, the 
failure of its practitioners to distinguish between the agential and institutional 
dimensions of the "interaction order" leads to an inability to theorise the dynamics of 
collective action and to a refusal to admit that different role-positions in society might 
allow their incumbents to function either as "macro-actors" or "micro-actors" in 
everyday interaction (hence undermining their view of social order as resulting from 
an aggregation of micro-transactions between "laypersons"). Secondly social action 
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theory's "understratified" view of social interaction (as composed solely of the 
institutionalised doings of rule-following role-incumbents) encourages a "de-centring" 
of the processes which generate social malintegration and macroscopic change in 
social systems and thereby often helps sustain an unwarranted consensus model of 
society. Thirdly this collapse of agential action or membership into role-action ensures 
that action theorists cannot furnish an adequate explanation of the genesis of rules and 
roles (i. e. of why social groups construct and reproduce the institutional roles and 
rules they do). Finally nor can its practitioners' grasp of individuals as role- 
incumbents account for how social interaction might modify or even transform the 
role-ensemble of a society (i. e. introduce to it new roles and attendant rules of social 
conduct or transform or abolish old ones) or of why individuals are motivated to select 
the institutional roles they do from society. I will elaborate on each of these arguments 
in turn. 
John Scott has made the observation that social action theory offers "only a 
partial view of collective agency. " As he puts it, for action theorists, "[t]he formation 
of small groups, business enterprises and political enterprises is recognised, but not 
explained, and they are seen as having only a shadowy existence as part of the 
`framework' of social life. "91 The reason for this "absence" in social action theory is 
twofold. Most obviously, of course, it is explainable in terms of its practitioners' 
"populist predilection" for revealing the roots of social order in the activities or 
transactions of micro-actors, conceived simply as "lay persons" or "ordinary members 
of society ,. 92 Since this kind of approach sees its task as adducing the "interaction 
order" from a non-hierarchical aggregation of micro-transactions between "lay actors" 
or "ordinary members of society" it is clear enough that it is ill-equipped to offer a 
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theory of collective action (this requiring explanation in terms of common interests 
shared by members of social groupings occupying the same basic "situation" or 
"circumstances" in society). After all, having reduced society to an aggregation or 
repetition of micro- transactions, social action theory can provide no coherent account 
of contradictory social interests which may motivate collaborative projects of societal 
replication or transformation, and nor can it grasp the specific social powers (i. e. 
"structural capacities") which members of different collectivities may draw upon 
during their mutual interaction, and which shape the trajectory of their interaction. 
This "relational individualismi93 in which contemporary social action theorists 
trade furthermore seems to undermine the warranty of stratifying the "interaction 
order" on the basis of the differing degrees of power which actors can mobilise in 
pursuit of their interests in the course of their daily institutional doings. Social action 
theorists do often recognise that the role-ensemble of society is populated by macro 
actors as well as micro actors (e. g. Berger and Luckmann's observation that some 
actors wield "bigger sticks" than others), 94 but they logically cannot theorise why this 
is the case, since at the very least this requires an explanation of how or why the daily 
"renegotiation" of social reality by micro-actors always yields a recurrent 
"institutional pattern" whereby particular individuals remain in control of resources 
denied to others which allow their decisions to "stretch widely in space and time. "95 
As Mouzelis rightly points out, the basic assumption underlying micro sociology (that 
all social phenomena "are made up of aggregations and repetitions of many ... micro- 
events")96 ensures that its practitioners cannot grasp "role-play" as energised by 
hierarchical transactions in which those decisions taken at the top of institutions 
subsume those taken by subordinates at lower levels. 
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For instance, meso encounters between junior managers of some particular 
organisation may be hierarchically connected with encounters of employees 
lower down in the organisational hierarchy, as well as with the macro 
transactions of senior managers.... The latter interactions (which do not 
necessarily entail many actors but rather powerful ones) are certainly no 
mere aggregates of those played lower down in the organisational hierarchy 
... since 
decisions taken at the top tend to become the value premises that 
those in subordinate positions have to consider when they take their own, 
more limited decisions. 7 
In fact the hierarchical ordering of institutional encounters in society can be 
explained only by referring the role-array to inter-agential relationships governing the 
reproduction of asymmetrical distributions of economic, political and cultural goods 
which confront interactants as emergent structures. For unless the "interaction order" 
is treated as comprised of social agents and role-actors it is unclear how the analyst 
can avoid regurgitating "functionalist" explanations of stratification which portray the 
ranking of institutional roles as corresponding to "common values" and determined by 
their respective contributions to the "needs" of society. 
The second reason for social action theory's relative neglect of collective agency 
(and social agents) is no less difficult to comprehend. Where "interaction" or "praxis" 
in the here and now is held to be constitutive of all things social and cultural, it is 
inevitable that the agential dimension of society -must be confined to a nebulous or 
peripheral role in social analysis. This is because the category of "social agency" 
refers us to "collectivities" of individuals sharing interests, social capacities and life- 
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chances in common (by dint of the positioning of these groupings vis-ä-vis various 
distributions of resources and the relationships of domination and subordination 
which pertain between them) which are causally efficacious in shaping the attitudes 
and conduct of people irrespective of their activity or interests as rule-governed role- 
incumbents or social practitioners. Now it is obvious that social agency can bring 
about macroscopic structural change in a way beyond the reach of role actors, not 
least because actors are forced to operate within the constraints of their institutional 
roles or "praxes", whereas agents may operate collectively on the basis of broader 
social and human interests which are not "hemmed in" by narrow sectional 
obligations or rules. 
It is, of course, for this reason that it is possible to talk of "social movements", 
which are precisely concerned with modifying or transforming overall social 
structures, not with tinkering with particular institutional rule-role sets. Thus, where 
actors and agents are conflated, or where the latter is collapsed into the former, this 
inevitably gives rise to an inherently partial view of interaction and a relatively static 
picture of social life, since reference to institutions and role-play neglects important 
sources of conflict or social malintegration (e. g. stratification by class, gender or 
ethnicity, the struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors, etc. ) and directs 
attention instead towards the functions of social organisations and institutional roles. 
Lacking an account of inter-agential incompatibilities or antagonistic interests, as 
these are predetermined by pre-structured asymmetries of resources, social action 
theorists consequently often find themselves drawn into the impasse of opting for a 
consensus model of society and attendant demonisation of social disorder. 
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For example, this subsumption of social agency under institutional role-action 
explains why Berger's and Kellner's famous analysis of the institution of marriage 
abstracts from it those realities of gender inequality and oppression which ensure that 
it cannot be portrayed simply as a "partnership" in which the participants "construct 
not only present reality but ... past reality as well, fabricating a common memory ... 
project[ing] the future in accordance with this maritally defined identity. "98 More 
frequently, however, this understratified view of the "interaction order" encourages 
action theorists to account for conflict by making their appeal to "institutional 
imperfectations" generated by the plurality of functions which constitute societal 
organisation (e. g. as is recommended by Berger and Luckmann in their more "radical" 
moments) 99 Yet this strategy is indefensible, not least because it is unclear why a 
mere differentiation of societal functions should necessarily generate either 
institutional strains or discord between different roles, particularly since the 
"interaction order" is said to be "negotiated" collectively by a community of lay- 
actors. Why, for instance, should the institutional roles of doctor and lawyer generate 
antagonistic values, interests or "sub-universes of meaning"? 
Contra the theoretical logic of social action theory, it is possible to grasp 
institutional strains within the role-array of society only by relating these to agential 
collectivities and agential relations as these are "bounded" within the constraints and 
enablements of an emergent social structure. For example, cut-throat rivalries between 
business firms in the marketplace, and social conflict between managers and workers 
within the business enterprise, do not stem from the "institutional segmentation" of 
functions in the socio-technical division of labour. On the contrary, these forms of 
social malintegration stem from the fact that the business enterprise is inserted within 
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social relations of commodity production which pressurise each unit of capital to "out- 
compete" its rivals under pain of foreclosure, and from the fact that workers and 
capitalists have opposed interests by virtue of the fact they constitute propertyless and 
propertied social groupings with the income of the latter derived from the economic 
exploitation of the former. In this case institutional strains in the economic structure 
of society (e. g. the boom-slump cycle) stem from structural contradictions of the 
capitalist mode of production mediated by antagonistic intra-class and inter-class 
relationships and conflicts. Again, only by distinguishing the "role actor" from the 
"social agent" is it possible to obtain an explanatory purchase on the facts of this 
matter. 
The incapacity of social action theory to account for the origins or indeed 
possibility of the normative rules and institutional roles which characterise a society 
can be illustrated by studying the genesis of particular institutional forms. Consider, 
for instance, the example of trade unions. Given that social agency is regarded by 
action theorists as interchangeable with social action, and given that social action is 
regarded as "rule-governed" or "rule-following" role-action (by definition within an 
institutional set-up), it has to be admitted that it is entirely mysterious how trade 
unions could ever have come into existence. After all, it seems indisputable that rules 
governing the institutional doings of trade unions cannot explain the social 
interactions which brought these into being since such rules can emerge only from the 
fact of trade union organisation itself. In other words, as emergent properties of the 
formation of trade union organisation, "rules applicable to them would only actually 
be involved after they had been formed. "loo 
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This argument has a more general application. Consider the example of the 
origins and subsequent development of the British welfare state outlined earlier. What 
were the normative "rules" which governed or underwrote its emergence? Certainly 
the emergence of the welfare state was constrained and enabled by pre-existent legal 
and cultural norms (as were trade unions). But these "rules" were secondary to the 
fundamental objectives of welfare reform (stabilising the social order, "gentling" the 
masses, improving the efficiency and exploitability of labour, etc. ). Furthermore such 
rules of "doing welfare" were in any case developed ex post by the trial-and-error 
practical exigencies of developing a welfare system and social policy worthy of the 
name. Once again, as in the case of trade unions, explanations of social interaction in 
terms of rule-governed role-action cannot here account for how the "rules" of "doing 
welfare" were ever articulated (these were after all the products of social interaction! ) 
or why social groups were ever motivated to formulate these "rules" in the first place. 
Explanations of social interaction solely in terms of role-action, in short, appear to be 
tautological, presupposing that which they are supposed to explain. This crucial 
failing of role-theory reveals yet again the need to root social actors in an anterior 
interactional context (i. e. the agential collectivities into which they are born) if social 
causes are to be found for new institutional forms. For it is the agential location of 
individuals in hierarchical social relations which furnishes them with social interests 
(as determined by the differential life-chances and respective degrees of autonomy 
and control in society which pertain to the members of the collectivity of which they 
belong) in articulating or defending certain forms of institutional arrangements. And it 
is these same agential interests which supply individuals with the motives or reasons 
to act collaboratively in so doing (I will return to this argument shortly). 
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If the concept of "agential interests" (and hence social agency) will suffice to 
supply the hinge which links together institutional structure and social interaction, 
then there appears no good reason why it should not be regarded also as the 
mechanism which explains institutional elaboration (or its absence) in the role- 
ensemble of a society. By contrast social action theory has, of course, never been able 
to explain how or why institutional change occurs in a social system. This is because 
once social interaction is treated as animated by interests which are determined by the 
social roles (and attendant normative expectations) which individuals internalise as 
part of their self-identity, it becomes well-nigh impossible to ground role-change in 
coherent human motives or reasons (rooted in turn in objective interests). 
In other words, once the interests of human agents are defined in terms of the 
roles they adopt from society, and once these roles are regarded as "pre-scripted" by 
normative rules or conventions, it becomes hard to imagine how individuals muster 
the "internal" (personal) and "external" (social) resources to act collectively in the 
modification or even transformation of either the roles they inhabit or the role- 
ensemble of society as a whole. Social interaction becomes trapped in what Archer 
describes as "normative conventionalism, "' 01 whereby individuals have choice as to 
how they impersonate or personify roles, freedom within the constraints of roles, but 
no choice or freedom as to whether they follow or endorse the normative obligations 
associated with roles. The result is, again, a curiously static picture of social life, 
which rides roughshod over the historical fact of ongoing institutional elaboration in 
the role-ensemble of capitalist society, in which "role-clash" is posited as the only 
source of structural and institutional change (but cannot be justified theoretically 
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given the collapse of the human person and personal identity into the social self and 
social identity respectively). 
The lesson to be learned from the failings of social action theory is that, although 
an account of individuals as role-actors does indeed capture certain important features 
of the people which animate social systems, this will not suffice as a general account 
of social interaction. The key error of social action theory lies not in its regard of 
individuals as role-incumbents, tightly circumscribed by normative rules, but in its 
reduction of social agency and human person-hood to role-action. The fact that the 
characteristics which pertain to individuals as members of agential collectivities (e. g. 
underprivilege, poverty, powerlessness, propertyless, exploitation, oppression and 
their opposites) are those which "people acquire involuntaristically and not as roles 
that they occupy through choice"' 02 is what justifies the realist view that social agency 
and role-action are not interchangeable and that the former is interest- governed rather 
than rule-governed or rule-following. 
Margaret Archer makes the point as follows: 
It is defensible ... to view [the properties of agents - i. e. "privilege" and 
"under-privilege" etc. ] as positions rather than roles because of the 
impossibility of specifying any but the fuzziest and most highly contested 
normative expectations associated with them. Whilst systems of social 
stratification, especially rigid and unidimensional ones, may generate roles 
associated with particular strata (such as Brahmin, Nobles or Literati), this is 
contingent to stratification rather than being a necessary and internal feature 
of it. The quintessential features of all stratification systems, namely 
"propertylessness", "powerlessness" and the lack of prestige (together with 
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their opposites), are ... distributions of positions with determinate life 
chances rather than an array of roles with clearly defined normative 
expectations. ' 03 
After all, it is clear enough that individuals (and collectivities of individuals sharing 
the same relationships of domination/exploitation and subordination with other 
agential groups and similar life-chances) may possess interests in common without 
translating these into role-action. The unemployed and poor still have real interests in 
decent jobs and high wages (and, of course, in socialist equality) even where they do 
not "play" or "perform" the "role" of voter, trade unionist, demonstrator, rioter or 
revolutionary activist. 
Most important of all, however (to return to an earlier point), a treatment of 
individuals as role-actors, social agents and human persons ensures that the plain fact 
of institutional elaboration is no longer mysterious. For individuals can now be 
plausibly seen as possessing interests (human and social) which are external to roles 
and which gift them potent reasons or motives for acting collaboratively to modify or 
transform the roles they occupy or are subject to. "Normative conventionalism" can 
thus be circumnavigated where 
Adam as Agent is allowed on the scene. For we become Agents before we 
become Actors. After the Fall, the rest of humanity enters society through 
the maternity ward doors and we immediately acquire the properties of 
Agents through belonging to particular collectivities and sharing their 
privileges or lack of them - as males/females; blacks/whites; 
foreigners/indigenous; middle class/working class.... [T]he "under- 
291 
privileged" confront plenty of exigencies, given their poor life chances, and 
thus have the best of reasons for struggling towards collective organisation 
(unionisation, franchise and civil rights movements, feminism), just as 
privileged Corporate Agents find good reason in protection of their vested 
interests to try to contain or repress the former. In the struggle between them 
... the extant role array undergoes considerable transformation. 
New 
positions get defined under the prompting of promotive interest groups, 
though they will bear the marks of compromise and concession in the course 
of interaction against opposition. Equally the defence of vested interests may 
prompt role changes precisely in order to defend interests themselves (Kings 
will accept any form of constitutionalism in order to remain King - but a 
Constitutional Monarch is a very different role embedded in a much 
modified role-set). In short, the re-grouping of Social Agents provides the 
motor which generates new role-rule sets as some of its unintended 
consequences, thus providing an account of their development in terms of 
non-rule governed action, which is not open to Social Actors as encumbents 
of roles hedged by normative conventions.... Another way of putting it is that 
Agency makes more room for the Actor, who is not condemned to a static 
array of available positions. 
'°4 
By way of illustration of this argument let us reconsider one last time (I promise! ) 
my earlier example of the evolution of the British welfare state and social policy (in 
this case between 1945 and 1951). As we have seen the interactions between the rival 
corporate agents of capital and labour (and between the corporate agents of the 
propertied and the primary agents of the propertyless) led to the rapid post-war 
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construction of a system of universal social and welfare provision. The impact of 
these agential interactions (the regrouping or remodelling aspect of social agency) on 
the role-ensemble of British society was profound. Whole new institutional sectors 
were formed (involving modified rule-role relations). Others were rapidly expanded in 
response to the demands of organised capitalism and greater societal enfranchisement, 
including those associated with teaching, the medical profession, social work, as well 
as more "mundane" occupations concerned with ancillary and clerical functions. Can 
it seriously be doubted that the dynamic of social agency provided here the stimulus 
for institutional remodelling, in the absence of which it would not have taken place? 
More generally, of course, unless one regards the social roles which comprise the 
institutional structure of society as overdetermined by dynamic processes of agential 
regrouping, it is difficult to explain the higher or lower levels of income, autonomy, 
"elasticity" and prestige which correspond to different occupational roles (other than 
by resorting to functionalist-type accounts of "societal needs"). How else other than in 
terms of agential dynamics, for instance, can the modification (by means of state 
intervention) of the formerly arbitrary and draconian powers of the capitalist 
entrepreneur over his workers be explained? How else, other than in terms of the 
differential agential origins and history of vocational groups, do we account for the 
differing fortunes (in terms of income, job security and working conditions) of the 
legal and medical professions on the one hand and the teaching and social work 
professions on the other? Without an anchorage in anterior agential interaction such 
social phenomena are placed beyond the ken of sociological explanation. 
A final major strength of drawing an analytical and temporal distinction between 
social agency and role-action (both of which are nonetheless social aspects of the 
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individual's life-process), and between interest-related and role-governed social 
interaction, is that it allows the theorist to furnish a major part of the explanation of 
why persons select the roles they do from society without departing company from 
interest-explanation. Again social action theory is unable to do this, because having 
identified reasons with interests and interests with roles (and the normative rules 
connected to them), it has to assume that "the initial choice [made by individuals] of a 
[role] position is contractarian, a contract which it is non-rational to enter in prospect 
but which can be rational in retrospect or rationally corrected" (because individuals 
cannot have a reason to adopt a role and attendant social identity if they possess "no 
prior interests upon which reasons can work"). 105 In sharp contrast to this kind of 
approach, the realist stratification of the "interaction order" into its differentiative 
dimensions allows the analyst to account for why persons select their social roles from 
within a (greater or lesser) range of institutional options in terms of the social 
interests they inherit at birth by simply being a member of a particular agential 
collectivity. 
From this perspective, the agential contexts into which individuals are inserted 
(class, ethnicity, gender, etc. ) will determine the differential "opportunity costs" 
(constraints and enablements - material and cultural) attached to pursuing different 
kinds of social position (or positions) within the institutional sector of society, and 
hence furnish persons with rational motives for restricting their initial role-choices 
(and those corrected by experience) to that part of the role-ensemble which appears to 
be within reasonable reach. Urban working class blacks, for example, are not likely to 
"achieve" the role of barrister or high court judge, given the reality of discrimination 
by class and ethnicity and economic and cultural subordination, and so are unlikely to 
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regard the pursuit of such roles as a sensible "career" option. On this basis, and from 
this starting point, a complete or fully satisfactory account of why individuals select 
the specific social roles they do from within those areas of the role-ensemble which 
are accessible to them can be constructed by analysing those additional social, 
personal, biographical and psychological factors which might "bring the residual 
contractual element [of role-selection] into the area of sensible choice". 106 Committed 
socialists and Black Nationalists, for instance, are not likely to apply to join the police 
force, given the facts of their personal identity, irrespective of whether such a "career- 
move" is within reasonable reach. Such an option is available only to those in 
possession of what Theodor Adorno once described as the "authoritarian personality". 
3.4: SELF, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY: A 
STRATIFIED MODEL OF PEOPLE 
The foregoing argument indicates the need to anchor the role-actor not only in the 
social agent but also in the human person. In practice this means that a distinction has 
to be drawn between personal identity and social identity. A distinction should also be 
drawn between the human being and the human person, between human nature and 
the human subject, or between mind (or consciousness) and self, with the latter being 
conceived as emergent from the interface between organism and environment 
(because it is from human self-consciousness or self-awareness that both personal and 
social identity are emergent). Again the necessity of distinguishing analytically and 
factually between mind, self, personal identity and social identity is best demonstrated 
by reminding ourselves of the conceptual weaknesses which have befallen those social 
action perspectives (especially those associated with "high" symbolic interactionism 
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and social constructionism) which have been most explicit in collapsing the first three 
strata into the last. What are the relevant arguments here? 
I have suggested that "over-social" views of the individual fail for four basic 
reasons. Firstly the existence of self-consciousness cannot be seen as dependent on 
social interaction (e. g. G. H. Mead's children's play and dialogic speech-acts), because 
an antecedently existing self has to be postulated to explain the possibility of cultural 
learning and the ability of infants to acquire linguistic concepts and to self-objectify in 
their play. Secondly the self cannot be seen as synonymous with the properties of 
personal and social identity, since a precondition of individuals engaging in the 
"presentation of self in everyday life", or initiating "frontstage and backstage 
performances" of self, is the a priori existence of a self which is precisely capable of 
"self-negotiation", "self-monitoring" and "self-presentation". Finally personal identity 
cannot be treated as synonymous with social identity, least of all with self- 
presentation (i. e. the self as a reflected identity forged by "labelling" or "societal 
reaction"), for it is a matter of empirical fact that individuals do somehow summon 
the "internal resources" to resist the definitions or expectations of society or social 
group, whilst it seems uncontentious that a distinction has to be made between the self 
which is "self-presented" and the self which does the "self-presenting". 
The only solution to the antinomies of symbolic interactionism's and social 
constructionism's theory of "mind, self and interaction" is to make out a case for five 
basic claims. The first argument I would like to make is that mind or consciousness is 
a natural capacity of humanity's species-being (dependent upon the psycho-organic 
organisation of human beings and generated historically through processes of natural 
selection) whose contents are not exclusively social or cultural. My second argument 
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is that self-consciousness has a naturalistic foundation since it is emergent from the 
interchange between organism and environment. In practice this means that self or 
subject should be identified with Mead's "I" (not his "me"), and hence freed from 
dependence on society, culture and language. My third argument is that Mead's 
conception of the "me" (the individual's capacity to see himself or herself as an object 
for another person and later the social group to which he or she belongs), far from 
being constitutive of the "I-not me" distinction, should be regarded instead as a socio- 
cultural and linguistic articulation, refinement or development of the self. From this 
point of view, the "I and the "me" (or the "I-not me" dialectic of the self) stands for 
the individual's sense or feeling of unitary subjectivity, i. e. his or her sense of bodily 
and spiritual continuity in and relative autonomy from the world, whereas the 
Meadian conception of the "me" represents the translation and transformation of self- 
awareness into personal identity. 
The fourth argument I would like to make is that personal identity is emergent 
from the interface between self-conscious subjects and their social and material 
environment, comprises social and non-social dimensions, and is the source of the 
capacity of human persons to resist those socio-cultural definitions or expectations 
(i. e. processes of "societal reaction" or "labelling") which the "Generalised Other" or 
"significant others" would impose on them during ongoing social interaction. My 
final argument is that the "looking glass self', the self as a matter of situational 
definition, the self that is identified with the roles which the individual internalises as 
his or her own and with the "masks" which (s)he dons and doffs in different 
institutional contexts, refers us not to personal identity but to social identity. The 
function of the distinction between personal and social identity is not therefore to 
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differentiate between the naturalistic and social sources of the self but to give 
theoretical content to the common-sense (and intuitively correct) notion that the self- 
identity of individuals comprises relatively stable and enduring properties as well as 
more ephemeral or situational ones. Such a distinction is necessary, furthermore, not 
simply in order to explain the distance between self-identity and self-presentation, 
between substance and image, but also in order to explain the self-evident fact that 
self-identity simply cannot be arbitrarily redefined or reconstructed every time an 
individual comes within hailing distance of the "attitudes" or "reactions" of those who 
inhabit the various institutional contexts he or she inhabits. 
The naturalistic foundations of human consciousness 
The necessity of the analyst to grasp human consciousness naturalistically (i. e. as a 
property of the organism and as requiring no social referent or locus) may be 
demonstrated by briefly reminding ourselves of the basic philosophical difficulties 
which have undermined sociological accounts of mind (which see consciousness as an 
abstract potential of the brain but necessarily dependent on culture to emerge). Two 
key difficulties spring to mind here which are worthy of note. Firstly it appears 
contentious that "society" or "culture" or "language" be held as necessary 
enablements of a "recognisably" or "distinctively" human consciousness. This is 
because accepting this position places human beings below the level of many animal 
species, whose members do apparently possess sufficient consciousness (and 
continuity of consciousness) to make enduring elementary distinctions in the object- 
world during the experiential flow of their life-cycle, and who do utilise their 
interactional experiences with physical nature in a way which allows them to engage 
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in elementary learning processes. More concretely, this position paradoxically places 
human beings below their nearest primate relatives (chimpanzees, pygmy chimps, 
gorillas and orang-utans), since these are all animal species whose members appear 
capable of a degree of pre planning in their dealings with each other and with the 
"significant objects" (e. g. foodstuffs, natural enemies, etc. ) which populate their 
environment. 
Thus if it is true that "[t]here are no pre-existing ideas ... and nothing is distinct 
before the appearance of language"107 (i. e. if there is really no "rational" or coherent 
cognitive process prior to enculturation), it is certain that "animals would be unable to 
hunt, cats would not find their way home, chimps would not engage in primitive tool- 
use, and infants would not acquire language. " 108 Although it is undoubtedly the case 
that the pre-social capacity of the human mind to make "logico-rational" distinctions 
in the object-world and to plot or initiate intentional conduct is not at all synonymous 
with cultural and linguistic "constructions" of reality, it is equally certain that the 
former must be prior to and enabling of the latter. All too often, it seems, sociological 
imperialists "confuse the capacities of the (human) mind with its (social) contents. "109 
The naturalistic components of consciousness emergent from human neurobiology 
cannot so easily be disposed of. 
Secondly, nor is it true that processes of dialogic communication or signification 
transform human consciousness into a fully cultural consciousness (by intervening 
between individual thought and external reality), thereby excluding other mediating 
influences (i. e. non-discursive social relations and non-social experiences) from 
impacting upon individual thought and activity. If this were indeed the case there 
would be no possibility of cultural or linguistic change or reform, since neither social 
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nor natural reality could function here to stimulate or motivate redefinitions of given 
situations or objects by contradicting or challenging established symbolic 
representations or constructions of these. If the simple fact that pre-linguistic children 
can be socialised into culture shows that the causal powers of intentionality, 
abstraction and reasoning power, possessed by all competent human infants, simply 
cannot be a gift of culture (however great a role cultural factors have played in the 
evolution of the human brain or in enhancing the intellectual powers of concretely 
situated individuals), then equally the plain fact that (for instance) "politically correct" 
controversies over appropriate language-use can ever arise evidences that the cultural 
contents of individual thought (as these are expressed in linguistic signifiers) are 
conditioned to a large extent by non-discursive experiences of non-cultural "objects". 
After all, if the contents of human consciousness are drawn exclusively from the 
"inherited store" of signifiers or symbols contained in a culture, and if these symbols 
or signifiers impose order or meaning on social and physical reality, it is difficult to 
imagine not so much how but why individuals are moved or impelled to reinvent or 
redefine the meanings of their material situations and social relations. To explain 
cultural and linguistic change, in other words, it is necessary to refer to changes or 
developments outside culture or language. For example, until recently, established 
linguistic practice in academia and literature entailed the generic use of "man", 
"mankind" and "he" when referring to all things human. Since the late 1970s, 
however, this has changed very rapidly, with "(s)he" or "he/she" or "she/he" being 
substituted for "he", "people" for "men", and "humankind" or "humanity" for 
"mankind. As John Molyneux rightly observes, this development "was possible 
because this particular linguistic reform was a product of a real movement and a real 
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change in the consciousness of millions of women and men which in turn arose from 
real changes in material conditions and social relations (the influx of women into paid 
employment, higher education and the professions, the pill, abortion rights). "' 10 But if 
non-discursive or extra-cultural "social objects" are causally efficacious in shaping 
human consciousness (as for instance the social situation of propertylessness 
conditions the thinking of the propertyless poor), what is the warranty of denying that 
non-social relations with the material objects and processes of physical nature can do 
the same? 
The fact that the contents of mind are not exclusively social or mediated 
culturally is not difficult to demonstrate. For example, it is (or should be) 
uncontroversial to believe that exposure to, say, the English winter climate will 
normally ensure that individuals respond by wrapping up warmly and/or turning on 
their heating appliances. One would expect the opposite behaviour during the warm 
summer months. Here non-social interaction with physical reality (the impact of the 
weather on the human body) furnishes individuals with pressing interests and hence 
good reasons to respond in the appropriate or rational ways (to avoid overheating or 
overcooling). It is of no avail to appeal to the "socialisation" or "cultural tradition" to 
explain the facts of this matter. For if cultural "rules" do exist which govern these 
kinds of behaviour, these can be explained only in terms of physiological signification 
and bodily interaction with nature. In any case, socialisation or cultural learning is 
dispensable in these situations (even if it remains useful or desirable). Lest parents 
neglect to inform their young offspring of the lamentable consequences of 
inappropriate clothing in specific weather conditions, physical reality will itself teach 
them the lesson in due course! Clearly non-social relations with the natural world do 
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have an important input into the contents of human consciousness and into certain 
forms of social behaviour. 
What applies to the relationship between individuals and nature applies equally to 
the interface between culture and nature. One would, for instance, have to be blind not 
to notice the profound impact of the physical environment upon, say, the cultural 
traditions and economic relations of the aboriginals of the Australian outback. Nor 
will it suffice to undermine the above observation by arguing that "primitive" 
societies are "closer to nature" than modem ones, or that the latter have emancipated 
their cultural structures and social relations from any kind of "determination" 
(however loose) by physical circumstances. Socio-cultural practices and structures are 
always anchored in human biology, itself a power of nature, of nature acting upon 
nature, whereas the greater "autonomy" of industrial societies from the natural world 
is itself a function of a closer approximation here of cultural knowledge to material 
reality -that is, of a closer relationship between culture and nature. 
' 11 
Not only are sociological accounts of consciousness entirely unsuccessful they 
are also entirely superfluous. In recent years developments in neuro-biology and Al 
(the study of computers) have allowed philosophers to develop anti-reductive 
materialist theories of consciousness which have managed to avoid the twin pitfalls of 
mechanical determinism and idealist irrationalism (or the unstable combination of the 
two in Cartesian dualism). The most interesting and ingenious of these attempts to 
overcome "the mind-body problem" has undoubtedly been provided by the American 
philosopher of mind Daniel C. Dennett. 
12 A brief exposition and defence of his 
arguments should therefore suffice to make the case for endorsing a naturalistic 
account of consciousness. 
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Dennett's recent work has been concerned with developing two complementary 
theoretical approaches to the study of mind. The first of these is his "synchronic 
model" of consciousness, which seeks to reconcile his view of mind "as a natural 
phenomena whose activities are continuous with those of the physical world" with his 
corresponding view that "human beings are `intentional systems' whose behaviour 
cannot be explained without ascribing to them beliefs, desires and other mental 
states. "' 13 The second is his "diachronic model" of consciousness, which seeks to 
anchor the historical origins of mind in purposeless mechanical biological evolution 
(defined by him as an "algorithmic process"), from which consciousness has arisen 
from unconscious then semi-conscious organic matter in a sequence of developmental 
stages. 
Now Dennett's "synchronic model" of mind is designed to illuminate the 
irreducibility of "mental states" to "physical states" without making appeal to 
Descartes' mysterious "mind stuff" (a disembodied essence lurking somewhere in the 
brain which is the author of self and intentionality). The centrepiece of his argument is 
that just as a digital computer is best understood as an assemblage of constituent sub- 
systems, "each of which undertakes tasks which require less intelligence than those of 
the computer as a whole, and each of which is in turn composed of progressively 
smaller and less intelligent sub-systems ", 1 14 so it is that the human mind functions in 
the same basic way. 115 In other words, like the computer, the human mind is for 
Dennett a composite structure of "homunculi" (little men), in which the "highest level 
design breaks down ... into a committee or army of intelligent homunculi with 
purposes, information and strategies", and in which each of the "intelligent 
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homunculus" is organised "into smaller ... less clever homunculi. "116 Dennett 
summarises this argument as follows: 
In an organism with genuine intentionality - such as yourself - there are, 
right now, many parts, and some of these parts exhibit a sort of semi- 
intentionality, or mere as if intentionality, or pseudo- intentionality - call it 
what you like - and your genuine, full-fledged intentionality is in fact the 
product (with no further miracle ingredients) of the activities of all the semi- 
minded and mindless bits that make you up... That is what a mind is - not a 
miracle machine, but a huge semi-designed, self-redesigning amalgam of 
smaller machines, each with its own design history, each playing its own role 
in the "economy of the soul". 117 
The point of this argument is to provide an explanation of how "all the 
complexity and richness of human mental life ... can somehow emerge from brute, 
mindless matter" which has assumed a particular level and complexity of 
organisation. "The analogy of the computer, composed of progressively less 
intelligent sub-systems, shows that there is no sharp dividing line between mind and 
matter but a series of continuous gradations which blur this distinction. "8 "Mind" or 
"consciousness" emerges, from this point of view, where the inherently and radically 
decentred hardware of the brain and central nervous system (each part of which has its 
own separate "design history") becomes "yoked together" in "common cause", 
thereby "giving their union vastly enhanced powers, "119 a process dependent upon the 
long historical interface between organism, environment and (latterly) culture during 
the formative years of modern homo sapiens. 
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It follows from these arguments that "mind" is not the gift of some kind of 
cosmic super-subject (the "soul" residing behind the physical circuits of the machine- 
organism). Nor is it the product of any specific area or "special centre" of the brain (as 
is argued by a school of thought Dennett describes as "Cartesian materialism"). 120 
And nor is it the "simple effect" of the physical structure of the brain and nervous 
system as a whole. On the contrary, mind constitutes the "virtual capture" of the 
brain's "parallel multi-track processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory 
inputs" from "outsider sources" by a "higher level design" (the "Joycean machine" as 
Dennett calls it) 121 which subsumes the lower-order strata and processes from which it 
has emerged. This means that conscious thought does not reduce to "brain states" 
because mind is precisely that which organises a flux of "simultaneously active 
channels of operation" and accompanying "varieties of perception ... or mental 
activity" into a serialised "stream of consciousness". 122 
The purpose of Dennett's "diachronic model" of mind is simply to account for the 
historical basis of the "stream of consciousness" emergent from mindless organic 
matter. Whereas in Brainstorms and Consciousness Explained Dennett "uses AI to 
help offer a static analysis of how human brains as they exist now, as organs of a 
certain living species, perform certain complex mental functions", 123 in his Darwin's 
Dangerous Idea he has constructed a natural history of mind which traces "the gradual 
accretion, over billions of years, of the sort of Design - of functionality and 
purposiveness - that can support an intentional interpretation of the activities of 
organisms (the `doings' of 'agents '). 9)124 As Dennett rightly argues, given certain 
"basic premises" or "general conditions" specified by Darwin's theory of evolution 
(most notably "resource stress", "the struggle for existence", random genetic 
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variability within populations of organisms, "the strong principle of inheritance", and 
the concept of "differential reproductive fitness" of specific genetic structures), "' it is 
reasonable to postulate consciousness as the end product of a particular evolutionary 
sequence of natural selection. From this point of view "mind appears historically 
through a succession of steps along a continuum, in which intentionality gradually 
appears in forms which (relative to the final step) appear crude and stupid. "126 
Now I will not dwell here on the reasons this mode of adaptation was set in 
motion: suffice to say that such genetic traits were selected because they enhanced the 
behavioural flexibility of human beings and their hominid forebears, allowing them to 
escape dependence on a narrow range of habitats. For current purposes it is enough to 
make the point that Dennett has articulated a formidable challenge to theological 
notions of teleology in nature ("[g]ive me ... regularity - the mere purposeless, 
mindless, pointless regularity of physics - and I will show you a process that 
eventually will yield products that exhibit not just regularity but purposive design") 127 
and idealist appeals to "skyhooks" or "mind-first" principles128 (which descend to 
earth from nowhere to account for the strata which support them) without lapsing into 
the crudities of "central state materialism" 
Consciousness, self and self-identity 
Of course, whilst many contemporary sociologists would endorse my claim that 
human intelligence and reasoning power be gifted a biological foundation and 
naturalistic genesis (on the grounds that the living human body is pre-social and that 
human consciousness is emergent from the physical structure of the human brain as 
this has undergone evolutionary elaboration in interaction with nature and culture), 
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much controversy continues to surround my corresponding belief that human self- 
consciousness or self-awareness (i. e. the "locus" or "centre" around which personal 
identity and social identity is constructed) be equally gifted a naturalistic foundation. 
Indeed, whereas philosophers are divided on the question of the genesis of the human 
subject and his/her relationship to social process and social relations, sociologists 
have (as we have seen) tended to be dismissive of any notion of the pre-social and 
extra-social self, preferring instead to regard human self-consciousness as either the 
product of anterior socio-cultural structures or as forged in the process of daily social 
interaction, ongoing social "practices", or the free play of "discourse" or "language 
games". 
Contra sociological imperialism, however, a concept of self, relatively 
independent of socio-cultural determinants or conditioning pressures, is absolutely 
indispensable if the theorist is to even begin the job of explaining society and social 
change. The first step towards demonstrating that this is indeed the case involves 
specifying the dependence of social relations on properties of self-consciousness and 
personal identity. Margaret Archer explains: 
Justification of the above ... consists 
in specifying what properties define a 
human person and demonstrating that these same properties are necessary 
conditions of social life itself. Such a defining feature has appeared to many 
to be the continuity of consciousness. The idea that a person is something 
which is aware of its persistence and progress through time is thus to 
advance the continuity of consciousness as part of what we mean by personal 
identity. This continuous sense of self is ... the indispensable contribution 
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which our humanity makes to our social life. For unless there are persons 
who know themselves to be continuous over time, who work as self- 
persisting recorders, then nothing would prompt the attempt to survive in 
society, and likewise nothing would secure the survival of society. Survival 
itself would not be on the agenda. Though it is otiose, perhaps it makes 
matters more graphic to stress that activities which take place over time, like 
reflecting or acting themselves, as well as prudence and deferred 
gratification, strategic intervention, planning or hoping all depend upon a 
continuous sense of self. This being the case, then those collective and 
individual actions of actors and agents who do things like acknowledging 
their vested interests, weighing these interests against one another and 
weighing them against their values, would not enter the picture. The same 
goes for becoming members of social movements and for personifying roles 
in particularistic ways. In all these cases, unless there is self-awareness that it 
is the same self who has interests upon which constraints and enablements 
impinge and that how they react today will affect what interests they have 
tomorrow, then questions about the meaning and explanation of social action 
never arise. 129 
Thus, in order to explain how persons appropriate role-expectations and 
responsibilities from the institutional sector of society, act in the light of social 
interests and cultural values, and construct for themselves personal and social 
identities, it is necessary for them to have a sense of self (logically anterior to their 
social interaction) which recognises that these are consistently applicable to them 
irrespective of time or place. In other words, the individual has to be attributed 
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sufficient powers of self-reflection to define his or her experiences and projects as 
belonging to or as initiated by the same person over time if (s)he is to be deemed 
capable of meeting his or her social obligations and taking responsibility for his or her 
social activity. Without this continuous sense of self, social obligations and 
expectations could never impinge upon individuals, because they would not be the 
kind of beings capable of recognising them as such. 
For example, unless the incumbent of an institutional role is self-aware of his or 
her continuity as a distinct individual over time there is nothing which can ensure that 
he or she will be capable of recognising that the rules and obligations attached to a 
role are as much applicable to his or her activities in the future as they are in the 
present or have been in the past. Furthermore, unless one takes as given the existence 
of a continuous sense of self, irreducible to social interaction, it becomes difficult to 
see how e. g. role-clash in the institutional sector of society is even possible. For 
"[u]nless a person has a sufficiently continuous sense of self to recognise that both 
roles are theirs and that performing the two will mean confronting their 
incompatibility sooner or later, then there is neither a personal dilemma nor any social 
impetus to avoid the impasse (by resigning, reinterpreting etc. ). s130 
The purpose of the above argument is to suggest that human self-consciousness 
or self-awareness is not only irreducible to social relations or social process but is also 
basic or primitive to social life generally. It is, of course, this latter assertion which is 
normally treated with the greatest scepticism by those who would endorse some or 
other version of the "oversocial" or "oversocialised" view of individuals. Many 
sociologists would perhaps attest to the view that a continuous sense of self-identity is 
indeed a necessary condition of role-action and agential action, and that a useful 
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distinction between personal identity and social identity can be drawn, and yet insist 
that this sense of self is nonetheless a gift of society and culture (i. e. the product of 
primary socialisation or the earliest social interactions of the human infant). From this 
point of view, although symbolic culture and complex social organisation presuppose 
human beings in possession of a sense of self, a defence of the social roots of self- 
awareness can nonetheless still be made by claiming that primary socialisation 
functions to transform "indeterminate organisms" into selves who subsequently play 
their part in reproducing society or culture. Such socio-cultural reductionism fails, 
however, and for four basic reasons. I will address each of these in turn. 
Firstly it is obvious enough that a necessary precondition of human socialisation 
and cultural learning getting started at all is the existence of a particular kind of 
animal organism (the living human body as the repository of certain natural causal 
powers and tendencies) which is already capable of making elementary classifications 
or "rudimentary distinctions in the flux of experience", 131 including the primary 
distinction between itself and the environment it inhabits. As we have seen, "to accord 
authority to the social over human thought ultimately depends upon establishing that 
society is essential to the possibility of human thought at all. Yet ... society can enjoy 
no such primacy, for human beings are born into a undifferentiated world such that 
the primary task has to be the differentiation of objects, meaning that the 
distinguishing of social objects cannot be a predicate but only a derivative of a general 
human capacity to make distinctions - including ... the crucial one 
between "myself' 
and the rest of the world. "132 
Equally importantly, before a human being can acquire cultural and linguistic 
concepts of self from the society (s)he inhabits (s)he must first be capable of grasping 
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social concepts and possess enough of a sense of self to regard these as applicable or 
relevant to his or her own life-process. Without this a priori sense of self there can be 
no secure basis or impelling motivation for the cultural articulation of concepts of the 
self, nor for individuals to appropriate specific social definitions of the self as their 
own. For if the latter is to be internalised by people it has to be assumed that humans 
are the kind of beings who possess the need (indeed radical imperative) to articulate 
their sense or feeling of continuity of unitary subjectivity and of the distinction 
between themselves and the world they inhabit. Indeed, if this point is conceded, if it 
has to be admitted that human beings are indeed the repositories of these powers or 
abilities, and are capable of authoring these kinds of initiatives, then why not regard 
them as being the bearers or authors of others? As Ian Craib rightly observes: "The 
subject refuses to lie down. "133 
Secondly, in logical extension of Margaret Archer's argument that it is necessary 
to posit a continuous sense of self to account for the possibility of role and agential 
action, it should count as the decisive rebuttal of purely sociological conceptions of 
subjectivity to point out that one can explain the capacity of pre-linguistic human 
infants (who as yet have not been constituted as social selves) to internalise the 
cultural rules, linguistic norms and appropriate conduct of their native society only by 
accepting that they possess enough of a self (i. e. self-awareness of their own 
continuity in the world) to regard these rules or expectations as being consistently and 
continually applicable to themselves over time. Unless one assumes a priori that self- 
consciousness is anterior or prior to social consciousness, that personal identity is 
more primitive than social identity (and that the latter are emergent from the former), 
it becomes well-nigh impossible to explain how socialisation and cultural learning can 
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ever get off the ground. In other words, to explain how, for instance, G. 1I. 
Mead's social actors or Giddens' social practitioners are capable of 
internalising the collective expectations and norms of the "Generalised Other". 
which precisely allow them to participate in those habitualised or routinised 
practices which reproduce society, it has to be assumed that they do actually 
possess beforehand sufficient properties of subjectivity or self-reflection to 
recognise themselves in the obligations and expectations of the Other. 
Failing this, "the implication for society is that nothing gets done, for 
without selves which sense that responsibilities are their own, and which also 
own expectations, then the latter will have all the force of the complaint that 
`something ought to be done about it. " But this means that "the strongest 
form of socialisation theory ... ultimately cannot work with completely 
indeterminate material: it has to he determinate in this one way at least, that 
of acknowledging itself to he the same being over time. "134 Thus a naturalistic 
conception of human self-consciousness can be verified transcendentally. That 
is, by positing what state of affairs must logically exist in the world (in this case 
a pre-social self) if human society and culture is to be possible at all. 
Thirdly, in recent years research into the mental capacities of many 
species of non-human primates has radically strengthened the case for rejecting 
a sociological explanation of human self-consciousness. This is because such 
studies have uncovered evidence of self amongst certain species of great apes 
and Old World monkeys, which in no plausible sense can he accounted for in 
terms of enculturation, socialisation or language-use within ongoing social 
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relationships (unless one is to count "vocalisation" as "verbalisation" or elementary 
tool-use, social imitation and economic co-operation as "culture"). For example, 
incidents of "tactical deception" amongst baboons, chimpanzees and gorillas are now 
extremely well documented in the relevant literature ("including ... concealment, 
distraction, the creation of misleading indications of intent, and manipulation of 
innocent bystanders"), 135 and these are strongly suggestive of the existence in these 
species of a sense of self. As Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin rightly point out: 
The significance of deception goes well beyond its just being another social tool. 
The agent of deception must have an idea of what response its actions will provoke 
in the target. The agent must be able to put itself in the mind of the agent. In other 
words, in order to practice deception, an individual must have a clearly developed 
sense of self. 136 
Equally significantly, complementary researches into the taught linguistic skills 
of certain apes in captivity (and particularly into the manner of which these apes use 
human language to express their feelings and desires) also appears to be strongly 
indicative of the existence in these species of a sense of self-awareness which 
predates their immersion or integration into symbolic culture. In the words of 
primatologist Patricia Marks Greenfield, "we have demonstrated that a pygmy 
chimpanzee -a species virtually unstudied before from the point of view of language - 
has not only learned, but also invented, grammatical rules that may well be as 
complex as those used by human two-year-old children. "137 But given that purposive 
language-use in human infants is comprehensible only given the presumption that 
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they have already acquired a sense of self (because mastery of linguistic concepts and 
elementary grammar is dependent upon individuals being able to distinguish 
themselves from the object-world and recognise the applicability of linguistic signs 
and rules to themselves over time) it does not seem unreasonable to impute equivalent 
"subjective givens" to the higher non-human primates. Indeed, the capacity of chimps 
and (to a lesser degree) gorillas to learn and use human sign language is particularly 
demonstrative of the existence here of a pre-social self in a slightly different sense. 
This is because these linguistic abilities may be acquired (by means of human 
instruction) by animals whose own sociality is insufficiently developed or refined to 
account for them sociologically, as is proven by the fact that that symbolic language 
use does not arise "spontaneously" or "naturally" in any primate species other than 
human beings. 
Thus when, for instance, the captive chimp Washoe signs "come love hug sorry 
sorry", 138 in response to disapproval by her keepers or teachers at some or other item 
of her behaviour, she is demonstrating that she is capable of putting herself in the head 
of the Other and recognising certain of her emotions and behaviours as her own and 
assuming responsibility for them ("I" have upset "you"; by doing so "I" have upset 
"myself'; "I" must make amends to "you"). Equally when, for example, another 
captive chimp (Kanzi) responds in the appropriate way to complex instructions (such 
as "go to the bathroom" or "pick up the ball and give it to Rose"), 139 what we are 
witnessing here is behaviour which is dependent upon the possession by its progenitor 
of a sense of self. For this is conduct which can be enacted by Kanzi only given his 
own awareness of his own distinctiveness from the world, his own continuity in time 
and space, and his knowledge that the expectations of others apply consistently to 
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himself and not to others ("you" want "me" to go to the bathroom; "I" will go to the 
bathroom). Yet these elementary cognitive elements of self - which explain how 
Washoe and Kanzi can use grammar as competently as two year old human infants - 
pertain to a species whose "natural sociality" does not equip its members for life in 
complex symbolically-mediated relations, and whose sense of self cannot therefore be 
attributed in any plausible way to socio-cultural causes or antecedent conditions. I 
contend that if closely related non-human primates possess an elementary sense of self 
which is primitive or basic to their integration into their natural communities it is 
reasonable to suppose that the same holds true of human beings. 
Thirdly, it seems clear enough that the human body is itself crucial to our 
identification as persons, and this of course is anterior to any specific society or 
culture which human beings inhabit. The human body is, in other words, a pre-social 
source of self-identity. Bodily continuity in the life of an individual is precisely 
required "in order to connect experiences together as part of one consciousness. " 
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This is because the biological or physiological unity of the human body, and the fact 
of its relative autonomy from the rest of organic and inorganic nature, enables and 
indeed impels persons to define themselves as unitary subjects (despite the express 
orders of a certain school of continental philosophy whose practitioners nonetheless 
do generally acknowledge "themselves" as authors of their "own" publications). More 
precisely, given that human beings possess species capacities of intelligence, 
abstraction and reasoning power, it is a necessary function of their possession of 
physical bodies which persist over space and time (and which constitute their 
consciousness) that they interpret or sense themselves as relatively self-subsistent and 
unified selves confronting an external or independent object-world. The genesis of 
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self-consciousness and self-identity cannot then be attributed to "social facts" 
(however these might be conceived). For it is a prerequisite of our enmattered or 
embodied constitution, and of the mental powers which this bodily constitution 
defines, which allows (and perhaps compels) us to imagine our experiences, 
consciousness and the contents of our consciousness as our own property, as 
belonging or pertaining to us and not to others. 
The living human body is a crucial source of this pre-social reflexive self- 
awareness in a slightly different sense. As the bearer of a range of species powers and 
capacities (i. e. consciousness, intelligence, rationality, cultural and linguistic learning, 
etc. ), and as the possessor of certain psycho-organic needs, it would be naive indeed to 
imagine that these biologically-given capacities and needs do not have an important 
input into what individuals become as persons. It is, after all, uncontentious that the 
motivational source of humanity's earliest interactions with nature and society is 
precisely needs-satisfaction (i. e. the baby's demands for nourishment, comfort or 
warmth). Moreover the mechanism by which humanity's natural powers are 
articulated and elaborated is precisely this process of needs-satisfaction, which in 
being set in motion allows individuals to appropriate the properties of the species as 
their "own", that is, as a constituent element of their personal identity. 
This argument does not, of course, add up to the contention that self-identity is 
reducible to human biology, or to the specific genetic makeup of individuals, as 
would be claimed by socio-biologists. Whilst differences in individual "psychology" 
are causally influenced by the unique genetic organisation of living bodies, and whilst 
these genetically influenced variations in the psychic nature of individuals often feed 
in to their definition of themselves as people, it would be quite wrong to regard these 
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as making a fundamental contribution to personal identity. For whereas genetic 
differences might at best be a cause of variations in temperament or emotional 
endowment between individuals, render them more-or-less competent at particular 
social skills, or predispose them towards or against certain sensory experiences (which 
might in turn impact upon the manner of their self-definitions), these are nonetheless 
likely to be a less significant source of personal identity than the experience and 
activity of persons in the material world during their life-cycle. Nonetheless the fact 
that personal identity is forged primarily through interaction with external reality 
should not allow us to lose sight of the fact that "human beings must have a particular 
physical constitution" to be capable of constructing and sustaining enduring personal 
identities. "Even in those cases where the biological may be socially mediated in 
almost every instance or respect, such as child-care, this does not mean that the 
mediated is not biological nor that the physical becomes epiphenomenal.,, 14 1 After all, 
it is a peculiar kind of conceptual blindness which encourages sociologists to insist 
one-sidedly on the social mediation of personal identity without recognising that this 
property of persons is equally and simultaneously mediated by human biology and 
physical nature. 
My argument thus far establishes the need of social theory to endorse Marx's 
belief in the existence of a pre-social human self-awareness in order to explain how 
society and culture (and personal identity and social identity) can be possible at all. 
The fourth and final failing of "oversocialised" and "oversocial" accounts of the 
individual, however, is their refusal to endorse the causal power and explanatory 
salience of what Margaret Archer describes as "those human relations which cannot 
be construed as social relations", 142 yet which shape the personal and social identity of 
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individuals - that is, the extra-social components of self-consciousness. Of course, to 
accept that human beings may have "non-social relations with non-social reality, 
which as part of [their] consciousness is also part of what [they] are as persons"143 is 
complete anathema to those analysts who would insist that all human experience must 
be socially mediated (i. e. through culture and language) and that the social mediation 
of human experience must ensure that an unbridgeable chasm exist between culture 
and nature. But "the things which the self senses ... are not exclusively social 
(nor are 
they only mediated to us through society) "144 And it is these "things" (the 
undifferentiated object-world which the human baby organism initially encounters 
and the structure of material nature within which persons are necessarily immersed 
throughout their lives) which play an important role in conditioning the personal and 
social identities individuals acquire during their biographical life-cycle. 
Again this argument is well made by Margaret Archer: 
[The extra-social self] ... is a necessity which arises out of our embodiedness. 
We are born into a world which comes to us as one made up of 
undifferentiated objects, including people, out of which we gradually have to 
learn to discriminate the social from the non-social. In other words, the 
object/people distinction is an acquired one and we acquire it in that order. 
Not only ... 
is this predicated upon our human capacity for learning such 
distinctions, but crucially upon our surviving long enough to do so! As 
animals, our bodily needs for food, drink and warmth require an immediate 
relation with things that are really nutritious, thirst quenching and warming. 
Survival depends upon these being regularly experienced and therefore these 
experiences cannot wait upon their social definition (instead the basis for 
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signification is physiological) nor upon the recognition that they are socially 
mediated.... In the beginning, the provenance of these necessities is 
irrelevant, i. e. whether or not they do in fact depend upon social provision, or 
divine providence for that matter. Direct interaction with the otherness of 
nature is necessarily prior to being able to distinguish social others: for 
survival, the sequence cannot be the other way round. 
'45 
But, as Archer rightly goes on to argue: 
... 
if we do from our beginnings ... have non-social experiences of non-social 
reality ... then why should we not continue 
to do so for the rest of our lives? 
Hunger, thirst and discomfort may be our first prompts to extra-social 
exchanges with nature, but there is also Marx's important insight that we are 
committed to continuous practical activity in a material world, where 
subsistence is dependent upon the working relationship between us and 
things, which cannot be reduced to the relations "between the ideas of men". 
In this sense, cumulative experiences of our environment will foster 
propensities, capacities, aversions which sift the social practices we later 
seek or shun, and thus the social identity which we then assume because of 
something we already are as persons. '46 
Now to admit that human beings can and must have non-social experiences of 
non-social reality throughout their lives, and that these experiences shape their social 
identities by defining them as persons, is to do no more or less than concede that 
material reality (as well as society) places constraints and enablements on their 
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activities and thinking, and hence on the manner in which they think about 
themselves. We have already seen that it is entirely reasonable to suppose that non- 
social exchanges with non-social reality are efficacious in shaping the consciousness 
and activity of individuals. How then can it be denied that these "natural relations" 
have an important input into the constitution of an individual's self-identity and social 
identity? 
After all, physical damage or neglect of the human body (which is not at all 
culturally specific) may often retard the development of a "stable" or "balanced" 
personal identity, or indeed damage one that has already been constructed (as is 
evidenced, for example, by the psychological insecurity - or worse - and intense 
unhappiness which often afflicts people who have undergone childhood abuse or 
trauma. Equally, persistent and pleasurable experiences of physical reality (e. g. plenty 
of space, stimulating environmental "things" to experience and manipulate, clean air, 
sunlight, exercise and access to the material goods which ensure physical and mental 
health or well-being, particularly when enjoyed in childhood, will certainly contribute 
to the articulation of a robust self-image in later life. And, more generally, those 
interactions with non-social reality which individuals find rewarding or punitive, 
pleasurable or otherwise, will as we have seen contribute to how they imagine 
themselves as people, which will in turn constrain and enable the kinds of social roles 
and social identities they appropriate from society and personify in particularistic 
ways. For example, an individual who is susceptible to sea-sickness is not likely to 
seek out employment as a deck hand! 
I conclude that it is reasonable to accept that the "I-not me" distinction (the 
individual's self-awareness of his or her own continuity in and relative independence 
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from the world) does not arise specifically from social interaction and is not mediated 
by society and culture alone. But how, then, can self-consciousness be explained? The 
only sensible answer to this question is this: a sense of self must be emergent from 
and mediated by non-social interaction with physical or material reality. As Archer 
rightly points out, it does seem uncontentious that self-consciousness arises because 
the psycho-organic urges or drives of the human infant force him or her into engaging 
in bodily exchanges with the object-world ("the reality of the external world initially 
being established through bodily testing of the food and drink coming to it from 
"outside" which generates an "inner" satisfaction only available from "outsider" 
sources"), being "forged between the [individual's] experiencing of [his or her] own 
organismic needs and inner inability to satisfy them". 
147 On this view, baby organisms 
learn to distinguish themselves from the material environment (which is initially 
experienced as an undifferentiated object-world), and later human infants learn to 
recognise themselves as objects, by confronting the manner in which the physical 
environment operates relatively independently of their own behaviours, providing 
constraints and enablements on the exercise of their desires from "outside", supplying 
the external means to satisfy those elementary bodily needs (e. g. food, drink, warmth, 
comfort, etc. ) which cannot be realised with resort to their internal resources. In 
simpler words, non-social (i. e. bodily) interaction with non-social reality enables and 
impels new-born and developing infants to interpret their experiences in terms of the 
"I-not me" distinction, since it is these interactions which force the human organism 
to confront the fact that the world is not a mere extension of ego or will. 
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Self-objectification from the view of other subjects 
The obvious advantage of the above naturalistic account of self-consciousness over 
treatments of human persons as social selves is that it allows the theorist some kind of 
purchase on how human infants are able to commence along the path of self- 
objectification in the eyes of other persons. Since human infants obtain an elementary 
sense of self by means of non-social exchanges with non-social reality they therefore 
enter into processes of socialisation and cultural learning with precisely those qualities 
of subjectivity which are required to explain their capacity to "take the role of the 
other" and later self-construct personal and social identities. Broadly, the unsocialised 
and pre-linguistic human being is from birth inserted in socio-cultural relations, being 
forced at once to interact with objects and persons as (s)he seeks to satisfy his or her 
desires, learning gradually to differentiate between them not through immersion in or 
exposure to any specific social practice or cultural activity (i. e. Mead's children's play 
and games) but through the different kinds of interaction which are necessarily 
involved when relating to subjects and objects respectively. 
In other words, subjects become distinguished from objects because in practice it 
is impossible for children to relate to them in the same way. Objects do not, of course, 
"act" at all, do not possess human emotions, operate (in so far as they function at all) 
in relatively routine and predictable ways, and are either passively manipulable or 
passively impervious to the child's will. Subjects, by contrast, do "act", do resemble 
the child physically and emotionally, do not function passively or entirely routinely, 
and are neither entirely manipulable nor entirely indifferent to the child's wants. In 
sharper contrast still to objects, subjects exercise will and power over children, offer 
them warmth, comfort and nourishment, and strive to interact or communicate with 
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them. Infants consequently learn through practice and experience that certain 
"objects" (i. e. persons) differ from mere "things". They sense that certain objects 
resemble themselves, possess qualities which are mysterious and awesome and yet not 
dissimilar to their own, act autonomously of themselves and things, and possess 
feelings and will as they do themselves. It is, of course, a short step from here, and 
one as much contingent upon biological maturation as socialisation, for young 
children to subjectively identify themselves with those persons who are a part of the 
everyday landscape of their lives, imaginatively placing themselves in the role of 
these "significant others" during their play, before later acquiring the more impersonal 
roles of the "Generalised Other" as they immerse themselves in co- operative games 
and complex role-play. 
Unlike "over-social" views of persons, in short, the great strength of this realist 
account of the subject is that it is capable of making a meaningful distinction between 
the primary (non-social) and secondary (social) components of self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness has naturalistic roots in human biology (those species powers of 
intelligence, abstraction and reasoning power inherent in the conscious brain which 
allow, indeed impel, individuals to interpret their bodily intercourse with the object- 
world in terms of the "I-not me" differentiation) and non-social interaction with 
material reality (the process by which the conscious brain is forced to confront the 
externality of the world beyond its own embodied self). This elementary pre-social 
and extra-social (but not pre-given) self, forged in the interface between the psycho- 
organic powers and needs of the living body and the object-world, constitutes the 
"core" or "centre" of individual personality, the subject who thinks, self-monitors, 
self- negotiates and initiates innovative and spontaneous action. 
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At the same time, however, the self as a matter of social definition, the self as 
socially and linguistically dependent, is no mere fantasy of the endlessly inventive 
sociological imagination, but is rather a subsequent stage in the cultural and linguistic 
articulation of the self, emerging as individuals translate their sense of unitary 
subjectivity into social concepts of person-hood, self-identity and social identity. Thus 
Mead's "me" (the self as an object for the "community") is indeed as much dependent 
on language-use and social interaction as it is upon the prior existence and subsequent 
development of the causal powers of human nature inherent in the living body. For it 
is uncontentious that "taking the view of the other" requires a context (i. e. society) 
which enables a distinction between subjects and objects to be drawn. And it is 
equally certain that the conceptual appropriation and articulation of self-identity must 
always be expressed in linguistic symbols derived from society and is conditioned by 
social experience. Equally, however, Mead's "me" would be a complete non-starter if 
human beings did not possess properties of self-consciousness both prior and 
supplementary to their construction as social selves. 
Personal identity and social identity 
The social construction of the capacities which Mead identifies with the "me" is also 
an early stage in the individual's self-construction of a personal identity. The 
subsequent articulation by individuals of an enduring personal identity (elaborated 
during the process of their experiential life-cycle) is thus an emergent property of an 
enhanced and developed self-awareness which is characteristic of self-objectification 
from the point of view of other subjects and the "societal community" or "Generalised 
Other". But of what is personal identity constituted? As indicated earlier personal 
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identity has social and non-social components. This is one way in which it may be 
distinguished from social identity, which as the name implies is entirely social in 
content (although it may be negatively influenced by non-social experience). The non- 
social or naturalistic sources of personal identity include those psycho-organic needs 
and capacities of humanity's "species-being" which self-conscious individuals learn 
to recognise as their own property, and also all those personal aversions and 
preferences, emotional dispositions, and physical and mental capacities of individuals, 
co-conditioned by their specific genetic makeup and bodily interaction with material 
reality, which they regard as crucial to their self-perception or self-definition. The 
social sources of personal identity, on the other hand, include those processes of 
primary and secondary socialisation by which individuals acquire social skills with 
which they identify, and the cultural and linguistic concepts by which they express 
and develop these skills, and along with these their self-identities. The social sources 
of personal identity refer us also, once again, to those personal capacities, emotional 
dispositions, sensory likes and dislikes, etc., which individuals regard as definitional 
of "who they are" (in so far as these are conditioned by social experience and 
socialisation), and to those cultural and political values which individuals often 
internalise as their own and actively seek to personify in thought and deed. 
If personal identity is comprised simply of that which the individual recognises 
and endorses as definitional of the kind of subject they are, then of what does social 
identity consist? Social identity is best understood as a kind of "special case" of 
personal identity, a kind of "optional extra" which individuals may or may not acquire 
given the kind of life they lead as members of society. More specifically, social 
identity refers us both to those aspects of self-identity which are invested in the social 
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roles which individuals appropriate from society and self-consciously internalise as 
their own property148 and to the self as presented by the individual in a particular 
interactional or institutional context (under pressure from socio-cultural expectations 
or obligations). Consequently, although all persons possess a personal identity, forged 
by biographical experience and the allegiances, propensities and capacities this 
sponsors, not everyone possesses a social identity. For only those persons who "feel at 
home" in the social roles they have chosen (or have had foisted upon them) can invest 
themselves subjectively in them, whereas those who regard the "attitudes" of the 
Other as plain wrong or worse may not always be prepared to don and doff the masks 
expected of them. Unskilled factory workers, for instance, are unlikely to regard their 
occupational role as an important element of their self-identity, given its monotony 
and low status, preferring instead perhaps to subjectively invest themselves in their 
hobbies or leisure pursuits or political activities. 149 Equally, to offer another example, 
even in the inhospitable political and cultural climate of Nazi Germany, not all 
socialists or anti-racists donned the mask of orthodox or official opinion in their 
everyday dealings, irrespective of the appalling personal risks of not doing so. 
150 
Now there are at least four good reasons why this analytical and factual 
distinction between personal identity and social identity needs to be drawn. The first 
of these is that it allows us to obtain some kind of purchase on the dynamics of "role- 
clash" in the institutional sector of society. Since personal identity relates to those 
experiential processes by which individuals acquire self-knowledge of and assume 
self-responsibility for their human needs and interests, and of their personal capacities 
and wants, it follows that social roles which satisfy neither of these things will foster a 
reappraisal by individuals of their purpose in personifying them, and possibly a 
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subjective or actual withdrawal from them (as these are compared with alternative 
roles or identities). The second important reason why personal and social identity 
ought to be differentiated is that doing so allows us to grasp some of the reasons why 
individuals appropriate certain social roles and attendant social identities but reject 
others. Since personal identity often relates to those social experiences (agential or 
cultural) by which individuals internalise ethical and political values or allegiances, it 
follows also that these will also impact upon the kind of roles or social identities 
which they actively seek or shun. 
The third important reason why personal identity and social identity cannot be 
treated as interchangeable is that it is the former which explains the capacity of 
individuals to resist the latter (i. e. oppose or reject the social "attitudes" and 
"definitions" of "significant others" and the "Generalised Other"). Hence personal 
identity, in so far as it involves self-awareness of human interests, personal capacities 
and cultural and political allegiances, and in so far as it is defined by biographical 
life-experience, does gift individuals the "internal resources" to resist those situational 
processes of "societal reaction" or "labelling" which might adversely subvert or alter 
their self-perceptions or self-definitions. The final major reason why personal identity 
and social identity must be distinguished one from the other is that by doing so we 
allow ourselves to make sense of the fact that the individual does indeed don and doff 
social roles (and with them social identities) without ceasing to be either a subject or 
the same person over time. Personal identity thus enables human beings to function as 
coherent, unified and purposive agents, capable of recognising, articulating and acting 
upon their human and social interests, and in so doing defining and redefining 
themselves as actors. In other words, personal identity, emergent from self- 
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consciousness, is what enables individuals to function as agents and actors, and hence 
reproduce, elaborate or transform structure and interaction alike in pursuit of their 
interests. 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous chapter I developed a materialist theory of the naturalistic foundations 
of social interaction and social structure. Human nature and the individual subject is 
understood here as possessing "determinate" and "structured" properties irreducible to 
the imprint of society which precisely explain the possibility of complex societal 
organisation and history-making. In this chapter I have sought to grasp the 
"interaction order" which rests upon these "microfoundations" and its relationship to 
the organismic-subjective and structural levels of society. In doing so I have sought to 
make out a case for three basic arguments. Firstly social interaction is best understood 
as "somewhat rational" human conduct involving the co- ordination of individual 
activities or those activities of individuals which are necessarily situated in socio- 
cultural relations (in the sense that these relations supply them with resources for 
acting or with reasons for so doing). Secondly the "interaction order" is comprised of 
distinct strata - subjects, agents and actors - with agents and actors "emergent" from 
the organismic and subjective properties of individuals. Finally "interests" (human 
and structural) should be regarded as powering the interface between structure and 
agency. 
The point of my first argument is to synthesise the best elements of the Weberian 
and structuralist traditions of sociological theory and thereby to overcome the key 
weaknesses of each. From this perspective social interaction is authored by rational 
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subjects and is precisely comprehensible and hence capable of being analysed 
objectively because it is "somewhat rational". Yet it is situated in social relations 
which define what is to count as rational social conduct by shaping the "situational 
logics" in which individuals are embroiled and by furnishing them with the ideational 
resources by means of which they make sense of these situations. The point of my 
second argument is to obtain an explanatory purchase on why and how social systems 
are replicated, elaborated or transformed over time. Interaction is the sole "cause" of 
all things social and cultural. But interaction has to be grasped as comprised jointly of 
agential action (i. e. conduct energised by structurally determined inter-agential 
relations and by attendant agential "circumstances" and interests) and role action (i. e. 
conduct which is explainable in terms of the institutional roles or functions which 
individuals select from society) if social analysis is not to regurgitate the errors of 
social action theory (i. e. the neglect of collective action, the overemphasis on social 
integration, the inability to theorise institutional elaboration, the collapse of the 
interaction order into a non-hierarchical flat place of micro transactions, etc. ). From 
this point of view "normative conventionalism" (the tight circumscription of 
interaction by rules attached to institutional roles) can be overcome by grasping 
institutional reproduction and elaboration as powered by the struggles and interests of 
broader collectivities of individuals who are not "hemmed in" by narrow role 
commitments. 
The purpose of my final argument is to show how explanations of social 
interaction in terms of "interests" can be made which avoid the polarities of structural 
determinism and voluntarist idealism. My fundamental claim here is that interests 
cannot be understood in "subjectivist" or "psychologistic" terms, as the random 
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"preferences" of individuals, as is recommended by exponents of the "orthodox 
conception of agents" (so much in vogue by modem rational choice theorists). On the 
contrary, these must be grasped "objectively" as corresponding to the psycho-organic 
needs of humanity's species-being, as these are mediated by the social relations and 
agential collectivities into which individuals are involuntarily deposited at birth. Put 
simply, individuals possess basic human needs which must be fulfilled on a daily 
basis if they are to survive or prosper, and possess therefore human interests in 
ensuring that these needs are met. At the same time, however, the location of 
individuals in social relations and agential collectivities determine both the degree to 
which their human needs are fulfilled or frustrated and the kinds of social strategies or 
practices ("modes of realisation") which they must pursue if they are to safeguard or 
enhance their life-chances. 
It is the interface between human needs and the social "positions" individuals 
occupy in social relations which ensure that the former are translated into agential 
interests (i. e. those social modes of realisation of human interests which correspond to 
agential collectivities as defined by inter-agential relations). Understood thus, and 
translated into the categories of historical materialism, the concept of social labour 
connects human interests and needs to economic structure (the forces of production), 
whilst the concept of class interests connects class structure to class struggle (the 
relations of production), thereby allowing the theorist to postulate a dynamic 
historical account of societal process rooted in their mutual interplay. But why should 
social labour and class agency be "privileged" in this way as the mechanism which 
explains the overall dynamics of social systems? The analysis contained in the next 
chapter will seek to answer this question. 
330 
CHAPTER FOUR 
STRUCTURE, POWER AND 
CONFLICT 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly to outline a realist account of social 
systems which neither reduces structural properties tautologously to some or other 
form of "organised" interaction nor reifies them by gifting them hydraulic powers of 
determination by virtue of which individuals function simply as agents of their 
functional requirements. Secondly to utilise this general model of "structure" or 
"structural properties" to outline a logically coherent and conceptually defensible 
materialist understanding of society or "social system" along the lines outlined and 
defended by Marx and Engels (i. e. one which avoids the twin pitfalls of reductionism 
and determinism, on the one hand, and voluntarism or "spontaneism", on the other 
hand). 
My point in attempting to establish the explanatory power of Marx's structural 
sociology (which doubtless many would find terribly old hat) is that a hierarchical 
model of structural constraints, enablements and impulses (such as that articulated by 
Marx's base-superstructure model of the social system) is the only way to avoid 
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collapsing socio-historical analysis into two unacceptable positions. On the one hand, 
a "cultural focus", which leads directly to the mind-numbing relativism of analytical 
philosophers (such as Winch and the contemporary theorists of post-structuralism and 
the sociology of knowledge), for whom the concepts and practices of a particular 
society cannot be understand outside the socio-historical context of their articulation, 
and for whom the "symbol sphere" or "language" appears to have consumed the 
whole of society. On the other hand, the "orthodox" Weberian view, which denies 
directionality to societal process, and which grasps historical outcomes as the 
radically indeterminate products of a chaotic flux of equivalent causal "factors" (the 
"economic", the "political", the "military", the "cultural", etc. ). 
I take it that both these views are false: the former because it is an implausible 
species of reductionism which leads to the wildest form of idealism (and furthermore 
renders sociological analysis a non-starter); the latter because it is refuted by the plain 
fact that it is possible to speak of "development" or "evolution" in historical process, 
and because societies are relational and cannot therefore be disarticulated into 
autonomous elements or spheres of activity or power. This being the case, my 
argument is that Marx's analytical distinction between structure and superstructure, 
properly understood, offers the theoretical tools to achieve two important ends. Firstly 
to avoid collapsing society into an "undifferentiated totality" without departing from 
the view that society is a system (not a fluid combinatory of autonomous practices, 
institutions or modes of social action). Secondly to grasp history as "progress" and as 
"totality" in the sense of possessing an "inner logic" which imparts to it a "vertical" 
directionality by virtue of which it can be grasped as a whole. Before embarking upon 
these tasks, however, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the concept of 
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"structure", the relationship between "structure" and "culture", and the manner of 
which structures shape social interaction and human agency. 
4.1: STRUCTURE AND CULTURE IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
The concept of social structure has a long pedigree in the social sciences. Explicitly or 
implicitly, overtly or covertly, the idea of social structure has been central to most 
schools of sociology and social theory, at least from the work of Marx onwards. There 
is indeed something to be said for the argument, forcefully put by Margaret Coulson 
and Carol Riddel, that "the idea of social structure is the lead off point, and the 
anchorage idea of sociology. "' Certainly this has been the case in the work of many 
of the classical sociologists. Marx's "social relations", Durkheim's "social facts" and 
Parsons' "action systems", for instance, are all conceptual efforts to grapple with the 
patterned nature of social life, and to get to grips with the manner in which the 
individual confronts an "objective" social world which appears to shape his or her 
thinking and activity from "outsider sources". 
Doubtless it is this which explains why the history of sociology has been 
(amongst other things) the history of consecutive conceptual efforts to grasp the 
nature of social structure. The compressed historical span since the Second World 
War has thus already seen the rise and fall of functionalism, conflict theory and 
various forms of structuralism, all of which were undoubtedly "macroscopic" in 
orientation. Indeed, even those sociologists who have sought consciously to reduce 
the concept of structure to the epiphenomenon of the social action of isolated 
individuals have not been able to rid themselves easily of the need to resort to 
"structural" or "institutional" analysis. Max Weber's philosophical writings are, of 
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course, a case in point. Having theorised the conceptual and methodological poverty 
of "holism" (as he saw it), which for him falsely postulated the existence of 
irreducibly social phenomena, Weber went on to produce a voluminous output of 
substantive historical sociological work which precisely analysed the causal influence 
of "collectivities" or "constellations" upon social action in various socio-historical 
contexts? 
There are a number of reasons for seeking to explain human and social life in 
terms of "structure" or "structures". Firstly, as indicated above, it does seem 
indisputable that societies possess a certain interdependence of social practices or 
social functions, that is systemic properties, which persist over time and which involve 
persistent regularities or patterns of social interaction of which the interactants 
concerned are often unaware. As Alex Callinicos rightly observes: "We can [refuse] to 
regard them [structures] as self-reproducing organisms and still refuse to apply the 
term `society' to any set of human relationships which showed no capacity to continue 
across generations. "3 Secondly societies (or more generally social systems) always 
entail specific kinds of social relationships, particular kinds of "institutional patterns", 
configurational regularities of social interaction of a distinct nature, which precisely 
enable us to distinguish meaningfully between them. To refer to structure in this sense 
is thus to draw attention to the manner of which specific configurations of social 
relations at any given point in time exert a causal influence or conditional guidance 
upon the consciousness and conduct of the human agents who govern them. Thirdly, 
"to say that a society has a structure is to say there are limits to the extent to which it 
may vary without becoming an instance of a different kind of society. "4 Here the 
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concept of structure allows the theorist to discern the point at which an accumulation 
of quantitative changes in a society brings about its qualitative transformation. 
Finally, and most importantly, the concept of structure allows us to grasp the fact 
that social relations and institutions have an "autonomous" and "external" character 
and significance which does not depend in the least upon the particular nature of the 
interactants who animate and reproduce them: 
When I perform my duties as a brother, a husband or a citizen and carry out 
the commitments I have entered into, I fulfil obligations which are defined in 
law and custom and which are external to myself and my actions.... 
Similarly, the believer has discovered from birth, ready fashioned, the beliefs 
and practices of his religious life; if they existed before, it follows that they 
exist outside him. The system of signs that I employ to express my thoughts, 
the monetary system I use to pay my debts, the credit instruments I utilise in 
my commercial relationships, the practices I follow in my profession, etc. - 
all function independently of the use I make of them. Considering in turn 
each member of society, the following remarks could be made for each 
single one of them. 5 
Thus we can endorse Erik Olin Wright's injunction to define social relations as 
"sets of empty spaces"6 and thereby insist upon a meaningful distinction between 
social interaction (and the human agents who are responsible for it) and social 
structure. The social roles of "teacher" and "pupil", for example, pre-exist the current 
generation of actors whose daily doings reproduce or elaborate them (which implies 
their externality from current interactants and their social action) and furthermore 
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exert a conditional influence upon the institutional practices and role-identities of their 
individual incumbents (which implies their autonomy from current interactants and 
their social action). 
The above observations establish the case for seeking to understand societies in 
terms of the structures they possess. But what is structure? In keeping with the general 
view of contemporary sociologists, I would endorse the position that "social structure 
refers to the enduring, orderly ... relationships between elements of a society. "7 
Structure is societal organisation, the relationships between "parts" of a social 
system. But what is the ontological status of structures grasped in these terms? My 
contention is that the concept of social structure is the obverse of the concept of social 
interaction. Whereas social interaction refers to the conscious and self- conscious 
activity of human beings, and especially the ways in which this activity or "agency" 
continually reproduces or reshapes society, social structure refers to the resultants or 
effects of this activity, the manner in which the action and interaction of the dead 
confront the activity and thinking of the living as an inherited environment of 
"institutions", "distributions", "artefacts", "language habits", "belief-systems", "ways 
of living", and so on and so forth, which both frustrate and facilitate the possibilities 
of agency and consciousness of those here present. Socio-cultural structure is, in other 
words, "the traditions of all the dead generations" (i. e. certain of the "emergent 
properties" of previously materialised social conduct), which in "framing" or 
"bounding" the activity and thinking of contemporary flesh-and-blood interactants in 
definite and specifiable ways ensures that societies or social systems either tend to 
persist in a given form or are modified or transformed on the basis of a predeterminate 
range of developmental possibilities. The concept of structure thus draws our attention 
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to the fact that "society is more than the sum of the people in it", 8 or indeed of the 
totality of their interpersonal relations or interactions. 
Such an ontological understanding of structure means that social analysis must 
take on a specific methodological orientation. Specifically the function of structural 
analysis is to offer "a guide which tells us where to look in trying to explain any social 
phenomenon sociologically. "9 Since individuals and their interaction are always 
contextualised within an environment comprised of structures (to which it is rationally 
oriented) it follows that the explanation of social conduct "should be sought first in 
the way that society is organised ... 
in its principles of organisation. "10 In other words, 
whatever the impact of human agency and interaction in reproducing or elaborating 
the structural properties of a society, it is nonetheless always with structures that any 
explanation of social phenomena must commence. Structures explain the social 
conduct which allows them to persist or which causes them to perish (given certain 
premises about human organisms and subjects - namely that individuals have psycho- 
organic needs and capacities which they self-consciously articulate as such and 
attempt to act upon), just as human agency explains the elaboration, replication or 
overturning of these same structures over time (given the same anthropological 
premises as specified above). 
The nature of structural and cultural conditioning 
In the foregoing I have suggested that structures "explain" social interaction (even if 
social interaction explains structural change or statics). But how do they do so? 
Certainly not by operating as hydraulic determinations of human action and 
consciousness as is suggested by structuralists and functionalists. On the contrary, as 
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Margaret Archer has recently pointed out, structural conditioning is essentially a 
mediatory process which is best grasped as an "objective influence which conditions 
action patterns and supplies agents with strategic directional guidance. "11 This it does 
by defining the objective situational logics in which interactants find themselves or 
enter into during their life-cycles. In Archer's own words: "It is the situations to 
which people respond which are mediatory because they condition (without 
determining) different courses of action for those differently placed, by supplying 
different reasons to them. " 12 
There are three aspects to structural conditioning (as a mediatory process) by 
virtue of which "directional guidance" is imparted to the social conduct of interactants 
(and hence to socio-cultural dynamics). These are: involuntary placement, vested 
interests and opportunity costs. 13 First "involuntary placement". To grasp the meaning 
and import of this concept it is necessary to remind ourselves that the social 
environment is pre-structured by material and cultural emergents prior to the doings 
of those here present. These emergent structures "account for what there is (materially 
and culturally) to be distributed" amongst a society's members, "the shape of such 
distributions", 14 and the manner of which these distributions are related to one another 
and to institutions in a "structure of structures". Such emergents also account "for the 
nature of the extant role-array, the proportions of positions available at any time and 
the advantages/disadvantages associated with them, " 15 and other societal properties 
besides. 
Now in the case of societal "distributions" of cultural and material goods, it is 
scarcely plausible to deny that interactants are inserted involuntarily at birth into 
agential collectivities, which by virtue of their asymmetrical access to resources 
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provide their members initially with differential life-chances. But this is scarcely any 
less true of individuals as role-incumbents. In this case, although interactants have a 
certain freedom over which of these to appropriate as their own from society (within 
constraints imposed by the facts of their agential origins and upbringing), it 
nonetheless remains certain that "such exercises of voluntarism do not free agents 
from involuntaristic involvement in structures and their situational conditioning": 
Thus most of us have the choice of whether to marry or not, but agential 
awareness of the structural powers which this would entail (legal 
responsibility, financial communality, canonical obligations and juridical 
restrictions on exit) may serve hermeneutically to prompt avoidance. Yet the 
alternative choice of "partnership" may dodge those particular situational 
constraints attaching to the marriage project, but it is not a method of gaining 
immunity from all structural influences; these agents have merely 
"exchanged" one potential situation for another form of situational 
conditioning (the law still arbitrates on custody of children, relative 
entitlements to common goods, eligibility for certain benefits, etc. ). 
Similarly, opting for single or celibate status is not to opt out of situational 
constraints, but to be embroiled in a different set. 16 
Second "vested interests". The significance of the involuntary placement of 
interactants within "positions" or "places" within social relations is that it distributes 
different vested interests to those differently placed. "Vested interests" are definable 
as those appropriate modes of social praxis which agents occupying a particular 
socially constructed situation in society can or ought to pursue if they are to enhance 
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or defend their life-chances or well-being (whether individually or collectively vis-b- 
vis the members of other social groupings differently situated). For those sections of a 
"societal community" whose members occupy positions by virtue of which they 
monopolise a disproportionate share of or access to a society's means of economic, 
political and cultural production and consumption, these vested interests will include 
pursuance of those social strategies or practices which allow them to maintain their 
position of power, privilege and authority relative to subordinate agential 
collectivities. For those members of society who are occupants of social groupings 
which are collectively disenfranchised relative to the advantaged (in terms of having 
restricted access to authoritative and allocative resources which are materially 
available and which would by virtue of their redistribution allow them to sustain 
improved life- chances or well-being), it is clear that vested interests are those 
structurally determined praxes which would allow agents in subordinate positions to 
either wrest control of those resources necessary to end their subordination (or failing 
this to at least improve their life-chances by obtaining a more equitable share of a 
society's resources) or to join the ranks of privileged or advantaged groupings. 
This being the case, whatever the peculiarity of the vested interests which pertain 
to differently situated collectivities of agents in social relations, it is certain that "one 
of the main antecedent effects of structures ... consists in dividing the population ... 
into those with vested interests in maintenance and change respectively, according to 
the positions in which they find themselves involuntaristically. " 7 In other words, the 
significance of structural conditioning here is that vested interests (in maintenance or 
change) are a function of the involuntary placement of interactants in different 
situations or positions in social relations vis-a-vis various distributions of material and 
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cultural goods. But this means that agents' vested interests (as opposed to their wants 
and desires) are not subjectivist phenomena. On the contrary, they are "objective 
features of ... situations" 
18 by virtue of the fact that emergent structures, by defining 
the general standards of living of differently placed collectivities of people, determine 
which courses of social action are best suited to improving or protecting the lot of 
their members. For example, collective methods of industrial struggle and union 
membership are, for members of the working class, more effective social means of 
achieving greater autonomy and higher life-chances in capitalist society than 
"individualistic" modes of self-aggrandisement. This is because the proletariat's 
agential situation of propertylessness denies its members the economic and cultural 
resources to compete as equals with members of the middle classes by means of 
individuated mobility (I will return to this argument below). 
Third "opportunity costs". Yet it is apparent that structural conditioning grasped 
in terms of "involuntary placement" and attendant "vested interests" is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for asserting that structures "explain" the interaction which 
reproduces or elaborates them. After all, specifying objective vested interests does not 
itself provide a structural interest-explanation of social agency and societal dynamics. 
Agents might not recognise which courses of social action are appropriate to their 
social circumstances or positioning (perhaps because being "undetermined" by 
structural emergents their interpretations of their situations are always "open" or 
fallible, or perhaps because the effectivity of dominant ideology is sufficient to 
prevent them recognising where their vested interests lie). Equally, having recognised 
their vested interests agents may choose to disregard them (perhaps because afraid of 
the consequences of pursuing them or perhaps because they find their pursuit 
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distasteful or ethically reprehensible). Furthermore agents may find subjective wants 
more compelling sources of motivation than whatever objective social interests they 
possess. As Archer rightly points out, "[s]ince a vested interest is not a `social force' 
nor do people's responses have anything in common with billiard balls' unreflective 
movements, then their influence depends for its efficacy upon them being found good 
by large numbers of those who share them (though not necessarily upon them being 
found best by all in the same position)"19 What is needed, in short, is the specification 
of some kind of mechanism which would allow vested interests to be transmitted 
(however imperfectly) into forms of social consciousness and specific modes of social 
practice geared towards their pursuance or defence. 
The mediatory mechanism by means of which the vested interests attached to 
structural situations in society become efficacious in explaining the conduct and 
consciousness of interactants is that of opportunity costs. "Without in any, way 
depriving agents of their fundamental interpretative freedom, nevertheless real 
structural influences mean that objective opportunity costs are associated with 
different responses to frustrating or rewarding experiences, which condition (without 
determining) the interpretations placed upon them. "20 "Opportunity costs" are 
attached to the various modes of social praxis or activity by which individuals may 
pursue their human needs and culturally-constructed wants, meaning that particular 
action-responses to structurally determined agential circumstances are likely to induce 
either rewards (in terms of greater societal enfranchisement or improved life-chances) 
or costs (in terms of reduced autonomy or freedom of action and stagnant or declining 
life-chances) - or a different balance between the two - and indeed to induce these 
effects differentially for members of different agential groupings. 
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Naturally the existence of these "opportunity costs" attached to different modes 
of social praxis do not function as hydraulic dctcnninations of human agcncy and 
consciousness. One reason for this is that human beings are "sovereign artificers" 
%,, hose powers and properties of self, intentionality and rationality allow them 
sufficient autonomy of action and thought to resist the most stringent of structural 
constraints. Furthermore structural conditioning does not generate a passive agent 
"deterministically doomed" to follow his or her vested interests because the existence 
of differential "opportunity costs" attached to different social practices does not make 
it certain that agents will seek to forego penalties and facilitate rewards (or to 
subordinate vested interests to subjective wants or beliefs). 
For example, there is no reason why particular members of powerful elites or 
socially dominant classes should not choose (for ethical, political or altruistic reasons) 
to renounce the privileges of their background and upbringing - perhaps by covertly 
supporting and funding workcrs' resistance to capitalist cxploitation or by handing 
over their fortunes to charity. Nor is there any reason why individuals occupying rolc- 
positions of high status and incomc in institutions should not dccidc for the same 
reasons to sacrifice both in favour of the more modest pickings associatcd with oilier 
(pcrhaps morc socially beneficial or intcllcctually dcmanding) institutional functions - 
such as resigning a company dircctorship to train as tcachcr or doctor or to bring up a 
child. Noncthclcss, this having been said, it remains certain that most individuals will 
act and think in rough accordancc with thcir vcstcd intcrests, not least bccausc 
freedom of action and interpretation is precisely freedom to orient towards 
opportunity costs in a way which minimiscs punishing constraints and facilitatcs 
rewarding cxpcricnccs. Thus most will find those reasons for pursuing vested interests 
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more compelling than those which recommend alternatives as they evaluate the latter 
against the balance sheet of costs and benefits. 
Now the mediatory influence of opportunity costs is twofold. Firstly they 
function "through allocating different costs for the same course of action to those who 
are differently situated . "21 This they do by placing individuals in agential groupings 
which have greater or lesser access to those various societal distributions of economic, 
political and cultural capital which facilitate individual mobility or "success" (in terms 
of obtaining those scarce institutional functions which confer high income and status), 
thus hampering those in "disadvantaged" positions in social relations from competing 
on equal terms with those from "advantaged" backgrounds for occupancy of these 
same "privileged" role-positions. Thus, although the existence of opportunity costs 
grasped in this way does not preclude individuals in disadvantaged or subordinate 
positions from achieving "upward mobility" into the upper reaches of the institutional 
hierarchy, they do nonetheless function to ensure that greater costs (e. g. financial 
hardship during further education or training) and risks (e. g. the real possibility that 
these costs will be in vain due to a limited number of opportunities or discrimination) 
are attached to the project of individual advancement. For the disadvantaged such 
costs or risks, or to put it another way this asymmetry between costs or potential costs 
and the advantages or potential advantages which are likely to result from paying 
them, are often sufficient (in perhaps a majority of cases) to either discourage this 
kind of project from being initiated or to successfully derail it before it has a chance to 
yield results. 
Secondly, "differential opportunity costs not only affect the ease or difficulty of 
undertaking the same course of action for groups which are differently situated, they 
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also condition which projects are entertained by them and thus serve to explain why it 
is that these can be systematically and diametrically opposed. " This is the case 
because the "connections between the antecedent setting of life-chances, the vested 
interests associated with them, and the opportunity costs predisposing towards 
different projects can account for divergent trends amongst those variously 
situated. 922 In other words, the objective positioning of individuals in social relations, 
which ensures they must follow specific kinds of social strategies if they are to most 
effectively enhance or defend their vested interests, at the same time exert a certain 
pressure over them to behave in the appropriate ways (i. e. to maintain existing powers 
and privileges or avoid increasingly punitive restrictions on their freedom or 
consumption). It is for this reason, for example, that individualistic modes of self- 
advancement (social mobility up the institutional pecking order) are the preferred and 
normal strategy of members of the middle classes to achieve or sustain their life- 
chances and secure autonomy at work, whereas for members of the working class the 
strategy which is normally relied on (and for many positively preferred) is that of 
collective mobilisations (i. e. union organisation and action) for these same purposes. 
By way of further illustration of this argument I will consider the above example 
- the directional guidance exerted by structures (by means of vested interests and 
attendant opportunity costs) to the kinds of collective social practices which are likely 
to be pursued by workers to improve or defend their conditions of life and work - in 
greater detail. Now workers who fail to take strike action in response to the projects of 
employers to "rationalise" production or "streamline" the labour force (in favour say 
of a "work-to-rule" or an appeal to "public goodwill") are unlikely to succeed in 
protecting jobs or conditions of work. This is because such a strategy entails a failure 
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on the part of the workers to effectively utilise their "structural capacity" to halt the 
production of value and surplus value upon which the accumulation of capital (and 
hence the profitability of capitalist enterprise) depends. By failing to take the 
appropriate "collective" response, however, workers send a signal to the employers 
that they lack the "stomach" for a determined confrontation and by doing so 
encourage the latter to seek out yet more concessions and retreats (more "flexible" 
practices justified in the name of "globalisation", etc. ). The logic of this process is 
therefore a downward spiral of growing working class passivity and declining 
confidence, together with steadily declining life-chances and autonomy at work, until 
such time as an explosion of anger (or desperation) propels the workers to take more 
determined or resolute action which has the potential to redress the balance (and 
which in doing so re-educates them as to which strategies are better suited to 
effectively assert their vested interests against the employing class). 
Thus, as my example shows, although structurally determined "opportunity 
costs" attached to different modes of social praxis or action do not determine or 
guarantee that interactants adopt consistently the appropriate means to defend or 
enhance their vested interests, they do provide a purchase on the question of why they 
often do so (despite attempts at ideological obfuscation by opposing interests and the 
"fear factor" of defeat and its consequences). Workers in Britain and elsewhere, for 
instance, despite the setbacks and defeats of the 1980s, still possess the "structural 
power" of the mass strike to reverse the trend of labour market "restructuring", and we 
can be sure that steadily increasing frustration and anger at their growing relative 
disadvantages in society will prompt its exercise again in the near future. 
r 
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To claim that this is indeed the case is not, of course, to minimise the significance 
of those countervailing generative structural pressures (such as a less favourable 
balance of class forces from the point of view of the proletariat than existed in the 
1970s, brought about by the isolation and defeat of the workers' struggles in the 
1980s, the spectre of mass - though now declining - unemployment, the vacuum of 
political leadership and ideology on the left, and so on and so forth) which have 
prevented them from doing so. These structural constraints have clearly sapped the 
militancy and confidence of the western working classes, and continue to do so. But it 
nonetheless remains the case that the rising pressure of mass discontent at the base of 
society (faced with growing poverty, relative disadvantage, insecure temporary 
employment, crumbling public services, lack of adequate industrial or political 
representation, etc. ) cannot be contained indefinitely. 23 It is this steady accumulation 
of costs attached to proletarian inactivity and passivity which guarantees that 
convulsive confrontations between the state and capital on the one side and the 
workers on the other (by "traditional" means of mass industrial struggle) are likely to 
break out in the none-too-distant future. 
4.2: THE MARXIAN CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE: AN EXPOSITION AND 
DEFENCE 
My contention is that the basic concepts of Marxian sociology furnish the analyst with 
the best available theoretical tools to grasp the manner of the interface between the 
various structural elements which comprise any social system. The task of this section 
and the next is to provide good arguments in defence of this strong claim. I will start 
by describing in the broadest terms the philosophical basis of the "materialist 
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conception of society". Then I will outline the core theoretical concepts of the 
Marxian account of structure (i. e. "mode of production", "forces of production", 
"social relations of production", "structure - i. e. base - and superstructure", etc. ). A 
critical appraisal of the more enduring and influential claims of the orthodox liberal 
critique of Marxian sociology (i. e. the argument that Marxism equals "technological 
determinism" and "economic reductionism") will be integrated into the discussion 
proper. 
The philosophical and anthropological premises of historical materialism 
It will be recalled that my discussion of Marxism thus far has involved the articulation 
of three basic points. Firstly the simultaneous and combined importance of 
anthropological and sociological premises in historical materialism, with the former 
underpinning the latter, providing "naturalistic" and "humanist" micro foundations to 
Marx and Engels' theory of society and culture (chapter two). Secondly the manner in 
which both these aspects of Marxian theory arise from a totalising dialectical and 
materialist philosophy of nature which postulates the explanatory and historical 
primacy of matter over mind, of being over consciousness, and which thus regards 
human thought as emergent from underlying physical and biological structures and 
the contents of this thinking as a "reflection" of material reality (social and physical) 
rather than vice versa (chapter one). Finally the manner in which "philosophical 
materialism" (grasped as a dialectical ontology of nature specifying a stratified 
material world of irreducible levels extending from basic chemical and physical 
structures to the higher structures of biological and human reality) underwrites an 
account of human nature as a "differentiated totality" whereby its distinctive physical 
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architecture and emergent properties (of intentionality, self-consciousness, rationality 
and culture) are seen as evolutionary products of the historical movement of social 
labour as human beings and their hominid ancestors have acted to procure a material 
subsistence from the physical environment (chapter one). 
Now it is this stratified or differentiated concept of human nature which 
constitutes the foundation of Marx and Engels' understanding of interaction, structure 
and system. To reiterate the relevant points. For Marx and Engels it is the core activity 
of social labour in the procurement or production of the basic material necessities of 
life (food, shelter, dwellings, etc. ) which has allowed and which continues to allow 
humanity to enjoy a cultural existence and history. Further, this core activity of 
material production has also played an absolutely central role in the self-creation of 
humanity as a particular biological species with distinct capacities and needs. From 
this perspective, in the same way as humanity's species-capacities of intellect, self, 
rationality and language arose as an evolutionary emergent from the "basic" or "core" 
human activity of social labour for subsistence (as part of the lengthy historical 
process during which our hominid ancestors evolved into fully modern human 
organisms), so humanity's subsequent socio-cultural history and development has 
been made possible and given a powerful stimulus by the ongoing historical 
interchange between productive social labour and the physical environment (and the 
economic structures which have arisen from this interaction between humanity and 
nature and which feed into the process as a causal power or generative mechanism in 
their own right). This is because the dialectic between socio-economic production, its 
emergent properties (the ensemble of economic structures which every generation of 
agents find "already made") and material nature generate the output of economic 
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resources which are necessary to support non-productive social activities and which 
thereby enable (in the sense of providing "conditions of existence" for) the 
construction and increasing differentiation of non-economic social structures over 
time. 
The mode of production as structure and action 
The famous Marxian distinction between base (i. e. structure) and superstructure is 
sketched out above in the simplest terms. Before examining the meaning and efficacy 
of the structure-superstructure model, however, it is worth considering how Marx and 
Engels conceptualise the "base", if only because many of the most influential critiques 
of historical materialism (especially the claim that Marxism is a form of technological 
determinism) have precisely based their authority upon its misunderstanding. Now it 
is important to make the point that for Marx and Engels the mode of production is 
both "structure" and "action", and as such cannot be identified simply with the "base" 
(as I have interpreted it as emergent structures). In other words, Marx and Engels do 
not clearly distinguish between the "structural" and "activist" aspects of the mode of 
production, between the mode of production as the "core" or "fundamental" social 
practice and the mode of production as a configuration of social structures which are 
"basic" to other social structures in a social system. Yet it is clear that although Marx 
and Engels often treat the mode of production as synonymous with the labour- 
process, 24 they also define it in a way which simultaneously acknowledges both the 
activity or agency of material production to transform nature and generate use-values 
and the fact that in producing their means of life economic agents enter into "definite 
relations" and encounter "specific circumstances" which are independent of their will, 
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not of their own making, and which correspond to a "definite stage" of development 
of the productive forces. 25 
Now Marx and Engels' focus on the dual nature of the mode of production is 
quite legitimate, not least because the explanatory primacy of the mode of production 
as structure in Marxist theory is in part derived from the fundamental importance 
which Marx and Engels attach to the process of material production in sustaining 
human and social existence on a daily basis. Yet it is important to delineate the two 
meanings of "mode of production" if we are to derive from their writings a theory of 
the interface between "action and its environments". That these distinct aspects of the 
mode of production are normally conflated by Marx and Engels is not surprising. 
They did not, after all, possess the conceptual tools (i. e. an emergentist ontology of 
the social world) to add theoretical substance to their own insight that "men make 
history but not in circumstances of their own choosing. s26 This being the case, I 
propose to do so on their behalf. 
Consequently, in the analysis that follows, the mode of production as structure 
will be treated as an accumulation of material wealth or economic resources and 
technical know-how upon which agents draw in the labour-process, the institutional 
functions or role-positions which comprise the "organisational properties" of the 
labour-process, and the pre-structured "distributions" of means of production and/or 
subsistence which (where appropriate) shape the class positions and attendant vested 
interests of interactants in advance of their economic or other practices and which feed 
into the "institutional properties" of the labour-process. The mode of production as 
activity, by contrast, will be treated simply as both the productive "doings" of agents 
in reproducing their material existence and expanding their material and other needs 
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in ongoing interchange with nature (via the medium of the labour-process), and as the 
exploitative "doings" of non-producers in appropriating surplus-labour or surplus- 
product from the direct producers by whatever means or methods are available to 
them. 
Forces and relations of production as emergent social structures 
An important source of confusion amongst Marxists and non-Marxist interpreters of 
Marx centres upon the respective explanatory function of the two constituent elements 
of the mode of production - the forces of production and the relations of production. 
There are a number of possibilities here. First there is the "conventional" view, held 
by the orthodox Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals (e. g. Kautsky, 
Plekhanov, Stalin, etc. ), and powerfully restated in more recent times by the analytical 
philosopher G. A. Cohen, 27 which contends that the forces of production are more 
fundamental than the relations of production, since these alone hold the key to societal 
dynamics. Productive forces select production relations according to their capacity to 
further socio-economic development or "progress". Secondly there is the polar 
opposite view (whose most important contemporary allegiants include Robert Brenner 
and Alex Callinicos), which holds that it is the relations of production which are the 
most basic structure of the mode of production, on the grounds that production 
relations determine whether or not the productive forces develop or stagnate, and 
because it is in any case impossible to speak meaningfully of productive forces in 
abstraction from the social organisation of the economy. 28 Finally it has become 
fashionable more recently still to interpret the mode of production (somewhat 
eccentrically) as forces and relations of production plus politics and ideology. "Social 
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relations of production appear in specific economic, ideological and political forms", 
as one leading light of the approach puts the argument 29 
My contention is that the easiest way to grasp the concept of "mode of 
production" in Marxian theory is by drawing out what for Marx distinguishes forces 
of production from relations of production. For only by doing so can we grasp the 
interrelationship between them. What constitutes the forces of production? In my 
view, and also I believe in Marx's view, forces of production have a material, social 
and ideational aspect. The "material" and "social" dimensions of the "forces", on the 
one hand, refer us to labour-power and the institutionalised forms of co-operative 
social "activity through which men and women seek to meet their needs by acting on 
and transforming nature", which "implies a certain organisation of production, the 
possession of the appropriate tools, and so on. "30 More specifically the socio- 
economic aspect of the "forces" entails a particular technical organisation of work by 
means of which labour-power is combined with means of production (raw materials, 
tools and technology), and a corresponding mode of social co-operation by means of 
which this union between labour-power and nature is accomplished, which together 
determine "the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity"31 at any given 
point in time. The "ideational" aspect of "forces", on the other hand, refers us to the 
inherited store of technical (and sometimes scientific) know-how which is directly 
integrated into the labour process and which also determines the manner of which 
labour-power and means of production (the "objects" and "instruments" of labour) are 
combined in everyday economic activity. As Marx puts it, "general social knowledge 
has become a direct force of production. "32 Marx also appears to identify forces of 
production as those modes of wealth-creation associated with rising social classes 
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which have not as yet been constituted as the dominant relations of production in a 
society. 33 
Relations of production, by contrast, are specific kinds of social relations which 
are the dominant economic (or politico-economic) structures of the society in which 
they are embedded. More specifically relations of production are those "relations 
which ... concern the control of the process of production and the distribution of its 
products. "34 Now where these relations of production predetermine an unequal 
distribution of the means of production in a society they give rise (or are equivalent) 
to relations of economic exploitation, i. e. class relations. Marx makes the argument as 
follows: 
Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of 
production, the worker, free or unfree, must add to the labour-time necessary 
for his own maintenance an extra quantity of labour- time in order to produce 
the means of subsistence for the owner of the means of production, whether 
this proprietor be an Athenian aristocrat, an Etruscan theocrat, a Roman 
citizen, a Norman baron, an American slave-owner, a Wallachian boyar, a 
modern landlord or a capitalist 
35 
As is well enough known, Marx's theory of class, and of the relationship of 
classes to relations of production, is never spelled out by him explicitly. The third 
volume of Capital breaks off at precisely the point where Marx is set to make clear his 
own approach to this question. Nonetheless it would be quite wrong to suppose that 
Marx's theory of class cannot reliably be derived from his theoretical writings taken 
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as a whole, especially the three volumes of Capital. Certainly this is the view of 
G. E. M. de Ste Croix. His interpretation of Marx's approach appears to me to go right 
to the heart of the matter: 
Class (essentially a relationship) is the collective social expression of the 
fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social 
structure. By exploitation I mean the appropriation of part of the product of 
the labour of others.... A class (a particular class) is a group of persons in a 
community identified by their position in the whole system of social 
production, defined above all according to their relationship (primarily in 
terms of the degree of ownership or control) to the conditions of production 
(that is to say, the means and labour of production) and to other classes.... 
The individuals constituting a given class may or may not be wholly or 
partly conscious of their own identity and common interests as a class, and 
they may or may not feel antagonism towards members of other classes as 
such. 36 
Clearly, then, class structures are integral to relations of production which 
correspond to a certain stage of development of the productive forces - specifically 
those "forces" which provide material "conditions of existence" for an unproductive 
group to emerge in society. Class-based relations of production, by concentrating 
certain of the means of production in the hands of a tiny minority of non-producing 
"owners", allow this privileged group the structural capacity to appropriate surplus- 
labour or surplus-product from a subordinate class of "direct producers", who are 
forced to yield to economic exploitation in exchange for some kind of access to the 
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means of subsistence. This asymmetrical distribution of the means of production 
determines not only the effective control of the means of wealth-creation by a 
particular exploiting class but also the extent to which the subordinate or exploited 
class exercises control over its own labour-power: the lesser the degree of control 
exercised by the exploiting class over the means of production the greater the degree 
of control exercised by the subordinate class over its own labour-power. Relations of 
production, in so far as these are rooted in class exploitation, must therefore always 
entail a structurally determined antagonism" between classes, so that "class struggle 
itself becomes an intrinsic rather than a contingent consequence of the structure of 
class relations. "37 Furthermore, where there exists this asymmetry of distribution of 
the instruments and materials of labour, i. e. where there exists relations of 
exploitation, there must also exist an unequal distribution of the means of subsistence, 
which in turn stimulates a class conflict over the distribution of the social product as 
well as over control of the production process. 
A final observation. Aside from the above it does seem reasonable to infer from 
Marx's writings an additional important dimension to his treatment of relations of 
production. As Jon Elster observes, during his discussion of pre-capitalist class 
societies, "the nature of the non-producing owners would presumably enter 
importantly into analysis of the furthering or fettering of the productive forces by the 
relations of production. "38 For example, whatever one thinks of Marx's own 
discussion of the so-called "Asiatic mode of production" (and I do not think very 
much of it), it is nonetheless apparent that his designation of the Oriental civilisations 
as "stagnant", as incapable of internally generated development, precisely depends 
upon some conception of the manner in which the nature of the "non-producing 
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owners" acts as a brake on economic "progress" or evolution. Furthermore, as Alex 
Callinicos rightly observes, Marx's claim that "capital exists and can only exist as 
many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as their reciprocal 
interaction with one another", 39 would be equally incoherent if we were to attempt a 
definition of capitalist relations of production in abstraction from the internal 
characteristics of the capitalist bourgeoisie as a particular social class 40 It should go 
without saying that Marx's theory of capitalist development and crisis hinges crucially 
upon the role of intra-class economic competition in generating the dynamic of 
"accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production for production's sake", and 
hence the periodic over- accumulation of capital. As Marx puts it: "Competition is 
nothing more than the way in which the many capitals force[e] the inherent 
determinants upon one another and upon themselves ... the influence of 
individual 
capitals on one another has the effect precisely that they must conduct themselves as 
capital. "41 A fully satisfactory account of the relations of production in any society 
must therefore include an analysis of the internal configuration of the class which 
"owns" or otherwise possesses productive property. 
To summarise the preceding discussion. The mode of production in Marxian 
analysis can be legitimately grasped as a particular configuration of socio-economic 
structures - the forces and relations of production. The forces of production are the 
organisational properties of the socio-technical labour-process - especially the manner 
or form by which labour power and means of production are combined in a particular 
economic system in order to transform nature and generate use-values - and the 
"bank" of scientific and technical knowledge which is integrated into material 
production and which is developed on the basis of human interaction with nature via 
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the medium of social labour. The relations of production consist of "the relationship 
of the direct producers to the means of production and their labour-power, the nature 
of any non-producing owners, and the mode of appropriation of surplus labour from 
the direct producers by any such owners" 42 (i. e. the mode of class exploitation as 
determined by these structural elements). Relations of economic exploitation entail an 
asymmetrical distribution of the means of production (and hence consumption). The 
form of exploitation (or surplus extraction) thus determines or is synonymous with 
"the class structure, so that classes are defined relationally, by their objective 
relationship both to the means of production and labour-power and to other classes. 
Exploitation in turn gives rise to class struggle", 43 which powerfully shapes the 
dynamics of social systems. 
The mode of production and structural causation: orthodox objections 
This above understanding of the mode of production in Marxist theory enables us to 
dispense with three common objections to historical materialism. Firstly the argument 
sometimes encountered that Marx is unable to distinguish analytically between forces 
and relations of production in a way that allows him to grasp their interplay in 
determining the constitution and dynamics of economic and social systems. Secondly 
the contention, most recently repackaged by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, that 
Marx's structural sociology "reifies" or "fetishises" the objects, instruments and 
products of labour, in effect treating "the economy ... as a mechanism of society 
acting independently of human action. "44 Finally the claim that by seeing specific 
production relations and wider social structures as a simple "effect" of a given stage 
of development of the productive forces Marx is guilty of "technological 
358 
determinism". I will address each aspect of the "orthodox critique" in the order I have 
presented them above. 
It is, of course, perfectly true that productive forces are an indissolubly human 
and social phenomenon. But it is also equally certain that Marx makes no attempt to 
deny that this is the case. There is simply no question of Marx's distinction between 
forces and relations of production being one between purely "technical" and 
"material" factors (i. e. technology, tools, raw materials, human skills and the 
economic output of social labour), on the one hand, and those social relations which 
determine the production and distribution of the social product, on the other. Since for 
Marx and Engels the productive forces in their "structural" aspect are precisely the 
resultants of human and social activity, and precisely entail social organisation (i. e. 
the socio- technical organisation of the human labour-process), it follows that the 
distinction between productive forces and production relations must be grasped as one 
between relations among social positions which enter into the production or 
procurement of use-values and those relations among social positions external to the 
labour-process which determine the distribution of the means of production or 
procurement and social product (including the mode of surplus extraction). But this 
means a meaningful distinction between forces and relations of production can be 
made without abstracting the former from membership of society or from any kind of 
dependence upon human agency. Clearly productive forces, as emergent properties of 
the historical interface between social labour and material nature, cannot be construed 
as detaching the developmental dynamic of the productive forces from the socio- 
economic practices of human beings. 
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This interpretation of the productive forces in Marxian sociology enables us to 
dispense also with the argument that historical materialism "is not simply a theory that 
accords a privileged place to economic factors [but] is, more specifically, a form of 
technological determinism [according to which] the rise and fall of successive 
property regimes are explained by their tendency to promote or fetter technical 
change., -A5 Along with the related (though not identical) charge of "economic 
determinism" or "economic reductionism" (see next section), the claim that Marxism 
equals "technological determinism" has traditionally been the major objection of 
"bourgeois" intellectuals to historical materialism since Marx first formulated his 
approach in the 1840s. Indeed, it is a view which is very much alive and kicking in the 
1990s. The following curt dismissal of Marx's historical sociology along these lines 
by Tony Spybey, to offer one contemporary example, is far from untypical: 
Under the terms of historical materialism, societies must pass through the 
epochs of ancient, feudal and capitalist, each with its respective "relations of 
production": "master and slave"; "lord and serf'; "capitalist and worker". 
When the "relations of production of an epoch cease to be appropriate for its 
technologically advancing "forces of production", a major contradiction is 
created in the social structure and revolutionary change is regarded as 
inevitable. For this reason, historical materialism is sometimes referred to in 
terms of "technological determinism". 46 
In order to get to grips with the orthodox interpretation of Marx's account of the 
relationship between the mode of production and societal process it is necessary to 
make a concession. For like all stereotypical views there is some kind of textual basis 
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for interpreting historical materialism as a species of technological determinism. For 
example, Marx does at one point argue that "it is not only what is made but how, and 
by what instruments of labour, that distinguishes different economic epochs. 
Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development that 
human labour has attained, but they also indicate the social relations within which 
men work. "47 Whereas elsewhere he makes the claim that "social relations are closely 
bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their 
mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way 
of making their living, they change all their social relations. The windmill gives you 
society with the feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalist. "49 
But it is also the case that even these apparently extreme statements of 
technological determinism have an ambiguity which renders any secure interpretation 
of them as such of doubtful validity. Consider the first passage cited above. To claim 
that the economic product and level of technological development of a society 
furnishes a useful conceptual means of distinguishing between different "economic 
epochs" does not necessarily add up to the view that this is the only acceptable way of 
doing so. There is no indication here that Marx is distinguishing between modes of 
production or modes of economic exploitation on this basis. In fact the application of 
his argument appears to be much narrower than this, referring instead to the structured 
relationship between means of production and labour-power - that is to structural 
properties of the forces of production. Least of all is there any suggestion that Marx is 
claiming here that social systems are determined by the level of development of the 
productive forces. Rather he seems to be arguing that the level of economic and 
technological know-how (i. e. the methods of social labour) "indicates" or "is 
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associated with" the "social relations within which men work. " Understood in this 
way, such a viewpoint seems to me to have little in common with the notion that the 
objects, instruments and products of labour (i. e. the means of production and 
subsistence) unilaterally explain the labour-process, let alone the more radical idea 
that productive forces select production relations. 
Similar problems call into question the adequacy of a "mechanical materialist" 
interpretation of the second passage cited above. It should be obvious, after all, that it 
is at least possible that Marx is (again) not claiming here that productive forces are the 
sole "cause" of relations of production or wider social relations. After all, he does 
explicitly say that social relations are "closely bound up with", not determined by, the 
forces of production. Aside from this it is clear that Marx's claim that the "windmill 
gives you society with the feudal lord ... the steam-mill society with the industrial 
capitalist" does not necessarily indicate a strict causal relationship between forces and 
relations of production, with the latter responding passively to developments in the 
former. Indeed, even when taken solely on its own terms, i. e. even when this passage 
is abstracted from its wider intellectual context, it appears equally plausible to 
interpret it as a statement of correspondence between a certain level of development 
of the instruments, techniques and productivity of the labour-process and the specific 
kinds of production relations associated with it. 
Whatever one makes of passages of the above type, however, what cannot be 
doubted is that there are remarkably few of them to be found in the substantive works 
of either Marx or Engels. Any attempt, therefore, to comprehend Marx's sociology on 
the basis of such isolated remarks, in abstraction from the bulk of his theoretical and 
historical writings, is bound to degenerate very quickly into misunderstanding, even 
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vulgarisation. In fact, contrary to what he argues in the first passage cited above, Marx 
does not attempt to analyse "economic epochs" in terms of their material instruments 
of production and associated level of labour productivity. Instead he distinguishes 
modes of production one from the other in terms of their characteristic relations of 
production, in particular (where appropriate) in terms of their distinct modes of class 
exploitation by means of which surplus labour is extracted from the direct producers 
by non-producing "owners" or "controllers" of certain of the means or conditions of 
production. This is why, for example, Marx does not draw a crude distinction between 
"foraging", "pastoral", "agrarian" and "industrial" modes of production, instead 
differentiating between "primitive communism", "slavery", "feudalism", "capitalism", 
etc. 
By way of confirmation of this argument it is necessary only to consider a couple 
of examples from Marx's theoretical writings. In the third volume of Capital, for 
instance, Marx insists that the "specific economic form in which surplus-labour is 
pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of rulers and ruled. It 
is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the 
direct producers ... which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire 
social structure. s49 Elsewhere, in Capital volume one, Marx argues that "[w]hat 
distinguishes the various economic formations of society - the distinction between for 
example a society based on slave-labour and a society based on wage-labour - is the 
form in which this surplus-labour is in each case extorted from the immediate 
producer, the worker. " 50 Such passages and numerous others hardly evidence a 
commitment on Marx's part to reducing relations of production to forces of 
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production, especially "forces" conceived in narrowly "technicist" or "materialist" 
terms. 
But if the relationship between productive forces and production relations in 
historical materialism cannot plausibly be interpreted as one in which the former 
"determines" the latter, of what does it consist? Does Marx wish to say that 
productive forces, though not the unilateral "cause" of production relations, are 
nonetheless the more "fundamental" structure of the mode of production? If so in 
what sense are the "forces" more "basic" than the "relations"? Does his own rejection 
of technological determinism commit him to a view which sees production relations 
as "basic" (in an explanatory sense) to productive forces? Or does Marx wish to argue 
that it is the mode of production, not one or other of its constituent structures, which 
has primacy in explaining social systems? My own view of Marx's meaning on this 
question is, on first sight, a paradoxical one. On the one hand I believe that Marx does 
indeed regard productive forces as "basic" to production relations. Yet on the other 
hand I am convinced that he is committed to a view which sees the mode of 
production or "economic structure" as a totality (not either one of its constituent 
structures) as enjoying explanatory primacy in shaping the constitution and dynamics 
of societies. To see why this is the case, however, it is necessary first to dispose of the 
"either-or" positions cited above. 
Marx's most famous compressed statement of structural causality - i. e. the 1859 
Preface to his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy - can be used to 
justify either the primacy of productive forces or the primacy of the relations of 
production in historical materialism. Chris Harman, for example, argues for the 
primacy of the "forces" over the "relations" on the grounds that for Marx "relations of 
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production correspond to forces of production, not the other way round. " 51 Alex 
Callinicos, by contrast, appears to endorse the opposite view, partly because 
production relations are for him (and for Marx he believes) responsible for furthering 
or fettering productive forces, and partly because he seems to regard an effective 
debunking of technological determinism as depending upon the ascription of 
dependent status to the latter vis-ä-vis the former. 52 G. A. Cohen's defence of the 
primacy of productive forces vis-ä-vis the relations of production, on the other hand, 
is rooted in his belief that that the 1859 Preface identifies three distinct hierarchically- 
ordered structures in society: the forces of production, the "economic structure" (the 
relations of production), and the superstructure, the first of which "selects" the others 
in accordance with their functionality to economic "progress". In his words: 
Now the sum total of relations of production in a given society is said [by 
Marx] to constitute the economic structure of that society, which is also 
called - in relation to the superstructure - the basis, or base, or foundation. 
The economic structure, or base, therefore consists of relations of production 
only: it does not include the productive forces. It is true that to exclude the 
productive forces from the economic structure runs against the usual 
construal of Marx, but he actually said that the economic structure is 
constituted of relations of production.... People mistakenly believe that the 
productive forces belong to the economic base because they wrongly think 
that the explanatory importance of the forces ensure their membership of it. 
But while the forces indeed possess this importance, they are not part of the 
economic base, since they are not economic phenomena. To stay with the 
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spatial metaphor, they are below the economic foundation, the ground on 
which it rests 53 
But what is remarkable about each of these interpretations of the mode of 
production as structure (or structures), and of the relationship of the mode of 
production to the other structures of society, is their uncertain status in Marx's own 
account in the 1859 Preface and elsewhere. Each of them obtains for itself a 
superficial plausibility by highlighting particular statements or comments of Marx on 
this question whilst ignoring those which at least partially contradict the opinion 
which is being derived from them. Consider first of all Callinicos's view that Marx's 
method involves "starting from the relations of production, and treating them, not the 
forces of production, as the independent variable"54 in any explanation of societal 
process. Although Callinicos is correct to observe that Marx does indeed tend to 
identify modes of production in terms of their respective relations of production 
and/or modes of surplus appropriation, this hardly proves his case, for what is ignored 
in his account is Marx's own insistence that developing productive forces collide with 
or bring under pressure existing relations of production, primarily by bringing into 
existence the material and social preconditions (i. e. new forms of wealth-creation 
which are incompatible with the vested interests of established "ruling" classes, newly 
developing or rising social classes, etc. ) for challenging and indeed overthrowing 
these established relations. Clearly, in Marx's view, productive forces have a dynamic 
all of their own by virtue of which they "rebel against" the existing social organisation 
of production and exploitation. Indeed, Marx is also quite specific in his insistence 
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that production relations "grow out of production itself', 55 which certainly supports 
the legitimacy of an interpretation of the former as "basic" to the latter. 
Consider now the legitimacy of Harman's converse view that "forces" enjoy 
explanatory primacy over "relations" in shaping both the economic structure and 
wider social relations of society. Harman is quite right, of course, to point out that 
Marx argues in the Preface that production relations "correspond to" productive forces 
and productive forces "rebel against" production relations and not vice versa. But this 
is surely sketchy evidence in support of an interpretation of historical materialism 
(such as Harman's) which treats the latter as exercising primacy over the former in 
explaining social structures and societal dynamics. "Forces" may well be "basic" to 
"relations" in the sense that these provide them with "conditions of existence". But to 
admit this much does not mean that relations of production are any less important than 
productive forces in accounting for what happens in society or history by virtue of the 
conditional influence both exert upon superstructural forms and the consciousness and 
conduct of interactants. 
A different set of objections apply to Cohen's arguments. These appear to me to 
rest upon a highly dubious distinction between "material" and "socio-economic" 
structures, that is upon "a set of contrasts between nature and society", 56 which in this 
sense exist nowhere in Marx's writings. Indeed, such an interpretation seems to square 
ill with the simple fact that Marx's critique of liberal political economy was designed 
primarily to reveal the falsity of its fetishisation of historically specific socio- 
economic relations as "formally rational" (i. e. "technical-material") relations between 
individuated subjects and various objects of utility, and of its treatment of socially 
generated categories (private property and the abstract individual) as the naturalistic 
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foundations of social order. 57 We are thus expected by Cohen to accept that Marx 
abstracts "material relations" from "social relations" having criticised his opponents 
for having done the same. 
In any case, of course, Cohen's interpretation of the Preface is substantially 
undermined by Marx's contention that "the mode of co-operation [i. e. the socio- 
technical structure of material production] is itself a `productive force"'58 It is, after 
all, difficult to see how the productive forces can be anterior to the socio- economic 
structure of society if the "forces" themselves have an indissolubly "social" character. 
Though Cohen is right to point out that Marx does describe the "sum total of ... 
relations of production" as constituting "the economic structure of society", it is also 
true that Marx argues in the same passage that "[i]n the social production of their life, 
men enter into definite relations ... of production, which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their productive forces. "59 Elsewhere Marx makes the claim that 
"the formation of the economic community" is "founded" upon the mode of surplus- 
extraction, which in turn "reacts upon production as a determining element. s60 
Passages such as these are hardly compelling proof of Marx's abstraction of forces 
from relations of production, or of his treatment of the latter as alone comprising the 
economic "base" of society. 
The real relationship between forces and relations of production 
There is in short precious little substantive evidence supporting a view of historical 
materialism as privileging in a causal sense either productive forces or relations of 
production in shaping one another and the wider social structure of a society. The 
most that can be said is that forces and relations of production are both (for Marx) 
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aspects of the "economic structure" of society, which is held to be the "base" or 
"basis" or "foundation" of all other social relations in a society. But if neither "forces" 
nor "relations" can be plausibly seen as "causing" or exercising "dominance over" 
each other and the total social structure of which they are a part, of what does their 
relationship consist? 
My own view, arrived at in part by means of elimination of plausible alternative 
views, is that the interrelationship between forces and relations of production has to be 
grasped in tenons of the distinct range of constraints, enablcments and impulses which 
each places on the other and on societal development as a whole. The significance of 
the productive forces in the Marxian schema lies in their function of defining the 
possibilities for an investment of material and human resources in structural and 
cultural elaboration or differentiation in any specific society or social system. The 
forces of production determine what is materially possible in any historical epoch (in 
terms of enabling the existence and persistence of certain kinds of social and cultural 
structures, practices or forms of consciousness and ruling out the existence or 
persistence of others). Productive forces also generate a certain impetus towards the 
"selection" by interactants of the appropriate structural forms which would allow their 
unfettered development. It is in these senses that productive forces arc "basic" or 
"foundational" to production relations. The former furnish material "conditions of 
possibility" of the forms which the latter can take and exert a certain directional 
pressure upon intcractants (belonging to a rising class based upon new forms of 
wealth-creation) to act in ways appropriate to further their development. 
To offer an obvious example. It is only after the productive forces have developed 
to a point where they permit the generation of a surplus-product over and above the 
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basic consumption needs of the direct producers that it becomes possible for class- 
based relations of production to emerge on the historical canvas. In this situation 
forces of production enable the existence of class-divided relations of production 
(which themselves allow a further development of material subsistence and hence a 
growth of the human population). Yet at the same time they preclude a return to 
"primitive communism" (because the expanding populations to which agricultural 
production gives rise cannot be supported by foraging modes of wealth-creation and 
because exploiting classes in any case use a portion of the surplus to maintain the 
armed forces necessary to defeat any attempt to restore these). And they preclude also 
an advance to socialist relations of production centred on the abolition of economic 
and political inequalities (because these require the development of productive forces 
to the extent that society can support a decent life for all and not just for a tiny 
minority, i. e. up to the point where an insufficiency of goods and services to satisfice 
all fundamental human needs can be overcome). 1 
I have contended that such productive forces also generate a certain stimulus 
towards the reorganisation of production relations in a way which promotes their 
further development. On the one hand the development of the productive forces in 
Europe from at least the 15th century onwards generated a powerful impulse to the 
rise of capitalist relations of production developing, as Marx put it, "in the interstices 
of feudal society": 
From the early 19th century onwards, on the other hand, the development of 
the productive forces has created an increasingly powerful impetus towards 
socialism. The increasing socialisation of production, the growth of the 
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world working class, the rise of the world economy, the advances of science 
and technology ... all press humanity in the direction of social ownership and 
democratic planning. 2 
There are four basic reasons why productive forces provide this impulse towards 
the reorganisation of production relations. Firstly class-based relations of production 
always place fetters upon the development of material production which throw society 
into crisis and thereby open up a "space" in which oppositional currents to the ancien 
regime can prosper (i. e. by articulating ideas which promise a solution to the problems 
of society and mobilising struggles against the old order). Secondly, and as we have 
already seen, the cumulative development of the productive forces of society provide 
"conditions of possibility" for the construction of new production relations, which are 
better equipped to allow further economic development, which "somewhat rational" 
agents (appropriately placed and with vested interests in so doing) are bound to grasp 
the potential for sooner or later. Thirdly "vested interests" and attendant "opportunity 
costs" in acting in ways appropriate to these vested interests are associated with those 
social agents whose livelihood depends upon the advancement of new forms of 
wealth-creation or social ownership, which collide with the vested interests of agential 
collectivities centred on socially dominant modes of economic exploitation (i. e. in 
extinguishing or controlling the threat of new productive forces to the established 
social relations from which they derive their privileges), and which in so doing 
motivate a struggle between them, the outcome of which determines the future 
developmental possibilities of society. 
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Finally relations of production always invest in the agents of subordinate classes 
not only vested interests in developing the productive forces beyond the existing 
economic organisation of society but also the "structural capacities" to do so. In other 
words, there are powerful and objectively determined factors working in favour of the 
overturning of existing relations of production by the developing forces of production 
these have themselves (at least in part) engendered. For example, under capitalism, the 
structural capacities of the working class include: "its immense numerical superiority 
over the bourgeoisie; its concentration in workplaces and the cities; the dependence of 
the bourgeoisie on the working class for all its operations including the operation of 
its state; and the fact that the working class can rule society without the bourgeoisie 
but the bourgeoisie cannot exist without the working class, which means that the 
bourgeoisie has to go on defeating the working class indefinitely but the proletariat 
has only to defeat the bourgeoisie once (in the world historical sense). " 63 Such 
structural factors of the capitalist mode, generated by the relentless expansion and 
centralisation of production and hence of the working class, impart a certain 
directional impulse towards the establishment of socialist relations of production by 
virtue of the fact they make the eventual victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie 
not only a possibility but also a probability (though not of course an inevitability: this 
depending on the outcome of the struggle between classes during "critical periods" 
where the balance of power between them is virtually even). 64 
The significance of the relations of production, by contrast, consists of the fact 
they generate a social integument which facilitates and stimulates a certain 
quantitative and qualitative development of economic output and labour productivity 
yet which act as a brake or barrier on this development of material production beyond 
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a certain point. As Marx puts it: "From forms of development of the productive forces 
these social relations turn into their fetters. "65 This does not mean that the social 
relations of production determine whether or not there is any economic development 
in a society. A treatment of structural conditioning as structural hydraulics is, after all, 
ruled out by Marx's theory of "species-being", which allows for a certain weak 
tendency of the productive forces to develop irrespective of socio-historical context, 
under the stimulus of rational human interests (in expanding consumption, taming 
environmental pressures, allowing greater leisure opportunities, etc. ). This being the 
case, the explanatory function of production relations does not consist of the fact that 
they are (normally) sufficiently constraining of human agency to fix or extinguish this 
tendency of the productive forces to develop. To repeat the basic point: production 
relations exert a conditional influence upon productive forces by virtue of their 
capacity to further or fetter their development. They do not "select" or "cause" 
productive forces, any more than productive forces "select" or "cause" production 
relations. 
Relations of production constrain and further productive forces in the sense they 
shape both the tempo of economic development and the scope for economic progress 
and consumption which is possible in a society without endangering the reproduction 
requirements of its economic structure. This capacity of relations of production to do 
so is a function of their internal organisation. Hunter-gatherer social relations, for 
instance, are capable of supporting the consumption of a band consisting only of 
twenty or thirty persons, and they constitute a barrier to economic development 
beyond the narrow requirements of "simple reproduction" (though they enable a level 
of consumption for all which is entirely adequate to elementary human needs). This is 
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because foraging social relations are based upon procuring not producing the means 
of subsistence from the material environment, which by its nature provides little 
potential to increase labour productivity, and no stimulus whatsoever towards a 
division of labour beyond that of sex. 
Capitalist social relations, by contrast, give rise to a dynamic of economic growth 
which outstrips by far the rate of economic development of any previous mode of 
society, and which generates the material potential to sustain an equivalence of 
consumption on a global scale without denying anyone a decent standard of life. Yet 
these relations can only do so by sustaining "societal scarcity" in tandem with 
convulsive crises of "overproduction" and "overaccumulation" which threaten the 
stability of the whole system. This is because capitalist production relations are based 
upon two great "separations" - of the direct producers from any access whatsoever to 
the means of production and of the property-owning class into separate yet 
interdependent units of capital in a competitive marketplace - which pressurise the 
latter (under pain of bankruptcy) to continually strive to increase the rate of 
exploitation (i. e. productivity) of the former and to accumulate resources in expanded 
production irrespective of the limits of the market to absorb the output of labour. Here 
prohibitive opportunity costs attached to practices which are not conducive to the 
pursuit of optimum profitability and maximum exploitation of labour in the 
marketplace ensure that most members of the propertied class precisely conduct 
themselves as capitalists. 
Production relations, where these are organised as class relations, thus fetter the 
productive forces by virtue of the fact they generate vested interests among the 
powerful and propertied in preserving an asymmetrical distribution of the means of 
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production and consumption, upon which they must act in defence if they are to 
preserve or enhance their life-chances or advantages generally vis-ä-vis other class 
groupings. In the case of feudal and tributary society, for example, production 
relations typically fetter productive forces by overburdening the subsistence agrarian 
economy with the profligate consumption and other expenditures of an unproductive 
group, thereby giving rise to terrible famines and the collapse of peasant production 
(due to an insufficiency of use-values) during periods in which agricultural yields are 
lower than average. In the case of capitalist society, by contrast, production relations 
typically fetter productive forces, not by generating an insufficiency of use-values to 
meet the culturally-defined expectations of rulers and ruled, but by stimulating a 
periodic expansion of economic investment and output (subject to the competitive 
pressures of "many capitals") beyond the limits of the market, and by undermining the 
basis of capital accumulation and hence profitability by replacing workers with 
machines (subject to these same competitive market pressures). 
In any social system, therefore, the potential of the productive forces to develop, 
and the nature of their development, depends crucially upon the extent to which the 
social relations of production and economic exploitation (i. e. class relations) retard or 
facilitate (or indeed distort) the rational imperative of human agents to improve the 
methods and productivity of social labour. The less the structure of class relations 
operates to fetter the capacity or inclination of interactants to pursue their human 
interests in developing material production, or the more the class organisation of 
society functions to subsume rational human needs and interests under vested interests 
rooted in the competitive accumulation of wealth ("production for the sake of 
production"), the greater is the capacity of the relations of production to facilitate or 
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even impel a more rapid tempo of development of productive forces than would 
otherwise be possible. 
4.3: STRUCTURE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE IN MARXIAN SOCIOLOGY: 
AN EXPOSITION AND DEFENCE 
Before addressing the meaning of the relationship between structure and 
superstructure in Marxian sociology it is necessary to consider briefly the question of 
what comprises the superstructure. To make clear an earlier argument: the actual or 
immediate contents or products of human consciousness have nothing to do with the 
superstructure, since these are bound up with social interaction, not with the resultants 
of this interaction. 
66 Nor is the superstructure to be identified only with legal and 
political relations (plus other ideological forms which are "functional" to the base), as 
is suggested by G. A. Cohen's interpretation of Marx. 
67 Certainly Marx does argue that 
the economic structure of society is the "real basis upon which rises a legal and 
political superstructure. " But he also claims elsewhere that, 
upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, 
rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, 
illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The whole class creates and 
forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding 
social relations. The single individual, who receives them through tradition 
and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting 
68 
point for his own activity. 
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Clearly Marx identifies the superstructure with social ideas generally as well as 
political and legal relations. The superstructure is, then, best grasped as an ensemble 
of emergent social and cultural structures which arise on the "economic foundation". 
It is, in other words comprised of every social and ideational structure which is not 
part of the base. This does not necessarily mean that every cultural or social property 
which is to be found in the superstructure is directly explainable in terms of the 
economy. (An endorsement of the contrary view seems to explain Cohen's desire to 
resist "overpopulating" the superstructure). For one thing the "real basis" of "social 
relations", which for Marx gives rise to "modes of thought and views of life" includes 
human organisms, their species capacities and needs, and the law-governed physical 
environment which furnishes the labour process with its raw materials. 69 Furthermore 
Engels makes the point that social ideas and institutions are generated by the 
reciprocal interaction of superstructural spheres, not simply by the economic base as 
"sole active cause". 70 This means that non-economic social and cultural structures 
have economic and non-economic "material foundations" and are shaped by 
horizontal generative mechanisms as well as by vertical ones. 
Enough said (for the moment) about the superstructure. Let us now address the 
relationship between base and superstructure. Now the structure-superstructure model 
should "be seen as making a distinctive claim about the kinds of structures which have 
primacy in explaining social systems, namely that these are the forces and relations of 
production. , 
71 But of what does this "primacy" consist? Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
view of its centrality to Marxist sociology, intense controversy has always surrounded 
the appropriate way of grasping the interplay between "economy" and "society" in 
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historical materialism, and a number of different "solutions" to this question have 
been mooted by Marxists over the years. 
For the "orthodox" Marxists of the Second International, Marx's claim that the 
mode of production is the "real basis" of society was commended as an unequivocal 
statement of technological determinism: productive forces determine economic 
relations which in turn determine social relations. For the humanist New Left, by 
contrast, Marx's argument was treated simply as "metaphor" or "heuristic", the 
usefulness of which was often more misleading than illuminating. From this point of 
view Marxism was better grasped as the "philosophy of practice" (as Gramsci 
famously put it) not as a structural sociology. 72 In response to these opposing 
positions, the structural Marxists attempted a compromise position which insulated 
Marxism from the terrible twins of voluntarist idealism and economic determinism. 
For them the relationship between structure and superstructure became reformulated 
either as economic "determination in the final instance" or less ambitiously as a 
statement of the passive restrictive impact which the economy exercises over 
society. 73 Finally in more recent years, of course, it has become fashionable to 
interpret the structure-superstructure model as an empirical thesis which is applicable 
only to capitalism (where economy and class are said to be dominant unlike in pre- 
capitalist societies where politics and status are more important). 74 
Structure and superstructure: traditional objections 
Why this diversity of opinion on the theoretical status of base and superstructure in 
historical materialism? An interesting explanation of why this has been the case is 
provided by David Lee and Howard Newby. 75 For them the logic of Marx's structure- 
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superstructure distinction, as a particular application of the materialist method in the 
human sciences generally, sponsors a determinism and fatalism which is difficult to 
square with the "dialectical", "emancipatory" and "humanist" dimensions of his 
thought. In other words, Lee and Newby postulate an unresolved tension right at the 
heart of Marx's social philosophy between, on the one hand, a theory of human 
agency (Marxism as the "philosophy of practice") and, on the other hand, a theory of 
"structural causality" in which economic facts are "ultimately determining". It is this 
contradiction at the heart of Marxist discourse (between "humanism" and 
"structuralism", between "voluntarism" and "economism") which has fuelled the 
ongoing dispute between those who have legitimately appropriated different aspects 
of his philosophical legacy, or such is the opinion of Lee and Newby. 
Whatever one makes of this argument, at least Lee and Newby recognise that 
there is room for "ambiguity" on the manner of which Marx's social theory should be 
understood: "humanist" or "economist", "activist" or "structuralist", "emancipatory" 
or "determinist". By contrast, a depressing feature of the overwhelming majority of 
post-war opinion in the western academy on this question has been its inability to 
concede even this much. Under the baneful conditional influence of Cold War politics 
and ideology, the western intelligentsia has generally seen fit to endorse Max Weber's 
crude dismissal of Marxism as an "antiquated doctrine ... which satisfies the dogmatic 
need to believe that the economic `factor' is the only `real' one, the only `true' one ... 
which `in the last instance is everywhere decisive'. "76 Particularly in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and with the spectre of "communism repentant"", it 
is doubtless this fact which explains how it is that Tony Spybey, to offer a random 
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example, can still find a publisher in the 1990s prepared to publish his (staggeringly 
original! ) view that, 
[t]he appraisal and criticism of historical materialism may be continued on 
the basis of [its] economistic bias. The crucial mechanisms and dynamics of 
change ... are located exclusively 
in the economic institutions of human 
societies. This implies a neglect of other institutions, in particular the 
politico-military institutions associated with the wielding of power and 
authority.... The proposal that a single type of social institution can be seen 
as functional for change is one that must be treated with suspicion. 78 
Now the very best thing that can be said of the argument that either Marx or 
Engels endorse economic reductionism is that it is (to put it diplomatically) 
"considerably overstated". Two simple observations ought to suffice to make this 
clear. Firstly, although there are undoubtedly a number of passages in the works of 
Marx and Engels (some examples of which I have already analysed) which it is 
possible (though not always plausible) to interpret in this light, it is nonetheless the 
case that the attribution of a reductionist world-view to either of them can be sustained 
only by isolating such passages from the wider theoretical context of their writings. 
Secondly, aside from considerations of this kind, it is clear that Marx's most famous 
exposition of the structure-superstructure model, and of his distinction between 
"social being" and "social consciousness" (in the 1859 Preface), is notable chiefly for 
the manner in which it avoids postulating the monocausal determination of political 
and ideological relations by economic structures: 
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In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, 
political and intellectual life-processes in general. It is not the consciousness 
of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness. 79 
Since Marx is quite clear here that the relationship between economic structure 
and politico-ideological superstructure is not a determined one, in which the latter is a 
passive reflection of the former, it does seem uncharitable to say the least to place the 
blame for the vulgarisation of Marxism as economic reductionism on the Old Man's 
"muddled" ideas. Taken at face value, after all, Marx's argument grasped as a whole 
commits us only to the notion that the social and material facts of human existence 
"determine" (in an unspecified way) human consciousness, including perhaps the 
products of human consciousness. I have already suggested (in chapter one) that this 
is an entirely defensible thesis, and not one which necessarily entails an implausible 
separation of thought and action in the daily life-process of individuals. As a 
statement of the structural relationship between "economy" and "society", on the 
other hand, Marx's argument is far more qualified and subtle. The language here is of 
"correspondence", "rootedness" and "conditioning", not of "determination". For Marx 
the economic structure no more appears to "cause" the superstructure than, say, the 
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foundations of a block of flats determines the internal configuration and furnishings of 
the dwellings which reside above. 
Clearly, then, whatever Marxism is it is not simple economic determinism. But is 
there perhaps more substance to Lee and Newby's more interesting claim that there 
exists a "contradiction" between "structuralism" and "activism", between 
"materialism" and "humanism" in Marx's thought? In fact, there is not. The latter 
aspect of this argument is easiest to dispose of. As we have seen, Marx's theory of 
"human nature" (upon which his humanism is based) is a materialist account of the 
genetic foundations of conscious human agency. As such Marx's endorsement of 
materialist ontology and method in the human sciences generally does not in the least 
contradict a "voluntarist" account of human agency. Clearly it is not being denied by 
him that "structures" or "societies" are made and remade by the conscious and self- 
conscious doings of individuals. All that it being argued is that the "voluntarism" of 
social action has its material basis in humanity's species-being. 
The first part of Lee and Newby's argument poses a greater challenge to Marxism 
than the second. Nonetheless it does not pose insuperable problems for the version of 
historical materialism I am seeking to articulate and defend in this chapter. I have 
already suggested that Marx does not (as he ought) distinguish clearly between 
"action" and its "environments". Inasmuch as he fails to do so his sociology is 
certainly "ambiguous". But once we put Marx "right" on this matter (in the manner I 
have suggested) the "tension" in his theory disappears. Just as the social world is 
populated by both structures and subjects, so it is possible to speak of "conditions" 
and "consciousness", of "determination" and "voluntarism" in social life. Lee and 
Newby, by contrast, cannot imagine how this "confusion" in Marx can be resolved. 
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Because they themselves do not distinguish between "action" and its "environments" 
(and apparently can conceive of no conceptual means by which this might be 
accomplished) they are forced into either-or polarities: structure or action, or to put it 
another way Marx's base-superstructure model of society versus Marx's "philosophy 
of practice". 
Structure-superstructure as a thesis of vertical causation in social systems 
Despite the variety of interpretation on the question of the appropriate way of 
grasping Marx's structure-superstructure model, it is my own belief that a thorough 
examination of the joint works of Marx and Engels allows of only one "reasonable" 
understanding of this matter (in the sense of not being contradicted by the textual 
evidence). I do not believe, nor can I see how, the textual data supports a view of the 
relationship between structure and superstructure as mere "metaphor", or as "ideal 
type" or "heuristic device" (and certainly not as economic reductionism). Nor do I see 
how the "explanatory primacy" of the mode of production can be interpreted only in 
terms of the restrictive impact it has on the wider social structure of a society, or as 
"determination in the final instance", as the Althusserians would have it. Freed from 
these dead-ends, my own interpretation of Marx defends the primacy of socio- 
economic "base" vis-ä-vis politico-ideological "superstructure" in terms of the 
following arguments. Firstly the "foundational" role of the mode of production in 
generating "conditions of existence" for non-economic social structures (and the 
practices which govern them) and in furnishing a determinate range of material 
constraints and enablements upon which these structures and practices are dependent 
and within which they are "bounded" in empirically specifiable ways. Secondly the 
p 
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explanatory significance of the mode of production as the central determiner of the 
vested interests and hence political consciousness and conduct of interactants. Finally 
the explanatory significance of the mode of production in shaping the content of 
political and juridical relations, and especially of those cultural and ideological forms 
which are "functional" to its stable reproduction, or which express the "contradictions 
of real life". 
The role of economic structures in enabling and setting limits to non-economic 
structures and practices 
The notion that the mode of production is the "basis" or "foundation" of all non- 
economic social activities and structures in society in the sense of generating 
"conditions of possibility" for their existence and development has already been 
elaborated in chapter one. It is therefore sufficient for my current purposes to simply 
reiterate the relevant points in summary fashion. The foundational status of the 
economic structure of society in Marx's sociology has a twofold character in this 
sense. On the one hand, a "diachronic" dimension. This is because the mode of 
production in human history must have had an existence prior to non-economic 
practices and structures, which makes it an entirely defensible argument to claim that 
the former is "basic" to the latter, the "source" from which the latter is "emergent" 
and in which it is "rooted". As Marx puts it: "The first historical act is ... the 
production of the production of material life itself. "80 On the other hand, ' a 
"synchronic" dimension. This is because the mode of production precludes certain 
superstructural forms (e. g. "a feudal base is incompatible with universal suffrage and 
parliamentary democracy and obviously could not give rise to the philosophy of John 
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Stuart Mill, the economics of Adam Smith, the novel as the dominant literary form or 
the paintings of either Rembrandt or Jackson Pollock")81 whilst at the same time 
generating the surpluses of time and resources (human and material) which allow any 
society to support and further elaborate non-productive activities and therefore non- 
economic emergent structures. 
This aspect of Marx's latter argument is well summarised by Roger Gottlieb: 
The mode of production is a central determiner of social life because it sets 
the limits to and provides the resources for all other human activities. The 
level of technological, scientific and productive development determines 
how much time and energy we have for activities other than simply meeting 
our survival needs. The mode of production provides the resources to support 
non-labouring intellectuals, artists and researchers. Thus the possibilities of 
philosophy, art and theoretical science exist within bounds determined by 
how developed the productive forces are. This development not only makes 
certain activities possible, it rules out others, making old ways of life 
impossible and demanding new forms of human interaction. The more 
technology is developed, for instance, the less people need to trust in 
superstition. The more production is socialised and geographically 
interdependent, the less meaningful small political boundaries can be. From 
small dukedoms we forge nations. Out of nations we forge a united Europe. 
82 
As Chris Harman rightly points out, Marx's view that socio-economic structure is 
"basic" to politico-ideological superstructure in the senses described above is derived 
from his corresponding view that "there exists a core activity at any point of history 
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which is a precondition for everything else that happens [in society] - the activity of 
work on the material world in order to get food, shelter and clothing. "83 Since social 
labour to procure the means of subsistence generates the resources which allows the 
reproduction and elaboration of forms of activity external to material production, so it 
is equally the case that those emergent economic structures which flesh-and-blood 
agents inherit from previous generations of toilers function to support the wider 
structures of society in the same fashion and shape the potential to which these can be 
elaborated or developed by those here present. As Engels famously puts it: "Political, 
juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on 
economic development. But ... [i]t 
is not that the economic situation is cause, solely 
active, while everything else is only passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the 
basis of economic necessity. "84 Thus it is the productive labours of the dead 
generations which support superstructural emergents and which prefigure the scope 
and form of their subsequent development by human agents: structure is "basic" to 
superstructure because the activity of material production to sustain human life is 
"basic" to all other socio-cultural activities. In other words, the mode of production as 
"structure" and "action" is what enables the possibility of those modes of socio- 
cultural practice which give rise to the development or differentiation of 
superstructural spheres over time. 
The decisive role of economic structures in shaping the political consciousness 
and agency of interactants 
I have suggested that Marx is committed to a view of structural conditioning whereby 
the socio-economic base of society explains the political thinking and agency of 
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interactants. This thesis is obviously more controversial than the one I have attributed 
to Marx above. Nonetheless it is defensible and plausible if it is understood as 
follows. That is, not as a thesis specifying that every aspect of political consciousness 
or form of activity must have an economic motive or locus. But as a statement of the 
primacy of those "situational logics" governed by productive force development and 
class membership in determining the general "conditions of life" and "vested 
interests" of human agents, and by logical extension which of those politico-cultural 
values or attitudes in currency in a society are likely to form the core of their thinking 
and thereby feed into collective struggles to reproduce, reform or transform an 
existing social system. In the following exposition I will attempt to add some 
substance to this argument. 
As noted earlier, where social relations of production involve an uneven 
distribution of the means of production (and hence subsistence) they give rise to class- 
divided societies, whereby a non-productive group utilise their effective control over 
certain of the conditions of labour and wealth-creation to extort surplus labour or 
surplus product from a class of "direct producers". By stratifying the "societal 
community" into vastly divergent socio-economic circumstances, with grossly 
asymmetrical access to material and cultural goods, class-divided relations of 
production distribute contradictory vested interests (plus attendant opportunity costs 
in acting appropriately in their defence or pursuit) to concretely situated agents. These 
"conditions of life" which are bounded by the class positioning of agents in the 
relations of production, along with the vested interests which agents possess by virtue 
of their class positioning (and upon which they must act if they are to defend or 
improve their life-chances), together feed into the social consciousness of interactants 
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as conditional influences, shaping the general outlook and hence politico-cultural 
activity of those subject to them. Indeed, they do so not as one structural generative 
mechanism amongst a plurality of equivalents (e. g. nationality, ethnicity, gender, 
etc. ), but as the fundamental one, which as such explains rather more of the content of 
human political thinking and agency than do the others, or such is my contention. 
What is the warranty for endorsing this simple though controversial argument? 
Marx has a decisive answer. This is simply that class relationships have a fundamental 
significance in shaping inequalities of access to authoritative and allocative resources 
which other modes of stratification simply do not have to an equivalent degree. Class 
has explanatory primacy in conditioning the socio-political thinking and activity of 
interactants (for structural change or replication) by virtue of its key role in 
determining the access of interactants to the basic necessities of food, clothing and 
shelter, not to mention leisure, cultural and educational opportunities, together with 
effective means of political representation in a society. Though it is certain that other 
forms of "disadvantage" and "inequality" (even domination) exist in society, that 
these are as "real" as class divisions, and that these are by no means insignificant, 
these are nonetheless less important than class relations in these crucial respects, not 
least because class relations are relationships of exploitation which by their very 
nature must involve "domination" together with an asymmetrical distribution of the 
means of production and consumption. Since the interests and experience of agents 
are shaped crucially by their respective access to the means of material and cultural 
production and subsistence it follows that the content of their political consciousness 
and action (and those forms of cultural identity and activity which are explainable in 
terms of their conditions of life) must be explained primarily in terms of class. 
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By way of elaboration of these (exceedingly contentious! ) assertions I will 
address what is perhaps the key objection to them. I refer to the popular view of 
sociologists that any talk of the "primacy" of class over other modes of inequality (in 
the senses I have described) is an "essentialist" error, on the grounds that class is but 
one form of "stratification" or "domination", others such as race and gender being 
equally or more important. What are the grounds for accepting this argument? In the 
extended analysis that follows I will seek to answer this question. This I will do by 
focusing on the examples of stratification by race and sex, for the simple reason that 
these are normally seen as particularly decisive counter-examples to the primacy of 
class as I have conceived it. What is the warranty for supposing that these determine 
the life-chances or conditions of life (and hence vested interests) of interactants to the 
same extent as stratification by class? What are the implications of stratification by 
race, gender and class for the articulation of human agency? I will address each of 
these questions in the order I have presented them above. 
Employment, pay and property by sex, race and class in modern Britain: empirical 
indicators 
Important inequalities exist between men and women and between ethnic groupings in 
terms of property ownership. It is reasonable to surmise that white males possess on 
average about 3.4 times more wealth than non-white males per head of the 
population, 
85 and survey data indicates that only 40% of marketable wealth in the UK 
economy is owned by women (according to figures for the early 1970s). 
86 Major 
inequalities also exist between men and women and between ethnic groupings in 
terms of access to Professional or Managerial class (PMC) positions. Contemporary 
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research indicates that 27% of white male economically active persons but only 21% 
of non-white male economically active persons were employers, professionals, 
administrators and managers in 1988-90 (a mere 12% of whom were Africans or West 
Indians). 87 Survey data also shows that: (i) 32.1 % of male employees but only 24.7% 
of female employees in full-time work were occupants of PMC posts in 1979; 88 (ii) 
15.8% of all working males but only 10.5% of all working females were employers, 
higher professionals or administrators in 1993; 89 and that only 3% of high court 
judges, 5% of company directors, 14% of barristers and solicitors, 17% of full-time 
university lecturers and 4% of academic professors were women in 1991.0 To this I 
might add that inequalities of wealth and access to PMC positions go hand in hand 
with inequalities of income between men and women and between whites and non- 
whites who are incumbents of the same or similar occupational positions in the labour 
market. 91 
Nonetheless empirical indicators from other sources are strongly suggestive of 
the fact that such economic inequalities between women and men and between whites 
and non-whites are much narrower than those which are structured by class 
relationships. This is particularly evident in the case of property ownership. 
According to government figures for 1991, the lower 50% of the population 
(comprised largely of manual workers, unemployed manual workers, plus their 
dependants) own a mere 8% of national wealth. Taken as a whole the working class 
(approximately 70% of the population) own just 21% of national wealth 92 Now one 
does not need to be a mathematician to work out that females (approximately half of 
the population) own nearly twice as much property as proletarians (approximately 
three-quarters of the population). Nor does one need to be a statistician to grasp that 
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the average distribution of wealth per head for non-white males is vastly greater than 
that for proletarian males and females. For whereas it is defensible to surmise that 
individual non-white males own on average nearly 30% of the property of individual 
white males, it is also uncontentious that proletarian men and women in semi-skilled 
and unskilled occupations own a share of property per head which is half that of non- 
white males (and eighteen times less than that accruing to male and female members 
of the "professional-managerial" and employer classes). 93 
That class relations also play the major role in determining pay differentials in the 
occupational structure is also beyond serious question. This can be demonstrated by 
comparing the inequalities of income which exist in the labour market by race, sex 
and class. Empirical research has shown that in 1978 manual workers received on. 
average roughly 47.5% and unskilled manual workers just 41.5% of the pay of higher 
professionals, managers or administrators. 
4 Since subsequent years have seen the 
abolition of wages councils, the return of mass unemployment, the shifting of the 
burden of direct and indirect taxation from rich to poor, and the weakening of trade 
union organisation and working class militancy, it is reasonable to suppose that these 
relative differentials in income between members of the PMC and the manual working 
class have been considerably widened. How do these figures compare with those 
which reveal the extent of inequalities of pay by sex and race? The New Earnings 
Survey reveals that women workers earned on average only 74% of the hourly rate and 
66% of the gross weekly earnings of male workers in 1984.5 Nicholas Abercrombie 
and Alan Warde report that non-manual and skilled manual workers from ethnic 
minorities earned only 77% and 89% respectively of the income of their white 
counterparts in 1986.96 Again stratification by class clearly gives rise to significantly 
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greater inequalities in the "market situation" and hence life-chances of interactants 
than does stratification by race or sex. 
The causal primacy of class membership or positioning in shaping the access of 
interactants to high status positions within the occupational structure is perhaps less 
clear than it is for determining occupational income differentials and the distribution 
of property. Nonetheless it is no less decisive. Data from social mobility surveys is 
particularly instructive here. David Glass's famous 1949 study, for instance, reveals a 
high degree of social closure by class: 53.4% of the sons of professionals and higher 
administrators were themselves professionals, higher administrators, managers or 
executives, whereas only 0.8% of the sons of unskilled manual workers, 1.3% of the 
sons of semi-skilled manual workers, and 3.3% of the sons of skilled manual workers 
were occupants of these same positions. 97 Subsequent research into social mobility 
has revealed a significant weakening of the rigidity of the occupational structure by 
class but enormous inequalities of access and opportunity remain firmly in place. 
According to the Oxford Mobility Study of 1972, for example, 64.8% of the sons of 
higher professionals, high grade administrators, managers in large industrial concerns 
and large proprietors were to be found in these same occupations.. By contrast, only 
14.9% of the sons of unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled manual workers were found to 
be occupants of these role-positions. 8 These findings of the Oxford study have been 
confirmed by more recent research by Gordon Marshall et. al. (1988) 99 According to 
this, 59.6% of sons from PMC backgrounds (as defined by the occupational position 
of "chief childhood supporter") were themselves occupants of PMC positions as 
adults, whereas just 20.2% of sons from manual working class backgrounds were 
found to be incumbents of these same positions. '°° 
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Though these data are not strictly analogous to or contemporary with those cited 
above for the distribution of the occupational structure by sex and ethnicity, they 
nonetheless does suggest that the class membership of interactants has far greater 
causal significance than their racial or sexual characteristics in determining their 
access to the "new middle class" of professionals, administrators or managers and the 
employing class. Certainly the relative degree of participation by individuals from 
working class backgrounds in the upper reaches of the occupational hierarchy is less 
than for individuals who are women or who are from non-white ethnic groupings. 
Thus 24.7% of full-time female workers were members of the PMC in 1979 whereas 
only 16.6% and 20.4% of adult males from skilled working class backgrounds were to 
be found in the same category in 1972 and 1988 respectively (most of whom were 
certainly in full-time employment). Thus 21% of non-white adult males were 
members of the PMC in 1988-90 whereas only 15.6% of adult males from semi- 
skilled and unskilled working class backgrounds were to be found in the same 
category in 1972 and only 20% in 1988.101 Furthermore, the relative differentials in 
opportunity which exist between the sons of working class and middle class parents, 
in terms of obtaining access to the PMC, are at least twice as great as those which 
exist between men and women or between white and non-white ethnic groupings. 
Thus whereas white males are roughly 1.3 times more likely to be found in the PMC 
than non-white males, and whereas male employees are roughly 1.5 times more likely 
to be found in the PMC than female employees, male employees from PMC 
backgrounds are 2.95 times more likely than male employees from manual working 
class backgrounds to be found within this occupational bracket. 
102 
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Further evidence for the primacy of class relations in determining the access of 
interactants to the PMC can be derived by comparing the occupational positions of 
men and women on the basis of their class origins. Research by Stanworth and 
Giddens has revealed that out of a sample of 460 company directors only 1% had 
manual working class origins. '03 This compares to 5% of company directorships 
which are held by women according to research already cited. Unfortunately, 
however, a paucity of studies examining the class composition of other elite 
occupations (such as university lecturers, professors, barristers, solicitors, judges, etc. ) 
means that general conclusions cannot be drawn here in relation to the "primacy 
debate". We know the extent to which women are under-represented in certain elite 
professions but not the extent to which individuals from working class families are. 
Fortunately aspects of Marshall's research can be used to illuminate this issue. 
Marshall's data reveal that 41.4% of females compared to 59.6% of males whose chief 
childhood supporter belonged to Class I (whose members are defined as higher 
professionals, higher grade administrators, managers in large industrial concerns and 
large proprietors) were themselves to be found in these same positions or in lower 
Class II positions within the PMC (such as lower professionals, lower scale 
administrators, managers in small businesses, etc. ). Marshall's data also show that 
57.2% of females compared to 59.4% of males whose chief childhood supporter was a 
member of Class II were also to be found in Class II or I. 104 Clearly men from PMC 
backgrounds have relative advantages over women from the same backgrounds. In 
fact, women from Class I origins have opportunities for occupational success which 
are about two-thirds of those enjoyed by men from the same class. 
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But these relative disadvantages between men and women within the PMC are 
minute beside those which exist between men and women from different social 
classes. For example, as I have already pointed out, of males whose chief childhood 
supporter was a skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled manual worker, a mere 20.2% 
managed to "make it" into the ranks of the PMC according to Marshall's figures for 
1988. For women from the same class position the figure for 1988 was a paltry 
14.5%. 105 Thus whereas women from the upper bracket of the PMC have 
opportunities for remaining within the PMC as a whole which are a third less than 
those of men from the same class situation, the opportunities for occupational 
mobility into the PMC by men from manual working class backgrounds are less than 
half of those of women from middle class backgrounds (for working class women 
more than a quarter less than for working class men), and little more than a third of 
those enjoyed by men from middle class backgrounds. This is surely fairly decisive 
evidence of the primacy of class membership over sexual makeup in limiting and/or 
facilitating the occupational opportunities of interactants. 
Education by sex, race and class in modern Britain: empirical indicators 
A sober appraisal of the available empirical data on the distribution of educational 
opportunity and access in contemporary Britain is again unambiguously supportive of 
the primacy of class over gender or ethnicity in shaping the life-chances of 
interactants. Consider first of all the distribution of elementary and "°A" level 
qualifications by sex, race and class. Now girls have "outperformed" 
boys in terms of 
acquiring GCSE, CSE and "0" level passes at Grade C or above for more than thirty 
years. 106 Indeed, since the 1990s girls have begun to "outperform" 
boys in terms of 
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acquiring "A" level qualifications as well. 107 There is no reason to be believe this 
trend will not continue, especially since it is probably explainable by differing 
socialisation patterns for male and female children which have proven to be extremely 
enduring. This being the case, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that the 
current unequal distribution of elementary and further qualifications by sex in the 
population at large will not persist beyond the next twenty years. 
Recent research has also indicated that differential educational attainment 
between ethnic groupings in terms of obtaining elementary and secondary 
qualifications is increasingly being undermined. Important inequalities still exist 
between whites and non-whites at these levels but they are less significant overall than 
previously. Thus 17% of whites and 13% of non-whites (including 16% of West 
Indians) of working age had achieved GCE "0" levels in 1988-90 whereas 24% of 
whites and 16% of non-whites (including 24% of West Indians) of working age had 
achieved "A" levels or their equivalents during the same period of time. 108 These 
figures paint a more optimistic picture than others for 1981-2 which showed that 17% 
of white but only 6% of black school leavers had achieved five or more graded "0" 
level results and that 13% of white but only 5% of black school leavers had achieved 
"A" level results. 109 
By contrast, the prospects for undermining proletarian disadvantage in terms of 
acquiring elementary and secondary qualifications remain as bleak as ever. Males and 
females from manual working class backgrounds (and especially males) continue to 
"underachieve" sharply relative to middle class males and females. These relative 
differentials in educational success at these levels between those from working class 
and middle class backgrounds are far greater than those which exist between those 
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from white and non-white ethnic groupings. Non-whites find that their chances of 
obtaining "A" levels are about two-thirds of those of whites, whereas persons born 
into "professional" middle class families are nearly four times more likely to achieve 
"A" level qualifications than those born into unskilled manual working class families. 
110 Whites find that their chances of ending up without any educational qualifications 
are about 16% less than for non-whites, whereas persons born into unskilled manual 
working class families are more than eight times more likely than those born into 
professional middle class families to end up with no educational qualifications. "' 
What is true of the relationship between class and ethnicity is also true of the 
relationship between class and gender. The fact that the emergent structure of 
educational disadvantage at secondary school and college level is shaped far more 
significantly by class than by gender is thrown into sharp relief by the following 
statistics. Whereas 33% of males and 40% of females had no educational 
qualifications in 1988-90, the equivalent figure for people from unskilled manual 
working class backgrounds was a staggering 60%. h 12 Whereas 59% of males and 53% 
of females had GCSE, CSE, "0" level or "A" level qualifications in 1992, for people 
from skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual working class families the equivalent 
figures were only 41%, 37% and 29% respectively. 113 Whereas 36% of males and 
17% of females aged 16-59 had "A" level qualifications or their equivalents in 1992, 
only 4% of individuals from unskilled manual backgrounds, 6% of individuals from 
semi- skilled backgrounds, and 8% of individuals from skilled manual backgrounds 
had managed to do the same by 1990-1.114 
The further up the education system one travels the tighter becomes the 
correspondence between educational disadvantage and class background and the 
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weaker (in relative terms) its association with gender or ethnicity. Figures show that 
roughly 46% of the intake of universities are women and that that a significantly 
larger percentage of all non-white school leavers than white school leavers are now to 
be found entering higher education establishments (though this is partly explainable in 
terms of higher unemployment rates for non-whites than for whites). ' 15 Research data 
also indicate that 11% of men but only 6% of women (aged 16-69) and that 8% of 
whites compared to 9% of non-whites (aged 16-59) have degrees. 116 In terms of 
access to and success in higher education, then, it is reasonable to conclude that 
whites no longer have (statistically significant) relative advantages over non-whites 
and that the relative advantages which men have over women are marginal. By 
contrast, men continue to hold significant advantages over women in terms of 
obtaining degrees and postgraduate qualifications (though with the growing 
equalisation of the numbers of men and women entering university this inequality is 
likely to be further eroded over the next few years). 
Now the relationship between class membership and access to and success in 
higher education is altogether less ambiguous than this. The reader will be unsurprised 
to learn that persons from manual working class backgrounds are far less likely than 
either women or non-whites to go to college or university or to achieve degree 
qualifications. This can be established definitively by the following measures. First by 
comparing the relative inequalities of access to higher education which exist between 
whites and non-whites and between men and women with those which exist between 
people from different class backgrounds. From this perspective, whereas stratification 
by ethnicity no longer appears to translate into (statistically significant) inequality of 
access to higher education institutions, and whereas stratification by gender ensures 
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that only 46% of the intake of universities are women, stratification by class ensures 
that only 1.1% of the intake of universities are from families whose head of household 
is an unskilled manual worker (according to figures for 1984). 117 Second by 
comparing the relative inequalities of access to university for women and men from 
different class backgrounds. From this perspective, whereas 40% of men and 24% of 
women aged 25-29 not in further education who had attended a university or 
polytechnic as their last educational establishment had fathers in professional or 
managerial occupations, only 1% of women and 3% of men (who fell into these 
categories) had fathers in unskilled manual employment! 
18 
Third by comparing the relative inequalities of access to higher education for 
whites and non-whites from different classes. From this perspective, whereas 37% of 
whites compared to 56% of non-whites aged 16-19 went into higher education in 
1988-90, only 47% of non-whites from unskilled or semi-skilled manual working 
class backgrounds compared to 69% of non-whites from professional-managerial or 
employer backgrounds did the same. 
119 Finally by comparing the relative inequalities 
of achievement in higher education (in terms of acquiring degree qualifications) which 
exist between men and women and between whites and non-whites with those which 
exist between people from different class backgrounds. From this perspective, 
whereas 9% of non-whites compared to 8% of whites aged 16-59 had acquired 
degrees or their equivalents in 1988-90, and whereas 7% of women compared to 12% 
of men aged 16-59 had done likewise by 1992,120 only 3% of persons aged 25-59 
from unskilled manual working class families compared to 32% of persons of the 
same age category from professional middle class backgrounds had achieved as much 
by 1990-1.121 Furthermore, whereas 56% of men and 47% of women aged 25-59 born 
399 
into professional middle class families had attended a higher education institution by 
1990-1, only 20% of men and 11% of women from skilled manual backgrounds and 
10% of men and 6% of women from unskilled manual backgrounds (of the same age 
bracket) had done likewise. 122 This means that persons from unskilled manual 
working class backgrounds are more than three times less likely than persons from 
professional middle class backgrounds to enter higher education and thirteen times 
less likely than persons from PMC backgrounds to secure a degree or equivalent 
qualification. By contrast, there are no (statistically) significant disadvantages at these 
levels between whites and blacks, whereas the chances of middle class women going 
into higher education are roughly 85% of those of middle class men, and those of 
women securing a degree or equivalent more than half of those enjoyed by men. 
The primacy of class relations in shaping the political consciousness and social 
agency of interactants 
My argument establishes that class relations have primacy over other structures of 
inequality by virtue of the fact they have by far the greater efficacy in shaping the 
situational logics of interactants. What are the implications of my account in terms of 
the shaping of political consciousness and agency and the articulation of social 
interests? I have made the claim that the "fateful power" of class relations in defining 
the life-chances of interactants ensures that class interests are "basic" to their political 
thinking and activity. What is the meaning of this proposition? For the most part it 
means that agents will recognise that class interests are fundamental to whatever other 
interests or identities they possess and will tend to act upon these in preference to 
others where they have the confidence to do so (unless prevented or discouraged). It is 
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for this reason that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggle. "123 Clearly this is not always the case for everyone, however, since 
mechanisms of class subordination are reinforced by other oppressions, and the 
uniqueness of individual experience does not always provide an accurate guide to 
which of these are basic. 
This being the case, I contend also that even where agents perceive that their life- 
chances are shaped primarily by structures other than class, and even where they 
imagine interests and identities other than class are of greater significance in shaping 
the content of their political actions, this is in fact a false consciousness, itself 
explainable in terms of class positioning, which can be revealed as such by examining 
the social content of the ideologies and agency of those who espouse such views. For 
example, despite the fact that many urban working class non-whites doubtless regard 
institutionalised racism or perhaps racist attitudes as the fundamental cause of their 
social disadvantages, if it can be shown that the grievances they articulate are 
primarily class issues, and if it can be shown that the forms of resistance which they 
engage in response to inequality and deprivation are modes of class agency, it follows 
that my thesis of the primacy of class relations in shaping the political thinking and 
activity of interactants is defensible. This, I suggest, can be demonstrated 
124 
satisfactorily. 
Yet I am not committed to arguing that for each and every interactant class 
relations are primary in the ways I have described above. It is important to grasp that 
the purpose of my argument is to postulate the primacy of class in shaping the life- 
chances and agency of collectivities not of individuals. For particular individuals 
structures of inequality other than class will be more significant in determining their 
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life-chances, even if this is not the case for most. Who would doubt, for instance, that 
this is sometimes true of the victims of sexual violence or of racially-motivated 
assaults and police "fit-ups"? Such experiences might well lead those who have been 
subject to them to conclude that racial or sexual domination are the fundamental 
forms of subordination in society. However it remains the case that such experiences 
are untypical in the sense that most blacks and (especially) most women have not 
endured them. The disadvantaged life-chances and economic exploitation associated 
with the class situation of the propertyless, on the other hand, is the inescapable 
experience of all proletarians, whether men or women, black or white. 
It is also important to be clear that my argument is not a statement of the 
correspondence of class interests and class consciousness. To say that class interests 
are basic to the social agency and political consciousness of interactants does not 
mean that interactants always and everywhere accurately represent either their 
immediate or their long-term class interests. 125 It is enough to say that agents will 
more often than not regard class as the central determiner of their situation in society 
and will think and act politically, whether appropriately or otherwise, in the light of 
this awareness (though they will for the most part be subject to systematic "directional 
guidance" to draw upon "traditions" of industrial struggle and political action which 
are at least appropriate to their immediate class interests). Nor is my argument a 
statement of structural determinism. Agents will normally tend to base their agency 
upon their (immediate) class interests, or upon a rough approximation of these, 
because a long-term failure to do so will incur punishingly prohibitive opportunity 
costs in the form of declining life-chances, which being "somewhat rational" most 
will be reluctant to pay. 
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This close connection between class membership and the political consciousness 
and social agency of interactants exists as much for bourgeois women and non-whites 
than for their proletarian counterparts. Yet the interplay between them is often more 
immediately or directly discernible in the case of the latter. This is for the simple 
reason that workers suffering at the sharp end of inequality, poverty, poor housing, 
substandard education and lack of autonomy at work (where they can get it! ) simply 
cannot afford the luxury of "constructing" their social experiences in a way which 
relegates class issues and grievances to a subordinate or secondary status. Class issues 
and interests will be immediately relevant to or present in their thinking and agency 
even where these are not recognised as such or are confused with interests other than 
class. Working class blacks and women, for instance, will articulate vested interests 
(e. g. for employment, a minimum wage, union rights, decent housing, properly funded 
welfare services, subsidised childcare facilities, an end to paramilitary policing, etc. ) 
which are unambiguously explicable in terms of class positioning, notwithstanding 
whatever beliefs they might have to the contrary. 
Indeed, they will tend to regard these as "more real" (i. e. less abstract) than those 
"purer" ethnic or gender interests championed by patriarchy theorists and black 
nationalists (such as "wages for housework", the overturning of "traditional" sex 
roles, equality of participation in the occupational sphere, even withdrawal from 
"colonial" or "patriarchal" society on the assumption that "whites" and "men" possess 
objective interests in the subordination or oppression of blacks and women by virtue 
of the material and other benefits which they purportedly derive from it). This is for 
the simple reason that a politics of gender and ethnicity conceived apart from and in 
opposition to class interests is alien to the real experience of proletarian women and 
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non-whites by virtue of the fact it stands in contradiction to fundamental aspects of 
their "social being". Little wonder that social movements oriented on patriarchy 
theory and black nationalism (which seek to organise women and blacks irrespective 
of class) have quickly found themselves fractured and undermined by class 
antagonisms. Little wonder that the contemporary politics of race and sex (as these are 
conceived by feminism and black nationalism) have been unable to secure activist 
organisational roots within the working class and can no longer even enlist mass 
passive or inactive support from working class women or blacks. 
126 
This is not to say that authentic gender and ethnic interests and identities are not 
integral aspects of the "social being" of women and blacks. Certainly issues such as 
racially motivated police harassment, racist attacks, domestic violence, inequalities of 
opportunity and pay in the labour market, abortion rights, and so on, are (or can be 
reasonably interpreted as) important sources of antagonism in society between men 
and women or between black and white. Nonetheless it is reasonable to suggest that 
for a majority of women and blacks such antagonisms are not seen as being rooted in 
irreconcilable differences of interest between themselves and men and/or whites, nor 
as more fundamental forms of advantage and disadvantage than those which are 
shaped by economic and class factors. Least of all are sexist and racist divisions 
interpreted by most women and blacks as forms of domination by which all men 
oppress and dominate women and by which "whites" subordinate "blacks". Nor are 
they likely to be understood in these terms under any circumstances. This is not 
simply because the "social being" of women and ethnic minorities is too complex and 
contradictory to be grasped by such simple and straightforward concepts. It is also 
because theories of ubiquitous male and white domination offer no practical political 
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means by which such oppressions can be successfully undermined, and as such are 
usually seen as rather pointless. 127 
A survey of black youth in 1980s Britain has revealed, for instance, that 
unemployment, low pay and state oppression are more fertile sources of discontent 
than racially-motivated assaults or white prejudice generally. 128 Today working class 
blacks are more likely to identify particular institutions of racial-class domination 
(especially the state) rather than "whites" as "the enemy". Recent research also 
indicates that most blacks in the UK (86%) recognise the need for "people of 
Asian/West Indian origin [to] ... join trade unions alongside white people. "129 Other 
surveys have documented a steady erosion and increasing marginalisation of racist 
attitudes amongst whites in the UK since the 1950s, '30 together with a sharp rise in 
"mixed race" relationships, including marriage. 131 Elsewhere the point has been made 
that women and men generally have a need to enter into intimate relationships with 
one another, to marry each other, to share their lives together, and continue to do so 
for reasons of "romantic love", which inevitably cuts against any simple identification 
of the relations between them as unambiguously and necessarily antagonistic or 
oppressive. 132 Since the same can hardly be said of the relations which exist between 
capitalists and workers, or between white racists and blacks, it is clear enough that 
gender and familial relations cannot be perceived simply or largely as rooted in the 
"oppression" and "exploitation" of "women" by "men", as a form of "serfdom" or 
"servitude" 133 or suchlike, despite the fact that real societal inequalities exist between 
the sexes and that particular interpersonal relations between particular men and 
women involve the exploitation and oppression of the latter by the former. 
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Such material realities simply do not square with the social analyses offered by 
feminism and black nationalism. Thus, whereas women and blacks will identify with 
aspects of the description of their subordinate status in society, as this is presented by 
patriarchy theorists and black nationalists (for the simple reason that they do 
experience sexism and racism which adversely shapes their life-chances), this 
awareness will rarely translate into positive endorsement of (and least of all activist 
support for) the formal ideas and politics of those who espouse such views. Indeed, 
though especially alien to the real experiences and interests of working class women 
and ethnic minorities, the political ideologies of black nationalism and patriarchy 
theory are hardly compatible even with the life-worlds of bourgeois women and 
blacks (because the experience of such individuals of racism and sexism is far less 
acute and vicious than for their proletarian "brothers" and "sisters" and is often 
different in kind). This being the case, it is scarcely surprising that feminism and black 
nationalism today have neither an organisational basis nor a substantial following 
amongst women or non-whites of any social class. 
Yet it is true that middle class women and blacks are more inclined than their 
working class counterparts to construct gender or ethnic interests and identifies which 
explicitly downgrade or deny class issues or interests. It is for this reason that modern 
feminism (oriented on patriarchy theory) and black nationalism (oriented on the 
ineradicability of white racism) is the exclusive preserve of PMC women and blacks 
respectively and is dominated by bourgeois politico-cultural values and attitudes. 
134 
This ideological orientation is sometimes explainable in terms of class opportunism 
pure and simple. Black and female members of the employing and managerial classes, 
for example, have vested interests in propagating the fashionable idea that gender and 
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ethnicity are the fundamental divides in society because this absolves them of 
responsibility for the exploitation of all proletarians (whether men or women, blacks 
or whites) and erects ideological barriers to the unification in struggle of a working 
class divided by race and gender. More often, however, it is accountable in terms of 
self-deception, as this is shaped by the specificity of their class positioning and 
experience. In this case the emancipation of middle class blacks and women from the 
brute realities of material subordination and disadvantage, by granting them the space 
to take their privileged class-determined life-chances "as given", allows them to 
project their relatively marginal disadvantages vis-a-vis white and male members of 
the same class as the fundamental forms of inequality for all blacks and all women 
and to fondly imagine they are part of a "community" unified by sex or race. Yet, 
despite this, the content of their social consciousness and agency is normally better 
explained in terms of class positioning and attendant vested interests, irrespective of 
their views to the contrary. This is, of course, indicative of the fact that "gender 
interests" and "race interests" do not generally override "class interests" even for 
those who wish to claim the reverse is true. 135 
The decisive role of economic structures in shaping the function and content of 
superstructural forms 
I have contended that for Marx the structure of the mode of production is primary in 
conditioning political relations and certain forms of culture and ideology (especially 
those which have a "political" or "economic" dimension or function). How should this 
"primacy thesis" be understood? As implied above, not as a thesis of the "absolute 
determination" of every item of superstructure by structure. This would rehabilitate 
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the dishonest (or ignorant) caricature of Marxism proffered by the likes of Laclau and 
Mouffe, for whom "the base/superstructure model affirms that the base ... determines 
the superstructure, in the same way that the movements of a hand determine the 
movements of its shadow on a wall. " 136 Rather Marx's argument must instead be 
grasped as a specification of the central role of relations of production in conditioning 
the core content and function of those superstructural emergents (especially legal and 
political structures and ideologies) which are immediately relevant to either sustaining 
or challenging an existing mode of production and class exploitation. That such a 
view is defensible, even plausible, will hopefully be demonstrated in the analysis that 
follows 
The first point to make is an obvious one. Not all elements of the superstructure 
more-or-less express the vested interests of the propertied or even the "middling" 
classes. This is for the simple reason that the economic structure of a society is not a 
monolith, but is rather "a contradictory totality, a unity of opposites", 137 by virtue of 
the fact that it is comprised of a relationship of economic exploitation (and hence of 
political domination) between classes vis-a-vis the means of production, which 
imparts to interactants (by virtue of their agential positioning) differential life-chances 
and vested interests (in societal replication or change). To make the point more 
economically: since the economic structures of class-divided societies are dialectical, 
so the same is true of their superstructures. This being the case, certain cultural or 
ideological forms, and certain institutional structures (especially forms of political 
organisation), are always articulations or expressions of the conditions of life and 
vested interests of subordinate classes, whereas others entail a contradictory synthesis 
of the world-views and vested interests of rival or opposed classes. 
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Classic examples of the former include the original teachings of Jesus Christ prior 
to their adaptation in a distorted form as the official religion of the Roman empire 
(which inverted Greek and Roman views of the poor and destitute as "base" or 
"unworthy" and of the rich as "noble" and "upstanding" and developed the idea that 
private property and profit-making is immoral), 138 the socialism of Marx and Engels 
and those classical Marxists (Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Gramsci) who have sought 
to develop their intellectual and political legacy, and the revolutionary theory and 
practice of the Leninist form of party organisation. A classic example of the latter is, 
of course, the ideological and organisational emergents of the "trade union 
consciousness" of workers under capitalism, such as parliamentary socialism, 
Labourism and the bureaucratised reformist parties of western Europe, all which are 
rooted in an unstable (and normally unworkable) compromise between the interests of 
capital for higher profits and labour for higher wages and greater autonomy or self- 
determination at work. That Marx did not regard the politico-ideological super- 
structure as performing only a conservative function (in stabilising the relations of 
production) is implicit in his claim that "consciousness must be explained from the 
contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive 
forces and the relations of production. " There can be no doubt that for him the 
superstructure must be grasped as a "site of struggle" in which "legal, political, 
religious, aesthetic or philosophic forms" are those by which agents become conscious 
of the conflict between the forces and relations of production "and fight it out". 139 
The second point to make is that particular elements of the superstructure have a 
crucial "functionality" in respect of the reproduction requirements of the "dominant" 
mode of production in any society whereas others do not. On the one hand, those 
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"parts" of the superstructure which do possess this functional (practical and 
ideological) utility to relations of production - such as "the law, the judiciary, the 
police, the military, the education system", 140 political ideologies, political 
institutions, etc. - are immediately or directly subject to "directional pressure" to 
accommodate themselves over time in terms of their content to the vested interests of 
those class groupings who control or otherwise possess the means of wealth-creation. 
"Thus a modem capitalist economy could not co-exist with laws which were anti- 
capitalist in that they either looked back to feudalism by, for example, prohibiting 
usury (lending money and charging interest) or anticipated socialism by banning the 
employment of wage-labour or legalising the expropriation of the rich by the poor. "141 
On the other hand, those "parts" of the superstructure which do not possess this 
functional importance to relations of production (such as certain forms of "other- 
worldly" religious doctrines, etc. ) are not subject to this intense "directional pressure" 
to develop in ways which "fit in" with or which do not contradict or otherwise 
obstruct the dominant economic relationships (which is not to say that many of these 
cultural structures are not profoundly ideological). Thus "a capitalist economy can ... 
coexist with art that yearns for the feudal past (the pre-Raphaelites in Victorian 
England, the poetry of Ezra Pound, the fantasy novels of J. R. R. Tolkien) or makes 
propaganda for the socialist future (the plays of Brecht, the paintings of Leger and so 
on)", 142 not to mention a variety of different religious and philosophic forms. This 
means that certain elements of the superstructure are more or less "determined" by (or 
more or less "autonomous" of) the economic base than others. Which falls into which 
category cannot be settled by a priori schematic classifications but only by empirical 
investigation. As Franz Jakubowski puts it: "Any analysis of the extent to which 
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ideological and material relationships interpenetrate must be made individually, 
according to each particular case. " 143 
Naturally my argument does not mean that those elements of the superstructure 
which are embroiled in tight functional relationships with the base are passive effects 
of structural hydraulics. Interaction (motivated by vested interests and the punitive 
opportunity costs of not acting consistently in their defence or pursuit) is the 
mechanism by which superstructural emergents are brought into correspondence with 
the structural emergents of a society. But it is vested interests, as these are determined 
by the involuntary positioning of agents in the relations of production, which 
generates the impulse for the propertied to act in the appropriate ways, i. e. to utilise 
their structural capacities (as owners or controllers of wealth and property) to force 
superstructural spheres into a "functional" relationship (of compatibility or 
accommodation) with the mode of production. Yet it is important to note that 
functional relationships of correspondence or accommodation between structure and 
superstructure (or rather between structure and those elements of the superstructure 
which have immediate practical and ideological implications for the economic 
structure) are never "harmonious" or "integrated". The collision of vested class 
interests in society, as these in turn are shaped by relations of production, ensure that 
these superstructural relations are always "sites of struggle". Nonetheless it remains 
the case that, excepting periods of mass or revolutionary class struggle which call into 
question the existing organisation of social relations, the balance of class forces must 
always be such that the vested interests of the propertied are normally far better 
represented than those of any other agential grouping in those superstructural spheres 
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which are especially conducive to the "functional requirements" of the dominant 
economic relationships of a society. 
Economy and polity 
I have suggested that those elements of the superstructure which have particularly 
close links to the economic structure of society are political (i. e. state) and legal 
relations. Constraints of time and space compel me to focus on a single example - the 
relationship between economy and polity in capitalist society. The close 
correspondence between economy and polity is derived, in the first place, from the 
fact that the state owes its historical existence to inter-class antagonisms which are 
rooted in a certain level of development of material production: 
The emergence of the state presupposes a relatively highly developed 
division of labour. On the one hand, it presupposes that human labour is 
already productive enough to ensure that not all physically capable 
individuals actually carry out directly productive labour for their own means 
of subsistence, but they are already in a position to be employed on social 
interests which do not directly coincide with their own interests as 
individuals. On the other hand, the emergence of the state presupposes that 
there is already an opposition between individual and social interests; that 
production and appropriation no longer occur socially, as in primitive 
communism, but that appropriation takes place by means of exchanges 
between individuals. This mode of production causes society to split into 
classes, which are distinguished from each other by their position in the 
production process; the main result of this is that conflict occurs between 
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those classes which possess the means of production and those which do not. 
This is why the state becomes necessary. '44 
The historical origin of the state, in other words, is to be found in the conflict 
between exploiting and exploited classes: 
It is the admission that this society has got itself entangled in insoluble 
contradiction and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is 
powerless to exorcise. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with 
conflicting economic interests, shall not consume themselves and society in 
fruitless struggle, a power apparently standing above society, has become 
necessary to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; 
and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it and 
increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state. 
But this means that the state is "as a rule the state of the most powerful, 
economically dominant class" of a society, a mode of class domination. As such it is 
reconstituted anew to service the vested interests of every propertied class which rises 
to predominance in society, and in this way is brought into correspondence with 
"everystage of the relations of production": 
The ancient state was, above all, the state of the slave-owners for holding 
down the slave, just as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for 
holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern 
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representative state is the instrument for exploiting wage-labour by 
capital. '45 
The mechanism by which state structures are brought into "functional 
correspondence" with changes in "property relations" is of course the social agency of 
a rising propertied class (such as the bourgeoisie within the "womb" of feudal 
society). Yet the agency is more-or-less successful in the long-run because of the 
pressure of structural constraint. Initially the state has to reconcile the interests of old 
and new propertied classes (e. g. the aristocracy and the merchant capitalists in "late 
feudalism"), increasingly dependent as it is upon the revenue of both, and this 
modifies its social functions and the content of its political actions (the sponsorship of 
markets and trade as well as the legal protection of landed wealth and bonded labour). 
Later on, however, as old production relations are increasingly subverted by new (e. g. 
as petty capitalism supplants feudalism in the countryside), the polity - or rather the 
state elite - is placed under ever greater directional pressure to identify more closely 
with the vested interests bound up in the latter, since more and more of its revenue 
and patronage depends upon the economic activities of the newly ascendant class, 
without access to which it could not hope to maintain its bureaucratic structures nor 
its political control over a given territory. (I will develop this argument shortly in 
greater detail in the context of a discussion of the specificity of the interplay between 
polity and class in capitalist society). 
These structural constraints need not be derived entirely or even solely from the 
domestic scene however. The pressure can be regional or even global. Where a new 
mode of production has achieved predominance in one society, in one area of the 
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globe or even internationally, other societies or regions will quickly come under 
pressure to follow the same course. Assuming that the new mode of production is 
"progressive" (in the sense that it allows a greater tempo of economic development 
than the old), the punitive opportunity costs attached to clinging to unreformed 
political structures which are bound to archaic property relations (and attendant vested 
interests) are likely to include either military subordination (the external destruction of 
the state) or social and political decline more generally (together with the risk of 
overthrow of the state elite from within and its replacement with another more 
conducive to capitalistic interests and development). The history of early modern 
Europe provides ample examples of both contingencies. In Spain, for instance, the 
absolutist monarchy was unable to reform itself (stuck as it was between the 
landowners and the great merchants), and faded from the scene as a Great Power, 
losing control of much of its empire, presiding over a lengthy period of social 
dissolution and economic backwardness, before disintegrating altogether. In France, 
by contrast, the absolutist state was eventually overthrown by a petty-bourgeois led 
coalition, resulting in a period of rapid economic growth and the establishment of an 
empire of its own. Elsewhere, of course (most notably in Germany and Japan in the 
later part of the 19th century), the state elite was to the forefront in promoting 
successful capitalist industrialisation, motivated by the desire to partake of a slice of 
the economic cake to be plundered from more backward societies or regions and to 
avoid being subordinated to more developed industrial powers. 
But this tight correspondence between economy and polity is often disguised by 
the fact that the latter must simultaneously function as the guarantor of the conditions 
of class exploitation against the threat posed by the propertied classes of foreign 
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territories. The state must be an instrument of domestic class domination and of intra 
class competition on a wider stage (whether regional in the conditions of late 
feudalism or global as under the auspices of modem capitalism), and this means that a 
fundamental part of the state's activities must be concerned with the mobilisation and 
exercise of military power. A failure to grasp this fact doubtless explains the belief of 
many neo-Weberian sociologists (and Marxists influenced by their ideas) that 
"historically ... the primary function of the state has been external, in continuing 
struggles with other states for territory and power", 146 meaning that the logic of 
"exterminism" or "military accumulation" or "political competition" is beyond the 
ken of class analysis, following as it does from a dynamic which is autonomous of the 
mode of production. 147 Such a conception of state relations and class relations as 
comprising "two parallel systems" or discrete sources of social power, each "driven 
by different imperatives", 148 no doubt explains the (entirely logical) view of those 
(such as E. P. Thompson and Anthony Giddens) who argue that combating the threat 
posed to humanity by the "global military order" is a separate matter to the struggle 
for socialism against capitalism, and one which requires an independent movement 
which is capable of uniting "all good people" across class lines. 149 
Yet there are a number of good reasons for rejecting this neo-Weberian 
perspective. First international state relations since the Bolshevik revolution have 
undoubtedly been shaped by the "twin concern of the dominant classes in advanced 
capitalist societies ... to defend the `national interest' against all other capitalist states 
and ... to prevent the spread of 
`communism' anywhere in the world. "150 To interpret 
the latter as a "classless" phenomenon is thus to miss the whole point of the Cold 
War: namely that it was a conflict between rival systems of property relations on a 
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global scale, waged by military, ideological and economic means, and initiated by the 
USA and its allies to ensure that non-western parts of the world system remained 
"open" to commerce under the auspices of "neo-imperialism", irrespective of the 
social and human costs of this "strategy" for innumerable "Third World" peoples 
(chronic underdevelopment and attendant mass poverty). '5' Second, in the period 
prior to the challenge posed by "actually existing socialism" to bourgeois property 
relations (the so-called "age of imperialism" between 1875-1914), the drive of the 
advanced western states to forge or expand empires or zones of influence was 
motivated primarily by economic motives, themselves shaped by developments in the 
relations of production (notably the rise of state monopoly capitalism, the expansion 
of production beyond the limits of domestic markets and their existing satellites, the 
growing propensity of the system to crisis, etc. ). ' 52 Whatever the origins of the state 
system, then, its subsequent development has bound it ever tighter to capitalist social 
relations and interests. 
Third the historical and empirical evidence mobilised in defence of the thesis of 
the autonomy of polity from economy in modern capitalist societies is often flimsy to 
say the least. Nigel Harris, for example, in his attempt to establish "the general 
indifference of private capital to what I have identified as the primary function of the 
state" (i. e. waging war for the purpose of acquiring "power" or "territory"), claims 
that "[c]apital swallowed the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam 
War without a bleep. "153 He also goes on to argue that much state legislation, which is 
purported by Marxists to be in accordance with the interests of capital, is not actively 
promoted by the business lobby, and as such cannot be understood in terms of a class 
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analysis, being better grasped in terms of the political interests of the state elite to 
ensure the social cohesion of the territory it administers. 154 
Harris cites the example of anti-immigration controls in defence of this thesis. 
Though he acknowledges that these might serve capitalist interests by dividing the 
working class between "natives" and "foreigners", hence making collective resistance 
to capitalist exploitation more difficult, he denies that this evidences the subordination 
of the state to capital. ("[W]e can indeed invent reasons as to why capital favours 
immigration control, but are these the reasons immigration controls exist? "). 155 This is 
because such legislation has normally been campaigned for not by big capitalists but 
by "right wing conservative and openly fascist political forces" 56 who are most 
committed to nationalist identities and interests. The indifference of private capital to 
anti-immigration policies is, Harris contends, a measure of the dispensability of such 
measures to the functioning of the modem trans-state economic system (which 
depends we are told on the free movement of commodities, capital and labour). '57 
After all, "[p]rivate capital has an interest in dividing the working class only when it is 
united and threatening", 158 and such unity has been conspicuously lacking most of the 
time. 
But these arguments won't do at all. Consider Harris's example of immigration 
controls as evidencing the "autonomy" of state policy-making from capital and class 
structure in recent times. This is remarkably weak. Surely capital does have an interest 
in the existence and persistence of these state measures irrespective of whether or not 
the working class is "united and threatening". For how can the working class be 
prevented from becoming united and threatening save by ensuring that its members 
remain divided? Harris is quite right to point out that big capitalist interests were not 
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to the forefront in pressing for a tightening of anti-immigration policies in the recent 
past. Yet the forces which did promote them were hardly "classless" phenomena, 
since these had their locus in the petty bourgeoisie, who have often been mobilised by 
capital as the "bribed tool of reaction" (as Marx once famously put it). In any case, of 
course, it is far from clear why the failure of big capitalists to lobby for tighter anti- 
immigration policies evidences an "indifference" on their part to such a policy. If, as 
Harris claims, trans-state capitalism has a "need" for the free movement of migrant 
labour, why has it not been the case that vociferous demands have not been 
forthcoming from major industrialists, financiers or shareholders for the relaxation of 
immigration controls? There is, of course, an obvious answer to this question. As 
Callinicos remarks: "The fact that western big business has acquiesced over the past 
couple of decades in a marked tightening of immigration controls is itself 
`independent evidence' that these controls don't work against the interests of 
capital. "159 So much for the "autonomous imperatives" of the economic and political 
systems of late modernity! 
The first part of Nigel Harris's argument also collapses on closer empirical 
inspection. It is, for one thing, something of a commonplace among historians of 
international relations "that central to the Roosevelt administration's war aims was the 
construction of a global order in which US capital and commodities could flow 
freely. "160 Furthermore it is equally well known that important sections of German 
capital regarded territorial expansion and the "disciplining" of the working class at 
home as the long term solution to the global economic crisis of the 1930s which hit 
Germany particularly hard. This is why leading capitalists sponsored Hitler's rise to 
power. 161 Less well known, however, is the fact that the primary war aim of the 
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Japanese regime was to secure access to the cheap raw materials controlled by 
European powers in south-east Asia which would have enabled a faster tempo of 
capitalist industrialisation and a "captive market" for Japanese finished goods. 
Capitalist development in Japan was under threat by the effective exclusion of its 
capital and commodities from larger and larger chunks of the world market which 
were being absorbed into the expanding empires or zones of influence of Europe (in 
Africa and the middle-east) and the USA (in central America and China). These and 
other economic pressures were an immediate stimulus to Japan's invasion of China 
and later high-risk attack upon the world's largest and strongest imperial power. 162 
Britain, by contrast, was motivated to enter the war primarily to preserve its colonies 
from younger imperialisms (which again were major props for a recession-torn 
domestic economy) 
163 
Little surprise that the war initially did not encounter much in the way of 
resistance from private capital! That the Korean War played a fundamental part in the 
rise of the permanent arms economy (which laid the basis for the long post war boom) 
is also indisputable. 164 Aside from this, of course, it is surely ridiculous to suggest, as 
Harris does, that US capital absorbed the Vietnam War "without a bleep". In fact, 
"the financial disorders which helped precipitate a small recession in 1970-1 and then 
the slump of 1974-5" were in part generated by the economic burden of the war. As 
Callinicos has rightly observed, these pressures certainly played a part in "persuading" 
the US government to withdraw from the conflict, 165 though the anti-war movement 
was of course equally efficacious in this regard. 
Fourth these empirical failings of "state-centred" analysis are often compounded 
by conceptual errors. Again, Nigel Harris's recent work provides a classic recent 
420 
example of this. For when he attempts to specify in concrete terms the autonomy of 
the state from capital his analysis quickly runs into contradictions and equivocations. 
"The role of the state is being ... changed, ... from representing a national society and 
capital (the old corporatist `social democratic' alliance of state, business and labour in 
Britain), to enforcing on the domestic economy and society the imperatives of a global 
economy; from promoting the interests of domestic capital to seeking to capture and 
keep a share of global output; from managing a relatively diversified and supposedly 
autonomous national economy to managing flows of goods and services which start 
and end far beyond the authority or even the knowledge of the state. "166 
But is this account really consistent with a view of state and capital as following 
"parallel logics", as entering only into an "alliance" of mutual convenience and 
benefit (albeit one which is now being undone by the internationalisation of 
production and finance and the growth of transnational corporations)? In fact, Harris's 
own argument, far from revealing the interaction of two separate structures of 
domination (polity and economy), instead is suggestive of something entirely 
different. This is of a "shift of one form of subordination of the state to capital to 
another", 167 from the domination of the state by the imperatives and interests of a 
domestic economy and attendant capitalist class (autarkic state capitalism) to the 
domination of the state by the imperatives of a global economy and attendant 
international capitalist class (trans-state capitalism). 
Fifth research has shown that the state elites of contemporary capitalist societies 
are recruited almost entirely from the ranks of the propertied "upper class", share 
common patterns of socialisation and education with those who are destined to 
become "captains of industry", maintain close social networks (including ties of 
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marriage) with fellow members of this class (and with no others), and often maintain 
business interests and connections even during their tenure as state officials. 168 This 
can hardly be seen as demonstrating a merely contingent relationship between state 
and capital, as is claimed by opponents of the "instrumentalist" view of the state. 
Rather this is a structured relationship emergent from a long historical process 
whereby institutional mechanisms have been forged which ensure that the state elite 
responds appropriately to the structural pressures exerted by nationally and 
internationally based domestic capital with a minimum of friction. 169 
Little wonder, then, that top state administrators (and government ministers of 
whatever party) tend to identify the "national interest" with securing conditions 
conducive to the competitiveness of domestic big capital on a local and international 
stage. How else explain this phenomenon other than in terms of the class cohesion of 
the economic and political elites of capitalist society? Certainly an explanation of 
inter-state relations since the war in these terms (i. e. in terms of the common class 
interests and enculturation of the political and economic elites of capitalist societies as 
these are shaped by structural constraints imposed on the state by domestic capital and 
the global market) allow us a better purchase on this question than do abstract 
Weberian appeals to the "will to power" or "the madness or irrationality of people in 
170 power. 
Finally the neo-Weberian abstraction of state relations from class relations seems 
to derive much of its authority from a highly simplistic reading of the classical 
Marxist theory of the state, which is (falsely) held to grasp political institutions as a 
"passive superstructure" external to the economy and defined entirely in terms of a 
domestic class structure. 171 This having been done, it is then an easy matter to refute a 
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class analysis of the state by appealing to the self-evident fact that the interactions 
between states (and not simply the interactions between classes and capitals) are 
important in constraining or shaping the "world political order". Yet Marx's classical 
account of the state in The Communist Manifesto (in which he famously described it 
as "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie")'72 was 
simply an attempt to draw out the class content of a particular form of state - namely 
the minimalist "nightwatchman" state of early Victorian England. His analysis here, 
like those of the classical political economists, mistakenly "takes as given" the 
correspondence of this form of the state to a developed capitalist society in which the 
bourgeoisie has assumed complete mastery of the economy. But this was not Marx's 
"last word" on the problem of the interface between class relations and state relations. 
This is attested to by his careful analysis of "Bonapartism" (the French imperial state 
of Napoleon I and Napoleon III), which for him had secured for itself a partial 
independence from the rival interests of the land-owning and capitalist classes on the 
one hand, and from the workers and peasants on the other. 173 The state here was 
certainly not grasped by Marx as a mere tool of the economically dominant classes, as 
a "passive superstructure" reflecting the economic interests of the propertied, nor as a 
mere "effect" of the class struggle between propertied and propertyless. 
Of equal significance, classical Marxists such as Lenin and Bukharin have 
sought to analyse state relations in the era of developed "monopoly" capitalism, and in 
doing so have explicitly theorised "imperialism" as a system of politico-military 
interactions between states, brought into being by the monopolisation and 
centralisation of production within national boundaries and the resultant "growing 
together" of economy and polity as "state capitalism". 174 This hardly adds up to a 
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"failure" on the part of Marxism to theorise "state violence" or the "global military 
order" (as is claimed by Giddens), 175 whatever one makes of the truth or falsity of the 
analysis on offer. Nor does it add up to a "neglect" of inter-state relations in 
constraining the conduct and shaping the character of individual state apparatuses (as 
is claimed, for instance, by Nigel Harris). 176 In fact, far from portraying institutional 
state structures as a "simple superstructure", as an appendage to capitalist relations of 
production, it is clear enough that classical Marxist scholars have instead grasped 
these as comprised of a nexus of political, cultural and economic relations, as 
simultaneously base and superstructure. "So, for instance, `property rights' are judicial 
(part of the superstructure) but regulate the way exploitation takes place (part of the 
base). "'" 
A second reason why the closeness of the "functional" relationship between class 
interests and state interests is often obscured is simply that the latter does have an 
"inherent tendency" towards relative autonomy from the former (the reverse side of 
the partial determination of state by economy). That is to say, the state does have "a 
tendency to alienate itself from the society from which it was born": 
With the increase in the division of labour the state grows in importance as 
the organiser of social life. Its accumulating functions are no longer limited 
simply to representing the ruling class against the oppressed class and 
against the classes of other countries: it begins to concern itself with the 
economic and cultural interests of the society as a whole, though naturally 
this is a process which continues to be to the advantage of the ruling class as 
a whole. As the state grows more important, the state apparatus and the 
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autonomy of movement of this apparatus also grow, and this has 
fundamental repercussions, both good and bad, on the economic basis. At 
this point the state has to insert its own needs (taxes, tariffs, etc. ) directly 
into economic life, and in the process of doing this can sometimes harm the 
interests of the ruling class which it is trying to serve. 178 
The degree of autonomy of polity from the "economically dominant class" 
obviously varies in different societal and historical contexts. This it does, crucially, in 
accordance with the balance of class forces: 
The absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
strong because the power of the nobility and the bourgeoisie was evenly 
balanced, though even in this case the state cannot be said to have been 
independent of the relations of production. Absolutism was still based partly 
on feudal forces, whose political rights it upheld (even if in a somewhat 
reduced form) and whose economic existence it guaranteed by maintaining 
serfdom. On the other hand it had already begun to build on the growing 
bourgeoisie, representing the latter's economic interests by introducing the 
mercantilist policies which were needed for the development of modem 
industry. As soon as the bourgeoisie had established clear economic 
superiority this state was destroyed and gave way to another, which could 
express the bourgeoisie's economic domination in a political form. The 
bonapartism of the first and especially the second French empires, where 
bourgeoisie and proletariat had fought each other to a standstill, is another 
example of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus. Modern fascism, 
too, comes partly under this heading: an even balance of forces between 
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capital and labour puts the petty bourgeois layers in political control, 
although they do not have any influence on the economic foundations of 
capitalism and are obliged to carry out policies in favour of the bourgeoisie, 
which is still the economically dominant class. 179 
As a rule the relative autonomy of polity from the direct control of the ruling 
class acquires a consistently high and its most stable form in a developed capitalist 
society. There are two reasons for this. Firstly the productive forces are sufficiently 
advanced here to support an independent "unproductive" centralised administrative 
apparatus on a nation-wide scale. Secondly, and more importantly, the structural 
configuration of capitalist relations of production (the total separation of the direct 
producers from access to the means of production) enables their routine reproduction 
by economic mechanisms without the continual intervention or threat of intervention 
of politico-military force in the class struggle. In Marx's words: "The silent 
compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over 
the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional 
cases. "180 The fact that the capitalist state is not generally an integral part of the 
relations of production or economic exploitation in this sense (and especially not of 
the laissez-faire capitalism which existed in Victorian Britain) is what accounts for its 
establishment as a power apart from the economy, following its own independent 
interests and historical development, whatever its role in intervening in the economy 
(domestic or otherwise) on behalf of capital or safeguarding the socio-political 
conditions in which capital can flourish both home and abroad. 
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Thus, the very fact that the mode of production of capitalist society does allow a 
separation of its "political" and "economic" functions ensures that a certain (though 
tightly circumscribed) space is opened up for a differentiation of interest between the 
state and capital to develop. The state elite does have a real interest in attempting to 
concentrate in its own hands a greater share of the total surplus value pumped out of 
the direct producers against capital. Further, because a major function of the state 
bureaucracy consists in overseeing and defending the overall political conditions of 
surplus-extraction of the national capital it represents, this can often mean that it finds 
itself in conflict with its "own" bourgeoisie, for whom the military defence of some 
abstract "world order" against uncooperative Third World states or anti-capitalist 
regimes often appears a less pressing concern than the protection of profit margins 
from an excessive burden of state expenditures (which cannot always be passed on to 
the workers). 
Aside from this, of course, it is often the case that the state is forced into making 
concessions to a radicalised working class (or even to one which is not yet radicalised 
for tactical reasons). There is also plenty of scope for the state elite to bind itself to 
particular sections of capital at the expense of others (if these better service its 
interests or are perceived as especially conducive to overall national competitiveness). 
Nor are there any institutional barriers external to the state which might prevent the 
political executive from embarking upon policies which are disastrous from a 
capitalist point of view (e. g. embarking upon an economically debilitating war to 
legitimise an unpopular government). Finally the "relative autonomy" of the state 
from capitalist interests is also derived from the fact that certain of its functions are 
necessarily apolitical. Thus, whatever the class character or interests of the political 
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elite, the role of the state in administering or overseeing a large scale national 
community ensures that certain of its activities (e. g. upholding certain kinds of 
criminal law or traffic regulations such as the Highway Code) must be "classless" in 
the sense that they are indispensable to the running of any industrialised urban society. 
Yet (all of this having been said) it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
there are definite limits to how far the "autonomy" of the state from capital and class 
relations can go. This is because the capitalist class and the state elite are bound 
together by a relationship of structural interdependence from which neither can 
extricate themselves. On the one hand, as Chris Harman points out, 
[t]he limiting case for the state is that, even if it overrides the interests of 
particular capitalists, it cannot forget that its own revenues and its own 
ability to defend itself against other states depend, at the end of the day, on 
the continuation of capital accumulation.... Any state bureaucracy that fails 
to accomplish this is going to see the resources it needs for its own privileges 
and its own functioning dry up.... Thus the Nazis could expropriate Thyssen, 
the could seize the wealth of Jewish capitalists, they could establish the 
horrific machinery of the death camps without it providing any appreciable 
benefit to German capital. They could even insist on continuing the war after 
it was clearly going to be lost and the interests of German capitalism would 
have been served by attempts at a negotiated peace. But they could only do 
all of these things so long a they ensured that capitalist exploitation took 
place on the most favourable terms for capital (state and private) and, 
therefore, that accumulation continued. The same applies to Peron, Nasser, 
the Ba'athists, the East European regimes and so on. 
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On the other hand, 
[t]he limiting case for the individual capital is that though it can, with 
considerable difficulty, uproot itself from one national state terrain and plant 
itself in another, it cannot operate for any length of time without having 
some state to do its will. It is too vulnerable to try to operate in a "Wild 
West" situation in which there is no effective state, leaving it both prey to 
forces from below which might disrupt its normal rhythms of exploitation 
and to other capitals and their states.... Productive capital cannot get a 
surplus unless the state ensures the a plentiful supply of "free" labour with 
sufficient skills, and provides means of physical defence. It also requires that 
commodity capital ensures realisation of the surplus value and that money 
capital can provide the funds for further expanding production. Commodity 
capital cannot function effectively unless the state lays the basis for the 
operation of a stable national market and uses its influence to open up 
foreign markets. 181 
Thus it is this relationship of "structural interdependence" between polity and 
economy in modem capitalism which "sets the most fundamental limits on the 
`autonomy' of the state. " This mutual dependence does not prevent the economic and 
political elites from acting, up to a certain point, as if they have absolute autonomy. 
"In particular, money capital and commodity capital can act as if they ha[ve] no 
dependence upon the geographically rooted means of production of industrial capital. 
In the same way, those who run the state can act, up to a certain point, as if their 
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revenues d[o] not depend upon successful capitalist exploitation and accumulation. 
This is what happens when reformists, populists or even fascists get control of parts of 
the state structure and use them to carry through social change. " 182 Nonetheless the 
"structural dependence of the state on capital means that persisting in a policy which 
conflicts with the interests of capital will have negative consequences for the state, 
certainly in the long term, sometimes sooner. " There are a number of economic-class 
mechanisms which function to "reign in" the state elite. The most obvious of these is, 
of course, capital flight, an "investment strike". But there are other ways besides. "If 
capitalists don't like a policy, they lobby against it. The informal networks linking 
them with the state bureaucracy, as well as the latter's economic dependence on 
capital, mean that more often than not they win out. "183 Where all else fails, 
furthermore, "the mutual interdependence of the different elements asserts itself in the 
most dramatic fashion, through crises - the sudden collapse of the system of credit, the 
sudden inability to sell the commodities, sudden balance of payments crises or even 
the threat of state bankruptcy. "' 84 These economic constraints of the total system of 
commodity production are normally sufficient to force the state system into line with 
capitalist interests. 
But this means that a class analysis of the state bureaucracy is altogether 
appropriate. For this can no longer be seen as a classless elite which is simply 
pressurised from without to do capital's bidding. And so, irrespective of the very real 
space which can open up between the goals and interests of the state elite and the 
economic elite, this "structural interdependence" which binds them together ensures 
that they are invariably unified in opposition to the working class. In other words, 
since private capital and the state bureaucracy share a common objective relationship 
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of economic exploitation with the proletariat (because both derive their revenue from 
a cut in the total surplus value left over after working class consumption), they are 
compelled to close ranks against the workers in defence of capitalist relations of 
production. It is for this reason that Marxist analyses of power relations in capitalist 
society rightly stress (in opposition to the Weberian view of this matter) that 
economic and political elites are not different in kind, autonomous factors of 
"stratification" (economic "class" versus political "ranking", etc. ), but are rather 
distinct executive wings of a unitary propertied class of exploiters, whose internal 
differences of interest and antagonisms pale beside those which separate them from 
the direct producers. 
CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing I have attempted to accomplish two objectives. Firstly to articulate an 
account of structural properties which neither obliterates the voluntarism of human 
agency nor reduces it to the passive effect of socio-cultural hydraulics. Secondly to 
outline and defend a materialist understanding of social systems - by means of a 
realist "reconstruction" of Marx's base-superstructure model - which avoids the 
unacceptable extremes of monistic economic reductionism, on the one hand, and a 
pluralistic "theory of factors", on the other. The purpose of my first argument is to 
make sense of the structural conditioning of human interaction without departing 
company from the view that people are alone responsible for structural statics or 
change. The purpose of my second argument is to theorise a hierarchical model of 
emergent structures, which can stand as a practical alternative to postmodern "idealist 
reductionism" and neo-Weberian "empiricism", and which is capable of supporting a 
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"stages theory" of history which grasps it as "totality" and "progress" (i. e. as an 
overall pattern of societal evolution and transformation governed by the dialectical 
interface between productive labour, class conflict and the contradictory economic 
structures within which these modes of agency are bounded). 
My first argument works as follows. The differential positioning of interactants in 
emergent socio-economic structures ensures that their activity and consciousness is 
subject to structural conditioning. This does not mean that those irreducible needs and 
capacities (and hence objective interests in pursuing or exercising them) which pertain 
uniquely to human beings as organisms and subjects are negated. Structural 
conditioning does not work upon indeterminate material (upon which it can make 
what it will) for the simple reason that human beings are bearers of organismic and 
subjective properties which render social determination a non-starter. Subjects do not 
simply respond passively to external stimuli, in the manner of Pavlov's salivating 
dogs, because they are capable of abstracting themselves away from immediate reality 
and assessing the degree to which this is alienating or fulfilling of their aspirations 
and can be modified in accordance with their interests. Rather structural conditioning 
functions by virtue of its role in distributing differential and normally antagonistic 
vested interests (in societal reproduction or reform and the appropriate social 
strategies which are required to achieve these ends) to agents who are differently 
placed, upon which they can normally be counted to act under pain of incurring 
punitive opportunity costs (declining living standards, etc. ), hence imparting 
"systemness" to their social interaction and "directional guidance" to structural 
dynamics. 
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Such a schema in no way invalidates a conception of agents as "sovereign 
artificers", nor a conception of society and history as dependent upon the powers and 
properties of human nature. Structural conditioning - the interface between 
involuntary placement, vested interests and attendant opportunity costs - works upon 
human agents by confronting them with an objective environment of finite cultural 
and material resources in which they have to act (and upon which they normally must 
draw in order to act) and by placing them in structured situations or "situational 
logics" within this environment which supply them with rational grounds or "good 
reasons" for acting in accordance with structurally prescribed interests. This means 
that structural conditioning can function only by virtue of the organismic and 
subjective capacities of human agents, not in spite of them, or in opposition to them. 
What is the relationship between the structural conditioning of human agency 
thus conceived and my account of Marx's structural sociology? I have interpreted 
Marx's base-superstructure distinction as specifying a hierarchical ordering of 
emergent social structures. Such structures have their "ultimate genesis" in social 
labour to produce a livelihood from the physical environment, and they are 
reproduced or transformed only through the social agency of the living, though from 
the point of view of every living generation of agents they are always "already made". 
Upon the "basis" of the economic structures of material production and class 
exploitation arise a range of additional socio-cultural structures and ideological forms. 
Some of these structures are directly emergent from the economic base; others are 
directly emergent from those structures which rest immediately on the economic base 
and which have arisen to safeguard or challenge it. Those elements of the 
superstructure which develop directly out of and feed directly into material production 
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and class exploitation (especially legal and politico-military structures and sometimes 
religious forms) function to co-determine with the "economy" in various mixes 
further elaborations of ideological or aesthetic forms and non-productive socio- 
cultural relations. Those superstructural emergents which have their origins or locus in 
the activities of those agents situated in antecedent superstructural spheres (such as 
law from religious ideas and rationalist philosophy from the interface between 
religion, law and science) react back in turn upon their own "causes" in anterior 
political or cultural structures and upon the economic basis upon which all non- 
economic institutions, ideologies and practices are dependent "in the final analysis". 
Again this occurs not through structural hydraulics, but through the generative 
mechanism of interest-governed class agency, as this is subject to directional 
guidance" by virtue of the positioning of interactants in the relations of production 
vis-ä-vis material and cultural resources. 
According to this conception, the mode of production and class exploitation is 
"basic" to society as a whole for three important reasons. Firstly because it provides 
"conditions of possibility" for the existence of non-economic structures (the output of 
wealth to support structural differentiation over time) and sets limits and provides 
enablements for their subsequent development. Secondly because class relations 
(centred on the uneven distribution of the means of production and subsistence) are 
the fundamental source of inequality in society, and hence of social malintegration 
(because of the conflicts of interest to which they give rise between the propertied and 
propertyless). Finally because relations of production explain the content of those 
social and ideological structures which are closely related to the economic base (as 
expressions or articulations of the contradiction between these and the forces of 
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production and of the conflict between exploiting and exploited classes) and the 
respective degrees of autonomy which are enjoyed by those cultural and other spheres 
which do not function to "fix" or challenge the vested interests of the socially 
dominant class. 
In the latter case, superstructural relations and ideologies are more or less 
"determined" by or "autonomous" of the economic base by virtue of the interest- 
governed social agency of the contending classes. Those institutions and ideologies 
which necessarily perform a key role in reproducing or legitimating relations of 
production (such as state relations and legal forms) are those which correspond most 
closely to the "dominant side" of class relationships. This is for the obvious reason 
that propertied elites possess both vested interests in securing the domination of those 
institutions and cultural structures upon which the preservation of their wealth and 
power depends and the structural capacities (control of the means of wealth creation) 
to secure this domination. The punitive opportunity costs of failing to translate 
economic domination into legal and politico-military domination ensures in turn that 
propertied elites are subject to directional guidance to act in ways appropriate to their 
structurally determined vested interests. This means that there is a long-run tendency 
in any social system for relationships of relative compatibility or correspondence to be 
forged between relations of production and those elements of the superstructure which 
are "functional" to their reproduction requirements. More generally, of course, the 
content of those superstructural relations and ideologies which express the 
contradictions of material life (between forces and relations of production) is the 
historical product of the ongoing dialectic of social conflict between the propertied 
and the propertyless (and sometimes between rival propertied elements), as this is 
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shaped by the interplay between the respective situational logics, vested interests and 
corresponding opportunity costs (in acting in defence of these interests) of the 
contending classes. 
Such is the complex nature of dialectical interaction between all the differentiated 
elements of any total social structure that it is easy to forget altogether the "social 
primacy" of the mode of production in the senses described in this chapter. The more 
developed the productive forces, the more elaborate and differentiated the social 
structure which is supported by them, and the longer the chain of intermediary links 
which separate the "higher" elements of the superstructure ("pure" ethics, art, theory, 
theology, philosophy, etc. ) from their economic "conditions of existence". Indeed, 
precisely because the "higher" elements of the superstructure are peripheral to the 
functioning of the relations of production, and therefore have the space to abstract 
themselves from the class struggle, it is unsurprising that these often enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy from "economic conditions" or class interests. But, despite the 
complexity of societal process, the explanatory primacy of the economic base 
remains, not simply because the mode of production and class exploitation is decisive 
in shaping the nature of those superstructural forms (especially political and legal 
structures) which are fundamental in fixing or stabilising an existing system of social 
relations, but because it is decisive also in shaping the systemic incompatibilities and 
social conflicts which can lead to the kinds of political agency which can bring about 
structural reform or transformation. By contrast, the greater the distance of 
superstructural emergents from the economic and material base, the less of a purchase 
they have on the real concerns and interests of human agents, and the less relevant 
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they become for explaining the social agency which brings about societal change or 
its opposite. 
Now the purpose of Marx's structural sociology is to obtain an analytical 
purchase on the question of why and how societies or social systems are subject to 
processes of quantitative development interspersed by "critical episodes" of 
qualitative transformation. His distinctions between forces and relations of production 
and between economic base and politico-ideological superstructure are crucial to an 
understanding of how this works. I have pointed out that forces of production are 
"basic" to production relations by virtue of the capacity of the former to set limits on 
the range of the latter which are possible in any historical epoch. I have also argued 
that productive forces have an inherent tendency (because transformative) to develop 
under the impulse of objective human needs and interests, though needs and interests 
which are socially developed and culturally defined (under the auspices of advances in 
material production). The development of the productive forces at some point runs 
into limits imposed by existing relations of production (under which they had 
previously been at work) and by doing so places the latter under "directional 
guidance" to undergo structural elaboration or transformation in a way which 
facilitates their further advance. 
This argument is well made by Chris Harman: 
The history of society is the history of changes in the ways in which 
production takes place, each associated with changes in the relations between 
human beings immediately around the productive process. And these 
changes in turn exert a pressure on all the other social relations.... Expansion 
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of material production is the cause, the social organisation of production the 
effect.... There is no mechanical principle which means that the expansion of 
material production - and with it changes in social relations - will 
automatically occur. But in any society there will be pressures in this 
direction at some point or other.... If, for instance, a band of hunter-gatherers 
adopts a means of radically increasing the food available to them (by, say, 
planting root vegetables for themselves instead of having to search for them) 
and of storing it for long periods of time (for instance, in earthenware pots) 
this necessarily changes their social relations with one another. Instead of 
continually moving, they have to stay in one spot until the crop can be 
harvested; if they are staying in one spot there is no longer any necessity for 
restriction on the number of children per woman; the crop becomes 
something which other bands of people can seize, so providing for the first 
time an incentive for warfare between rival bands. ' 85 
Not only at some point in any society are relations of production subject to 
directional guidance to undergo changes which unblock the development of the 
productive forces, but so too is the politico-ideological superstructure placed under 
this same pressure by the economic base (the forces and relations of production 
combined): 
Thus the first stirrings of capitalism in Europe generated pressures for a 
challenge to the Catholic Church which was both a major feudal landowner 
in its own right and provided ideological legitimation for the feudal order as 
a whole. The eventual outcome of these pressures was the Reformation of 
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the 16th century and the emergence with Calvinism of a new form of 
Christianity favourable to the "needs" of early capitalist accumulation. [Later 
on] ... the Industrial Revolution in Britain provided an impulse for the 
enfranchisement, first, of the industrial bourgeoisie and middle class, and 
then, of the industrial working class (resulting in the Reform Acts of 1832, 
1867 and 1884). [Later still] ... a change in the base - the massive rise in paid 
employment of women during the post-war economic boom - provided the 
impulse for a significant, though partial, change in the dominant social 
attitude towards women. 186 
Such structural pressures for social change (of the base upon the superstructure) 
do not, to reiterate a basic point, add up to structural laws which operate "over the 
heads" of human agents. Instead these are a function of the social agency of a rising 
propertied class, or of the conflict between exploiting and exploited classes, as this is 
mediated by the interplay between involuntary placement, vested interests (in societal 
reform or replication) and attendant opportunity costs (which ensure that for the most 
part class agents find good reasons for acting in accordance with their structurally 
determined interests). Nor does the "directional pressure" exerted by the base on the 
superstructure add up to a thesis of structural super-determinism (even if this is 
mediated through social agency) whereby economic "causes" lead in monocausal 
fashion to societal "effects". In the historical examples cited above, for instance, 
"none of the impulses were realised automatically or without bitter conflict, the 
outcome of which might have been different", 187 not least because "conservative" 
elements of the superstructure (state and legal relations plus the political ideologies of 
the socially dominant class or classes) are mobilised to prevent the development of 
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new forms of production and/or exploitation that challenge the status quo and the 
vested interests tied up in it, which have to be defeated politically and ideologically if 
a new form of society is to replace the old. 
On the contrary, what is being proposed is this. Firstly that the key role of class 
relations in shaping access to allocative and authoritative resources, and in 
determining the conditions of life and vested interests of those differently placed, 
provides interactants with good reasons or pressing imperatives to engage in class 
struggle aimed at the preservation or reform of the existing structure of economic 
relations and those elements of the superstructure which have arisen or been modified 
to safeguard it. In other words, class struggle emergent from class structure is the 
primary form of social malintegration, which is a necessary though insufficient 
condition of structural change. Secondly that such social malintegration (the conflict 
between classes) is brought to a head during "critical episodes" in which structural 
malintegration (the fettering of productive forces by relations of production) generates 
an organic crisis, the historical result of which is not arbitrary but is bounded by 
"economic necessity" (the level of development of material production and the kinds 
of class groupings and attendant class capacities this supports). This means that 
certain societal outcomes are objectively more likely than others (such as the long- 
standing decay of capitalism leading eventually to socialism rather than "the common 
ruin of the contending classes" and attendant "barbarism"), whereas others can be 
ruled out for certain (such as the development of capitalism out of the crisis of the 
tributary mode of production or the development of socialism out of the crisis of 
feudalism). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing I have sought to theorise the interface between the organismic, 
subjectivist, interactional and structural properties of social systems in a way which is 
consistent with a radicalised form of realist social theory: "emergentist Marxism". My 
purpose in so doing is twofold. Firstly sociological emergentism (and attendant 
methodological realism) is indispensable to constructing an anti-reductive 
understanding of the social world which neither reduces human agents to social 
structures or processes of socialisation or enculturation nor reduces social structures or 
social practices to human agents. Secondly a "materialistic" interpretation of socio- 
cultural emergentism allows the theorist to avoid the error of translating the realist 
thesis of the irreducibility of the distinct strata of human and social reality into an 
argument specifying the mutual autonomy of the "ideal" and "material" elements of 
society. So "emergentist Marxism", a particular form of realist social theory, is not 
only antithetical to all forms of conflationary-reductionist social theory (whether 
holism, atomism or idealism in their various guises), but also provides the analyst 
with the conceptual and analytical tools to resist fashionable neo-Weberian and 
postmodern understandings of socio-cultural reality as simply a kaleidoscopic 
combinatory of heterogeneous structures or practices or "power centres", none of 
which have any necessary connection or determinate relationship with each other. 
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The logic and structure of my argument can be briefly summarised as follows. 
First I have sought to establish the relationship between philosophical realism and 
emergentist materialism and the way in which the latter can both enrich the former 
and render defensible the central positions of Marxist philosophy and social theory 
(chapter 1). 1 defend three claims here. First that "depth realism" is in fact a defensible 
anti-reductive form of ontological materialism (because validated by the activity and 
results of the various sciences) which is broadly consistent with Engels' dialectical 
materialism. Second that methodological realism must be more explicitly "dialectical" 
if it is to realise its rich potential for apprehending socio-cultural dynamics. Finally 
that emergentist materialism, when translated into social science theory, renders 
defensible (indeed plausible) the central arguments of Marxism in anthropology and 
sociology: the explication of human beings, human consciousness and socio-cultural 
relations in terms of the historical interface between the "structuralist" and "activist" 
dimensions of the forces and relations of production. 
The remainder of my thesis is an elaboration and defence of these core 
propositions. My first task has been to theorise the properties and powers which 
pertain to human agents as organisms, subjects and interactants (social agents and 
institutional actors) which are precisely responsible for structural-systemic elaboration 
or reproduction. Chapter 2 is concerned with the "microstructures" of human society 
and history: human nature and its emergent properties. My argument is that Marx's 
"labour theory" of species-being furnishes us with a simultaneously naturalistic and 
social account of individuals as subjects and with the most basic explanation of social 
order and social change (societal organisation and societal transformation 
presupposing properties and powers of mind and self irreducible to the imprint of 
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society; societal change presupposing objective species needs and interests which 
"found" the social struggles of human agents). Chapter 3 is concerned with analysing 
the "interaction order" which is emergent from the "micro" level of the organismic 
and subjectivist capacities and needs of human agents yet overdetermined by the 
"macro" level of emergent socio-cultural relations. My argument is that this 
"interaction order" is the linchpin connecting individuals with the structural properties 
of social systems. 
From this perspective, human agents are the bearers of a determinate range of 
biologically based needs and capacities, and are furthermore in possession of 
"subjective emergents", by virtue of which they have secured for themselves a relative 
autonomy from their physical and social environments, including the capacity to 
remake these in accordance with their needs and interests. This means that an 
adequate understanding of human social interaction is, before everything else, an 
interest-explanation, not an explanation in terms of the "functional imperatives" of an 
abstract social system. Individuals have basic needs (both physical and psychological) 
by virtue of their membership of a particular biological species. They therefore have 
human interests in ensuring that these needs are met by whatever social means are to 
hand. Yet human needs and interests are not reducible simply to a "biological 
substratum", definable in terms of access to those material necessaries (of food, 
clothing and shelter, etc. ) which ensure human survival. On the contrary, human needs 
and interests are those which ensure the physical and psychological well-being of the 
subject, and this "well-being" is always defined by cultural standards, which are 
themselves determined objectively by the level of development of material production 
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and social labour, and the degree of welfare and self-autonomy this allows individuals 
to reasonably expect from the societies to which they belong. 
But I have said that (aside from possessing objective needs and interests by virtue 
of the historical interface between biology, social labour and physical nature) human 
agents also possess the species capacities of mind, self, intentionality, rationality, etc., 
to articulate these needs and interests and act consciously in accordance with them. 
This being the case, where human agents find themselves situated in social relations 
rooted in economic exploitation and political domination, by virtue of which they are 
denied the freedom and life-chances of others better placed or the consumption which 
the output of their own labour merits, they will feel these social relations to be unjust 
and oppressive, and will seek to resist or reform or even overturn them. In doing so 
they will encounter resistance from those elite groupings in society who have vested 
interests in the status quo by virtue of their control of allocative and authoritative 
resources. It is this "dialectic of control" between those agential collectivities who 
have vested interests in societal replication and those who have vested interests in 
societal change which provides history with much of its dynamic, as Marx rightly 
insists. 
Now elite groupings will tend to be the beneficiaries of life-chances and degrees 
of autonomy much above the cultural average. So much so in fact that it is defensible 
to view the privileges they enjoy as constituting a "surplus" over and above their 
objective human needs (as these are defined by productive force development and the 
average standards of living this can support). This means that the vested social 
interests of elite groupings are constituted by those institutional means (appropriate to 
their structural positioning) by which they meet their objective human needs and by 
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which they defend or enhance their sectoral advantages (which are also a function of 
their positioning in emergent social relations and which are invariably won at the 
expense of the life-chances of subordinate groupings). By contrast, the vested social 
interests of subordinate groupings are comprised of those institutional means by 
which they pursue or further their objective socially developed human needs and 
capacities without remainder, their "vested" interest in human emancipation from the 
tyranny of "artificial scarcity" being determined by their specific propertyless status in 
society. In the former case, vested social interests correspond to privileged life- 
chances, to the beneficiaries of mechanisms of class exploitation by which the life- 
chances of the many are subordinated to service those of the few. In the latter case, 
vested social interests correspond to universal needs, and are comprised of those 
social practices necessary to ensure these needs are met. 
This provides an ethical basis for championing the struggles of the oppressed and 
exploited against their oppressors and exploiters (a naturalistic principle of justice). 
Social relations which are capable of sustaining a certain reasonable standard of living 
for all (given a relatively egalitarian distribution of allocative resources), and which 
objectively allow the possibility of a more even distribution of authoritative resources 
(in the sense of not endangering the stable reproduction of society within its material 
means), but which fail to do so because an elite stratum has monopolised effective 
political power plus a cut of the social product above the cultural median, are morally 
reprehensible. Such social relations are morally reprehensible because they stand in 
contradiction to the maximum realisation of human needs and capacities which is here 
possible to achieve. 
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All of this brings me to the arguments contained in chapter 4.1 have said that the 
positioning of agents in emergent structures (and in specific contexts or environments 
within emergent structures) ensures their social conduct is subject to a range of 
constraints, impulses and enablements. The significance of structure is that it 
comprises a social and material integument, historically predating the interaction of 
human agents, which shapes their subsequent activity by immersing them in stratified 
social relations which determine their respective access to material and cultural 
resources and which define their objective social interests vis-ä-vis other agents. This 
does not mean that the psycho-organic powers and properties which pertain uniquely 
to human agents and their social interaction are negated or subsumed under social 
practices or processes of enculturation. The social agency of individuals is still the 
mechanism of structural elaboration and/or reproduction, and agents are still 
sovereign artificers, who act relatively voluntaristically (within a range of socio- 
cultural possibilities) on the basis of needs and interests which are irreducible to the 
imprint of society. Instead structural conditioning, defined here as the interplay 
between involuntary placement, vested interests and attendant opportunity costs, 
impinges upon agents by virtue of the fact they are situated in "positions" in social 
relations which furnish them with rational motives (the defence or pursuit of improved 
life-chances) for acting in accordance with their structurally defined interests. 
Yet there can be no doubt that it is the "situational logics" and attached agential 
interests determined by the positioning of interactants in class relations which have 
explanatory primacy in shaping their socio-political consciousness and agency. This is 
because class positions within emergent relations of production are decisive in 
determining the access of agents to authoritative and allocative resources in societies 
446 
past and present. This renders meaningful the Marxist thesis that the economic 
structure of a society not only provides "conditions of existence" for non-economic 
structures and practices but also "determines" its politico-ideological superstructure 
and decisively shapes the social conflicts which give rise to epochal societal change. 
There are two basic reasons for this. Firstly, the mode of production can now be 
plausibly seen as fixing the fundamental axis of social inequality, and hence as 
constituting the primary source of social (and system) malintegration in most 
historical societies. Secondly, because class interests and capacities are crucial in 
explaining the socio-political agency of interactants, it follows that there is a long-run 
tendency in any social system for superstructural emergents (and especially legal and 
political relations) to "correspond" to the contradictions internal to relations of 
production and especially to structures of class domination. 
I conclude that "emergentist Marxism" offers an account of societal development 
and/or transformation which is logically and conceptually defensible. This is rooted in 
the dialectical interface between particular kinds of structural and interactional 
mechanisms - namely between forces and relations of production, base and 
superstructure, social labour and class conflict. The only interesting question which 
remains is this: how adequate is emergentist Marxism to the task of meeting the 
criteria of scientificity and empirical progress famously specified by philosopher of 
science Imre Lakatos? Lakatos argued that a "progressive" research programme is 
characterised by its capacity for theoretical development and renewal (on the basis of 
its core conceptual positions), its capacity to resist falsification, and its capacity to 
predict novel facts. Assessing the validity of historical materialism's claim for 
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"scientificity" vis-ä-vis its major rivals in social theory and sociology is, I contend, the 
outstanding remaining task of Marxist analysis. 
448 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
Introduction 
Archer, M. S., 1995, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p. 14. 
2 Ibid., p. 247. 
3 Ibid., pp. 93-134. 
° Ibid., pp. 135-161. 
S Mouzelis, N., 1995, Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong?, Routledge, London, p. 122. 
6 Cohen, P., 1968, Modern Social Theory, Heinemann, London, p. 93. 
CHAPTER ONE 
I Marx, K., 1973, Grundrisse, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 100. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Sayer, A., 1992, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, 2nd edition, Routledge, London, 
p. 87. 
° Wood, A., 1981, Karl Marx, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 219. 
s Callinicos, A., 1998, "The Secret of the Dialectic", International Socialism, 2: 78, p. 94. 
6 Hegel, G. W. F., 1977, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 11. 
Murray, P., 1988, Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ, p. xiv. 
8 Gasper, P., 1998, "Marxism and Science", International Socialism, 2: 79, p. 142. 
9 Ibid., p. 143. 
10 Ibid.,. p,. 142. 
" Marx, K., 1976, Capital, volume 1, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 103. 
449 
12 Callinicos, A., 1998, op. cit., p. 94; Rees, J., 1998, The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and 
the Classical Marxist Tradition, Routledge, London, pp. 50-2. 
13 Hegel, G. W. F., 1966, The Science of Logic, volume 2, Allen and Unwin, London, p. 67. 
14 Hegel cites the excellent example of the negation of a bud as it bursts forth into a blossom and of 
the blossom as it is transformed into fruit to demonstrate this point. For him this shows that forms 
"are not just distinguished from one another ... [but] also supplant one another as mutually 
incompatible" and yet, despite this, remain "moments of an organic unity ... which alone constitutes 
the life of the whole" (Hegel, G. W. F., 1977, op. cit., p. 2). 
15 Rees, J., 1998, op. cit., p. 46. 
16 "The concept of `concrete objects' does not merely concern `whatever exists' but draws attention to 
the fact that objects are usually constituted by a combination of diverse elements or forces" (Sayer, 
A., 1992, op. cit., p. 87). 
" Gasper, P., 1998, op. cit., p. 142. 
18 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1987, Collected Works, volume 25, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 24. 
19 See especially: Anderson, P., 1983, "Class Struggle in the Ancient World", History Workshop, 16, 
p. 68; Anderson, P., 1979, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, New Left Books, London; Bois, 
G., 1982, The Crisis of Feudalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; de Ste Croix, G. E. M., 
1981, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, Duckworth, London, pp. 226-59; Harman, 
C., 1989, "The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, " International Socialism, 2: 45. 
20 Rees, J., 1998, op. cit., p. 7. 
21 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1987, op. cit., p. 495. 
22 This is Andrew Colliers definition of Bhaskar's philosophical realism (Collier, A., 1994, Critical 
Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy, Verso, London, especially pp. 42-50). 
23 Such as a materialist understanding of causality in nature conjoined with an idealist understanding 
of the "origins" of nature. 
24 Davies, P., 1983, God and the New Physics, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. ix; Davies, P., 1982, 
Other Worlds, Penguin, Allen Lane, London; Hawking, S., 1989, A Brief History of Time, Bantam, 
London, p. 175; Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I., 1988, Order out of Chaos, Heinemann, London, p. 
450 
313; Stewart, I., 1989, Does God Play Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Such views were also shared by the "founders" of modern physics - Newton and Einstein - and by 
Charles Darwin. 
25 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1977, On Religion, Schocken Books, New York, pp. 295-8. 
26 This, for instance, is Giddens' view. His definition of structure as "rules and resources" is supposed 
to capture the simultaneously ideational and material contexts of interaction. 
27 So it is that socio-biologists, such as Wilson and Dawkins, end up invoking a "free will" which 
allows us to subordinate our genetic imperatives to moral or ethical concerns (Dawkins, R., 1976, 
The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Lumsden, C. J. and Wilson, E. O., 1981, Genes, 
Mind and Culture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass). They are forced into taking this 
step because they do not wish to lend support to the idea that deviants or law-breakers are victims 
of their biology, a position which their own reductionist philosophy logically requires them to take. 
Yet "free will", if it is to mean anything, must refer to mind-states which are somehow 
"autonomous" of brain-states and of the interface between these and the material environment. This 
being the case, where else, other than from a cosmic supersubject, can this "mind stuff" be 
derived?. 
28 Social idealism, for instance, appears to be logically dependent on subjective idealism, because 
material structures or circumstances can be deemed inefficacious in shaping socio-cultural conduct 
and outcomes only where these are "mind-dependent" in the sense of being denied the autonomous 
power to constrain or condition the products of human consciousness. Social idealism, on the other 
hand, is not logically dependent upon the stronger version of objective idealism, because the former 
unlike the latter does not necessarily deny the reality of matter or the dependence of human 
cognition on matter. Nonetheless there is a close affinity between the two sets of views for the 
simple reason that it is more plausible to decentre "material factors" in a causal explanation of 
society and history if these can be seen as ultimately illusory, mere expressions of the 
consciousness of a cosmic supersubject, or if the ultimate dependence of mind upon matter can be 
called into question. After all, if the material world is the product of "free will", why cannot those 
451 
material beings made in Gods image and accordingly given a "free will" of their own follow the 
lead of their maker and put "consciousness in charge"? 
The relationship between the stronger version of objective idealism and subjective idealism is 
also one of close affinity rather than logical necessity. Again, the reason for this is that the latter 
need not deny the reality of matter, nor the dependence of human consciousness on matter, merely 
its capacity to shape or influence the products of human consciousness, though the philosopher has 
an easier time asserting the autonomy of the human subject from material determinations if the 
contrary is upheld. Finally the same relationship of affinity rather than logical necessity holds true 
between the weaker form of objective idealism and both subjective and social idealism. Subjective 
and social idealists may hold that the world is created by God or they may not. For it is possible to 
assert that history is driven by ideas or that matter is "indeterminate" until structured by thought 
without asserting the reality of God. But as a matter of record most have done so, again because 
positing the primacy of "consciousness" over "conditions", or of social consciousness over social 
structure, is given a plausibility which would be lacking in its absence. After all, if human agents 
are subject to various objective laws (of physics, chemistry, biology and social structure), the role 
of these laws in shaping consciousness and history can be reasonably denied only if they can be 
rendered subordinate to "spirit", which is plausible only if the ultimate "autonomy" of mind from 
matter is upheld. 
29 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., p. 4. 
30 Collier, A., "Materialism and Explanation in the Human Sciences", Mepham, J. and Ruben, D. H. 
(eds. ), 1979, Issues in Marxist Philosophy, volume 2, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, pp. 
36-8. Now the relationship between ontological materialism and explanatory materialism is one of 
logical necessity, or so it seems to me. The reason for this is that ontological materialism is 
logically supportive of an epistemological position which does not simply assert the externality of 
the objects of knowledge, their autonomy from the knowing subject, but also their capacity to 
condition or shape the manner of their appropriation by the knowing subject. This means that the 
consciousness and agency of individuals must always be explained in terms of a material referent 
(physical and social circumstances). Ontological materialism asserts the determination of "mind" 
452 
and "will" by "matter"; explanatory materialism is a refinement of this position - asserting the 
determination of the products and projects of mind (i. e. social action) by the material structures of 
nature, human nature and society combined. 
31 Engels, F., 1969, Anti-Dühring, Lawrence and Wishart, London; Engels, F., 1954, The Dialectics of 
Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow. The term "dialectical materialism" was coined not by Engels 
but by the Marxists of the Second International, most of whom do not seem to have understood his 
philosophy very well. Nonetheless it is as reasonable a title of Engels ontological approach as any, 
and for this reason I have retained it. 
32 "Critical naturalism" is the term by which Andrew Collier describes his own and Bhaskar's social 
ontology (Collier, R., 1994, op. cit., especially pp. 237-61. ). 
33 Andrew Collier, to whom I owe this useful distinction between vertical and horizontal causality in 
social analysis, endorses the first but not the second aspect of my argument (Collier, A., 1989, 
Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, pp. 58-61). His 
argument is that historical materialism is defensible only as a thesis of vertical determination (of 
superstructure by base). But I cannot see how this understanding of Marxism can support a 
materialist theory of history (or historical materialism) as opposed to a materialist theory of social 
structure (or sociological materialism). 
34 Bhaskar, It, "Philosophy and Scientific Realism", Archer, M. S., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, 
T. and Norrie, A. (eds. ), 1998, Critical Realism: Essential Readings, Routledge, London, pp. 19 
and 23-4. 
35 Bhaskar, R., 1978, A Realist Theory of Science, 2nd edition, Harvester Press, Brighton, p. 29. 
36 Bhaskar, R., "Philosophy", Archer, M. S., et. al. (eds. ), 1998, op. cit., p. 25. 
37 Bhaskar, R., 1986, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, Verso, London, p. 35. 
38 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., pp. 32-7. 
39 This is the Humean interpretation of natural necessity endorsed by empirical realists. 
40 Bhaskar, R., "Philosophy", Archer, M. S., et. al. (eds. ), 1998, op. cit., p. 25. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., pp. 36-7. 
453 
43 Ibid., pp. 44-5. 
44 Though for an alternative view see: Ruben, D-H., 1977, Marxism and Materialism, Harvester 
Press, Hassocks, pp. 100-2,128-33. Ruben also argues, rightly in this case, that philosophy must 
base itself on the results or knowledges of the empirical sciences, not simply on its activity (ibid., 
pp. 102-5). 
45 Or, in the case of human beings, of psychological laws by social and biological laws. 
46 Dennett, D. C., 1996, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life, Penguin, Allen 
Lane, London, pp. 181-3. Dennett distinguishes "reductionism, which is a good thing, from greedy 
reductionism, which is not. " For him "a proper reductionistic explanation of ... phenomena would 
leave them still standing, but just demystified, unified, placed on more secure foundations. " Since 
by "greedy reductionism" Dennett means to denote a position which denies "the existence of real 
levels, real complexities, real phenomena" it is clear that his meaning here corresponds to the realist 
concept of "reductionism". 
47 Rorty, R., 1980, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 354. 
48 Bhaskar, R., 1991, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 48. 
49 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., p. 46. 
50 Callinicos, A., 1996, "Darwin, Materialism and Evolution", International Socialism, 2: 71, p. 107. 
31 Rose, S., Lewontin, R. C. and Kamin, L. J., 1984, Not in our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human 
Nature, pp. 277-8. 
52 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., p. 109. 
33 Bhaskar, R., 1978, op. cit., p. 119. 
54 Collier, A., 1994, op. cit., pp. 107 and 131. 
55 Ibid., p. 110. 
56 Bhaskar, R., 1978, op. cit., p. 115. 
s' Sayer, A., 1992, op. cit., p. 119. 
S$ Ibid., p. 105. 
59 Ibid., p. 119. 
60 Rose, S., et. al., 1984, p. 286. 
454 
61 Bhaskar, R., 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism, 2nd edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel 
Hempstead,, p. 98. 
62 Benton, T., "Natural Science and Cultural Struggle: Engels and the Philosophy of the Natural 
Sciences", Mepham, J. and Ruben, D-H. (eds. ), 1979, op. cit., p. 122. 
63 Engels, F., 1969, op. cit., p. 83. 
64 Ibid., p. 442. 
65 Benton, T., "Natural Science", Mepham, J. and Ruben, R-H. (eds. ), 1979, op. cit., pp. 121 and 125. 
66 Ibid., p. 126. 
67 Gould, S. J., 1989, Wonderful Life, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 49-50 and 289. 
68 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1973, Selected Works, Lawrence and Wishart, London, volume 3, pp. 339, 
362-3. 
69 Benton, T., "Natural Science", Mepham, J. and Ruben, D-H. (eds. ), 1979, op. cit., pp. 122. 
70 Ibid., p. 124. 
71 Ibid., pp. 124 and 128. 
72 Ibid., p. 123. 
73 Ibid., p. 125. 
74 Ibid., 124. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Teleological views of history are those which attribute goals or purposes to developmental 
processes which are immanent from their genesis and towards the fulfilment of which they 
inevitably gravitate. Developmental theory, as such, is not necessarily teleological. 
77 Dennett, D. C., 1996, op. cit., pp. 41,65,69,76,205,308 and 343. 
78 Nobel prize-winning chemist Melvin Calvin quoted in: Siegel, P. N., 1986, The Meek and the 
Militant: Religion and Power Across the World, Zed Books, London, p. 11. 
79 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1987, op. cit., p. 124. 
80 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Or, as Engels puts it elsewhere, "[i]n every field of science, in natural as in 
historical science, one must proceed from the given facts ... the interconnections are not to be built 
455 
into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by 
experiment" (ibid., pp. 342-3). 
81 Ibid., p. 132. 
82 Engels, F., 1976, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Foreign 
Languages Press, Peking, pp. 45-6. 
83 Rees, J., 1998, op. cit., p. 286. 
84 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1987, op. cit., p. 121. 
85 Blackie, D., 1989, "Revolution in Science", International Socialism, 2: 42 
86 Kuhn, T. S., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago; Feyerabend, P. K., 1975, Against Method, New Left Books, London; Feyerabend, P. K., 
1978, Science in a Free Society, New Left Books, London. 
87 Perhaps the most important recent example of this is provided by the work of the "left Darwinians" 
- Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins - in microbiology and evolutionary ecology. 
A less recent, though still contemporary example, is provided by the contribution of scientists in the 
former USSR to quantum theory and relativity following the relaxation of state ideological controls 
on scientific enterprise after Stalin. The historian of science Loren R. Graham has pointed out that 
dialectical materialism equipped Soviet scientists with the philosophical orientation to arrive at 
views which won them international recognition among their foreign colleagues" (Graham, L. R., 
1972, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union, Knopf, Books, New York, p. 6). 
88 Engels, F., 1954, op. cit., pp. 83-91. 
89 Pomper, P. (ed. ), 1986, Trotsky's Notebooks 1933-1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics and 
Evolutionism, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 88. 
90 Where "metaphysics" is defined as a "speculative" or "descriptive" ontology of nature which 
founds the physical sciences instead of being based upon them. 
91 This is especially clear in the sciences of eco-biology, the "new physics" of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, and the "sciences of complexity". See especially: Lewontin, R. and Levins, R., 1985, 
The Dialectical Biologist, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass; Rose, S., 1997, Lifelines, 
456 
Penguin, Harmondsworth; McGarr, P., 1990, "Order out of Chaos", International Socialism, 2: 48, 
pp. 148-55; McGarr, P., 1994, op. cit., pp. 156-76. 
92 Engels, F., 1976, op. cit., p. 40. 
93 After all, Engels at once proceeds to argue that the laws are "different in their expression insofar as 
the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature ... these laws assert themselves 
unconsciously, in the form of external necessity" (ibid. ). 
94 Callinicos, A., 1998, op. cit., p. 100. 
95 Rees, J., 1998, op. cit., p. 286. 
96 Callinicos, A., 1998, op. cit., p. 100. 
97 See chapter two (pp. 87-109) and chapter three (pp. 145-161). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Timpanaro, S., 1975, On Materialism, New Left Books, London, pp. 44-5 
100 Ibid., pp. 34 and 45. 
101 Ibid., p. 45. 
102 In fact, the mechanisms of human biology and the physical world are better seen as being 
"constitutive" of individuals and socio-cultural relations, and as giving rise to both "passive" and 
"active" human experience. By contrast, stressing the "passive role of experience" in shaping 
individuals and social interaction can give sustenance to a "materialist pessimism". For a detailed 
articulation of this argument and sympathetic critique of Timpanaro see especially: Williams, R., 
1980, Problems in Materialism and Culture, Verso, London, pp. 106-16. 
103 See chapter 2 (pp. 64-9) and chapter three (pp. 151-160). 
104 From Engels speech at the graveside of Marx, Marx. F. and Engels, F., 1968, Selected Works, 
Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 430. 
105 Collier, A., "Materialism", Mepham, J. and Ruben, D-H. (eds. ), 1979, op. cit., p. 43. 
106 Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., p. 102. A similar argument is made by Engels: "We comprehend the ideas 
in our heads materialistically again - as reflections of real things instead of regarding the real things 
as reflections of this or that stage of the absolute idea" (Engels, F., 1976, op. cit., p. 40). 
107 Rees, J., 1994. "Engels' Marxism", International Socialism, 2: 65, p. 74. 
457 
18 Engels, F., 1976, op. cit., p. 55. 
109 Engels, F., 1975, Selected Correspondence, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 457. 
11o Engels, F., 1969, op. cit., p. 55. 
111 Labriola, A., 1966, Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History, Monthly Review Press, New 
York, p. 155. 
112 Marx, F., 1959, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, p. 67. 
13 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, Collected Works, volume 5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 36. 
"a Ibid., p. 37. 
"s Engels, F., "The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man", Engels, F., 1954, op. 
cit., pp. 228-32,234 and 37. 
116 Harman, C., "Engels and the Origins of Human Society", International Socialism, 2: 65, p. 85. 
"' Trigger, B., 1992, "Comment on Tobias', `Piltdown: the Case against Keith"', Current 
Anthropology, volume 33, no. 3, p. 275. 
18 Leakey, R., 1981, The Making of Mankind, Book Club Associates, London, p. 56. 
119 Most notably, of course, of Raymond Darts discovery of the remains of a bipedal ape in East Africa 
in the 1950s. 
120 Harman, C., 1994, "Origins", op. cit., p. 86. 
121 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 48. 
122 Quoted in: ibid., p. 52. 
123 Quoted in: Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, Origins Reconsidered, Abacus, London, p. 91. 
124 Ibid. 
125 David Pilbeam, quoted in: Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 52. 
126 Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, op. cit., p. 164. 
127 Ibid., p. 165. 
128 Ibid., p. 166. 
129 Ibid., pp. 166 and 172. This is the argument of neurophysiologist Bob Martin. 
130 Ibid., pp. 166-7,168 and 172. 
458 
131 Ibid., p. 198. 
132 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 139 
133 For useful expositions of Isaac's views see: Blumenschine, R. J., 1991, "Breakfast at Olorgesailie", 
Journal of Human Evolution, volume 21, no. 4; Sept, J. M., 1992, "Was there no place like home? ", 
Current Anthropology, volume 32, no. 2. 
134 Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, op. cit., pp. 304-5. 
135 Cited in: ibid., p. 249. 
136 Ibid., p. 259. 
137 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., pp. 138-9. 
138 Harman, C., 1994, "Origins", op. cit., p. 95. 
139 Postmodem idealism, as in other of the human sciences, has obtained a foothold in archaeology and 
paleaoanthropology in recent years, though here a marginal one. Thus Lewis Binford, Stephen Jay 
Gould, Adam Kuper and others argue that culture and language arose abrubtly about 25,000 to 
35,000 years ago with the emergence of homo sapiens as part of a "human revolution". Such views 
have virtually no empirical backing and have been subject to damaging critiques. For the more 
effective of these see: Foley, R. A., 1991, The Origins of Human Behaviour, Unwin Hyman, 
London, p. 383; Graves, P., 1991, "New Models and Metaphors for the Neanderthal Debate", 
Current Anthropology, volume 32, no. 5, pp. 519-21; Harman, C., 1994, "Origins", op. cit., pp. 96- 
102; Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, op. cit., pp. 185-99; Stringer, C., "Human Evolution and 
Biological Adaptation in the Pleistocene", Foley, R. A. (ed. ), 1984, Hominid Evolution and 
Community Ethnology, Academic Press, London, p. 64. 
140 Woolfson, C., 1982, The Labour Theory of Culture: A Re-examination of Engels' theory of Human 
Origins, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 3. 
141 Timpanaro, S., 1975, op. cit., pp. 40-1,43-52. 
142 See pp. 190-212. 
143 Ibid., pp. 186-212. 
144 Labriola, A., 1966, op. cit., p. 20 
145 Ibid., p. 217. 
459 
146 Timpanaro, S., 1975, op. cit., pp. 48-52 
147 This dilemma has recently been posed by Andrew Collier (Collier, A., 1989, op. cit., pp. 54-5). But 
it is a more longstanding objection of postmodernists to Marxism. 
148 Engels, F., "Letter to Joseph Bloch, ", Engels, F., 1980, Letters on Historical Materialism 1890-94, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 10. 
149 Engels, F., "Letter to Conrad Schmidt. ", Marx. K., Engels, F. and Lenin, V. I., 1972, On Historical 
Materialism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 299. 
150 Coulson, M. A. and Riddell, C., 1970, Approaching Sociology: A Critical Introduction, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, p. 81. 
151 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1967, The Communist Manifesto, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 79 
152 As Rosa Luxemburg once famously put it. 
153 A point made by Engels himself when specifying the relationship between polity and economy in 
capitalist society (Engels, F., "Letter to Schmidt", Marx, K., Engels, F. and Lenin, V. I., 1972, op. 
cit., p. 299). 
154 Harman, C., 1986, "Base and Superstructure", International Socialism, 2: 32, p. 15. 
Chapter Two 
I Marx, K., 1959, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, p. 67. 
2 Ibid., p. 98. 
3 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1973, Selected Works, volume 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 13. 
4 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 42. 
s Ibid., p. 121. 
6 Ibid., p. 47. 
Ibid., p. 122. 
s Ibid., p. 64. 
9 Geras, N., 1983, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend, Verso, London. 
10 Elster, J., 1985, Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 64-6. 
460 
11 See Geras, N., 1983, op. cit., pp. 61-2,69-73,83-86. 
12 Marx, K., 1959, op. cit., p. 68. 
13 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., p. 42 (my emphasis). 
14 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, Collected Works, volume 3, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 333. 
13 Marx, K., 1959, op. cit., p. 69. 
16 Marx, K., 1973, Grundrisse, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 83. 
17 Ibid., p. 84. 
is Callinicos, A., 1983, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, Bookmarks, London, p. 68. 
19 For useful summaries of the modem materialist theory of human origins and evolution see Durant, 
J. R. (ed. ), 1989, Human Origins, Clarendon Press, Oxford; Foley, R. A. (ed. ), 1991, The Origins of 
Human Behaviour, Unwin Hyman, London; Foley, R. (ed. ), 1984, Hominid Evolution and 
Community Ethnology: Pre-historical Human Adaptation in Biological Perspective, Academic 
Press, London; Hammond, P. B., 1976, Physical Anthropology and Archaeology, Macmillan, New 
York; Kingdon, J., 1993, Self-Made Man and His Undoing. Simon Schuster, London; Leakey, R. 
and Lewin, R., 1977, Origins: what new discoveries reveal about the emergence of our species and 
its possible future, Macdonald and Janes, London; Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, Origins 
Reconsidered, Abacus, London; Renfrew, C. (ed. ), 1973, The Explanation of Cultural Change: 
Models in Pre-history, Duckworth, London; Woolfson, C., 1982, The Labour Theory of Culture: A 
Re-Examination of Engels' Theory of Human Origins, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
20 Tanner, N. M., 1981, On Becoming Human, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 155. 
21 Rawls, J., 1971, A Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
22 Sandel, J., 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 
53. 
23 Ibid., p. 64. 
24 Ibid., p. 150. 
25 I am grateful to Andrew Collier for this insight 
26 See Cohen, G. A., "Reconsidering Historical Materialism", Pennock, J. R. andChapman, J. W. 
(ed. ), 1983, Marxism: NomosXXVI, New York University Press, New York, p. 233. 
461 
27 Doyle, L. and Harris, R., 1986, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 142-55. 
28 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., p. 51. 
29 Quoted in Leakey, R., 1981, The Making of Mankind, Book Club Associates, London, op. cit., pp. 
141-2 (my emphasis). 
30 That human consciousness is necessarily social and that language is socially dependent is certainly 
Marx's own view. In his words: "The `mind' is from the start afflicted with the curse of being 
`burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, 
sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real 
consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it exist for me; language, 
like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men.... 
Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as 
men exist at all" (Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., pp. 50-1). 
31 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., pp. 140-2. 
32 Rose, S., 1976, The Conscious Brain, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 173. 
33 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., p. 48. For Marx, "species-being" is in part definable as "my 
needs ... my own nature, this totality of needs and 
drives" (Marx, K., 1973, op. cit., p. 245). 
34 Marx, K., 1976, Capital, volume 1, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 275,277,341,375-6,621; Marx, 
K., 1962, Capital, volume 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 826,837 and 854. Here Marx 
describes these basic material needs as both biological and social imperatives. The former are 
described variously as "natural needs", "physical needs", the need for a "healthy maintenance of the 
body", including the need for "healthy relations between the sexes"; the latter are described as 
being conditioned by the "level of civilisation". 
35 Marx, K., 1962, op. cit., p. 800; Marx, K., 1970, Theories of Surplus Value, volume 2, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, pp. 117-18; Marx, K., 1973, op. cit., p. 488. 
36 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, op. cit., p. 217; Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1976, Collected Works, 
volume 5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 437. 
462 
37 Marx describes this variously as all round development of individuals, free development of 
individuals, "the means of cultivating [ones] gifts in all directions", the need for "the free play of 
the vital forces of [the] body and ... mind", and provision of "scope for the development of mans 
faculties" (Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1976, op. cit., pp. 255,439 and 78; Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., pp. 
375,460,772; Marx, K., 1972, Theories of Surplus Value, volume 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 
p. 256). 
38 Geras, N., 1983, op. cit., p. 83. 
39 Marx describes this as the need for "space, light, air and protection against the dangerous or the 
unhealthy concomitants of the production process. " Without this protection, the "five senses pay the 
penalty". (Marx, K, 1962, op. cit., p. 86; Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., pp. 586 and 591. 
40 Geras, N., 1983, op. cit., pp. 72-3; Heller, A., 1976, The Theory of Need in Marx, Tavistock, 
London, pp. 23-5,44-8,75-8,96-9,123-6. 
41 The universal existence in human society of such norms as "reciprocal altruism", "distributive 
justice" and "fairness" has been noted even by ardent defenders of methodological individualism. 
George Romans, for example, was prepared to acknowledge their salience in human history, 
although his theoretical interests and political values led him to attempt to colonise them for 
utilitarianism. (See: Homans, G., 1964, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London). 
42 Bottomore, T. B. (ed. ), 1964, Karl Marx: Early Writings, International Publishers, New York, pp. 
127 and 148. 
43 Elster, J., 1983a, Explaining Technical Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 74 
and 87-88; Elster, J., 1983b, Sour Grapes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, chapter 1. 
44 Elster, J., 1986, The Multiple Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
45 Wilson, E. O., 1975, Sociobiology: the New Synthesis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 
p. 4. See also E. O. Wilson quoted in: Trigg, R., 1982, The Shaping of Man: Philosophical Aspects 
ofSociobiology, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 110. 
46 Wilson, E. O., 1978, On Human Nature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, p. 172. 
463 
47 Rose, S., Lewontin, R. C. and Kamin, L. J., 1984, Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human 
Nature, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 244. 
48 Wilson, E. O., 1975, op. cit., p. 4. 
49 Dawkins, R., 1976, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. v 
so Rose, S., et. al., 1984, op. cit., p. 245. 
51 Dart, R., 1953, "The Predatory Transition from Ape to Man", International Anthropological and 
Linguistic Review, volume 1, no. 4. 
52 Ardrey, R., 1967, African Genesis, Collins, London; Ardrey, R., 1970, The Social Contract, Collins, 
London; Ardrey, R., 1976, The Territorial Imperative, Collins, London. 
53 Quoted in: Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 221. 
34 Lorenz, K., 1966, On Aggression, Methuen, London. 
55 As two opponents of this view put the argument (Wohlpoff, M. and Thorne, A., "The Case Against 
Eve", New Scientist, 22 June, 1991). 
56 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., pp. 17-20,65-6,70,73; Rose, S., et. al., 1984, op. cit., p. 230. 
s' Stringer, C., "Homo sapiens: Single or Multiple Origin? ", Durant, J. P. (ed. ), 1989, op. cit., p. 77; 
Graves, P., 1991, "New Models and Metaphors for the Neanderthal Debate", Current Anthropology, 
volume 32. no. 5, p. 521. See also E. Zubrow quoted in: Leakey and Lewin, 1993, op. cit., pp. 234- 
5. 
58 See for example: Benedict, R., 1964, Patterns of Culture, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London; 
Bicchieri, M. G. (ed. ), 1972, Hunters and Gatherers Today, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York; 
Childe, G. V., 1956, Man Makes Himself, Watts, London; Childe, G. V., 1963, Social Evolution, 
Watts, London; Diamond, S., 1974, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilisation, 
Tansaction Press, New Brunswick, NJ; Geliner, E., 1991, Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure 
of Human History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; Friedl, E., 1975, Men and Women: the 
Anthropologists' View, Waveland, Prospect Heights; Ingold, T., Riches, D. and Woodburn, 1991, 
Hunters and Gatherers, volume 1, Berg, New York; Leacock, E., 1981, Myths of Male Dominance, 
Monthly Review Press, New York; Lee, R., 1979, The ! Kung San: Men, Women and Work in a 
Foraging Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Lloyd-Warner, W., 1964, A Black 
464 
Civilisation, Random House, New York; Malinowski, B. (ed. ), 1970, Argonauts of the Western 
Pacific, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London; Megaw, J. V. S., 1977, Hunter Gatherers and the First 
Farmers Beyond Europe, Leicester University Press, NJ; Pritchard, E. and Fortes, M., 1961, African 
Political Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Sahlins, M., 1976, Stone Age Economics, 
Aldine, Chicago; Schrire, C. (ed. ), 1984, Past and Present in Hunter Gatherer Studies, Academic 
Press, New York; Turnbull, C., 1962, The Forest People, Chatto and Windus, New York. 
59 Quoted in Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 97. 
60 Ibid., p. 98. 
61 See: Harman, C., 1994, "Engels and the Origins of Human Society", International Socialism, 2: 65, 
pp. 104-12, for a useful summary of recent anthropological research which sheds light on the nature 
of "primitive communism". 
62 Friedl, E., 1975, op. cit., p. 136; Leacock, E., 1981, op. cit., pp. 139-40; Lee, R., 1979, op. cit., p. 
118; Lee in Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 107. 
63 Lee, R., 1979, op. cit., pp. 244,343-5,336-8. 
64 Wilson, E. O., 1975, op. cit., p. 574. 
65 Ibid., pp. 572 and 575. 
66 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 97. 
67 Harman, C., 1994, op. cit., p. 112. 
68 My claim that human nature predisposes or acclimatises individuals for life in egalitarian social 
relations and towards altruistic behaviour would doubtless be treated as contentious by many who 
would accept that human beings are naturally co-operative and sociable creatures. Yet a perfectly 
reasonable natural selection argument can be made which infers altruism and egalitarianism from 
the historical interface between self-conscious "co-operative man" and the social and physical 
circumstances of our hominid forebears. Such an explanation takes as its starting point the 
economic benefits of social co-operation in ensuring the "reproductive fitness" of humanity's 
anthropoid ancestors. As we have seen, given the elementary sociality of the hominids, in specific 
environmental circumstances (the retreat of the rain forest and its replacement by more demanding 
savannah-type terrain), natural selection operated here in the direction of intelligence, social 
465 
learning, and economic co-operation. One important consequence of this "evolutionary ratchet" 
being set in motion was the acquisition by human beings of self-consciousness and language which 
corresponded with the transition from simpler forms of scavenger-forager social relations to more 
complex hunter-gather modes of societal organisation. In these socio-economic and physical 
conditions, egalitarian values (and hence practices of reciprocal altruism) became indispensable to 
the "survival value" or reproductive success of the human species and individual genotype. This is 
because hunter-gatherer modes of subsistence were incapable of generating the economic surpluses 
which would sustain an unegalitarian distribution and consumption of allocative goods amongst the 
community or band. Since the scavenger-forager and hunter-gatherer ways of life, which 
characterised human existence throughout the 2.5 million year formative epoch of modern homo 
sapiens, were highly functional in terms of ensuring the "reproductive fitness" of the "Darwinian 
phenotypes", and since these modes of environmental adaptation could be reproduced only by 
means of a food-sharing strategy, it is quite acceptable to suppose that natural selection operated 
here not only in the direction of enhanced sociality and intellect but also towards a greater intensity 
and quality of sociality associated with reciprocated altruism and egalitarian living. 
Interestingly, this argument is accepted by Hayek, one of the leading gurus of the New Right! In 
his view, thousands of years of primitive communism have produced "lamentable" and dangerous" 
"innate instincts" towards socialism, leading the mass of people to desire "a just distribution, in 
which organised power is used to allocate to each what he deserves", to "pursue perceived desirable 
common objectives", and "to do good to known people". Accordingly, the task of the responsible 
state, according to Hayek, is to resist these pressures with every ideological and political means 
available in the interests of administrative efficiency and economic dynamism. 
69 Lee, R., "Reflections on Primitive Communism", in Ingold, T. et. al. (ed. ), 1991, op. cit., pp. 268 
and 262. 
70 Quoted in: Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 242. 
71 Harman, C., 1994, op. cit., pp. 111-12. 
466 
72 Washburn and More make the point that "man and chimpanzee are more closely related than horse 
and donkey, cat and lion, or dog and fox" (Washburn, S. I. and More, R., "Only Once", Hammond, 
P. B. (ed. ), 1976, op cit., p. 18. 
73 Wilson, E. O. and Lumsden, C. J., 1981, Genes, Mind and Culture: The Co-Evolutionary Process, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, p. 354. 
74 Harman, C., 1994, op. cit., p. 88. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., p. 89. 
77 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
78 Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 240., 
79 Harman, C., 1994, op. cit., pp. 106-12; Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., pp. 99-109. 
80 See Harman, C., 1994, op. cit., pp. 107-9; Leakey, R., 1981, op. cit., pp. 98-9; Leakey R. and 
Lewin, R., 1993, op. cit., pp. 46-7,141-2,177-82,184-9. 
81 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 288. 
82 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., p. 109. 
83 Taylor, C., "What is Human Agency? ", Mischel, T. (ed. ), 1977, The Self. " Psychological and 
Philosophical Issues, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 103-4. 
84 Ibid., pp. 107 and 114. 
85 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 118. 
86 Sen, A. K., "Rational Fools", in Sen, A. K. (ed. ), 1982, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 89-92,99,100-1,103. 
87 Scott, J., 1995, op. cit., p. 87. 
88 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 119. 
89 It should go without saying, for instance, that if "Prisoner A" undergoing interrogation believes that 
his or her confederate ("Prisoner B") is trustworthy, and consequently will not "crack under 
pressure", the former will have rational motives for refusing to "grass up" the latter, knowing that 
the "worst case" scenario will not be the maximum gaol sentence for either of them. A breach of 
trust by Prisoner A, on the other hand, although it might facilitate for himself or herself the 
467 
minimum gaol sentence, equally likely might encourage a reciprocation by Prisoner B, and hence 
the maximum gaol sentence for both. Where prisoners believe each other to be trustworthy, a 
breach of trust by either party is the high-risk strategy, and thus the less rational course of action. 
90 Blau, P., 1964, Exchange and Power in Social Life, John Wiley, New York. 
91 Abrahamson, A., 1981, Sociological Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 179-80. 
92 Craib, I., 1992, Modern Social Theory, 2nd edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, p. 
78. 
93 Elster, J., 1989a, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 98. 
94 Elster, J., 1989b, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 119 and 123. 
93 Homans, G., 1964, "Bringing Men Back In", American Sociological Review, 29, pp. 809-18. 
96 Coleman, J. S., 1966, "Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions", American Journal of 
Sociology, 71, pp. 615-27; Blau, P., 1964, op. cit., pp. 75-9. 
97 Giddens, A., 1990, Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 32,86 and 60. 
98 Cooley, C., 1909, Social Organisation, Schocken, New York; Cooley, C., 1922, Human Nature and 
the Social Order, Charles Scribners and Sons, New York. 
Becker, H. S., 1963, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, Free Press, New York; 
Lemert, E. M., 1972, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control, 2nd edition, Prentice- 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs. 
10° Abrahamson, M., 1981, op. cit., pp. 19,16-17 and 15. 
101 Mead, G. H., 1919, "The Mechanisms of Social Consciousness", Journal of Philosophy, 9, pp. 402- 
5; Mead, G. H., 1934, Mind, Selland Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
102 Ibid., pp. 154,169,270. 
103 Ibid., p. 169. 
104 Gottlieb, R., 1992, Marxism: Origins, Betrayal, Rebirth, Routledge, London, p. 193. 
105 Giddens, A., 1990, op. cit., pp. 75-6. 
106 Giddens, A., 1991, Modernity and Self-Identity, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 51. 
468 
107 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 122. 
108 Gddens, A., 1991, op. cit., p. 45. 
109 Ibid., pp. 38 and 42. 
110 Gottlieb, R., 1992, op. cit., p. 195. 
III Foucault, M., 1980, Power/Knowledge, Harvester, Brighton, pp. 73-4. 
112 Ibid., p. 90. 
113 Foucault, M., 1976, La Volonte de savoir, Iditions de Minuit, Paris, pp. 125-6. 
114 Ibid., p. 126. 
115 Foucault, M., "The Subject and Power", Dreyfuss, H. L. and Rabinow, P., 1982, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Harvester, Brighton, p. 221. 
116 Foucault, M., 1984, L'Usage des plaisirs, Iditions du Seuil, Paris, pp. 16-17. 
1" Abrahamson, M., 1981, op. cit., p. 16. 
118 Ibid., p. 10. 
119 G. H. Mead, cited in: Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
120 Ibid., p. 12. 
121 Lee, D. and Newby, H., 1983, The Problem of Sociology, Unwin Hyman, London, pp. 317-18. 
122 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit., p. 51. 
123 Ibid., p. 42. 
124 Goffman, E., 1969, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Penguin, Allen Lane, London. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Goffman, E., 1961, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, 
Doubleday, New York. 
127 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit., pp. 42-53. 
128 Ibid., p. 53. 
129 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 126. 
130 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit., p. 55. 
131 Archer. M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 122. 
132 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit., p. 51. 
469 
133 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 123. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit.; p. 38. 
138 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 122. 
139 Ibid., p. 124. 
140 Giddens, A., 1991, op. cit., p. 45. 
141 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 125. 
142 Ibid., p. 126. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Shotter, J., 1983, "The Duality of Structure and Intentionality in an Ecological Psychology", 
Journal for the Study of Social Behaviour, 13, pp. 39 and 19-20. 
146 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 127. 
147 As, for instance, the wealthy textile magnate Morozov did prior to the 1905 revolution in Russia. 
Morozov was an important source of funding for the Bolsheviks during the period in which the 
party was illegal and forced to operate underground. Tragically he committed suicide after the 1905 
defeat. 
148 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., pp. 128-9. 
149 Ibid., p. 129. 
150 Ibid. 
is, Giddens, A., 1984, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity, 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 77-81. 
152 Thrift, N., 1985, "Bear and Mouse or Bear and Tree? Anthony Giddens Reconstitution of Social 
Theory", Sociology, 19, pp. 339-53. 
15' Bertilsson, M., 1984, "The Theory of Structuration: Prospects and Problems", Acta Sociologica, 27, 
p. 344. 
470 
154 Craib, I., 1992, Anthony Giddens, Routledge, London, pp. 167-9. 
iss Ibid., p. 171. 
156 Ibid. pp. 169-71 
157 Giddens, A., 1984, op. cit., pp. 79-81 
158 Richard Leakey quoted in Harman, C., 1986, How Marxism Works, Bookmarks, London, p. 19. 
159 Anthony Giddens refers to these as "cultural universals". These include "grammatically complex 
language", "some recognisable form of family system", "the institution of marriage", "some form 
of incest prohibition", "the existence of art, dancing, bodily adornment, games, gift-taking, jokes 
and rules of hygiene" (Giddens, A., 1990, op. cit., pp. 39-40). See also: Freidl, J., 1981, The Human 
Portrait: Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Heibert, 
P. G., 1976, Cultural Anthropology, Lippincott, Philadelphia; Murdock, G. P., "The Common 
Denominator of Cultures", in Linton, R. (ed. ), 1945, The Science of Man in a World of Crisis, 
Columbia University Press, New York. 
Chapter Three 
I Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, volume 2, Bedminster Press, New York. 
2 See: Clarke, S., 1991, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London, 
pp. 197-229, for a useful critique of Weber's interpretative methodology. 
MacDonald, G. and Pettit, P., 1981, Semantics and Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. See also: Davidson, B., 1979, Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford; and 
Dennet, D. C., 1978, Brainstorms, Harvester Press, Brighton. 
MacDonald, G. and Pettit, P., 1981, op. cit.; Davidson, B., 1984, Inquiries in Truth and 
Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
s Wittgenstein, L., 1978, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 39; Wittgenstein, L., 1968, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 206. 
6 Wiggins, D., 1980, Sameness and Substance, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 222-3. 
471 
7 Elster, J., 1989a, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; Elster, J., 1989b, Nuts and Bolts For the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; Elster, J., 1989c, Solomic Judgements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
8 Coleman, J. S., 1990, The Foundations of Social Theory, Belknap, Cambridge, Mass. 
9 Mouzelis, N., 1995, Sociological Theory: what went wrong?, Routledge, London, p. 37. 
10 Callinicos, A., 1987, Making History: Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, p. 122. 
Giddens, A., 1979, Central Problems in Social Theory, Macmillan, London, p. 189. 
12 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. Cit., p. 123. See also: R. A., "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", in 
Urry, J. and Wakeford, J., 1973, Power in Britain, Heinemann, London; Dahl, R. A., 1961, Who 
Governs?, Yale University Press, New Haven; Rose, A. M., 1967, The Power Structure: Political 
Process in an American City, Open University Press, New York. 
13 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., pp. 124-5. See also: Connolly, W. E., 1983, The Terms of Political 
Discourse, Robertson, Oxford, pp. 44-6; Elster, J., 1986, Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, p. 349; Levine, A., 1984, Arguing for Socialism, Verso, London, pp. 
109-10. 
14 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 123. 
15 Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S., "Two Faces of Power", in Bell, R. (ed. ), 1969, Political Power, 
John Wiley and Sons, New York; Lukes, S., 1974, Power: A Radical View, Macmilllan, London. 
16 For instance, a view forcefully argued by: Therborn, G., 1980, The Ideology of Power and the 
Power of ideology, Verso, London, pp. 5-10. 
" It is, after all, rather absurd to believe otherwise, given that the working class in Britain today 
(approximately 70% of the adult population) owns a mere 14% of the total wealth of society. In 
1991 the bottom 50% of the British population owned just 7% of national wealth. See: Social 
Trends 21,1991, HMSO, London, p. 96. 
'$ Miliband, R., 1973, The State in Capitalist Society, Quartet, London, pp. 24,42,67-73. 
19 German, L., 1996, A Question of Class, Bookmarks, London, pp. 58-61. 
20 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
472 
21 Coleman, J. S., 1990, op. cit., pp, 29,32,243. 
22 As Mouzelis puts it (op. cit., p. 38). See: Elster, J., 1989a, op. cit., p. 15. 
23 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 37. 
24 Elster, J., 1989a, op. cit., p. 100. 
25 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 39. 
26 Elster, J., 1989b, op. cit., p. 76. 
27 See my discussion of this in chapter two (pp. 74-7). 
28 See those texts cited in footnote 19 of chapter two. 
29 Weber, M., 1961, General Economic History, Collier-Macmillan, London, pp. 207,275-8,352-4. 
30 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 39. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For useful discussion of "structural capacities" see: Wright, E. O., 1978, Class, Crisis and the State, 
New Left Books, London, pp. 99-101. See also: Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., pp. 86-91,132-3, 
184-7,235-6. 
33 Archer, M. S., 1995, Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 254-7. 
34 Ibid., p. 259. 
35 Anderson, P., 1980, Arguments within English Marxism, New Left Books, London, p. 19. 
36 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 258. 
37 Anderson, P., 1980, op. cit., p. 20. 
38 But this does not mean that the other distinctions I have made in the category of "interaction" are 
not important. For example, the distinction between collective and individual social agency is 
necessary to grasp the way in which the agential circumstances of persons can result in both 
individualistic and group responses to external pressures. 
39 Archer, 1995, op. cit., p. 258. 
40 Ibid., p. 259. 
41 Ibid., p. 260. 
42 Ibid. 
473 
43 Ibid., p. 260-1. 
44 Ibid., p. 261. 
as See especially: Wickham, C., 1985, "The Uniqueness of the East", Journal of Peasant Studies, 12, 
2 and 3. 
46 Archer, M. S., 1995, op, cit., p. 262. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 263. 
a' Ibid. 
50 Farrell, A., 1992, Crime, Class and Capitalism: the Politics of the Police, Bookmarks, London, pp. 
48-63. 
s' Scull, A. T., 1977, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J, pp. 16,25-33. 
52 Gatrell, V. A. C, 1994, The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People 1760-1868, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; Linebaugh, P., 1993, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in 
18th Century England, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
s' Fraser, D., 1973, The Evolution of the Welfare State, Macmillan, London, pp. 42-8; Hammond, L. J. 
and Hammond, B., 1995, The Labourer 1760-1832, Alan Sutton, London; Hobsbawm, E. J., 1969, 
Industry and Empire, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 86,100-2,229; Hobsbawm, E. J., 1973, The 
Age of Revolution 1789-1848, Cardinal, London, pp. 66,188,203,242; O'Brien, M., 1996a, "The 
Bloody Birth of Capitalism", International Socialism, 2: 70, pp. 120-6; Thompson, E. P., 1963, The 
Making of the English Working Class, Pelican, London, pp. 90,147,165,199,217,234,237-43, 
245,247,249,256-7,262-4,271,283,294-6,311-12,321,334-5,379-80,546-65,575,595-8, 
835,904-5. 
sa Ibid., pp. 67,92,176,198,201,211,229,253-5,266,284-5,313,321,325-6,333,387,400,428, 
437-40,458,469,482-3,529,533,537-45,563,569-70,593-4,598-659,703-14,732-3,784-8, 
800-6,858,875-6,904,905,908-13. For an excellent account of the Luddite movement see: 
Hammond, L. J. and Hammond, B., 1995, op. cit., pp. 259-304. See also: O'Brien, M., 1996a, op. 
cit., pp. 129-32. For outstanding histories of the Chartist movement see: O'Brien, M., 1996b, 
474 
"Perish the Privileged Orders" -A Social History of the Chartist Movement, Redwords, London; 
and Thompson, D., 1989, The Chartists, Temple, Hounslow. 
55 Fraser, D., 1973, op. cit., p. 12,15-30; Gough, 1., 1979, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, 
Macmillan, London, p. 55; Rogers, A., 1993, "Back to the Workhouse? ", International Socialism, 
2: 59, pp. 7-8. 
56 Ibid., p. 7; Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, British Politics: Analysing a Capitalist Democracy, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 304-5; Fraser, D., 1973, op. cit., pp. 15-26. 
57 Clarke, J., Cochrane, A. Smart, C., 1987, Ideologies of Welfare: From Dreams to Disillusion, 
Hutchinson, London, pp. 20-3; Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., pp. 305-6; Gilbert, 
B. B., 1966, The Evolution of National Insurance in Britain: The Evolution of the Welfare State, 
Michael Joseph, London, pp. 24-8,32-9,59-61,67-8,72-3,75-80,81-7,90-4,101,107,152; 
Ginsberg, N., 1979, Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan, London, pp. 8-13; Hay, J., 1975, 
The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms 1906-14, Macmillan, London; Hobsbawm, E. J., 1987, 
The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, pp. 101-3; Langan, M. and 
Schwarz, B. (eds. ), 1985, Crises in the British State 1880-1930, Hutchinson, London, pp. 20-22,23, 
24,53,69-71,74-5,80-126,227,229,261,266-7,269; Rogers, A., 1993, op. cit., pp. 10-12; 
Stedman-Jones, G., 1971, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in 
Victorian Society, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 246-7,251-3,254-61,265-70,271-7,331-3,334- 
6. 
58 Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., p. 304; Fraser, D., 1973, op. cit., pp. 59,70-1,75; 
Rogers, A., 1993, op. cit., p. 9. 
59 Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., p. 304; Gilbert, B. B., 1966, op. cit., pp. 98-101,107, 
111; Langan, M. and Schwarz, B. (ed. ), 1985, op. cit., pp. 74-5,256-73. 
60 McCord, N., "Ratepayers and Social Policy", Thane, P. (ed. ), 1978, The Origins of British Social 
Policy, Croom Helm, London, pp. 21-36; Hay, J. R., "Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and the 
Concept of Social Control", ibid., pp. 107-26. 
61 Gilbert, B. B., 1966, op. cit., pp. 221-2; Langan, M. and Schwarz, B. (ed. ), 1985, op. cit., pp. 111- 
12; Thane, P. (ed. ), 1978, op. cit., p. 140. 
475 
62 Gilbert, B. B., 1966, op. cit., pp. 269-77; Langan, M. and Schwarz, B. (ed. ), 1985, op. cit., p. 75. 
63 Gilbert, B. B., 1966, op. cit., pp. 111,114-5,222; Thane, P., "Non-Contributory versus Insurance 
Pensions 1878-1908", Thane, P. (ed. ), 1978, op. cit., pp. 84-104. 
64 Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., p. 305; Fraser, D., 1973, op. cit., pp. 79,86; Langan, 
M. and Schwarz (ed. ), 1985, op. cit., p. 267-9. 
65 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, The Labour Party: A Marxist History, 2nd edition, Bookmarks, 
London, pp. 8-22,23-54,98-104,151-65; Miliband, R., 1972, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in 
The Politics of Labour, 2nd edition, Merlin, London, pp. 17-24,98,101-3,108,161-3; Morgan, 
K. O., 1971, The Age of Lloyd-George: the Liberal Party and British Politics 1890-1929, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, pp. 38-57. 
66 By acclimatising working class opinion to the language and aspirations of democratic (political and 
economic) participation in society. Furthermore "[i]ndividual Chartists went on to play a vital role 
in working class radical politics as councillors and publishers, in agitation for reform" as well as "in 
the organisation of the early trade unions" (O'Brien, M., 1996b, op. cit., pp. 107-8). 
67 Blackie, D., 1991, Socialism and the Labour Party, Bookmarks, London, pp. 15-18; Cliff, T. and 
Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 223-7; Gough, I., 1979, op. cit., pp. 66,69-71. 
68 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 210-17,220-24. See also: Dearlove, J. and Saunders, 
P., 1984, op. cit., pp. 270-6; George, V. and Wilding, P., 1985, Ideology and Social Welfare, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, chapter 3; Ginsberg, N., 1979, op. cit., p. 34; Schott, K., "The 
Rise of Keynesian Economics: Britain 1940-64", Held, D. (ed. ), 1983, States and Societies, Open 
University Press, Oxford. 
69 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 236-7; Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., 
pp. 42-48,57,64,93,221,272-86; Mishra, R., 1984, The Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought 
and Social Change, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Brighton, pp. 1-29. 
70 For a summary of these attacks on the welfare state see: Clarke, J., et. at., 1987, op. cit., pp. 189- 
97; Clegg, S., 1989, "Thatcher and the Welfare State", International Socialism, 2: 44, pp. 59-99; 
Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., pp. 286-94,311-13,321-31; Lee, P. and Raban, C., 
1988, Welfare Theory and Social Policy, Sage, London, pp. 220-8; Mishra, R., 1984, op. cit., pp. 
476 
46-53; Rogers, A., 1993, op. cit., pp. 17-35; Timmins, N., 1996, The Five Giants: A Biography of 
the Welfare State, Fontana, London, pp. 369-494. For useful accounts of the welfare ideology of the 
New Right see: Clarke et. al.., op. cit., pp. 131-45; Dearlove, J. and Saunders, P., 1984, op. cit., pp. 
321-7; George, V. and Wilding, P., 1985, op. cit., pp. 19-44; Mishra, R., 1984, op. cit., pp. 26-46. 
For an excellent account of the impact of the New Right in government in the USA see: Galbraith, 
J. K., 1993, The Culture of Contentment, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
71 For excellent documentaries of Labour's gradual abandonment of labourism in favour of what is to 
all intents and purposes the politics of the New Right seasoned with "One Nation Toryism" (and 
dressed up in vague talk of "New Labour") see: Callinicos, A., 1996, New Labour or Socialism?, 
Bookmarks, London; Callinicos, A., 1996, "Betrayal and Discontent: Labour under Blair", 
International Socialism, 2: 72; Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 347-81,389-429; 
Foot, P., 1995, "When will the Blair Bubble Burst? ", International Socialism, 2: 67; Harman, C., 
1995, "From Bernstein to Blair: One Hundred Years of Revisionism", International Socialism, 
2: 67. 
72 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 94-105,133-7,188-92; Miliband, R., 1972, op. cit., 
pp. 93-120,152-192. It was this ideological stance which partly explains why the Labour Party and 
TUC so disgracefully "sold out" the General Strike of 1926, despite mass support by the rank and 
file for its continuance (see: Cliff, T., and Gluckstein, D., 1986, Marxism and Trade Union 
Struggle: the General Strike of 1926, Bookmarks, London, pp. 185-254,266-82,285-97). Equally 
lamentably, it was the Labour leadership's craven endorsement of neo-classical economic 
orthodoxy (together with the worst assumptions of bourgeois morality) which explains why 
MacDonald's governments of 1924 and 1929-31, not only refused to take any steps to reduce 
unemployment or to alleviate its material impact upon the workless and their families, but also 
continued to implement Tory measures (such as the "Genuinely Seeking Work Test") which 
disqualified millions of the unemployed from desperately needed relief and stigmatised them as 
"malingerers" (see especially: Deacon, A., "Concession and Coercion: the Politics of 
Unemployment Insurance in the Twenties", Briggs, A. and Saville, J., 1977, Essays in Labour 
History 1918-1939, Croom Helm, London, pp. 9-35) 
477 
73 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 1996, op. cit., pp. 347-50,356-9,372-4. 
74 For a full explanation of why the current crisis of capitalism (characterised as it is by increasingly 
deep and protracted slumps interspersed by weak and short-lived upturns) is likely to persist 
indefinitely see: Callinicos, A., 1983, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, Bookmarks, London, 
pp. 185-92; Harman, C., 1984, Explaining the Crisis: A Marxist Reappraisal, Bookmarks, London, 
pp. 75-122,122-55; Hannan, C., 1995, The Economics of the Madhouse: Capitalism and the 
Market Today, Bookmarks, London, pp. 32-45,51-62,65-85; Harman, C., 1993, "Where is 
Capitalism Going? " (parts I and 2), International Socialism, 2: 58 and 2: 60. For useful discussions 
of how the crisis of capitalism is paralleled by a crisis of orthodox economics see: Harman, C., 
1996, "The Crisis of Bourgeois Economics", International Socialism, 2: 70; Ormerod, P., 1995, The 
Death of Economics, Faber and Faber, London. Concerning the future of public welfare in the 
contemporary economic climate, Clauss Offe appears to have knocked the nail on the head where 
he remarks that modern capitalism can neither live with nor without the welfare state (Offe. C., 
1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State, Hutchinson, London). 
75 Cliff, T., 1992, "Prospects for Socialists", International Socialism, 2: 55, p. 69. 
76 Cliff, T., 1986, Lenin 1893-1914: Building the Party, Bookmarks, London, pp. 228-35; Wright, S., 
1984, The Making of the Revolution, Bookmarks, London, pp. 5-8. 
77 Barker, C. (ed. ), 1982, Revolutionary Rehearsals, Bookmarks, London (chapters on France and 
Portugal); Harman, C., 1988, The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, Bookmarks, London, pp. 85-12 1, 
277-312; Doyle, C., 1988, France 1968: Month of Revolution, Fortress, London. 
78 Barker, C. (ed. ), 1982, op. cit. (chapters on Chile and China); Harman, C., 1982, Germany - the 
Lost Revolution 1918-23, Bookmarks, London; Sewell, R., 1988, Germany: From Revolution to 
Counter-Revolution, Fortress, London; Marshall, P., 1988, Revolution and Counter- Revolution in 
Iran, Bookmarks, London. 
79 Hall, S., "The Great Moving Right Show", Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds. ), 1983, The Politics of 
Thatcherism, Lawrence and Wishart, London. 
80 Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, 1996, op. cit., pp. 345-88. 
478 
Sý Lenin, V. I., 1973, What is to be Done?, Foreign Languages Press, Peking. Lenin's claim here was 
that the workers could acquire spontaneously only a reformist outlook ("trade union 
consciousness"). Consequently the role of the socialist party was to "bring socialism to the 
workers" from without. This position was formally abandoned by Lenin in his State and 
Revolution. 
82 Cliff, T., 1985, Lenin 1914-17: All Power to the Soviets, Bookmarks, London, pp. 140-169,258-71, 
315-26,335-80; Cliff, T., 1987, Lenin 1917-23: The Revolution Besieged, Bookmarks, London, pp. 
367-93; Harman, C., "Party and Class", Cliff, T., Hallas, D., Harman, C. and Trotsky, L., 1996, 
Party and Class, Bookmarks, London, pp. 23-33; Le Blanc, P., 1993, Lenin and the Revolutionary 
Party, Basil Blackwell, Oxford; Liebman, M., 1985, Leninism Under Lenin, Merlin, London, pp. 
25-52,84-96,162-89,190-209; Molyneux, J., 1978, Marxism and the Party, Bookmarks, London, 
pp. 36-50,69-84,93-5,96-115. 
83 The former scenario characterised the ill-fated German revolution of 1923. After failing to exploit 
earlier revolutionary situations (because of poor tactics and organisation), the Communist Party 
consequently squandered the support of the working class and, isolated, was crushed by the forces 
of the German state (see: Harman, C., 1982, op. cit., pp. 264-302). The latter scenario characterised 
the earlier German revolution of 1919-20 (the "Spartakist Days" of January 1919 and the "March 
Action" of 1920) where the workers rose up spontaneously without a coherent insurrectionary 
strategy and against the advice of the Bolsheviks and most KPD leaders (ibid., pp. 163-96,192- 
221). Such was also the fate of the Portuguese revolution of 1973-4, the Iranian revolution of 1979 
(see: Barker, C. (ed. ), 1982, op. cit. ), and of course the 1905 revolution in Russia (Wright, S., 1984, 
op. cit., pp. 5-8). 
84 Archer, 1995, op. cit., pp. 259,260 and 262. 
85 As was the case, for example, in Britain immediately prior to the Chartist movement of the 1830s 
and 1840s (see: O'Brien, M., 1996, op. cit., pp. 7-16). 
86 For example, the formation of the Labour Party ("out of the bowels of the TUC") occurred in the 
aftermath of the "Great Unrest" of the 1880s and early 1890s. See: Cliff, T. and Gluckstein, D., 
1996, op. cit., pp. 5-23. 
479 
87 Again, another obvious example of this process was the rapid growth of the Bolshevik Party in the 
wake of the February 1917 revolution in Russia. Within a period of months the party was 
transformed from a small "sect" to a mass party capable of organising and leading the October 
insurrection (see: Cliff, T., 1985, op. cit., pp. 97-139,140-69,258-71,335-80). 
88 This is especially the case where corporate political agents of the propertyless absurdly attempt to 
reconcile the interests of those they purportedly represent with the interests of powerful propertied 
elites. For a useful survey of the dismal record of reformism and labourism in office in the post-war 
years see: Birchall, I., 1986, Bailing out the System: Reformist Socialism in Western Europe 1945- 
85, Bookmarks, London. 
89 Hallas, D., "Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Party", Cliff, T., et. at, 1996, op. cit., pp. 38-55. 
See also: Molyneux, J, 1978, op. cit., pp. 162-9. 
90 Perhaps the most sophisticated version of "role theory", which attempts (ultimately unsuccessfully) 
to overcome cultural determinism, is to be found in the work of Martin Hollis. See especially: 
Hollis, M., 1977, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; Hollis, M., 1988, The Cunning of Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Scott, J., 1995, Sociological Theory: Contemporary Debates, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, p. 116. 
92 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 16. 
93 Or "methodological situationalism" as one of its leading exponents, Randall Collins, describes it 
(Collins, R., 1981, "On the Micro Foundations of Macro Sociology", American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 86). Mouzelis rightly points out that the theoretical stance of social action theory is 
not so very different from that of methodological individualism. Just as the latter, in its more 
extreme form, reduces macro phenomena to a heap of isolated individuals, so methodological 
situationalism reduces them to an assembly of encounters. In the first case the monad "is the 
individual, in the second the micro encounter" (Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 22). 
94 Berger, P. and Luckmann, P., 1967, The Social Construction of Reality, Penguin, Allen Lane, 
London, p. 127. 
9S Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 16. 
480 
96 Collins, R., 1981, op. cit., p. 988. 
97 Mouzelis, N., 1995, op. cit., p. 21. 
98 Berger, P. and Kellner, H., "Marriage and the Construction of Reality", Drietzel, H. P. (ed. ), 1970, 
Recent Sociology, volume 2, Collier-Macmillan, New York, pp. 62-3. 
99 Berger, P. and Luckmann, P., 1967, op. cit., p. 103. 
100 Watson, R., 1992, "Reasons as Causes of Action" (unpublished Sociology PhD thesis), University 
of Warwick Central Library, p. 375. 
101 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 278. 
102 Ibid., p. 277. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., p. 278. 
107 Saussure, F., 1974, Course in General Linguistics, Fontana, London, p. 112. 
108 Molyneux, J., 1994, "The Politically Correct Controversy", International Socialism, 2: 61, p. 60. 
109 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., pp. 285-6. 
10 Molyneux, J., 1994, op. cit., p. 59. 
Which is, of course, a function of the rise of science and machine technology. It seems reasonable 
to believe that the enormous productive power of modem capitalist societies is itself illustrative of a 
greater objective human control over and penetration of the physical environment, which is in turn 
persuasive evidence of a deepening practical human knowledge of nature. 
112 Dennett, D. C., 1978, op. cit; Dennett, D. C., 1993, Consciousness Explained, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth; Dennett, D. C., 1996, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of 
Life, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
113 As Alex Callinicos accurately summarises his approach (Callinicos, A., 1996, "Darwin, Materialism 
and Evolution", International Socialism, 2: 71, p. 101. 
114 Ibid. 
481 
115 This does not mean that Dennett endorses the view that the human mind is simply "the programme 
that runs on your brains computer". In fact he is careful to distinguish the ways in which minds and 
computers differ. Uppermost among these is the way in which human minds (unlike computer 
brains) are brought into direct contact with nature by specialised sensory equipment mediated by 
organismic needs and capacities. Another is his recognition that "[t]here is a big difference between 
a ... computers serial architecture and 
the parallel architecture of the brain" (Dennett, D. C., 1993, 
op. cit., p. 215). Dennett's point is simply to illustrate that both computers and minds are "virtual 
machines", composite structures arranged hierarchically. "A virtual machine is what you get when 
you impose a particular pattern of rules ... on all that plasticity" 
(ibid., p. 211). 
116 In Consciousness Explained Dennett describes these sub-systems (homunculi )as "units with 
particular circumscribed competences" (op. cit., pp. 261-2). 
11' Dennet, D. C., 1996, op. cit., p. 206. 
118 Callinicos, A., 1996, op. cit., p. 101. 
119 Dennett, D. C., 1993, op. cit., p. 228. 
120 Ibid., pp. 29,108.. 
121 Ibid., pp. 228,108,111,215. 
122 Ibid., pp 108,111 and 214. 
123 Callinicos, A., 1996, op. cit., p. 102. 
124 Dennett, D. C., 1996, op. cit., pp. 205-6. 
125 Ibid., pp. 41 and 343. 
126 Callinicos, A., 1996, op. cit., pp. 104-5. As Dennett puts it: "[b]efore intentionality can be fully 
fledged, it must first go through an awkward, ugly, featherless pseudo-intentionality" (Dennett, 
D. C., 1996, op. cit., p. 205. 
127 Ibid., p. 65. 
128 Ibid., p. 76. 
129 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., pp. 281-2. 
130 Ibid., p. 284. 
482 
131 Durkheim, E., 1968, Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse, Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, p. 147. 
132 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 286. 
133 Craib, I., 1992, op. cit., p. 180. 
134 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., pp. 283-4. 
135 Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, Origins Reconsidered, Abacus, London, p. 300. 
136 Ibid., pp. 298-300. 
"' Ibid., p. 244. 
138 Cited in: Giddens, A., 1990, Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 40. 
"' Primatologist Sheelagh Savage-Rumbaugh, cited in Leakey, R. and Lewin, R., 1993, op. cit., p. 
244. 
140 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 286. As Nehemas puts it: "Because it is organised coherently, the 
body provides the common ground that allows conflicting thoughts, desires, and actions to be 
grouped together as features of a single subject" (Nehemas A., 1985, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, p. 181). 
141 Archer, M. S., 1995, op. cit., p. 288. 
142 Ibid., p. 289. 
143 Ibid., p. 290. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., p. 290-1. 
146 Ibid., p. 291. 
147 Ibid., p. 124-5. 
149 Ibid., p. 257. 
149 See for example: Goldthorpe, J. H., 1969, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 56-8,64-8,69-70,77-8,80-2,90-2,98-103,121-3,150-1,153-4, 
181-5,189-90. 
150 Almond, G., 1946, "The German Resistance Movement", Current History, 10, pp. 409-527; 
Dawidowicz, L., 1987, The War Against the Jews, Penguin, Allen Lane, London, pp. 191.2; 
483 
Marrus, M., 1987, The Holocaust in History, Pelican, London, p. 91; Merson, A., 1985, Communist 
Resistance in Nazi Germany, Lawrence and Wishart, London; Peukart, D., 1987, inside Nazi 
Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life, BT Batsford, London; Leuner, 
H. D., 1966, When Compassion was a Crime: Germanys Silent Heroes, Wolff, London. 
Chapter Four 
Coulson, M. A. and Riddell, C., 1970, Approaching Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
p. 43. 
2 Weber, M., 1930, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin University Books, 
London; Weber, M., 1947, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Free Press, Glencoe, 
Illinois; Weber, M., 1948, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London; Weber, M., 1961, op. cit. 
3 Callinicos, A., 1987, Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
p. 39. 
4 Ibid. 
s Durkheim, E., 1982, The Rules of Sociological Method, Macmillan, London, pp. 50-1. 
6 Wright, E. O., 1979, Class Structure and Income Distribution, Academic Press, New York. 
Coulson, M. A. and Riddell, C., 1970, op. cit., p. 51. 
8 Coulson, M. A. and Riddell, C., 1970, op. cit., p. 44. 
9 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
10 Ibid., p. 44. 
11 Archer, M. S., 1995, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p. 196 (italics removed). 
12 Ibid., p. 201. 
13 Ibid., pp. 201-8. 
14 Ibid., p. 201. 
's Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 202. 
484 
17 Ibid., p. 203. 
'$ Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 205. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 206. 
22 Ibid., p. 208. 
Rees, J., 1997, "The Class Struggle under New Labour", International Socialism, 2: 75, pp. 3-23. 
24 Or rather see the labour-process as an integral part of the forces of production. See for instance: 
Marx, K., 1976, Capital, volume 1, Penguin, Harmondsworth, chapter 7. 
25 Marx, K., 1970, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, pp. 20-1. 
26 Marx, K., 1954, The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 12. 
27 Cohen, G. A., 1978, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
28 Brenner, R., 1976, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe", Past and Present, 70; Brenner, R., 1977, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A 
Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism", New Left Review, 104; Brenner, R., 1982, "The Agrarian 
Roots of European Capitalism", Past and Present, 97; Brenner, R., "The Social Basis of Economic 
Development", Roemer, J. (ed. ), 1987, Analytical Marxism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; Callinicos, A., 1982, Is there a Future for Marxism?, Macmillan, London, pp. 146-7; 
Callinicos, A., 1983a, Marxism and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 110-13; 
Callinicos, A., 1986, "A Comment on Chris Harman's Base and Superstructure", International 
Socialism, 2: 34, pp. 122-5. 
29 Clarke, S., "Althusser's Marxism", Clarke, S., Seidler, V. J, McDonnell, K., Robins, K., Lovell, T. 
(eds. ), 1980, One Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics of Culture, Allison and Busby, 
London, p. 20. 
30 Callinicos, A., 1983b, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, Bookmarks, London, pp. 83-4. 
31 Marx, K., 1962, Capital, volume 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 791. 
32 Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., p. 287. 
485 
33 It is this which renders meaningful Marx's claim that the contradiction between forces and relations 
of production shapes the class conflicts which provide history with its dynamic. 
34 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 50. 
35 Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., pp. 344-5. 
36 de Ste Croix, G. E. M., 1981, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, Duckworth, London, 
pp. 43-4. 
37 Wright, E. O., 1979, op. cit., p. 22. 
38 Elster, J., 1985, Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 257-8. 
39 Marx, K., 1973, Grundrisse, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 414. 
40 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 50. 
41 Marx, K., 1973, op. cit., pp. 651 and 657. 
42 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 52. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., 1985, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Verso, London, pp. 77-8. 
45 Elster, J., 1986, An Introduction to Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 105-6. 
46 Spybey, T., 1992, op. cit., p. 15. 
47 Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., p. 286. 
48 Marx, K., 1978, The Poverty of Philosophy, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, p. 103. 
49 Marx, K., 1971, op. cit., p. 791. 
so Marx, K., 1976, op. cit., p. 325. 
s' Harman, C., 1986, "Base and Superstructure", International Socialism, 2: 32, p. 19. 
52 Callinicos, A., 1983a, op. cit., pp. 112-13. 
s3 Cohen, G. A., "Forces and Relations of Production", Roemer, J. (ed. ), 1987, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
54 Callinicos, A., 1983a, op. cit., p. 112. 
55 Mme, K., 1971, op. cit., p. 791. 
56 Cohen, G. A., 1978, op. cit., p. 98. 
s' Clarke, S., 1991, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, 2"d edition, Macmillan, London. 
58 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, Collected Works, volume 5, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 43. 
486 
59 Marx, K., 1970, op. cit., p. 20. 
60 Marx, K., 1971, op. cit., p. 791. 
61 See especially Engels in: Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, op. cit., pp. 348-9. 
62 Molyneux, J., 1995, "Is Marxism Deterministic? ", International Socialism, 2: 68, p. 52. 
63 Ibid., p. 64. 
64 Trotsky, L., 1971, The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, Pathfinder Press, New York, p. 137. 
65 Marx, K., 1970, op. cit., p. 21. 
66 Chapter one, pp. 51-2. 
67 Cohen, G. A., "Forces", Roemer, J. (ed. ), 1987, op. cit., p. 14. 
68 Marx, K., 1954, op. cit., pp. 40-1. 
69 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 42. 
70 Engels, F., "Letter to Borgius", Engels, F., 1980, Letters on Historical Materialism 1890-94, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 26. 
71 Callinicos, A., 1987, op. cit., p. 41. 
72 This drift has affected even those Marxists who reject the voluntarism of the New Left and the 
economic determinism of Stalinised historical materialism. Colin Barker, for instance, asks: "Is 
base and superstructure such a necessary distinction? " He thinks not because it "is not a metaphor 
that Marx uses much in Capital, the mature version of his Critique of Political Economy" (Barker, 
C., 1986, "A Comment on Harman's Base and Superstructure", International Socialism, 2: 34, p. 
119). Yet Marx does use the base-superstructure model in Capital, as Barker acknowledges. Indeed, 
this "metaphor" is precisely what justifies Marx's analytical focus here on the mode of production 
and the "economic law of motion of modern society". Elsewhere, of course, Marx describes the 
base-superstructure model as the "guiding principle" of his studies (Marx, K., 1970, op. cit., p. 20). 
73 For a useful discussion of this see: Binns, P., 1982, "What are the Tasks of Marxism in 
Philosophy? ", International Socialism, 2: 17, pp. 99-101. 
74 This seems to be what Ellen Wood is driving at when she argues that "the formula concerning the 
contradiction between forces of production and relations of production" is a "law of capitalist 
487 
development" but not of pre-capitalist class formations (Wood, E. M., 1984, "Marxism and the 
Course of History", New Left Review, 147, p. 102). 
75 Lee, D. and Newby, H., 1983, The Problem of Sociology, Unwin Hyman, London, pp. 117-18. 
76 Weber, M., 1949, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, pp. 68- 9. 
7' Acton, E., 1990, Rethinking the Russian Revolution, Edward Arnold, London, p. 2. 
78 Spybey, T., 1992, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
79 Marx, K., 1970, op. cit., pp. 20-1. 
80 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1970, op. cit., p. 48. 
S' Molyneux, J., 1995, op. cit., p. 55. 
82 Gottlieb, R., 1992, Marxism: Origins, Betrayal, Rebirth, Routledge , 
London, pp. 12-13. 
83 Harman, C., 1986, op. cit., p. 10. 
84 Engels, F., "Letter to Borgius", Engels, F., 1980, op. cit., p. 26. 
85 As far as I am aware there are no figures examining the distribution of property and wealth by 
ethnicity. I have arrived at the figures cited in the text by the following statistical means. First I 
examined data revealing the class composition of black and white populations (Jones, T., 1993, 
Britain's ethnic Minorities, Policy Studies Institute, London). This showed that 21% of the black 
and 27% of the white adult population are members of the PM or employer classes (and so 79% and 
73% of the black and white populations respectively are members of the working class). Second I 
examined the distribution of wealth by class. Roughly speaking, the employer and PM classes 
(about 27% of the population according to Jones figures) own 79% of national wealth whereas the 
working class (73% of the population) owns just 21% (see footnote 96). Third I examined data 
revealing the relative sizes of the black and white populations and used these to calculate the social 
composition and distribution of the class structure by ethnicity. Since ethnic minorities constitute 
about 6% of the population, it is reasonable to surmise that these make up about 1.25% of the 
membership of the PM and employer classes and about 4.75% of the membership of the working 
class. Fourth I then assumed (for the sake of argument) that the effects of race discrimination would 
ensure that the top 10% of property owners (who control about 50% of the total wealth) are 
exclusively white and that the black working class is composed entirely of semi-skilled and 
488 
unskilled manual workers (being located therefore in the lower 50% of the population who together 
own just 8% of national wealth), both of these assumptions most likely leading to an overestimation 
the impact of racism as a factor of stratification determining the distribution of property. On this 
basis, I was able to calculate that the black PM and employer classes own a minimum of 1.3% 
(approximately) of property compared to 77.7% for members of the white PM and employer 
classes, whereas the black working class owns just 0.7% of property compared to 19.3% for 
members of the white working class. This means that ethnic minorities (6% of population) own 
roughly 2% of national wealth whereas whites (94% of the population) own 98%. 
96 Westergaard, J. and Resler, H., 1976, Class in a Capitalist Society, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 
114. 
g' Jones, T., 1993, op. cit., p. 99. 
88 Routh, G., 1980, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79, Macmillan, London, p. 4. 
89 Employment Gazette, July, 1994, p. 255. 
90 Bogdanor, V., 1990, Women at the Top, Hansard, London; Giddens, A., 1997, Sociology, 31a 
edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 319-20; Grint, K., 1994, The Sociology of Work, Polity Press, 
Cambridge; Lie, S. and O'Leary, V., 1990, Storming the Tower: Women in the Academic World, 
Kogan Page, London. See also: Lloyds Bank Economic Bulletin, July, 1988. 
91 Abercrombie, N. and Warde, A., 1988, Contemporary British Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 
210 and 255. 
92 Social Trends 21,1991, HMSO, London, p. 95. These figures exclude pension fund holdings and 
the value of houses. 
93 See note 85. 
94 Routh, G., 1980, op. cit., p. 127. 
93 New Earnings Survey, 1984, HMSO, London, part A, tables 10 and 11. 
96 Abercrombie, N. and Warde, A., 1988, op. cit., p. 255. 
97 Glass, D., 1954, Social Mobility in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 183. 
98 Goldthorpe, J., Llewellyn, C. and Payne, G., 1980, Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern 
Britain, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 44 and 48. In fact, Goldthorpe and his co-authors do not 
489 
estimate the total percentage of sons from manual working class backgrounds who have "made it" 
into the PM and employer classes, instead basing their calculations on the percentages of sons from 
specific occupational bands (unskilled and skilled workers, etc. ) who have done so. I have arrived 
at the figure cited in the text for total male working class mobility by combining Goldthorpe's 
occupational categories. In doing so I have assumed for the sake of convenience that the respective 
sizes of the skilled working class and the unskilled and semi-skilled working class are equivalent. 
That this is not the case does not damage my argument in the least (there being more unskilled and 
semi-skilled male workers than skilled workers). This is because the differences in mobility rates 
for sons of skilled manual workers, on the one hand, and for sons of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers, on the other hand, are not sufficient to significantly affect the total calculation of 
intergenerational working class mobility I have derived from Goldthorpe's statistics. 
99 Marshall, G., Rose, D., Newby. H. and Vogler, C., 1988, Social Class in Modern Britain, Unwin 
Hyman, London. 
X00 Ibid., p. 77. Again I have reconstructed Marshall's data to calculate the mobility rates for the male 
offspring of manual workers as a whole, not for specific occupational bands. In doing so I have 
followed the same procedure as specified above for Goldthorpe (see note 102). 
'o' Goldthorpe, J., et. at, 1980, op. cit., pp. 44 and 48; Marshall, G., et. al., 1988, op. cit., p. 77. 
102 These calculations are based on Goldthorpe's and Marshall's data (ibid. ). 
103 See: Giddens, A. and Stanworth, P., "An Economic Elite: A Demographic Profile of Company 
Chairmen", Giddens, A. and Stanworth, P., (eds. ), 1974, Elites and Power in British Society, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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105 Ibid. 
106 Social Trends 24,1994, HMSO, London, p. 50. 
107 Ibid. 
los Jones, T., 1993, op. cit., p. 46. 
109 That is, Afro-Caribbean blacks. Swann, Lord, 1985, Education For All: A Brief Guide, HMSO, 
London, chapter 3, tables 2,4 and 7. 
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113 Ibid., p. 47; Jones, T., 1993, op. cit., pp. 31-2,33,42 and 44. 
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214. 
117 Abercromie, N. and Warde, A., 1988, op. cit., p. 355. 
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'" Jones, T., 1993, op. cit., p. 44. 
120 Social Trends 24,1994, op. cit., p. 47. 
$21 Ibid., p. 52. 
122 General Household Survey of 1990-1,1993, op. cit., p. 208. 
123 Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1967, The Communist Manifesto, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 79. 
124 For example, by considering the so-called "race riot" which occurred in Los Angeles in the spring 
of 1992. My reason for so doing is simply that one would most expect to discover evidence of the 
primacy of ethnic divisions in shaping social conflict in this context. Indeed, the absence of any 
such evidence, if this is what close analysis reveals, must surely call into question the views of 
those who hold that racial divisions are more fundamental forms of inequality (and hence of social 
antagonisms) than class divisions in contemporary capitalist societies (and especially in the USA). 
So what explains the agency of those involved (whether as participants or as agents of law and 
order) in the LA riot? The common view is that this was a spontaneous uprising against "white 
authority" by alienated black, Asian and Hispanic youth in response to institutionalised race 
discrimination in all areas of life, including and especially the racist conduct of the police. Certainly 
this perspective contains a nugget of truth. The immediate stimulus of the riot was the acquittal by a 
white jury of four white police officers who had been caught out on camera beating up an unarmed 
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black motorist. Thousands of black and Latino youth had recently been arrested on trivial charges 
during "Operation Hammer", a vast paramilitary police incursion into the LA ghetto (Davis, M., 
1990, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, Verso, London, chapter 5). Most of the 
rioters were from ethnic minorities. They were predominantly young. They were (and of course 
are) the victims of race discrimination. And racism is an important factor of stratification in the 
USA by virtue of which ethnic minorities (and especially Latinos and blacks) are more likely than 
whites to be unemployed or located in the lowest-paid jobs or over-represented as victims of crime 
or police victimisation (Hacker, A., 1993, Two Nations, Charles Scribners Sons, New York). 
Nonetheless a racial explanation of the LA riot is inadequate. Why is it? Firstly, like the inner 
city riots which rocked the UK in the summer of 1981 - also dubbed as "race riots" despite the fact 
that 67% of those arrested were white (Hiro, D., 1992, Black British White British: A History of 
Race Relations in Britain, second edition, Grafton, London, p. 90) - "the rebellion was multi-ethnic 
in character" (Callinicos, A., 1993, Race and Class, Bookmarks, London, p. 53), involving the co- 
operation of whites and non-whites in pillaging shops, destroying property, setting up barricades 
and fighting the police. "Willie Brown, a leading black California Democrat and the speaker of the 
state assembly, acknowledged that `the violence was not contained in the inner city: it spread to 
outlying and upscale neighbourhoods.... For the first time in American history, many of the 
demonstrations, and much of the violence and crime, especially the looting, was multi-racial - 
blacks, whites, Hispanics and Asians were all involved. ' Of the first 5,000 people arrested in the 
riot 52% were Latinos, 10% were whites, and only 38% were blacks" (Callinicos, A., 1993, op. cit., 
p. 53). Secondly the underlying cause of the rebellion was to be found in the combined impact of 
"Reaganomics" (a particular economic strategy of the Reagan and Bush administrations to boost the 
profitability of US capital by systematically redistributing "wealth and income from rich to poor, 
leaving real wages to fall") and the deep recession "which set in 1990 ... 
hitting the sometime boom 
economy of California particularly hard" (Callinicos, A., 1993, op. cit., p. 53), upon the ghettoised 
working class. Again there is a clear parallel here with the UK riots of 1981, the roots of which lay 
in the deflationary attacks on welfare rights and retrogressive tax policies of the Wilson-Callaghan 
and Thatcher governments and the recessions of the mid 1970s and early 1980s, which plunged 
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millions of urban proletarians into unemployment and poverty (Harman, C., 1981, "The Riots of 
1981", International Socialism, 2: 14, pp. 15-19). 
Finally the central conflict which unfolded during the course of the rebellion was not one which 
pitted (largely) ethnic minority rioters against white agents of "law and order" and the local white 
petty bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it was essentially a class conflict which pitted the urban poor 
against local multi-ethnic shopkeepers (who were perceived - rightly or wrongly - as profiteers 
exploiting the poverty of their customers) and PMC whites and blacks in key authority positions in 
the LA state apparatus. That class not race was the key antagonism of the LA rebellion was thus 
starkly revealed by the fact that middle class blacks in key managerial-administrative positions in 
US society played a leading role in quashing it and were sometimes as vociferous as their white 
colleagues in their moralistic condemnation of the "criminals" who took part (Callinicos, A., 1993, 
op. cit., pp. 53-4; Davis, M., "The Rebellion that Rocked a Superpower", German, L. and 
Hoveman, R. (eds. ), 1998, A Socialist Review, Bookmarks, London, pp. 271-3). For them there was 
no question of "ethnic issues" (the plight of ghettoised immigrant minorities) getting in the way of 
naked class self-interest (the "united front" with bourgeois whites in defence of property and "law 
and order"). Clearly the political thinking and agency of these PMC blacks entailed the 
subordination of racial to class allegiances during a "critical episode" where these were forced into 
conflict. This immediate "closing of ranks" of leading black and white members of the US power 
structure in opposition to and condemnation of the LA rioters, and the dishonourable role of leading 
blacks in suppressing the rebellion by force, was I contend an entirely predictable chain of events, 
on the grounds that class relations were (and are) here fundamental in determining the life-chances 
and hence vested interests of interactants. 
125 My distinction here is between those modes of class agency which are necessary to emancipate " 
workers from political subordination and economic exploitation (i. e. revolutionary class conflict 
aimed at the socialist reconstruction of society) and those modes of class agency which are 
necessary to alleviate or ameliorate the material situation of the workers within capitalist society 
(i. e. voting for reformist parties and trade union action in defence of wages and conditions of 
work). 
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p. 121; Ovenden, K., 1992, op. cit., pp. 64-5; Rowbotham, S. and Segal, L., 1979, Beyond the 
Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism, Merlin Press, London, p. 45; Shawki, A., 1990, 
op. cit., pp. 94-5; Sivandan, A., 1990, "All that Melts into Air is Solid", Race and Class, 31: 3; 
Smith, S., 1994, "Mistaken Identity; or can Identity Politics Liberate the Oppressed?, International 
Socialism, 2: 62,, pp. 9-11,22-4. 
"S Who would doubt, for instance, that feminism has become transformed since the early 1970s into a 
means of occupational self-advancement for a handful of privileged women, especially in 
academia, journalism and local government? Certainly this process of integration of former 
women's rights activists into prestigious role-positions in major institutions has been accompanied 
by their gradual abandonment of socialist politics and of a class analysis of society, for which (as 
we have seen) patriarchy theory has provided theoretical legitimation. Indeed, the politics of 
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contemporary feminism is more often than not explicitly anti-working class and anti-socialist. 
Former "Eurocommunist" Beatrix Campbell, for instance, once claimed (in the middle of a hospital 
strike whose victory would have benefited the wage packets of many thousands of women as well 
as men) that trade unions were part of the "patriarchal system" by which men oppress women, 
before going on to dismiss strikes as an outmoded macho "dispute practice" left over from a bygone 
era (The Guardian, 9 August, 1982). Elsewhere Campbell recommended that free collective 
bargaining be replaced by a redistribution of income from male to female workers (as if the former 
were responsible for the low wages of the latter! ), a policy which if enacted would undoubtedly 
have served to lower the consumption of the working class as a whole, not least because it would 
have sowed the seeds of greater factionalism in the working class, and done so without dismantling 
the sexual division of labour from which gender inequalities are derived (Campbell, B., 1978, 
"Work to Rule", Red Flag, no. 14; Campbell, B. and Coote, A., 1982, Sweet Freedom: The Struggle 
for Women's Liberation, Picador, London). 
This drift into union bashing and left baiting is extremely pronounced in the modern feminist 
"movement", often being predicated on the baseless assumption that the trade union campaign for 
the "family wage" in the 19th century was a plot hatched by male workers and male employers to 
confine women to the domestic sphere and reduce them to domestic servitude (see especially: 
Hartmann, H., 1979, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism", Capital and Class, no. 
8, for an elaboration of the feminist argument; German, L., 1989, Sex, Class and Socialism, 
Bookmarks, London, pp. 31-6,74-5, provides an effective critique of the Hartmann thesis). Such 
reactionary politics were of course especially lamentable and unhelpful during a period (the 1980s) 
in which the working class and trade union movement was taking a terrible battering from the state 
and capital. Yet they were (and are) entirely consistent with the class interests of bourgeois women, 
particularly during a period of downturn in the class struggle. After all, the class basis of bourgeois 
feminism grants its allegiants definite class interests in and class capacities for the reproduction not 
transformation of existing structures of economic power and privilege, which themselves depend in 
part on the subordination of women within the family unit (German, L., 1981, "Theories of 
Patriarchy", International Socialism, 2: 12, pp. 45-7; German, L., 1989, op. cit., pp. 61-79). So 
495 
much so in fact that many women in positions of power and authority in capitalist society, many of 
whom would doubtless claim to be feminists or influenced by feminism, appear oblivious to the 
fact they actively reproduce social practices which reinforce ideas of "women's proper place" - 
such as the employment of working class women in domestic service (Barrett, M. and McIntosh, 
M., 1982, The Anti-Social Family, Verso, London, pp. 144-5; Epstein, C., 1970, Woman's Place, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and London, p. 138; German, L., 1989, op. cit., p. 78)- or 
which reduce the life-chances of the most powerless and downtrodden of women (a striking recent 
example of this being Harriet Harman's decision to cut welfare benefits to single parents supported 
by all but one of New Labour's women MPs), and for reasons entirely explainable in terms of class 
interests. 
The class basis of "black politics" in the USA is equally clear. The 1980s and 1990s have seen 
concerted efforts by consecutive administrations of both main parties to secure the profitability of 
US capital by means of a retrogressive taxation policy and swingeing reductions in public spending. 
This, together with the recessions of the 1980s and early 1990s plus an especially aggressive 
employers offensive (which has succeeded in reducing real average wages and the gap between 
white and black wages), has ensured that the living conditions of the huge majority of non-white 
minorities have radically worsened and are now scarcely any better than in the mid 1960s, resulting 
among other things (for blacks) in a falling rate of enrolment in colleges and universities, declining 
life-expectancy, rising crime and unemployment, and subordination to a much higher degree of 
state racism and police victimisation (Alexander, P., 1987, op. cit., p. 98; Ovenden, K., 1992, op. 
cit., pp. 65-8; Smith, S., 1992, op. cit., pp. 18-20). 
By contrast, whereas the living standards of most blacks have deteriorated sharply over the past 
20 years, those of a tiny minority of blacks have increased sharply (Marable, M., 1991, Race, 
Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction, 2nd edition, University Press of Mississippi, 
Jackson and London, p. 151; Marable, M., "Black America in Search of Itself', The Progressive, 
November, 1991, p. 22). In the meantime, the number of elected black officials has gone through 
the roof, from a mere 100 in 1966 to over 7,000 today (Ovenden, K, 1992, op. cit., p. 66), of whom 
more than 200 are mayors. Many other blacks hold key authority positions in the US power 
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structure - including Clarence Thomas (Supreme Court Judge) and General Colin Powell (recently 
chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff). These PMC blacks have all benefited from the 
aff innative action programmes of the 1960s won by the civil rights movement. But all are 
integrated into state structures which have systematically attacked the civil liberties and life- 
chances of proletarian whites and blacks. Indeed, specific black state officials have been to the 
forefront of the offensive against the working class and ghettoised minorities. The following 
examples should make this clear. Colin Powell sent the federal troops into LA which put down the 
riot of 1992 (Callinicos, A., 1993, op. cit., p. 53). LA police chief Willie Williams has played a 
leading role in the vicious repression (including mass deportations) which has been meted out upon 
the black and Latino poor of the city in revenge for the riot (Davis, M., "Rebellion", German, L. 
and Hoveman, R., 1998, op. cit., pp. 271-2). Clarence Thomas has been to the forefront of the 
campaign against affirmative action (Ovenden, K., 1992, op. cit., p. 68). Douglas Wilder (governor 
of Virginia) has proudly boasted of his lack of involvement in any civil rights demonstration and 
has made clear his support for the death penalty (despite the fact that economic subordination and 
racism combined ensure that 50% of Americas prison population are blacks) and for anti trade 
union legislation (Ovenden, K., 1992, op. cit., p. 68). 
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theorists it should be noted that some of the blame for this vulgarisation of the Marxist theory of the 
state must be laid at the door of certain neo-Marxists. For example, both Miliband and Poulantzas, 
in their famous debate of the 1970s, treated the state as purely superstructural to a domestic 
capitalist economy and class structure. Yet the same error was not made by Marx, nor by Lenin, 
Bukharin, Hilferding, or more contemporary analysts of state- and trans-state capitalism - such as 
Cliff, Harman, Kidron. For these theorists domestic class structures are shaped by competitive inter- 
state relations in the global economy as well as by local elites and the ups and downs of domestic 
class struggle. Skocpol and other "state-centred" theorists cannot afford to admit this, however, 
because doing so would blunt their claim to be offering an analysis of the state which goes beyond 
the "economic reductionism" of Marxism. The result is a failure to engage seriously with Marxist 
accounts of the "relative autonomy" of the state. 
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resolves itself to one of the two previous ones" (Engels, F., "Letter to Schmidt", Engels, F., 1980, 
op. cit., p. 16. 
The abandonment of Keynesian reformism as state policy by all major western governments in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, in response to the global recessions and increasing internationalisation- 
integration of production, finance and trade of these years, in favour of deregulation, deflation, 
privatisation and the "war on welfare", provides a striking recent demonstration of Engels 
argument. In this case, the "law of motion" of the world economy (in its trans-state monopoly 
"stage" of development) has ultimately forced the state system into line with the interests and 
imperatives of an increasingly internationalised capitalist class. These same pressures have, of 
course, broken apart the old Stalinist states of Eastern Europe (Callinicos, A., 1991, The Revenge of 
History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions, Polity Press, Cambridge) and are 
increasingly undermining the social-democratic corporatist state structures of Germany and 
Scandinavia (Callinicos, A., 1994, "Crisis and Class Struggle in Europe Today", International 
Socialism, 2: 63; Callinicos, A., 1997, "Europe - the Mounting Crisis", International Socialism, 
2: 75; Harman, C., 1996, The Economics of the Madhouse: Capitalism and the Market Today, 
Bookmarks, London, pp. 94-7). 
iss Harman, C., 1986, op. cit., pp. 12 and 20. 
186 Molyneux, J., 1995, op. cit., p. 55. 
187 Ibid. 
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